00027432



Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 18 July, 2018

LETTERS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

LETTERS

ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR OF 1870.

27432

BY

'THE TIMES' CORRESPONDENT AT BERLIN.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

PRINTED BY PERMISSION.

LONDON:
TINSLEY BROTHERS, 18 CATHERINE STREET, STRAND.
1871.

[*All rights reserved.*]

00027432

CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.

PAGE

Introductory Remarks 1
The Preliminaries of Peace 14
No Congress 16
Return of the King of Prussia 19
Rearrangements 22
Russia and the United States 28
German Territory demanded by France. The North German Confederacy . 30
The French Demand refused. Austrian International Troubles . . 37
Northern and Southern Germany 43
Annexation 45
Count Bismarck on the Remodelling of Germany 49
Germany, Austria, and Italy 53
The King of Prussia on Annexation 55
Peace 58
The Prussian House of Deputies on Constitutionalism and the War . 59
The Annexation Debate 65
Cost of War 71
The Hanover Nobility Address to the King of Prussia 72
France disavows her Demand of Territory 78
Eastern Agitation 79
The North German Franchise 80
Prussia and Russia 85
Austria and Russia 94
Austria, Russinia, and Russia 100
Turkey, Austria, and Russia 104
Austrian Commercial and Domestic Politics 109
The North German and French Armies 112
Count Bismarck on Schleswig-Holstein, and Napoleon's Influence on the Conduct of the War and the Terms of Peace 113
Count Bismarck on Federal Affairs 120

PAGE
Russia and Austria 128
Russia, Galicia, and Austria 133
France and Germany. The Duke of Coburg and Count Bismarck . . 135
Strategical Railways 137
The Crown Prince of Prussia in the War of 1866 138
King William's Military Fête 150
The 'Almanach de Gotha' for 1867 153
Russia and the East 156
Poland and Germany. 163
The North German Elections 168
The French Demand of Territory in 1866 171
Swiss Misgivings 175
Austria objects to German Unity. Count Bismarck on the Russian Tariff and Police 177
The Zollverein and Austria 180
The French Emperor on German Rearrangements 181
The King of Prussia on German Rearrangements 182
The first North German Federal Parliament 185
Count Bismarck on the North German Federal Constitution . . . 189
Russia and Crete 192
Offensive and defensive Treaties between Prussia and the States of Southern Germany 198
The offensive and defensive Treaties. German Relations to Denmark, Poland, and Holland 199
Crete. The South German Treaties 203
King William's Birthday 205
France and the South German Treaties 207
Crete, Servia, Luxemburg 213
Luxemburg protected 217
France wants Luxemburg. 219
Luxemburg Debate in the German Federal Parliament 222
The Luxemburg Question 226
Luxemburg and the Powers 230
France apparently renounces Luxemburg. German Military Estimates . 233
France prefers fresh Claims 239
Luxemburg and the German Federal Treaties 245
France denies the Right of Prussia to garrison Luxemburg. Austria's Interest in the Preservation of Peace. Napoleon and Spain . . 247
Luxemburg and Austria. Napoleon helps the Enactment of the North German Federal Constitution 254

PAGE
A Luxemburg War imminent 261
The Luxemburg Compromise 264
Mediation and Armaments 270
The Luxemburg Compromise 272
The Luxemburg Conference 276
Military Preparations in France. French Taunts and German Reserve . 281
War again imminent 287
Luxemburg to be evacuated by the Prussians 289
Prussian Utterance on the Luxemburg Conference 293
Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France 297
The King of Prussia alludes to the Contingency of a War with France. A Hanover Conspiracy. Greece cooperating with Russia . . 304
A Panslavonic Meeting at St. Petersburg 308
International Courtesies qualified by Armaments. Russia admonishes Turkey 316
The King of Prussia at Paris. Military, political, and financial Reorganisation of Germany. North Schleswig 321
The Czar's Life attempted by a Pole at Paris 326
Russia and Poland 331
Negotiations in various Quarters 335
Polish and Russian Recriminations 337
Lord Stanley comments on the Luxemburg Guarantee. North Schleswig. The Panslavonic Congress 339
A Servian Government Paper on the Project of a Russo-French Alliance. Napoleon dissatisfied with Russia 342
A Prussian semi-official Organ on Lord Stanley's Explanation of the Luxemburg Guarantee 345
Crete. Bismarck a Doctor of Philosophy 347
Renewed Apprehensions 348
Napoleon's Visit declined. Dano-French Demonstration. Prussian Military Tactics adopted in Southern Germany 354
Napoleon's Journey in Southern Germany 357
The Salzburg Interview 362
Napoleon disappointed at Salzburg. Germany rallies round Prussia . 364
Playing with Fire 372
Reiterated Menaces of War from various Quarters 378
The Crown Prince of Prussia on German Unity 382
Russia profiting by the continued Hostility of France and Germany . 384
Evacuation of Luxemburg 388
Prussian Note on the Salzburg Interview 388

PAGE
A South German Parliament on Unity 390
Why Prussia evacuated Luxemburg 392
Are the South German States to be admitted to the Northern Confederacy only as a whole? 393
The Würtemberg Government on the offensive and defensive Treaty with Prussia 395
Diplomatic, Military, and Parliamentary Schemes 398
A French Threat 400
Salzburg Disclosures. The Bavarian Premier on the Reunion of Northern and Southern Germany 401
The Prusso-Bavarian Alliance and the Munich Peers. 406
Garibaldi's Expedition. Austria's Opinion on the Treaties between Prussia and Southern Germany. Turkey and Germany 407
Garibaldi, Rattazzi, and Napoleon. Germany Military and Zollverein Treaties 410
France and Italy. Bavarian Peers and Würtemberg Radicals objecting to the Prussian Treaties 413
Why Rattazzi invaded the Papal Territory. Count Beust's Paris Despatch 420
Napoleon proposes an Italian Conference. Prussian Treaties ratified by the South German States 425
'Napoleon III. and Europe in 1867' 429
Germany and the French Proposal of a Conference 439
The Conference becomes improbable 442
Italy, Turkey, and Poland 443
The Conference still more improbable 446
M. Rouher's 'Jamais.' Hesse-Darmstadt and the Conference . . . 447
North German Ambassadors. The Waldeck Accession Treaty . . 448
An outspoken Diplomatist 452
A Turkish Minister's Letter on the State of his Country 453
New-Year's Day at the Berlin Palace. Warlike Speculations . . . 458
The September Convention. French Diplomatic Experiments. Russia and Austria at Loggerheads 462
Count Bismarck and the Conservatives 468
Russia the Regenerator of the East 470
Russian Army Reform 475
A Lull at Paris 478
The Count of Paris on the State of Germany 481
The Hanover and Scotch Legions 493
The King of Hanover and Duke of Nassau endowed 494

PAGE
Russia adjourns the Remodelling of the East 496
The Poles, Russians, and Rayahs 497
The Hanover Legion provided with Austrian Passports 496
The South German Armies 500
The Hanover Legion and the Swiss Government 504
American Treaty for the Protection of adopted Citizens 506
Austria charged by Russia with harbouring sinister Designs in regard to Turkey 508
The Hanover Endowment sequestrated 512
Prince Napoleon at Berlin 516
Hanover, Brunswick, and Prussia 518
Prince Napoleon's Errand. The Danes. The Flemings 522
French Overtures to Prussia concerning the East 525
French Overtures. The Austrian National Debt 529
Austria complains of Prussia's Coldness 530
King William's Birthday 532
Poland patronised by France 533
Denmark supported by France and Austria 536
Schleswig. Attempts to sow Disaffection in the new Provinces . . 538
Prussia declines the French Overtures 540
Russian Motives for adjourning the Reorganisation of the East . . 545
The first Customs Parliament of Germany 547
The Political Parties of Germany 551
Austria and the Zollverein. The cis-Leithan Cabinet 558
Political Banquet at Berlin 562
A Napoleonic Pamphlet advocating War 565
Prussia's reserved Attitude. Something is brewing in Galicia . . . 568
General Ducrot surveys the Banks of the Rhine 573
Prince Napoleon at Vienna 574
General Ducrot's Survey. General von Moltke on the Army and Navy Estimates 577
Russia's Action in Turkey and Turkistan 580
Germany, Holland, and Belgium 581
La Marmora's Policy in 1866 584
Germany not disquieted by the continual Recurrence of warlike Symptoms 588
Germany disgusted at the provoking Attitude of France 594
Delicate Relations between Germany and Russia 597
Napoleon's ambiguous Language in addressing his Troops. Heavings in the East 602

PAGE
King William on the Question of the Day 606
King William's Speech 607
Fresh Provocations 610
Austria and France endeavouring to utilise the East 612
Austria utilising Poland 620
Postponement of the Kaiser's Polish Journey 626
Polish Admissions and Servian Complaints concerning the Austro-French Doings in the East 631
Bulgarian Address to Napoleon. Reaction of the Spanish Catastrophe on European Affairs 636
Disarmament. Fresh Polish Disclosures 639
The Czar comments upon the Austrian Idea of utilising Poland. The Action of the Bulgarian Committees suspended. Holland, Denmark, and Sweden assume a more friendly Attitude towards Germany . 645
The North Schleswig Question 650
Count Beust shadowing forth the Contingency of a French-Prussian Collision 652
Count Beust *versus* Lord Stanley 654
Russia's Reply to Count Beust. The German Unity Party begins to stir 658
Another Austrian Minister holds forth on the State of Europe . . . 663
The Russian 'Invalide' on Lord Stanley's Speech 665
Austria charging Prussia with encouraging a Roumanian Unity Movement 666
Count Bismarck's Reply to the Austrian Charge. Explosive Bullet Treaty 669
Count Bismarck on Count Beust and the Chances of Peace in the Autumn of 1868 671
The Cretan Question 674
The East once more taken in hand 677
The Cretan Question 682

LETTERS

ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR OF 1870.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

In the Middle Ages Germany was divided into 1200 independent states. These states were either monarchies or republics, and at the head of all stood the Kaiser.

Similar political subdivisions were then the order of the day in most European countries; but whereas in other lands the local authorities were absorbed by the central power at a comparatively early date, this was a slow process in Germany and Italy. Towards the close of the last century Germany still numbered several hundred states. Even after the overturning of all things incidental to the French wars from 1792 to 1813, there still remained some thirty.

The causes retarding absorption in Germany were manifold. Some arose from peculiarities of the national charac-

ter; others were supplied by history and the geographical position of the land. To no other race does it come so naturally to combine the two epithets 'nearest' and 'dearest' as to the German. When the German devotes himself to a calling, he becomes more indifferent to other branches of human activity than a stranger can well understand. Similarly he loves the house he has inherited, and vastly prefers it to a new and superior edifice; and he clings to his town, his tribe, and his principality, and has only gradually wakened up to a patriotism comprehending his entire country and race. The stability which the local governments derived from this national idiosyncrasy was strengthened by certain events, some of which, being the inevitable result of intellectual progress, bear the impress of a providential destiny, while others to the human eye look like blind chance.

In the beginning of the Middle Ages the theocratic notion, that God has but one spiritual and one secular representative in the universe, prevailed in many Christian lands. The Germans having destroyed the Roman Empire, their king thought it the most natural thing in the world to constitute himself the successor of the ancient universal monarchy. The Pope, in his capacity as the spiritual ruler of the planet, readily supported the claim of the German sovereigns, on condition that their power, then the greatest in Christendom, should be ever at the disposal of the Holy See. To enforce this pretension of general supremacy was of course impossible. Practically, no attempt was made to realise the grand idea, except in Palestine, Italy, and some other countries within easy reach. But even thus restricted, the wish to establish and extend the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic nation—such was the title of the German commonwealth

till the beginning of this century—did irreparable damage. Instead of aiming at the consolidation of their domestic power, the emperors, inspired by the alluring ideal of a catholic ascendancy sanctioned by the Almighty himself, frittered away their resources in perpetual warfare abroad. Instead of aspiring to be real kings of Germany, the desire to be emperors of all Christendom gradually deprived them of the influence legitimately their own. The baneful effects of this policy were enhanced by the peculiar mode of succession to the throne. The multiplicity of states and the independent spirit of their rulers tolerated no hereditary head. The emperors of Germany were elected by and from the princes of Germany. An hereditary dynasty might have acquired large personal possessions and, through them, power; the elected emperor only enjoyed that obedience which his proud vassals voluntarily rendered him. When, ultimately, the House of Austria came to supply an unbroken series of emperors, this no longer benefited the nation. A fearful catastrophe had shaken the very heart of its existence, and the case of Germany had, for a time, become hopeless.

The Reformation undid the nation, at least politically. Modern German history begins at the close of the Thirty Years' War. According to mediæval notions, the outbreak of hostilities found Germany one of the freest, wealthiest, and most populous countries in Europe. By the time peace resulted from general exhaustion, she had become the reverse of her former self. Thanks to the Slavo-Magyaric hosts, thanks to the Spaniards, Italians, and Walloons, a Catholic emperor was enabled to lead against his Protestant countrymen for an entire generation; thanks to the Swedes, who, coming over for religion's sake, stayed with a view to aggrandisement; thanks to the French,

finally, who were delighted to interfere where interference was alike profitable and safe, the severest trials could not be averted from the unfortunate country. Being divided and subdivided again into so many independent states, the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic nation had been never strong as a whole, except when ruled by a sovereign of extraordinary personal qualities, or roused to action by some great soul-stirring impulse. Of the former it was certainly not the good lot of Germany to have many; the latter are necessarily rare in a contemplative land, where the individual is everything, and common action, until lately, has been easily frustrated by differences of opinion, however slight and insignificant in themselves. If in the palmy days of the Germanic parliament and empire their organisation had always tended to render united action difficult, it is easy to imagine what confusion must have been created by civil war arising from religious causes, and waged with all the rude old-fashioned capacity for hatred existing 200 years ago. Broken up into a bewildering variety of territories, and divided by religious controversy, Protestants in that disastrous epoch would carry on a hundred localised wars with Catholics, both falling an easy prey to the foreigner, and struggling in vain against the organised legions of surrounding and consolidated nationalities.

At length Protestantism issued victorious from the terrible feud. The new religion became a recognised fact. Its establishment, however, had cost the country dear. Alsace and Lorraine were torn from the shattered body-politic by France. Pommerania had been declared a good prize by the Swede. The Lutherans in the German provinces of Austria, although forming the majority in most of them before the war, were slain or

forcibly restored to the bosom of an avenging Church. Last, not least, material prosperity and the ancient political and social arrangements were destroyed in nearly every province of the vast but dilapidated realm. Ruin was everywhere. Not liberty alone had fallen; the very classes which, according to the spirit of the time, monopolised liberty as their exclusive privilege, had been exterminated or reduced to beggary in the greater half of the land. The nobility was destroyed or impoverished. The burgher, that tower of freedom in the Middle Ages, had been either bodily killed or despoiled of his estate. Towns were sacked, villages burnt, and whole tracts of country converted into a desert. Never in civilised times had the world seen the like of this war. Leaving Berlin, a thing of recent growth, out of account, this province of Brandenburg, 200 years after the conclusion of peace, was but little more populous than before the fray began. In Thuringia the number of cattle even now does not much exceed the figure it attained 225 years ago. Bohemia, whose natural resources enabled her to recover more rapidly, from being a cradle of culture, has sunk since to the ordinary level of a Royal Imperial Apostolical province. Würtemberg and Hesse lost three-fourths of their inhabitants. Franconia had been so depopulated, that polygamy was made legal. To sum up, two-thirds of the inhabitants of all Germany had perished by the sword, famine, and pestilence, the remainder being reduced to the shadow of its former self.

After this war the imperial power was no more. The Protestant princes and citizens who had so long combated the Catholic emperor, even after the restoration of peace never thought of looking upon themselves as his subjects. If they recognised his position at all, it was a pure for-

mality, and no more. In no war could he count upon their support; in many a one he might be pretty sure of seeing them arrayed against him. The few Catholic princes of any importance left after the Reformation did not scruple to take advantage of the political attitude of their religious adversaries, and likewise accustomed themselves to regard the imperial dignity as a title without a meaning, as a name without any significance attached to it. In their recusancy they were encouraged by the neighbours of Germany, naturally regarding it as in their interest to dissolve the once powerful empire into a heap of small and impotent states, which might be preyed upon with impunity. The unfortunate geographical position of Germany aggravated this state of things. By her situation in the centre of Europe, she had been exposed to attack from all points of the compass during the great civil war; coupled with the internal divisions succeeding the war, this geographical shortcoming made her the theatre of foreign intrigues ever after.

But in the midst of decay the nucleus of a new national power was formed with marvellous rapidity. Catholic Austria had destroyed Germany: Protestant Prussia rebuilt the ruined polity. Since the war, the intellectual and political leadership of Germany was transferred to the Reformed section of society. It made of Prussia an efficient instrument for the fulfilment of its mission. A series of sovereigns of uncommon gifts, together with the solid character of their subjects, opportunely contributed to create the centre of a new and rising state at Berlin. Step by step Prussia rose, while Austria sank. Shut out by a rigid Catholicism from all participation in the intellectual life of the race, Austria gradually ceased to be a German state, and became subservient to the in-

creasing influence of her Slavonic and Magyar subjects. Prussia, on the other hand, led the way to the literary, military, and economical revival of Germany, giving her kings, warriors, writers, and an administration that have made her name respected in the world.

When, in the beginning of this century, amid the blows which Napoleon I. dealt out against disunited Germany, the Austro-German Emperor became tired of his nominal dignity, and resigned his useless title altogether, many patriots proposed that the vacated place should be occupied by Prussia. Showing herself worthy of the honour involved in this suggestion, Prussia was the first of all German states to take up arms against the victorious invader, and the most energetic in beating and defeating him. On the restoration of peace she, however, had to content herself with an increase of territory, her elevation to the imperial chair being prevented by the resistance of Austria and some other powers. Germany was now formed into a confederacy, nominally presided over by Austria, but leaving every one of her princes completely independent, except in case of foreign attack, when they were obliged to unite against the foe.

Since then—that is, since the year 1815—the most enlightened patriots of Germany have never ceased to recommend a reunion of her different states under a common head. The movement mainly originated with the liberal party, who, while asking for unity, were equally intent upon securing constitutional government. These two demands being popularly considered as inseparable, for a time arrayed all German governments against them. Though some might not have objected to unity, all were equally opposed to the adoption of the constitutional regime. On the one hand, parliamentarism had been rendered hate-

ful by the incessant commotions it created in France; on the other, the bureaucratic system, invented and organised in Germany, upon the whole, worked exceedingly well. Throwing open the official career to every qualified man as it did, and grounded upon justice and integrity as it was, the system had developed the moral, intellectual, and pecuniary resources of the country in a very effective way. To supersede it by parliamentarism, in the eyes of the governments, was to replace order by disorder, and make the multitude paramount, instead of the king and his efficient staff. Hence all the German governments —and among them the Prussian—at first declared against the unity movement.

However much the Prussian Government might have been benefited by one of the aims of the liberal party, it did not approve of the other; and urgently as it was invited to assume the leadership of the nation, principle forbade acceptance of the alluring prize, while clogged with what then appeared an immoral and irrational form of government. Some time had to elapse before the Prussian Government modified its views. At last it realised the advisability of yielding to the demands of the age. A Prussian Parliament was formed, and a compromise arrived at between the constitutional and bureaucratic systems. With this innovation, adopted in 1848, the impediment which had so long stood in the way of Prussia's seconding the unity party was removed. On March 28th, 1849, King Frederick William IV. was elected Emperor of Germany by the German Parliament convened to satisfy the ardent desires of the people. But the constitutionalism which he was to accept along with the new crown being too democratic, and very different from the Prussian pattern, the King declined the honour. When subse-

quently attempting to promote unity without the assistance of the liberal party, his endeavours were frustrated by the opposition of Austria, Russia, and many among the minor sovereigns. His failure is marked by the historical day of Olmütz, the 29th November 1850—the day when Herr von Manteuffel, the Prussian premier, had to appear at the Moravian fortress, to promise to the Austrian minister, Prince Schwartzenberg, that he would give up all idea of reforming the old Bund.

Warned by the narrow escape she had had, Austria, a little later, herself undertook to satisfy the popular desire for unity. But she was even less fortunate than Prussia. Not only were the minor princes quite as antagonistic to her as they had been to the Berlin Government, but her plans were wrecked from their inherent impracticability. The Austrian Government could have no intention to place its German provinces under a central German government, and thus sever them from its Magyar and Polish territories; while as to the latter being incorporated into Germany, neither the Germans, nor the Magyars, nor the Poles would have consented to it. Under these circumstances, the Germans looked upon the Austrian doings as an attempt to discover the quadrature of the circle. After a little while, the King of Prussia's declaration, that he would not even consider the plan, caused it to evaporate into thin air.

A determined Prussian king and a courageous Prussian minister were destined to put an end to the state of suspense which now supervened. On January 2d, 1861, William I. ascended the throne of Prussia; on September 23d, 1862, he appointed Count Bismarck his Minister of Foreign Affairs. The King had resolved to wipe out the memory of Olmütz; the minister possessed the talent and

the energy to undertake this commission in the teeth of great difficulties. A foreign complication, which for several years past had roused the ire of all political parties in Germany, furnished him an opportunity. On November 15th, 1863, died King Frederick VII. of Denmark. With him the male line of the Danish dynasty became extinct. This dynasty having been originally transplanted from Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, had retained the sceptre of the former when it acquired the latter. Upon its male line becoming extinct, Denmark legitimately reverted to the last female relative of the deceased king, while Schleswig-Holstein ought to have fallen to a branch of the ducal house which had never left the old country. For whereas a woman may reign in Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, as all other German countries, is under the Salic law. The Danes wishing to prevent the severance of the duchies from the kingdom, adopted the expedient of setting aside the last female relative of their king, and wanted to make him their sovereign upon whom the duchies legally devolved. But Duke Christian of Schleswig-Holstein, the heir of the duchies, having, in the anti-Danish agitation which had already begun in those northern parts, evinced a marked German bias, was hardly qualified to be king of Denmark. His brothers alike declining, a cousin of theirs, also a Duke Christian of Schleswig-Holstein, was elected by the Danes successor to the throne of Denmark *and* the duchies, and approved by the Powers. The better to insure success, the Danes likewise began to force their language upon the German inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein.

Germany felt deeply offended by these proceedings. A few words will explain her views. A foreign state would not allow a German country to revert to a German ruler, but keep it under its own sway. To secure this

object, the legitimate heir to a German country had been superseded, and the German language suppressed on the very frontiers of Prussia. That about one-sixth of the inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein were Danes, the Germans admitted; but they did not think it right that the political destinies of the other five-sixths, who are Germans, should be swayed by this small minority. In the eyes of the Germans, the Danish proceedings constituted an injury which, more than anything else, proved the imperativeness of uniting their forces and making a common stand against adversaries. The mere announcement of their plan by the Danes brought on the three campaigns of 1848, 1849, 1850. They had no result. Austria secretly acting against Prussia, who, she was afraid, would claim the duchies when conquered, this enabled some other powers to call Germany to order. Thus when the King of Denmark died in 1863, his elected successor ascended the throne of Denmark and the Duchies. Now the moment of action had arrived for Prussia.

Prussia at once advised Austria of her intention to declare war against Denmark, and save Schleswig-Holstein for Germany. Austria, to prevent Schleswig-Holstein from falling into the hands of Prussia, much against her will, had to submit to the painful necessity of likewise waging war with Denmark. Victory was not long in proclaiming itself on the side of Germany. Denmark defeated, Prussia demanded of the legitimate heir of Schleswig-Holstein that he should concede to her the right of garrisoning certain fortresses and ports. The reason alleged for this was, that in the event of another attack, the defence of the duchies, from their geographical contiguity to Prussia, would mainly fall to her lot. The Duke of Schleswig-Holstein refused to accede to this request. Austria and the minor states,

seeing in the Prussian demand the first step towards Prussia's realising her unity programme, supported the duke. The controversy soon waxed hot, and eventually brought on the war of 1866, when Prussia, aided by some sovereigns of northern and central Germany, defeated Austria and the southern states.

A thorough rearrangement of Germany ensued. Prussia formed the states of northern Germany into a confederation, whose executive was entirely in her own hands. The southern states were left to themselves, but bound to Prussia by offensive and defensive treaties. Austria having but a small minority of German subjects by the side of many millions of foreigners, had to renounce her constitutional connection with Germany. In all German states the liberals approved this sweeping reform, although the prerogative of the new Federal parliament was more restricted than had been anticipated. At the same time, it was more comprehensive than what would have been conceded twenty years ago.

Napoleon III. not only tolerated the war of 1866, but actually encouraged Prussia, as well as Austria—the two principal adversaries—to engage in it. He meant to play the umpire, and, when the combatants had weakened themselves in the strife, rearrange Germany to suit his own interests. The rapidity and completeness of the Prussian success deprived him of this opening.

The four years that have since elapsed Napoleon has spent in seeking alliances against Prussia. He found none. However numerous Prussia's ill-wishers, she had become too formidable to be inconsiderately attacked. Napoleon convinced himself that only after inflicting a telling blow upon Prussia could he hope for the assistance of her enemies to finish her. So he unsheathed his sword. He

has lost his army and his throne before the friends he counted upon could come to the rescue. Once more Prussia's success has been too prompt and too perfect to allow of foreign interference.

The following letters chiefly treat of Napoleon's attempts to find alliances against this government, and of the remarkable reaction his incessant angling for partners had on the relations between the various continental states. Many of the questions which have arisen in consequence of this prolonged diplomatic agitation are still pending: on their decision partly depends the future of Europe. To these letters are added others on the international complications which have supervened in the course of the war; and again some on such military and domestic affairs as have affected the course of European politics. The letters have been carefully revised. Being selected from a much larger number contributed to the *Times*, explanatory passages had sometimes to be inserted.

Berlin, February 1871.

THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE.

On August 3d, 1866, the *Gazette* of Vienna published the following text of the Preliminaries of Peace:

'Treaty of Preliminary Peace.

Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria and King of Prussia, animated with the desire of restoring to their countries the benefits of peace, have, with that view, and in order to fix the preliminaries of peace, named Plenipotentiaries, viz.

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, Count Aloysius Karolyi and Baron Adolph von Brenner Felsach.

And his Majesty the King of Prussia, his President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Otho, Count von Bismarck-Schönhausen, who, after having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed on the following fundamental acts, as bases of the peace to be concluded without delay:

Art. I. With the exception of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, the territory of the Austrian monarchy remains intact. His Majesty the King of Prussia engages to withdraw his troops from the Austrian territories occupied by them, after peace is concluded, under reserve of the arrangements to be made at the time of the definite conclusion of peace for the guarantee of the payment of the war indemnity.

Art. II. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria recognises the dissolution of the Germanic Confederation such as it has hitherto existed, and gives his assent to a new organisation of Germany without the participation of the Empire of Austria. His Majesty promises equally to recognise the closer union which will be founded by his Majesty the King of Prussia to the north of the line of the Main, and declares his consent to the German States south of that line contracting a union, whose national bonds with the Confederation of North Germany will be the object of an ulterior understanding between the two parties.

Art. III. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria transfers to his Majesty the King of Prussia all the rights which the Peace of Vienna of October 20th, 1864, had recognised in him over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, with this reserve, that the population of the northern districts of Schleswig will be anew united to Denmark, if they express the desire of a freely given vote.

Art. IV. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria engages to pay to his Majesty the King of Prussia the sum of forty millions of thalers, to cover a portion of the expense which the war has occasioned to Prussia; but from this sum is to be deducted the amount of the indemnity for war expenses which his Majesty the Emperor of Austria has still the right of exacting from the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, in virtue of Art. 12 of the Treaty of Peace of October 20th, 1864, before cited, say fifteen millions of thalers, besides five millions as the equivalent of the expense of maintaining the Prussian army borne by the countries of Austria occupied by that army until the conclusion of peace.

Art. V. Conformably to the desire expressed by his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, his Majesty the King of Prussia declares himself ready to leave subsisting, at the time of the modifications which must take place in Germany, the territorial condition of the kingdom of Saxony in its actual extent, reserving to himself, on the other hand, to regulate in detail, by a special treaty of peace with his Majesty the King of Saxony, the questions relative to the share of Saxony in the expenses of the war, as well as the future position of the kingdom of Saxony in the Confederation of the north of Germany.

On the other hand, his Majesty the Emperor of Austria promises to recognise the new organisation which the King of Prussia will establish in the north of Germany, including the territorial modifications which will be the consequence of it.

Art. VI. His Majesty the King of Prussia engages to decide his Majesty the King of Italy, his ally, to give his approbation to the preliminaries of peace, and to the armistice based on these preliminaries, from the time that, by a declaration of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, the Venetian kingdom shall have been put at the disposal of his Majesty the King of Italy.

Art. VII. The ratifications of the present Convention will be exchanged at Nikolsburg in the space of two days at latest.

Art. VIII. As soon as the ratification of the present Convention shall have been effected and exchanged, their Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia will name plenipotentiaries, who will meet in a place to be afterwards agreed on to conclude peace upon the basis of the present preliminary treaty, and agree upon the conditions of detail.

Art. IX. To this effect the contracting states, after having settled these preliminaries, will conclude for the Austrian and Saxon armies on the one part, and the Prussian army on the other part, an armistice whose detailed conditions in a military point of view will be immediately fixed. That armistice will date from the 2d of August, the day to which the present suspension of arms will be prolonged.

An armistice will be at the same time concluded here with Bavaria, and General Manteuffel will be charged to conclude with the kingdom of Würtemberg and the Grand Duchies of Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt,

after these states propose it, an armistice commencing the 2d of August, and based upon the state of military possession of the moment.

In testimony of which the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention, and affixed to it the seal of their arms.

Done at Nikolsburg the 26th day of July 1866.

KAROLYI, M.P.
BRENNER, M.P.
BISMARCK, M.P.'

NO CONGRESS.

Berlin, August 4th, 1866.

In reply to a Russian suggestion, that the redivision of Germany should be made the subject of common deliberation at a European congress, Prussia has declined to entertain any proposal of the kind. If she is to attend a congress at all, it must be convened for the avowed purpose of taking note of and sanctioning, as it were, whatever changes she may have previously worked out on her own responsibility. The fugitive princes may dispatch letters and ambassadors to all points of the compass, but will not change this determination of their victorious and confident foe. It could be only in case of a new war and a series of signal reverses in the field that Prussia would abate her claims on this head. Neighbours will soon perceive that mere remonstrance will not induce this government to renounce what it believes it has a right to consider the legitimate fruits of its victory. Strong by success in the field, and the sympathies of a large part of Germany, that looks upon her as the state from which the long-cherished boon of unity will proceed, Prussia is not likely to yield to wordy recriminations or the pressure of international advice. After what has occurred, her military self-respect and the grand national object of her policy render timidity on her part alike improbable.

Regarding the preliminaries of peace as drawn up at

Nikolsburg, we have been officially informed that Austria consents to renounce all permanent connection with both the northern and southern confederacies, recognising at the same time any territorial changes Prussia may think fit to enforce in northern Germany. This is as much as to say that, with the exception of Saxony, protected by a special proviso, all the northern states that have been at war with Prussia may be embodied by the latter, as far as Austria is concerned. Southern conquests, however, might be opposed by Austria, were they at all coveted by Prussia. The northern and southern confederacy are to regulate their mutual relations as they please. This, if the people are determined, will one day be admitted by Austria to imply that the two confederacies may be merged into one.

Even now a conversion to sensible politics is becoming more and more manifest among the people of the south. In every part of Baden votes are being passed by the wealthy and intelligent classes to protest against the splitting Germany in twain. In Würtemberg, the moderate liberal party are, for the same purpose, circulating an address to the King, which has been covered with the signatures of the most respectable citizens at Ulm, Heilbronn, Tübingen, Reutlingen, Urach, Blaubeuren, &c. The following passage will supply the burden of the whole:

'The only choice we have is between joining the new confederacy already established by Prussia, or becoming members of the other political body, which is to be created under Bavarian auspices. We all know that the idea of a separate South German League originates with that very power which for centuries past has been the hereditary enemy of Germany. France, being unable to prevent North Germany from becoming a united commonwealth, endeavours to keep at least Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and a portion of Darmstadt out of the union. Austria, defeated at Sadowa, would not have been strong enough to make this condition enter into the preliminaries of peace. It was France, whose ambassador, Benedetti, when he visited the King at Nikolsburg, forced it upon him by a menace of armed interference. France, wishing to keep Germany weak, insisted upon dividing her into two halves, when she could no longer

hope to maintain the old miserable arrangements, by which the country was broken up into a large number of independent states. It is obvious that the South German League, were it ever to become a reality, would be too weak to protect its citizens, or to pursue an independent policy in accordance with their interests. Cut off from all access to the sea, its commerce would be crippled and dependent upon the favour of adjacent states; deprived of all political connection with the Northern Confederation, it would be estranged from it in literature, religion, and intellectual progress; and thus entirely dissevered from its brethren, and dissatisfied with its own condition, it would become a prey to factions, and a plaything in the hands of the foreigner. And why should the sovereigns of Baden, Würtemberg, and Darmstadt be subjected to Bavarian supremacy, when Bavaria would be wholly unable to shield them from foreign attack? The interests of those sovereigns, no less than of their subjects, imperatively demands that the abominable French invention of a separate southern confederacy be repudiated, and the original Prussian proposal of a common parliament for northern and southern Germany be acceded to at once.'

Count Bismarck has just sent away the southern officials employed at Frankfort in controlling the common accounts of the Zollverein. The Zollverein, they were given to understand, being dissolved by the war, there was no longer any occasion for their continuing their functions. Steps were taken at the same time to establish custom-houses on the northern frontiers of Baden and Darmstadt. If this is more than a threat, it will greatly disquiet people on the other side of the fluvial line of division, and proportionately add to the pro-Prussian movement. Not to speak of the great variety of southern articles which have found a profitable market in the north for the forty years the Zollverein has existed, the quantity of Bavarian beer ordinarily exported to Prussia is so great, that the stoppage of intercourse consequent upon the war has lowered the wholesale price of this refreshing beverage by nearly one-half at Munich and Nüremberg. But the sale of vast quantities of goods was not the only advantage the southern states derived from the Zollverein. They also had a greater share in the common receipts than was justified by the consumption of their inhabitants.

The 4,700,000 Bavarians, for instance, want much less sugar, coffee, and other articles paying duty than an equal number of Northerners, so that, were the revenues of the Zollverein distributed among the several states according to the consumption, instead of the number, of the inhabitants, as is actually the case, this one southern kingdom would find its income diminished by 3,000,000 thalers a year. If the Zollverein is dissolved, the Southerners will have to tax themselves to make up for the deficit in their several exchequers.

RETURN OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

Berlin, August 5, 1866.

LAST night, at half-past ten, the King alighted at the Silesian Railway terminus. At the moment of his stepping out of the carriage, he was embraced by the Queen, who, with the ladies and gentlemen of the court, had been awaiting the return of her royal husband on the platform. While the first salutations were being exchanged between their Majesties, twelve young ladies in white silk, with wreaths of corn flowers in their hair, scattered roses before the feet of the returning victors. A brilliant array of generals, ministers, and other civil and clerical dignitaries encompassed the principal actors in the scene. It was a moving spectacle. The illuminations shed floods of light, the cannon roared, and the strains of the national anthem rose gloriously over the thousands of privileged spectators pressing round the official circle. In another moment Count Bismarck, in the uniform of a major in the Landwehr Cuirassiers, left the royal carriage. Jubilant hurrahs received the able and courageous minister, who, with friends thronging forward to shake hands, and wife

and children claiming his first attention, found himself immediately surrounded by a dense crowd of eager and sincere well-wishers. General Moltke, the military hero of the war, equally aroused the enthusiasm of his numerous admirers. With him were noticed Generals Roon, Boyen, Alvensleben, Podbielski, and a numerous suite of colonels and adjutants, together with the military *attachés* of the French, Italian, and Russian Embassies. When the King entered his carriage to drive home, one of the young ladies presented him a congratulatory poem, on a velvet cushion, which was most graciously received, and elicited a few grateful words in return. By the side of the King, who was in an open *calèche*, sat the Crown Prince. The Queen, whose health does not admit of her exposing herself to the night air, drove in a close carriage, followed by hundreds of equipages, containing the new arrivals and those who had come to greet them. As the royal personages flashed past the thousands assembled in the streets along their line of route, hurrah succeeded hurrah all the way from the eastern suburbs of the town to the palace.

Midnight was drawing near when the King, now again at home in his family, as well as in his country, appeared on the balcony of the palace. Then arose the 'Preussen Lied' from amid the people on the square in front, and being taken up in ever-widening circles, it was at length sung by the 30,000 or 40,000 there assembled. The King returned thanks; but though those who were near enough to see that he wished to speak were silent, the more distant continued singing, and there was no chance of catching a word. The Queen, the Crown Prince, and Prince Carl also showed themselves on the balcony, acknowledging the salutations of the public.

To-day, at noon, after a solemn service in the cathedral, attended by the King, Queen, and entire royal family, the session of Parliament was opened with the usual

ceremonies. Sunday was especially chosen for the act, to impart to it a religious sanctity after the signal triumphs obtained. As is customary, the ceremony took place in the White Hall of the Old Palace. Count Bismarck, in his military uniform, which he had never before been seen to wear on a similar occasion, stood on the left of the King, with the other ministers beside him. The Queen, Princess Carl, Princess Friedrich Carl, and the Grand Duchess Dowager of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, a sister of the King, were present in the royal gallery, while a long row of aristocratic ladies adorned the seats appropriated to them. Lords and members mustered in full number, and by their animated appearance testified their sympathy in the proceedings.

Nor did the speech from the throne disappoint the expectations raised by the promising state of politics. The King, who entered with the Crown Prince and the other princes of the house, received the pregnant manuscript from the hands of his Premier, and read it aloud with a firm and sonorous voice. His Majesty began by thanking God for the victory accorded to his arms. He hoped that the results of the campaign would redound to the permanent benefit of the country, and pave the way for the attainment of the national objects of Germany. Then passing on to domestic affairs, he briefly commented on the constitutional controversy that had been going on before the war, and accounting for the irregular military expenditure by a reference to the necessities of the time, asked for a bill of indemnity. His Majesty's words—sober and unpretending as ever—were received with loud applause. As the royal speech, so was the attitude of the House: business-like, and without the slightest tinge of an elation which might have been pardonable in the first flush of a brilliant success. Modesty in Germany is a plant of genuine growth. Being deeply sensible how much care and industry are required to attain any object in life, and how

much, after all, depends on those external circumstances which control the progress of earthly events, Germans as a rule are not very prone to exult in their own achievements. As a hard-working and reflective nation, they have realised what truth there is in the old adage about the φθόνος θεῶν: the difficulty of doing anything well in a world abounding in checks and counter-checks, and of repeating it successfully, even when once accomplished.

The Crown Princess, being in deep mourning for her infant son, did not leave Heringsdorf to attend the solemnities. Her royal husband this morning went to Potsdam to the grave of his lost child, who died while his father was absent in the war. To-morrow he repairs to the seaside, whence he intends to accompany his consort to some Silesian château.

REARRANGEMENTS.

Berlin, August 8, 1866.

ALTHOUGH by an act divulged but five weeks ago, and not as yet publicly revoked, Venice devolved upon France, Austria seems to consider the devoted province still her own. At any rate, in the pending negotiations she has preferred a claim for a pecuniary indemnity, if consenting to its embodiment with Italy. This demand being contrary to the preliminaries signed at Nikolsburg, in which the Emperor of the French is represented as the owner of Venice, and peace rendered dependent upon its being 'placed at the disposal of the King of Italy,' the matter has been referred by this Government to Napoleon III. for decision. It is hoped that it will be settled according to the preliminaries, in which case the instrument of peace will be probably completed in a few days.

The final arrangement with the minor States which have been at war with Prussia will occasion more serious

difficulties. Though Austria in the above preliminaries engaged to recognise whatever territorial changes Prussia might be pleased to enforce this side the river Main, so long as the Kingdom of Saxony is not touched, it does not follow that she is particularly eager to see the rest of the conquered States and provinces swallowed up by her rival. Indeed, in common with the dethroned sovereigns of Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, &c., and aided by some of the southern princes, she is trying hard, even at the last gasp, to cause the Emperor Napoleon to interfere in behalf of the imperilled existence of her minor friends. If she cannot preserve them their entire territories, she is now urging at Paris that their names at least should be perpetuated on the sovereign list. If the King of Hanover cannot be maintained in the unimpaired enjoyment of his sovereignty, she wishes to secure him a portion of his former domains; let the rest fall to Prussia if Fate so decrees. In like manner she interests herself in the other expelled potentates. Prussia having at Nikolsburg obtained Austria's assent to any territorial changes, has no occasion to communicate with her any longer upon this subject. In reply, however, to the incessant applications from Paris, she has not thought it superfluous to intimate her resolve to embody the whole of the conquered principalities, not returning any part of their territory to the former owners. So there will probably be an end of the matter.

In all this Austria now openly pursues the policy which, in former stages of her long opposition to this Government, she found it convenient to cloak under professed sympathies with 'the independence and prosperity of the minor States.' She simply aims at the division of Fatherland, not, indeed, from any hostility to the latter, but because its reunion can be effected only by Prussia, her traditional rival. That this was the sole design and purpose of her doings at the Bund for generations past is

now very candidly avowed by the Vienna *Volksfreund*, the organ of Cardinal Rauscher, or, what is pretty much the same thing, of the leading personages at court. 'Our interests,' says the Ultramontane paper, 'now clearly bid us confine the power of Germany within reasonable limits. It is plain that our policy in this respect must be identical with that of France.' Identical with that of France! Identical with the interest of a country whose ascendancy in continental affairs has for the last two centuries been founded upon the division of Germany! Confessions like these will soon complete the work of the present war, by driving the Southern States into the Prussian camp. The leading Ministers of the four Southern States at war with Prussia have either already arrived or are on their way to Berlin to settle the terms of peace. Saxony, the only Northern State still at war with this country, having vainly endeavoured to get a representative admitted to the negotiations with Austria, which are to be carried on at Prague, is expected to make the best of a bad bargain, and send an Envoy to Berlin notwithstanding. The King of Hanover, who is charged by this government with treachery, having, it is asserted, promised to succour them, when he had already settled with Austria, and never meant to abandon her, a few days ago offered to resign in favour of his son, if that could preserve the dynasty; but his propositions were negatived.

An exceptional position is claimed by the King of Holland in his capacity of Grand Duke of Luxemburg and Limburg. In the war he declared for neither party, nor have his future intentions been inquired into now that hostilities are over. In the mean time, Luxemburg, the capital of the grand duchy, and a fortress of some pretensions, remains garrisoned by Prussia as formerly, the right of this Government to keep the place being derived not, it is said, from the Federal treaties, which are extinct, but from the Act of the Vienna Congress of 1815.

The Parliaments of Altenburg and Schwarzburg-Sondershausen have ratified the treaties providing for the transference of their military and diplomatic business to Prussia. All over the North people are cordially agreed as to the expediency of recognising the results of the campaign, and adopting the Bismarck programme. The south, too, is becoming more and more alive to the policy of such a course, and, wherever the priests or republicans have not the upper hand, demands speedy reunion with the Northern Confederacy. An address to the King of Würtemberg, advocating these views has been covered with the signatures of leading citizens in sixty-four towns of the kingdom. Even in Bavaria the municipalities of Nüremberg, Augsburg, Kempten, Memmingen, and other important towns, have petitioned their sovereigns for the like purpose. The manufacturers of Offenbach and other towns in Southern Hesse, fearing that the dissolution of the Zollverein will follow on the heels of political division, stoutly protest against the idea of their being shut out from the north, and ruined merely to perpetuate the existence of their duchy. Their wishes are sure to meet with a hearing in course of time, though for the present they may not be entirely fulfilled. At the annual meeting of the Society of Political Economists, a most influential body, which assembled the other day at Brunswick, it was resolved that, should it be impossible to effect the political reunion of Northern and Southern Germany at once, the Prussian Government would do well to maintain the Zollverein nevertheless, and establish a special Zollverein Parliament to keep up the connection between the two halves of the nation, and prepare that consummation of unity which is now only a question of time. Possibly its advice may be taken.

The address of the Berlin town-council, presented to his Royal Highness the Crown Prince the day after his return from the theatre of war, runs as follows:

'Most illustrious Crown Prince,—May it please your Royal Highness, the burgomasters and town-council of Berlin take the liberty of welcoming your Royal Highness home, on your return from the field. The call of duty had hardly summoned your Royal Highness from your happy family circle when your heart was torn by the melancholy news of the death of a beloved son. The inhabitants of this city, cordially sympathising with the royal family in their hours of sorrow as well as of joy, felt the deepest concern in the grief of an illustrious couple who, having so long enjoyed the unalloyed blessings of the connubial state, were now visited by so severe a blow. The absence of your Royal Highness heightened our regrets at this afflicting trial, and we were deeply moved at witnessing her Majesty the Queen hastening to the camp to comfort her sorrowing son with the consolations suggested by her true mother's heart.

Stern necessity did not permit your Royal Highness to indulge your grief amid the din of battle. Of you, as one of the foremost generals in our army, an unclouded brow, a resolute will, and the fullest devotion to the duties of your martial calling were required at that hour. Entirely giving yourself up to the demands of the moment, your Royal Highness proved a genuine Hohenzollern; and your sacrifice was rewarded by the brilliant successes of the second army under your command, and the highest military decoration which his Majesty himself handed to his victorious son at the close of the decisive battle.

Most gracious lord, we are proud to see the heir of this kingdom contributing by his deeds to the extension of its frontier in the righteous cause of German unity. As our hopes of German unity are dependent on the strength of Prussia, we, in common with your Royal Highness, were highly gratified at finding our old military prowess revived in the exigencies of war, and augur a prosperous future from the increase of our force, as provided for in the preliminaries of peace. Though we knew we could not hope to effect the reorganisation of Fatherland unless Austria were expelled from our national body politic, still, had it been possible in any other way to dissolve the ties that bound us to Austria, war would never have been advocated by us. But as nothing remained but an appeal to the sword, what satisfaction must it have given to your Royal Highness to lend your aid in dealing the decisive blow!

May your Royal Highness, on returning to the avocations of peace, derive unmingled joy from the remembrance of those glorious days! May the painful recollections inseparable from war and its attendant evils be merged in the consciousness of the historical importance of the actions your Royal Highness was called upon to perform for the honour and power of Prussia, and for the national future of Germany!

We subscribe ourselves your Royal Highness's most loyal and obedient,

BURGOMASTER AND TOWN-COUNCIL OF BERLIN.

Berlin, August 5.'

His Royal Highness, who seemed deeply moved, returned the following reply:

'Gentlemen,—Receive my sincerest thanks for congratulating me, in behalf of this capital, on my return from the field. As a father, I was severely afflicted by the decease of a beloved child; as a general, I had to attend to the duties of my command. Deeply did I feel my inability to hurry home and support my wife on this trying occasion; but I had to do violence to my feelings, and deny myself the mournful privilege of closing the eyes of the dear departed one. I was fortunate enough to lead the army under my command through a series of victories to a great success. The conviction of having helped to secure for Prussia that position which history has allotted to her, and contributed to the national reconstruction of our German Fatherland, will ever brighten my path. With God's gracious assistance, I am indebted for it to those generals whom the King had placed by my side, as also to the intelligence, the courage, the unexampled gallantry of the officers and soldiers under my command. You are aware what heavy sacrifices have been entailed by the war. Let us hope that in the course of a long and honourable peace we shall heal the wounds inflicted. Berlin, ever munificent in its charities, has distinguished itself in a most patriotic manner by its efforts in behalf of the wounded and the support of widows and orphans. For this beneficent generosity receive my heartfelt thanks, which I beg you to communicate to your fellow-citizens.'

Another address to the King is the first of the kind the town-council have voted since the occurrence of the constitutional differences. The more, then, have we to congratulate the King that, reciprocating the confidence of his capital, he, two hours after the presentation of the conciliatory address, virtually restored in his speech from the throne the so-long-disputed prerogative of Parliament. The day after, on his Majesty attending the state performance in the opera-house, he was received with shouts of applause. Those hurrahs really came from the heart, and direct to the King's heart they went. Finding himself the object of such an enthusiastic ovation as had been rarely witnessed in this sober and self-possessed capital, the King stepped forward to the front of his box, wishing to return thanks; but before he could speak, his emotion overcame him, tears filled his eyes, and, after a word or two, unheard by the audience, he retired into the background.

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES.

August 10, 1866.

THE visit of the American vessels, the Miantonomoh and her consort the Augusta, to the Baltic has been made the occasion of an interchange of courtesies between the Russian and United States authorities. The American ships were met on the 6th inst., and escorted to Cronstadt by the Russian squadron of armoured ships; and after they had anchored in the smaller harbour they were visited by Rear-Admiral Lessovsky; and subsequently Mr. G. V. Fox, Assistant-Secretary of the United States navy, accompanied by the commanders of the Augusta and the Miantonomoh, paid a visit to the Port-Admiral Novossilsky. The next day the American Monitor was inspected by the Russian officers, to whom the actual working of the turrets and their armament was practically explained. In the evening a grand banquet was given in the hall of the Naval Club at Cronstadt, at which expressions of friendly regard were interchanged between the Americans and their hosts. On the 8th, the United States' Extraordinary Commissioners, accompanied by General Clay, the American minister, had an interview, at the palace of Peterhof, with the Emperor, to whom they presented the following address:

'Sire,—The resolution which I have the honour of presenting to your Imperial Majesty is the voice of a people whose millions of lips speak from a single heart.

The many ties which have long bound together the great empire of the East and the great republic of the West have been multiplied and strengthened by the unwavering fidelity of the imperial government to our own throughout its recent period of convulsion. The words of sympathy and friendship then addressed to the Government at Washington, by command of your Imperial Majesty, are fixed in the eternal remembrance of a grateful country.

As one of the wide family of nations, we yield our willing homage

to that noble act of humanity which is especially referred to in the resolution of Congress. The peaceful edict of an enlightened sovereign has consummated a triumph over an inherited barbarism which our western republic has only reached through long years of bloodshed.

It is therefore with profound emotion that I offer to your Imperial Majesty, to the emancipated subjects, to all the people of this vast realm, our heartfelt congratulations upon the providential escape from danger which led to this spontaneous expression of regret for the attempt, and thankfulness for its merciful arrest and failure.

The story of the peril from which a kind Providence has delivered your Imperial Majesty brings with it the remembrance of the mighty sorrow which so lately filled every loyal heart in our own land at the sudden loss of our chief, our guide, our father.

We thank God that a grief like this was spared to our friends and allies, the Russian people.

May the Father of all nations and all rulers protect, prolong, and bless the life which He has so signally preserved, for the service of the people to which it belongs, for the good of mankind, and the glory of His holy name.

G. V. Fox, Assistant-Secretary of Navy.'

The Emperor was expected to pay a visit to the Miantonomoh on the following day; and on the 10th a grand banquet was to be given at the town-hall by the citizens of Cronstadt to the American civil and naval officers.

GERMAN TERRITORY DEMANDED BY FRANCE. THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERACY.

Berlin, August 11, 1866.

THE statement of the Paris *Siècle*, that the French Government have mooted the question of the frontiers of 1814, is correct. Three days ago, M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador here, told Count Bismarck, that the war having resulted in considerable aggrandisement to this dynasty, he was instructed to urge the propriety of awarding some territorial compensation to France. Count Bismarck, after taking the pleasure of the King, and conferring with his colleagues, replied that this Cabinet would not cede an inch of German soil, while in a position to defend it. Here the matter rests for the present.

The answer of the Count, as it is in consonance with the demands of national honour and self-respect, is likewise in keeping with the dearest interests of the Government he represents. While vindicating the integrity of the national soil, he may hope to have all Germany to back him, the south no less than the north; but were he to give up so much as the smallest slice of German ground, he would be regarded as a mere dynastic intriguer, and rank with Austria, whose most influential organs are now advertising the alleged intention of the Imperial Government to make common cause with Napoleon III., to damage Germany, and exalt the House of Hapsburg at the expense of the nation it proceeds from. Bismarck's main resource in withstanding Kaiser and Emperor lies in unfurling the national standard, and constituting himself champion of the long-neglected Fatherland. As matters now stand, were Prussia attacked by her enemies, the ready organised regiments at her disposal might not indeed be numerous enough to render her victorious in a first campaign, considering she would have to fight two military empires at the same

time. But even the united power of France and Austria would scarcely suffice to conquer her, while her policy remains one with the aims and instincts of the nation. No petty potentate in such a case could dare declare against her. There would be a general uprising in every minor state to protect not Prussia, but the Germany of which she is an integral part; and would not the dissatisfied provinces of Hungary, Bohemia, and Croatia be remorselessly set on fire, and hounded against their Government, were it to join France in an anti-German enterprise?

The final issue of the struggle could be hardly doubtful. France has long enjoyed excessive power, because of the division of Germany. In this she has only availed herself of her opportunities, and we have no wish to rake up invidious recollections from a distant past. But should she try to prolong this state of things beyond its natural term, and open a sanguinary campaign merely to gratify les Zouaves de la Garde, the only consequence would be to put Germany on her mettle, when the usual result of a conflict between the fiery Gaul and the steady Teuton is sure to follow in due course. To no army can peace be dearer than to the Prussian, fully two-thirds of which have to be called away from the plough, the workshop, and the desk; but were a new campaign in a western quarter unavoidable, a good many of the men who did not at all like the idea of fighting the Austrians, their former allies and many years' associates in the glorious empire of the olden days, would have no objection to a trial of strength with the French, the traditional enemy of their race and country.

Before the common danger the little opposition to Prussian supremacy still existing in the South would melt away like wax, and unity more comprehensive and solid than can as yet be anticipated be established in the hour of need. This is the unanimous opinion of all with whom I have conversed upon the subject.

The mere news of French demands being put forward

has given a more martial tone to the public than it ever had in the varying stages of the past conflict. There is a vast difference between the first mention of Landau and Saarbrück by a French diplomatist—to these districts M. Benedetti is said to have referred*—and the dispatch of a gallant Maréchal with orders to take and seize; but public opinion is so irritated at the very first allusion to the odious subject, that consummation seems to be close at hand, and the earlier faced the better. There is a general desire to have done with the French. The young will say, 'Now for it!' the old will hope that the struggle, if unfortunately it cannot be avoided, will be taken up and carried on with all the inherent energy of their race; while all ages and classes unite in displaying the deepest resentment at foreigners presuming to treat Germany like Mexico, and prevent them from setting their household in order as they please. The idea, too, of a sovereign who marches in the van of civilisation holding out a very intelligible menace of bloodshed, not in defence of his land, not in vindication of his honour, but for the sake of conquest, has something in it revolting to the German mind, and were extremities resorted to, would fill the warriors of this country with the just ire of a man defending his premises against nocturnal visitors. It is the moral prevalence of legitimate anger over a mere hankering after military fame, and other motives of indifferent probity, that would tell sensibly against the French, were they to change hints into demands, and enforce the latter by arms. Are the French really incapable of understanding the political and intellectual condition of Germany? Are they determined to ignore the truth, that while the absorption by Prussia of some of the minor States of Germany is regarded as a step

* France, in a dispatch dated August 7, asked for the frontiers of 1814, which left these two German districts in her hands. It was only in 1815 that Landau and Saarbrück were recovered respectively for Bavaria and Prussia. Landau might be easily converted into an important fortress; Saarbrück would give France the coal she is in need of.

towards the unity of Fatherland, and hailed accordingly by most patriots, their appropriating an inch of German soil would be considered an act of piracy? The Berlin *National Zeitung*, an influential, but, as a rule, cautious and most reserved organ of the Liberal party, says:

'Prussia fulfils a national mission in consolidating the political structure of Germany. She reorganises a nation, but she does not carry on a predatory war against her neighbours. We hope that France, too, will not be prompted to war by motives worthy only of a robber. Were we called upon to defend ourselves against the brutal insolence of a conqueror, the elements of our national strength, though they have been so long dissevered, would combine and produce a more powerful effect than certain persons seem to imagine.'

If France objects, that the balance of power would be disturbed by Germany becoming a united commonwealth, the Germans retort, that it would, on the contrary, be restored, in consequence of so happy an event. Indeed, were all Germany to acknowledge Prussian supremacy, the new commonwealth would have no more than 38,000,000 of inhabitants, *i.e.* about as many as France. To unite Germany, then, would be to do away with the existing inequality in the aspect of the two countries, not to create one. For the present, however, it is not even intended to bring all Germany under one head. As yet the practical results of the unity movement are confined to the North, which has not quite 30,000,000 souls.

The French manœuvres at Berlin have produced immediate consequences. General Manteuffel has been dispatched to St. Petersburg on a special mission to the Czar. It is assumed that through him this Government will offer to assist Russia in the East, should Russia's aid be needed by Prussia in Germany. As an earnest of future services, Prussia is supposed to have induced the Prince of Roumania to express his readiness to exchange the suzerainty of the Sultan for the patronage of the Czar. A Roumanian corps is being drawn together on the borders of the Austrian province of Bukovina, and will compel the Kaiser to

oppose it by the concentration of a corresponding force. In Bukovina, as well as in south-eastern Hungary and Transylvania, which are chiefly inhabited by Roumanians, a movement is being set on foot to effect the reunion of these provinces with the Danubian principalities. Thus everything is in a ferment. By her very first importunities in Germany, France has achieved the unenviable distinction of reviving ancient difficulties in the East.

To complete the new arrangements of Germany, Prussia has communicated to the sovereigns of all northern states forms of treaty, embodying the terms mentioned in her Note of June 16, and already substantially accepted by them. After a brief preamble, to the effect that the alliance alluded to in the text already exists, and is herein to receive a more formal expression only, clause 1 provides an offensive and defensive alliance and a mutual guarantee of integrity between the various States concerned. Clause 2 enacts that the objects of the alliance shall be definitively secured by a federal constitution, to be formed on the basis of the Prussian programme of June 10, 1866, with the co-operation of a common Parliament. In accordance with clause 3, all other treaties between the contracting parties, so far as they are not affected by the present treaty, remain valid. By clause 4 the troops of the new allies are placed under the supreme command of the King of Prussia, their contributions to the cost of war being reserved for special agreement. The wording of this clause as it stands in German is rather indefinite. In clause 5 the various Governments engage to call a common Parliament, to be elected in accordance with the federal statute of April 12, 1849, as soon as Prussia desires. They are also to send plenipotentiaries to Berlin to draw up a federal constitution, to be formed on the model of the Prussian programme of June 10, and are subsequently to submit it to the common Parliament. Under clauses 6 and 7 the treaty is to remain valid for a year, unless superseded previously by the pro-

posed federal constitution; and it is to be ratified within three weeks of the day of its signature.

The draught of the treaty, of which the above is a succinct but accurate summary, was, on the 4th inst., transmitted to the Governments of Oldenburg, Brunswick, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg, Schwarzburg-Sonderhausen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Anhalt, Waldeck, Reuss-Greiz, Reuss-Schleiz, Lippe, Schaumburg-Lippe, Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburg. Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, Frankfort, and Saxony being entirely in the hands of Prussia, and without governments of their own, are not included in the number thus addressed, and will be dealt with differently. The six first mentioned States of this second category will be annexed; as regards Saxony, though the re-institution of her king has been conceded in the Austro-Prussian preliminaries of peace, her treatment, in all other respects, will depend on the confidence the Prussian Government think they can place in the future politics of the Wettin dynasty. There is a rumour that the Saxon troops will be stationed on the Russian frontier, the more effectually to wipe out from their recollection the memory of their Austrian companions in arms. But there is probably no truth in the report.

Many of the most respectable citizens of Emden, Norden, and Leer, the three largest towns in the Hanover province of East Friesland, have sent an address to the King of Prussia, praying for the embodiment of their country with this monarchy.

'Friesland,' they say, 'formerly belonged to Prussia, and was ceded to its present dynasty only on the great territorial re-division which took place at the Vienna Congress of 1815. But it always remembered the prosperity it enjoyed under Prussian rule. If now wishing for annexation, it is prompted both by the memory of past benefits and the conviction that the aggrandisement of this monarchy is identical with the unity and happiness of the German nation.'

The text of this petition has been published by its authors, together with an appendix, containing a terrible catalogue of derelictions laid to the charge of the present King of Hanover and his father. Therein is set forth, with no little animosity, how sire and son

'broke their oaths to the Constitution, pocketed the proceeds of the domains, abolished the provincial privileges of Friesland, and at last, with insane impudence, committed political suicide by deliberate opposition to Prussia.'

It is the old story of Hanover constitutional grievances.

In Southern Germany the unity agitation is unabated. At Stuttgart, a committee of the moderate liberal party has been established, for the purpose of effecting the immediate incorporation of the South with the Northern Confederacy. At Mayence, a fortress occupied by southern troops, even the prevalence of a state of siege has not prevented 150 citizens, among whom are nearly the whole of the town-council, signing a declaration to the same effect. Munich itself, the head-quarters of the anti-Prussian opposition, will hold a public meeting to-day, at which Prussian supremacy, 'however undesirable in itself,' will be declared as a 'lesser evil than the division of Germany.' The growth of patriotic opinion in Bavaria is illustrated by the fact that, a day or two ago, a large number of military reserves, called out to make up for the gaps in the Bavarian army occasioned by the war, mutinied at Würzburg, because, as they said, it was foolish to fight the Prussians and be beaten, when they need only join them to share in the benefit of good generals and superior weapons to boot. So violent were the men in vindicating these heretical theses, that they had to be actually discharged.

THE FRENCH DEMAND REFUSED. AUSTRIAN INTERNATIONAL TROUBLES.

Berlin, August 13, 1866.

In the German press the storm aroused by the French demand of territory continues. Of all papers those published on the menaced banks of the Rhine are the most violent in their denunciations of this modest request.

'Were France to enforce her demands,' says the *Cologne Gazette*, the leading paper of Western Germany, 'German unity would be established in a twinkle. The Southerners would kick their sovereigns out of the country, were any of them so dastardly as to join the foreigner for the purpose of extraditing German soil. Nay, they would enthusiastically hail King William as German Emperor, were he to draw the sword in defence of our frontiers against France. A fearful war would ensue, the ultimate result of which it is impossible to foresee. If Baron Ricasoli, who is only the minister of a second-rate power, told the Emperor of the French that he would not cede him any more Italian provinces, how much more is Count Bismarck in a position to inform his imperial neighbour that he could not give up an inch of German ground, even had he a mind to do so! Can Louis Napoleon, who knows Germany so well, be blind to existing realities? Will he renounce the friendship of Germany, which he might otherwise bequeath to his son as a most valuable legacy? Is he really the man to try and abstract a miserable shred of German soil, though he must know that in doing so he will make a mortal enemy of us? And will not all Europe be roused against him by these predatory politics? He now wishes for Landau, which is Bavarian, and Saarbrück, which belongs to Prussia; let him persist in his claims, and Belgium, Switzerland, and all countries on the left bank of the Rhine will fear a revival of the old Napoleonic practices. Before long a European coalition will be formed against him. His family was outlawed in 1815. Were he to look for conquest in 1866, the Napoleonides would prove themselves incorrigible.'

As yet Louis Napoleon has preferred no very urgent demand, but merely broached what, in the euphemistic language of Chauvinism, is called the equitableness of an indemnity. Let us hope that he will not go farther. From having had an entirely German education—he was at school at Augsburg—the French Emperor speaks the language of this country like a native, and has always taken care to keep himself *au courant* with the latest pub-

lications in the field of its general and political literature. If a pacific solution of pending difficulties is confidently anticipated in official circles here, more than upon anything else is this hope founded upon the superior acquaintance of Napoleon III. with the actual condition and inherent qualities of this race. I do not think that Prussia, so soon after the great effort of the Austrian war, would be particularly inclined to defend Switzerland, Belgium, or perhaps even Luxemburg, which though occupied by her troops, and a German principality, has not been included in the Northern Confederacy. But even these countries Louis Napoleon will not secure with the connivance of this Government, and if he wants them, must take them and abide the consequences.

To be sure, in Austria people are already indulging in the exhilarating thought that the Power they have been unable to crush will be soon confronted by a more competent adversary. The leading papers of Vienna bid France be quick; and the Austrian Government, though they cannot well announce another war while the first remains to be wound up, yet seem to evince a disposition so to shape their domestic politics as to be ready to accept the offer of an offensive alliance, should it be made them by their prospective ally.

It is a long story, and for its better understanding I must go back a little in the course of events. Hardly was the war over, when the Austrian Government began preparing for a reorganisation of their entire administrative system. Once more a complete change, the third within a few years, was to be introduced into the machinery. As the reader may recollect, the Charter of M. de Schmerling, giving ascendancy to the German element in the Empire, and fostering modern notions of constitutional government, was suspended some time ago. It could not withstand the attacks of the aristocracy, who thought it too liberal; the resistance of the clergy, who denounced it

as impious; and the hatred of the non-German races, to whom the undue numerical strength of the German element in the Central Representative Assembly gave terrible offence. The so-called dualistic principle was next, if not tried, at least trotted out and exhibited for public inspection. By it Austria would have been divided into a Hungary and a non-Hungary; a consummation tending to disintegrate the State, and which became altogether objectionable when it appeared that the Magyars were insisting as stanchly as ever upon the control of their own taxes and troops. So there remained nothing but to try the third possible system, the federal. This confers self-government in local affairs upon the various provinces, and allows each to organise itself on a strictly national model. It admits of a central parliament, but the powers of the general representative assembly are necessarily curtailed by the rights vested in its provincial rivals. This system finds most favour with the Slavonian subjects of the Kaiser, who, alike averse to German and Magyar supremacy, look upon provincial independence as a means of securing protection for their own national idioms, manners, and customs. To the Kaiser this form of administration recommends itself by allowing him a greater and more direct influence on the financial and military departments than either the centralistic or the dualistic system. The Slavonians having been the Cinderella among the sisterhood of Austrian nationalities ever so long, they will, it is confidently expected at Vienna, content themselves with a modicum of constitutional rights, provided they are accorded the use of their own language in the judicial, administrative, and educational establishments of their respective provinces. If current anticipations are correct, the satisfaction of Czechs, Croats, &c., at the concession to them of purely Slavonian schools, theatres, and courts of law, would be so immense as to cause them to regard the rights of the purse as comparatively indifferent, at least for the present.

But the system until very lately had its drawbacks. By impairing the authority of the central parliament, it might have injured its capacity for raising loans. By making the Slavonian nationality dominant in the Empire, it would have militated against the ancient claims of the Austrian sovereign to be considered a German prince, and to preside over a confederacy of German States at Frankfort. These objections long prevented the Kaiser from identifying himself with a plan otherwise acceptable in so many respects. The war did away with his scruples. After the issue of the last campaign, it was no longer by a mere form of constitution, whether centralistic, dualistic, or federal, that Austria could hope to improve her finances. A *bonâ-fide* improvement in her entire condition will be required for her to retain access to the money-market of the world. Again, having been obliged to divorce himself from the Bund, it is clear the Austrian sovereign is no longer in a position to have regard to the feelings of Germany, and emphasise the German origin of his house in his relations to his own subjects. Accordingly, no sooner were hostilities at an end than the Slavonians were given to understand, that their dearest wishes would be shortly fulfilled, and a polyglot administration, with no end of local parliaments, be introduced on the restoration of peace. Distinguished men of their race were received by the Kaiser, and others suffered to meet to draw up the outlines of a new constitution after their own hearts. The Slavonic period seemed to be close at hand.

But a few days since all this was suddenly stopped. Another policy had supervened at Court. Once more the Slavonians are nowhere. M. Riger is no longer in hopes of at once beginning his labours, and carrying Czechia back to the times when her name was renowned among the nations of the Continent. Count Goluchowski too, who was to make of Galicia a Poland in miniature, has been directed to postpone his endeavours until a more

opportune moment. The turn in the Austrian kaleidoscope is complete.

The cause of this remarkable change is attributed to the latest aspect of foreign affairs. The realisation of the federal system would have been the death-blow to the hope of the Magyars of preserving the territorial integrity of their kingdom, and recovering the time-honoured institutions of their race. Under the federal system, Hungary would have to be portioned out among Magyars, Croats, Servians, Ruthenians, Slovackians, and Wallachians, not to speak of Germans and Slovenians, who in some parts of the country sufficiently predominate to form also separate 'nationalities.' Even were this extreme measure not resorted to, the mere establishment of a national but not very constitutional government in the rest of the Empire would render it unlikely that a free charter and the right to rule over their ancient dependents, as formerly, would be restored to the proud magnates of Pesth. This disappointment coming so soon after the signal mistake the Magyars committed in the war, when they fancied the Kaiser would not submit to Prussia, but rather fight her with their aid, and reinstate their liberties by way of recompense, would, no doubt, have provoked them to the utmost. Now, if the Vienna press is right in anticipating another campaign—if the army at Florisdorf has reason to calculate upon another brush with Prussia, with France by its side, it would have been decidedly imprudent on the part of the Vienna Government to irritate the Magyars, and tempt them to turn the next favourable opportunity to better account than the last. As yet the Magyars are the only nationality in Austria capable of united action under popular leaders. Independently of this, it would be contrary to all rules of discretion to effect so radical a change in the constitution of the realm as the adoption of the federal system on the eve of a war. Such being the case, and as there is no other assignable reason to explain

the sudden shelving of the question, it is inferred, justly or not, that the generals and officers at Vienna, prophesying a speedy renewal of hostilities, although they may err in their surmise, are at least faithful interpreters of the views entertained by the Austrian Government.

Though Prince Gortschakoff has thought it the right thing for the minister of a legitimate sovereign to have a tussle with Count Bismarck about the claims of the Kings of Hanover, Saxony, &c., yet no serious intentions are here ascribed to his pointed notes. Russia at this moment is bound by three several ties to Prussia: the personal feelings of Alexander II. towards William I., his revered uncle—the inflammable condition of Poland—and the unsatisfactory state of her finances.

Count Bismarck, in reply to the inhabitants of the Hanover cities Emden, Leer, and Norden, petitioning for annexation, has informed them of the 'satisfaction of the King in the anticipation of being able to fulfil their wishes.' A similar address has been sent to Berlin by a number of respectable citizens of Osnabrück. The petitioners began this century as the subjects of their local bishop. They then became successively Prussians, Westphalians, French, and English; and having had an English Viceroy at their head for a short time, were finally ruled by the Duke of Cumberland and his son as Kings in their own right. Having seen so much of the vicissitudes to which the inhabitants of feeble states are liable in this immoral world of ours, it is no wonder the honest Frisians should earnestly long for repose in some consolidated concern.

The Germans in Austria are in a rage at their Government intending to treat with the Hungarians. Their feelings are illustrated by a pert little anecdote, which I cannot refrain from telling. The other day a bewildered Englishman asked a member of the Vienna Parliament to explain to him why there seemed to be no end to the constitutional question in that embarrassed country.

'Nothing is more easy,' quoth the other. 'Just imagine the Queen of England at the head of the Fenians trying to overthrow the Lords and Commons in Westminster Hall, and you have an exact picture of the Kaiser leaguing with the Hungaro-Czechians against his German Reichsrath.' Things have come to a pretty pass when stories such as this are repeated and appreciated at Vienna.

NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN GERMANY.

Berlin, August 15, 1866.

To revert to the international aspect of the German question, there is now no doubt that to avoid the danger of another hazardous collision, Count Bismarck, at the time of the Nikolsburg preliminaries, gave the Vienna and Paris Cabinets to understand that he would not at once receive the South into the new Bund. Although the mere announcement of an intention to this effect could be scarcely regarded as a direct promise, still circumstances have induced the Count to abide by his determination, and refuse admittance to Baden, which offered to join. The Baden Government has however been assured of the readiness of Prussia to permit the Southern States to remain in the Zollverein, provided they will renounce the right to veto innovations hitherto possessed by each member of this tariff alliance.* This is a necessary condition. Unless it is exacted, the reform of the tariff in a liberal sense, so long advocated by Prussia, will be always prohibited by the southern protectionists. Baden has already submitted to the Prussian terms, and the three other southern Governments, being dependent on the Northern Confederacy in all that relates to commerce, are sure to follow suit. Their

* The Zollverein having been formed upon the absurd pattern of the old Bund, all its members, great and small, came in for an equal share of rights. A measure proposed by Prussia could be resisted by Reuss-Schleitz.

production and consumption having been adapted to connection with Prussia for forty long years, how could they now separate themselves from the country, which is at once their principal market and their cheapest purveyor? Hence it may be expected that the Zollverein will be reconstructed on a sounder basis than hitherto, and a supremacy in matters mercantile, if not political, secured by Prussia in the south, no less than in the north. Add to this, that the wealthy and intelligent classes of the south are even now, when the war is hardly over, all but unanimous in wishing for political reunion with the north, and it is morally certain that, though this desirable consummation has, for the present at least, been prevented, it will yet be brought about in a not very distant future.

Curiously enough, the most ardent advocates of Prusso-German unity have, by their experience in the war, become those very armies of the south who, two months ago, were so eager to cross arms with their northern brethren. Bavarian and Würtemberg soldiers know themselves to be in no way inferior to Prussians. Still they were defeated in every encounter, and this in spite of superior numbers and excellent positions chosen beforehand. Putting the two things together, they have at last realised the truth, so long and obstinately denied by them, that for an army to be efficient, it must be larger than can be afforded by a petty State. The military education of the officers, the spirit of the men, and the quality of the *matériel*, to become what they ought to be, require a force capable of achieving great things both by numerical strength and the pecuniary resources at its command. This conviction once established, the gallant Bavarians and Würtembergers, as they will not side with France, and have despaired of keeping Austria at the head of the nation, cannot but acknowledge the necessity of putting Prussia in the place where the Kaiser once stood.

ANNEXATION.

Berlin, August 18, 1866.

A BILL submitted to the Lower House authorises the King to assume, for himself and heirs, the government of Hanover, Hesse Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort. In introducing the bill, Count Bismarck observed that the political and administrative institutions of the States annexed were to be preserved intact for the present, and by degrees only to be approximated to those of Prussia. This, he held, was the German mode of unifying States, as opposed to the Gallo-Italian method of at once abolishing the arrangements of acquired territories, and adapting their entire political structure to the foreign fabric of the larger and conquering State. I have no doubt that his views, being really in unison with the German way of thinking, will be approved on principle by the House. Still, as regards their practical application in the present instance, the House, I am told, will endeavour to prevent the perpetuation of a state of things which would leave the annexed principalities devoid of any political ties with this monarchy, except such as might be found in a common Sovereign, and the future common Constitution of the North German Bund. The people of Prussia, however delighted to receive the people of Hanover, Cassel, &c., into fellowship with them, on grounds of internal and external policy, seem to object to their King becoming, in addition to his Prussian dignity, the sovereign of half a dozen distinct principalities. So far as can be seen from the papers and the tone of parliamentary circles here, they believe that the larger the State, and the more diverse its constituent elements, the more probable the growth of constitutional liberty; and the more numerous the citizens of the kingdom, the lighter the burden of taxation and military service for all. In all likelihood, therefore, the House will so amend the bill introduced as to fix an early period for

the extension of the Prussian Constitution to the new countries, guaranteeing, at the same time, the latter their civil code as far as it is in accordance with local arrangements and time-honoured usages.

That Schleswig-Holstein and some Bavarian districts, which are also coveted by this Government, are not included in the bill, was, in the Premier's speech on the above occasion, accounted for by peace with their sovereigns not having yet been concluded. On Schleswig-Holstein, in accordance with the strict rules of international law, the Kaiser to this moment retains a co-proprietor's rights. As to Bavaria, she has not yet consented to the terms proposed, but, on the contrary, seems to prefer a renewal of hostilities to a loss of territory and the moral humiliation involved in it. Prussia, though no longer desirous of indemnifying the Darmstadt Duke by a slice of Bavarian soil, yet insists upon having one for herself. No doubt, diminished size would not enhance the ability of the Munich Cabinet to take the lead in the contemplated Southern Union, nor at all consolidate this political nondescript against the undermining influence sure to be exercised upon it by the North. This being so very apparent, the intractability of the Bavarian Government in the pending negotiations is here attributed to the invidious whisperings of France, who gives no outward sign of dissatisfaction for the moment. As a fact, it may be appended to this brief review of foreign relations that the Czar, in grateful recognition of the indulgence evinced by this Government in Darmstadt and Würtemberg—the one the home of his wife, the other his sister's kingdom—has no longer anything to say against the incorporation of the other conquered States.

The Lower House have appointed a special committee to compose an Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne. To give you an idea of Germanic fertility in all that relates to penmanship, no less than nine several

draughts have been laid before the committee by the several fractions of the House. Their main difference consists in the degree of emphasis given to the assertion that the Prussian Constitution has, indeed, been violated during the last few years, and that honourable members are delighted to see the trespass admitted by the Crown. Some draughts content themselves with a half reluctant allusion to past unpleasantnesses; others venture to dwell upon them, hoping that they will never occur again; while still more resolute ones soar so high as to point out the necessity of legal guarantees against any future suspension of the Charter. It is, however, hoped that the various Liberal fractions will find it possible to effect a compromise among each other upon the matter, and adopt some loyal and moderate wording, equally acceptable to all. By any other course they would not only imperil the scarcely restored harmony between Crown and Parliament, so indispensable at a time of foreign danger, but, being each of them less numerous than the Conservatives, run the risk of having a reactionary address palmed upon them by their adversaries.

On Thursday night Count Bismarck and Generals Roon and Moltke, the heroes of the war, were entertained by the *élite* of this city. The magnificent rooms at Kroll's selected for the occasion had been decorated with branches of fir and oak, according to the German fashion, interspersed with escutcheons and banners commemorative of the principal events of the war. On the appearance of the three distinguished guests they were received by a committee formed of eminent gentlemen of all political denominations, and, with a few words of friendly greeting, conducted to the seats prepared for them. The dinner was execrable, as—melancholy to record—is invariably the case in public rejoicings in Germany; but the wine being a redeeming feature, and a patriotic glow animating all present, the universal hilarity was not disturbed by

octogenarian fowls and mock-turtle at freezing-point. Of the many and eloquent speeches delivered, the first was by Count Stolberg, the President of the House of Lords, who concluded by proposing 'The Health of the King.' As, towards the close of his fervent address, he conferred upon his Majesty the title so long borne by the German emperors—'*omni tempore auctor imperii*'*—the whole assembly, consisting of some 800 or 900 people, rose from their seats, and by their cheers drowned the speaker's voice. Herr Seydel, the Burgomaster of Berlin, then proposed the health of the three honoured guests—'Bismarck, who had seized opportunity by the forelock, and with unflinching resolution realised the yearnings of his race for unity; Roon, who had organised the army that shattered the enemy; and Moltke, the unseen moving spring of all those splendid operations.' General Brand, a veteran soldier, eulogised the Prussian army, who, after so many years of inaction, had demonstrated to the world, and in doing so become fully conscious of, their strength. After him Count Bismarck rose to return thanks in his own name and that of his two companions in arms.

'The highest honour they claimed,' he said, 'was that of belonging to the great military corporation, which was the first of the kind in the civilised world—the Prussian army. All three were sincerely grateful to the chief magistrate of the capital for commending their endeavours on behalf of King and Fatherland. As residents in Berlin, they had learnt to respect its citizens. Whether right or wrong, Berlin was looked upon in foreign parts as the type of Prussian society, being the object of much southern wit for an imputed combination of excessive roughness and refinement. He, for one, had nothing to say against it. He never wanted a better heart, hand, or mouth than theirs to vindicate his interests. As to the Berlin mouth, it would be superfluous to say a word in its praise, this capital being in evil repute for the alleged talkativeness of its inhabitants. The hand was stout and liberal; a hand that struck the enemy in the field, and gave to the poor and the wounded with generous munificence. Since the days of the great Elector of Brandenburg the fame of the Berlin regiments had been well established in Germany; and

* 'The extender of the Empire at all times'—*Allzeit Mehrer des Reichs*, in German.

then, and ever after, the members of this great metropolis had been justly praised for their humane and charitable disposition. Yes, the heart of Berlin was true to the demands of the noblest patriotism. Berlin had always set an example to the other cities of the country, and been a lodestar in the hour of peril. He proposed "The prosperity of Berlin and each one of its inhabitants."'

The songs of the military choir accompanied the festivity, which closed with a display of fireworks in the Thiergarten.

COUNT BISMARCK ON THE REMODELLING OF GERMANY.

Berlin, August 19, 1866.

YESTERDAY the sittings of the Address Committee of the Prussian Parliament afforded Count Bismarck an opportunity of communicating his views on the actual state of the German question:

'It had been impossible to obtain the immediate inclusion of the South with the Northern Confederacy. At any rate, the risk that would have been incurred by the attempt, would have been out of proportion to the possible advantages of success.* So the Southerners were left to form a separate union among themselves; but as the Northern and Southern Bunds were at liberty to regulate their mutual relations free of foreign interference, considerable latitude was given to effect a close connection between the two. The degree of their intimacy would mainly depend upon the will of the southern people. Then, as regarded the Northern States, their federal bonds might be drawn all the tighter, owing to the temporary exclusion of the South; and as the power of Prussia had been so remarkably increased by the extension of her frontiers, he was in good hopes that the supremacy of the leading State would not be again disputed by any northern sovereign. He respected the reluctance of the civil and military officers in the annexed States to transfer their allegiance from one sovereign to another; but he trusted that, with due forbearance on the part of this Government, all classes of society in the new countries would soon unite in acknowledging the justice and imperative necessity of Prussia retaining her conquests. In all she had done, she had attached more weight to the interests of the people than the dynasties. An unsatisfactory arrangement, he regretted to say, would be probably come to

* This refers to the possible interference of the Emperor Napoleon, announced to the King of Prussia at Nikolsburg by M. Benedetti.

with regard to Saxony. In the other Northern States the troops would be merely commanded by this Government; but in Saxony, Prussia was under the necessity of claiming a share in the sovereignty of the land, so that King William would be the military, and King John the civil, ruler of the country. Such a complicated arrangement would no doubt become the source of dissension, and render the position of the Saxons vastly more unfavourable than that of the people in the annexed territories. Circumstances, however, had not admitted of a more convenient settlement being brought about in this particular instance.* The war had demonstrated the ability of Prussia to sweep away her enemies, and he thought he had a right to anticipate that the experience would not be lost on the south.

The Federal Constitution he was going to propose for the Northern Union was, perhaps, not the most perfect that might be devised, and, indeed, allowed the minor sovereigns a much more influential position than had been accorded them under the charter drawn up by the Germanic Parliament of 1848. But unity was effected on all essential points, and the minor sovereigns would in consequence be all the more willing to lend the leading State their cordial coöperation in those particulars in which to spare them would have been suicidal to Prussia, and indeed to Germany at large.'

These disclosures were well received by the committee, and we learn by the latest advices have been already acted upon in a most energetic manner. The day before yesterday the Prussian Government announced at Hanover that, whereas the ex-king of the country had on his departure taken with him public moneys to the value of 1,743,897 thalers, 9 groschen, 3 pfennige in silver, 800,000 florins also in silver, 1,438,889 thalers in gold, and 17,195,290 thalers in Hanover stock, the bonds in his possession were declared invalid, and no interest would be paid on them. I believe that, in appropriating what nearly every German sovereign, in a similar emergency, would have considered himself entitled to use for his political purposes, King George had no idea that the legality of his act could be impugned. Still, the money belongs to the Exchequer,

* Prussia eventually renounced her claim to a share in the sovereignty of the kingdom, and four years later reaped the reward of her temperate politics. An army under the Crown Prince of Saxony took an active part in the fights which resulted in the capture of the Emperor Napoleon at Sedan.

and will have to be refunded. The postage-stamps bearing his image have also been done away with.

The unifying action of Count Bismarck is strenuously seconded by the people. In the south, more particularly, meetings and addresses protesting against the division of Germany into two bodies-politic visibly multiply. A special party has been set on foot in Würtemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt with a view to bridge over the Main. It assumes the fitting title of the German Party, and already includes nearly all the moderate Liberals, together with the most eminent manufacturers and other representatives of the trading community in those parts. The university professors too—an essential element in German society—have many of them given in their adhesion to the new programme. To-morrow delegates from all parts of Würtemberg will meet at Plochingen, to determine upon a common plan of action, and combine their efforts with those of their political friends in Baden and Bavaria. But nowhere is the force of attraction exercised by Prussia, and the Northern Union generally, more signally manifested than in Hesse-Darmstadt. That principality, lying partly north and partly south of the Main, is cut in twain by the new aquatic barrier. Not unnaturally, those of its citizens living north of the river prefer annexation to an arrangement, which, while it separates them from their southern compatriots, yet leaves them subjects of a State always small, and now smaller than ever. Many of them have accordingly sent in petitions for direct annexation; while those in the southern half of the grand duchy, knowing Prussia to have limited its absorbing powers to this side the fluvial line of division, as the next best thing, entreat the Grand Duke to secure an immediate admission of his entire territory to the Northern Bund.

It is very remarkable that, with all these incitements to action, the opponents of Prussia in the south, so loud and clamorous about eight weeks ago, can hardly succeed

in getting up a single meeting or address. For the present their influence is mainly confined to the lower classes and the public employés. The former dread the duty of military service, so universally enforced in this warlike monarchy; the latter are aware that the Prussian Government, strict, orderly, and exacting as it is, will put a stop to the leisurely and somnolent way of carrying on business latterly rampant in some of the minor States. In some Catholic tracts of the south the lower clergy have not yet ceased to fan the flames of religious agitation against the Government. Will you believe it, that village priests of Upper Bavaria, although they cannot be ignorant of the prevalence of Roman Catholicism in three Prussian provinces, are reported to have made school-girls take a solemn oath that they will not swerve from the faith of their ancestors, should the country be conquered by the 'Lutherans'? To give an impetus to this pious movement, a barren apple-tree near Ratisbon has had the goodness to suddenly clothe itself with leaves; so at least affirms a paper published under the supervision of the Ratişbon episcopal see; and who will doubt the miracle, and its peculiar significance at the present time, when affirmed by such practised interpreters?

M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador, is back from Paris, whither he had repaired to impart his impressions as to the feasibility of obtaining an accession of territory from Prussia. What his message may be has not transpired. If warlike, it will be met in the same spirit; if peaceful, so much the better for both parties. In the mean time another conscription of 60,000 men, the second within a few months, is being quietly enforced. A large number of guns has been dispatched to the Rhine.

GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND ITALY.

Berlin, August 20, 1866.

To judge from the language of M. Benedetti since his return from Paris, no immediate interruption of peace need be apprehended. So far so good. But while Napoleon refrains from giving way to military ambition, Austria has been endeavouring all the time to promote his interests no less than her own in the peace-negotiations going on at Prague. It appears that Prussia, having engaged to conclude no peace except in common with Italy, found her own settlement inconveniently delayed by the necessity of waiting for that of her ally. The difficulty was occasioned by the late nominal cession of Venice to France. Austria, who at first seemed so very eager to have done with the war, in her negotiations with Italy, on pretence of having handed over Venice to France, asserted her inability to dispose of the forfeited province a second time. At any rate, she would not do so independently of the sanction of Napoleon III. She also intimated that France, having undertaken to refund the costs incurred in erecting the Quadrilateral, Italy would have to accept the same conditions, if the rights of the present owner were to be transferred to her. Possibly this Government might have advised Italy to swallow the pill, accept the coveted province at the hands of Napoleon III., and pay for the strongholds which have so long served to keep down her national aspirations. But Prussia was reluctant to recommend a compromise, unless Austria would engage to obtain Napoleon's consent to it, and so release Italy from the unpalatable necessity of applying to a party with which she had no concern, and whose interference was not likely to accelerate a settlement.

Austria at first did not fulfil the expectations of this Cabinet. Instead of withdrawing her proposal that Italy

should communicate with France, she, on the contrary, followed it up by another suggestion, to the effect that the entire negotiations had better be transferred to Paris, and finished with the concurrence of Napoleon III., who was to be a party in the conclusion of peace. Prussia being Italy's ally, this friendly request was not only addressed to Florence, but also to Berlin. But Prussia refused point-blank. In her opinion, were she to claim a cession of territory from one she has neither fought nor beaten in the field, even were it in behalf of somebody else, he might be tempted to reciprocate the request, and, happening to be no other than Napoleon III., revive the just-shelved question of the Rhenish frontiers. Prussia, moreover, not unnaturally, apprehends that were a common peace-instrument to be drawn up, including a sort of joint settlement between the three belligerents and France, Napoleon would acquire a title to an interference in German affairs, and consider himself lawful arbiter in any future dissensions between the Court of Berlin and the minor Cabinets. The fact of France supporting the Austrian proposals had nothing in it to allay the misgivings awakened; and so the labours of the Prague diplomatists had to be actually suspended for a day or two. At length Austria, finding she made no impression on her suspicious adversary, offered to conclude peace at Prague, and to engage, in the instrument there to be signed, to secure the extradition of Venice to Italy. The latter proviso, however, was not to become perfect until after its ratification by France. On the basis of this proposal, a more or less satisfactory arrangement seems to be close at hand. What has been, or will be, stipulated with regard to the little bill for the Italian fortresses, I cannot pretend to say.

THE KING OF PRUSSIA ON ANNEXATION.

Berlin, August 22, 1866.

A DEPUTATION of the House of Lords has waited upon the King, to present an address in reply to the speech from the throne. The address, which is but an echo of the royal words, explicitly approves all that has been done during the recess, and in the interest of conservatism hopes that peace and amity with Austria will be preserved henceforth. One passage alludes to the clear testimony which the war furnishes as to the efficiency of the army organisation so long opposed by the Lower House; another more significant asserts that, in case 'any unjustifiable claims should be put forth' by foreign Powers, this Government would be in a position to take up the gauntlet and make war unsupported by allies. The King, who had read the text of the loyal document in the papers, and is too busy not to dispense with ceremony in these eventful days as much as possible, released the deputation from the task of reciting it. He then said:

'I thank you, gentlemen, for communicating to me the feelings of your illustrious body. To God alone be all honour. On setting out for the seat of war I certainly hoped that we should be able to hold our own, as we always have. But I did not expect the rapid victories we achieved, and am doubly grateful to my gallant army for accomplishing them. Since the war, I have been obliged to dispossess certain sovereigns and annex their territories. I was born the son of a king, and taught to respect hereditary rights. If in the present instance I have nevertheless profited by the fortune of war to extend my territory at the cost of other sovereigns, you will appreciate the imperative necessity of the step. We cannot permit hostile armies to be raised in our rear, or in localities intervening between our provinces. To preclude the recurrence of such an event was a duty imposed upon me by the law of self-preservation. I have acted for the good of the country, and I beg you to convey my sentiments to the House.'

A very similar reply the King, a few days ago, gave to a deputation from the kingdom of Hanover, who had come to petition for annexation. He told them,

'He respected the scruples of those of their countrymen who from attachment to their hereditary ruler objected to a reunion with Prussia. But he had no alternative left. Prussia could not afford to have hostile dynasties in her flank and rear. It was the conviction of this military impossibility which had prompted his recent resolves.'

There is a candour in all this which cannot but produce a favourable impression upon the new subjects of his Majesty.

It is hardly accidental that, upon the eve of the address debate in the Lower House, a Berlin paper has been enabled to publish a private letter of the King's, written as far back as 1849. The letter treats of the common Constitution of Germany, which was composed by the Frankfort Parliament of 1848, and after long years of oblivion is now recommended for the King's approval in the draught submitted by the special committee on the address. No more condemnatory opinion than the one uttered by the King, then Prince of Prussia, could be imagined. He holds,

'That Constitution is only intended to pave the way for a German Republic. Nay, it would actually establish it, without needing any amendments of a democratic character. Under it the Kaiser (as the supreme ruler of Germany was to be again called) would be a mere sham, without any, the slightest, influence or authority. It was quite true that the manifest destiny of Prussia made her the natural and legitimate leader of Germany; but she could only fulfil her mission if a more practical and salutary way were adopted than the one sketched out in the common Constitution. King Frederick William IV. was quite right in rejecting it, and would take an early opportunity of securing his objects in a more sensible and conservative manner.'

It hardly needed the publication of this interesting letter to insure the rejection of this particular passage in the draught referring to the antiquated charter of the revolutionary year. The 'Reichs-Verfassung' is not only too democratic to be offered for the acceptance of conservative and victorious William I., but too extreme even for the tone of German society A.D. 1866.

In confirmation of my previous intelligence, I may

state, on the authority of the official *Correspondenz*, that peace has been concluded with Würtemberg and Baden, who lose no territory, but only pay the costs of the war. With Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt, the same organ informs us, an agreement has been effected, though not yet embodied in a diplomatic instrument. Bavaria cedes a few districts on its north-western frontiers, to be added to the Prussian province of Hesse-Cassel. Darmstadt cedes the principality of Homburg and allows Prussia the exclusive right of garrisoning Mayence; those of its provinces situate on this side the river Main join the Northern Bund. Both are also mulcted in a pecuniary penalty; the amount to be paid by Bavaria being stated at no less than 30,000,000 florins. Würtemberg pays 8,000,000. The sums exacted from Baden and Darmstadt are not mentioned. The *Correspondenz*, in accounting for the comparative leniency of these terms, says 'that the desire to enter into friendly relations with the South prevented this Government from enforcing its original demands. That object had been attained by the forbearance shown, and there was every hope that the national future of all Germany, both north and south, would be thereby benefited.' 'All Germany' is a significant term to be used by an official organ in the present crisis; and the promise implied in it is likely to be fulfilled before long. The Southerners continue to clamour for immediate reunion with the North, as though they had never wished for anything better. The latest demonstrations are reported from Southern Darmstadt, where the municipal authorities of every town in the country have signed a declaration to that effect. In Würtemberg pro-Prussian meetings, attended by the most influential classes, were held at Plochingen, Biberach, &c.

PEACE.

Berlin, August 23, 1866.

LAST night, at half-past 10 o'clock, the peace-instrument between Bavaria and Prussia was signed in Count Bismarck's cabinet. Würtemberg and Baden have already paid the sums exacted of them, of respectively 8,000,000 and 6,000,000 florins. Mayence, according to the preliminaries concerted with Darmstadt, will be occupied on the 26th by Prussian troops.

Rumours have been lately current that the Crown Prince of Hanover, having been deprived of his patrimony, would be allowed to succeed to the throne of Brunswick, on the demise of the present Duke. The latter is childless, and his inheritance would have devolved under any circumstances upon either Hanover or Prussia —which of the two is a disputed question. It seems, however, that even if Prussia had a mind to act a generous part and waive her claim in favour of the young Prince, the Brunswickers, who have always had a will of their own, as last shown in the expulsion of their sovereign thirty years ago, would hardly allow her to do so. No sooner had the rumour that their political independence might be indefinitely prolonged beyond the death of their present sovereign, gained ground, than meetings were held in the leading towns of the duchy to protest against anything which could prevent their reunion with Prussia. An address on the subject is circulating in the country, and will be shortly presented to the Prussian and Brunswick Governments.

The solemn entry of the Prussian troops into Berlin will probably take place on the 5th of September. Preparations are being made on a grand scale. The whole of the men are to be entertained at a festal banquet, and the day after will attend a *Te Deum* to be performed by thousands of vocalists, with a corresponding orchestral force.

The ornamentation of the streets, halls, and churches is to be left to a committee of artists, who will undoubtedly strive to excel the ordinary and rather monotonous display of the professional decorators. As a more permanent memorial, the burgomasters of the capital have proposed to the town-council to erect a monument in honour of the war.

THE PRUSSIAN HOUSE OF DEPUTIES ON CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE WAR.

Berlin, August 27, 1866.

YESTERDAY a deputation of the Lower House presented to his Majesty the following reply to the speech from the throne:

'Most illustrious and gracious King and Lord,—The great achievements which in a few weeks conducted our gallant troops from state to state, from victory to victory, until in the west they crossed the Main, and in the east reached the very gates of Austria's capital, have filled our hearts with joyous pride and sincere gratitude. We return the thanks of the people to the thousands laid in their graves, and the tens of thousands of survivors of the Line, as well as the Landwehr, which, created in an heroic period, has proved true to its traditions. We return thanks to the able and courageous leaders, and above all to your Majesty, who assumed the command in the decisive battle, shared danger and privations with the army, and by a rapid advance put a speedy termination to the unutterable miseries incidental to the war. In recounting the important results of the war, we find the Federal Constitution—that illusory tie, which for the last fifty years has proved useless and prejudicial in foreign as well as in domestic affairs—to have been dissolved at length. We find ourselves dissevered from Austria, the multiplicity of minor States reduced, our frontiers and power extended, and the time drawing near when a united Germany, under the auspices of the largest German state, may be created. Equally with your Majesty we are convinced that the fruits of the war will be only matured by an harmonious coöperation between Government and Parliament. By the blood of our fearless soldiers has the most valuable possession of the people, liberty, and the right of self-government, been again sealed. Without the consolidation and development of the constitutional rights of the people we may not count upon the sympathies of Germany, that alone can impart strength and duration to our power.

Considering that for a number of years past the public expenditure has

been defrayed without the legal enactment of a budget, and partly contrary to the votes of the House of Deputies, we are highly gratified at your Majesty having condescended solemnly to admit the illegality of those expenditures, as having been made without due regard to clause 99 of the Constitution. By this royal declaration, testifying to the necessity of an annual budget, to be enacted with the concurrence of the House of Deputies, and by the demand of an indemnity for the past accompanying the admission made, Parliament is justified in trusting that any such conflict will be obviated in future by a timely enactment of the budget previous to the beginning of the year to which it refers. If such a course be henceforth pursued, moneys refused by the House will not be expended on the pretence of being required for the public weal. The bills relative to the necessary indemnity and the state of the public finances submitted to our deliberations we shall weigh with due attention and diligence.

Pervaded with a sense of the great importance of the present epoch to the German Fatherland, we offer our cordial coöperation for the development of our unity and liberty, providentially intrusted to your Majesty. We cannot close our eyes to the difficulties in our way, nor do we wish to retard the establishment of the North German Confederacy till the time that the establishment of a united Germany will be possible; but we are deeply convinced of the necessity of creating a constitutional tie between the north and south of the German Fatherland, and we confidently hope that it will be realised in no very distant future. We trust that our German brethren in the south will become more and more keenly alive to the danger of national division, and will give a sincere and unequivocal expression to the wish, already cherished by so many of them, for permanent reunion with the North.

Your Royal Majesty, in the great days of Prussian history the devotion of the subject was ever associated with the strength and spirit of our sovereigns. This shall be the case in the future, as it was in the past. Then, who can be against us?

We subscribe ourselves, with the most profound respect,

Your Majesty's most humble and devoted servants,

THE HOUSE OF DEPUTIES.'

This address revives the memory of past dissensions with pitiless exactitude. In his speech the King had admitted that the military expenditure of the last few years exceeded the estimates. But he pleaded necessity occasioned by foreign danger. He stated that he had ever anticipated events would justify his conduct, and wound up by declaring that in his opinion any future dissension on the subject of parliamentary prerogative was rendered

impossible by that fortunate issue of the war which he had foreseen, and, in fact, hoped to bring about at the risk of encountering temporary opposition from the Commons. With this announcement, the constitutional difference which has agitated the country for some years is practically disposed of. If Parliament has, nevertheless, thought it necessary to revert to the subject, and dwelt upon it with a certain emphasis, it is all the more fortunate that the King should continue his conciliatory endeavours, and not allow himself to be diverted from his object, which is the restoration of peace and amity between the constituted powers of the State. His Majesty's reply to the address was as follows:

'I thank you heartily, gentlemen, for your address, and beg you to communicate the expression of my royal gratitude to the body which deputed you. I know your address gives utterance to sentiments entertained not only by the House, but by the entire country. You were right to emphasise the success of our arms, and to commend the army for its signal achievements. I do not know of any instance in history when such grand results have been so rapidly attained, and I thank God that He has chosen me and the present generation as instruments to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of Prussia—nay, of all Germany. My late brother, a good and a wise king, repeatedly endeavoured to consolidate our political position; but, owing to the unfavourable circumstances of the times, was obliged to bequeath the task to his successors. Well, gentlemen, we have been more fortunate this time, and, next to Providence, are indebted to the army if now reaping the fruits of victory. I cannot on this occasion but repeat my conviction that in overcoming the enemy the army was materially assisted by the advantages accruing to it from the new organisation of the line and the reserves. Much as it has been opposed, I am happy to perceive that the new organisation is better appreciated after the war. I am warranted in indulging the hope that it will benefit the country for years to come. I agree with you that great difficulties remain to be surmounted; but, with the help of God, I am ready to face them all.

As regards the Bill of Indemnity asked by my Government, and alluded to in your address, you will remember that I never denied the right of the purse as constitutionally vested in Parliament. But when I deemed the reorganisation of the army indispensable; when I knew it would shortly be regarded in the same light by the entire country; was I to imperil our safety by postponing it to a later date? Was I not, on the

contrary, obliged to protect the dearest interests of the kingdom, and to carry on the public administration on my own responsibility, as long as no agreement could be effected between the majority of the House and my Government? That it was a case of necessity, unique of its kind, I ever readily admitted, and admit to this day. I own, gentlemen, that were a similar emergency possible, I do not know of any other expedient which could be adopted; but the like can never occur again. Circumstances have changed, and smoothed the way to a better understanding between us.

Your address has been passed all but unanimously, and contains nothing which I do not cordially approve. We are at one again, and shall ever remain so. Once more let me thank you from the bottom of my heart for meeting me in a friendly and patriotic attitude in this great crisis of German affairs.'

This reply, uniting royal dignity with the unhesitating acknowledgment of the parliamentary prerogative, has been very well received by public opinion. Nay, it has satisfied the House also. It is lucky that the same warlike events, which, while looming in the distance, gave occasion to the constitutional controversy, opened a way for its removal when they actually arrived. With the perils of German unification anything but overcome, no one in his senses now thinks of reducing the army, however desirable in itself such a measure may appear. The King, on the other hand, with the nation compelled by circumstances to make him this concession, has no reason to prolong the quarrel, but, on the contrary, every motive to induce him to conciliate public opinion at the end of such a war, and possibly on the eve of another equally serious one. That his Majesty never cherished any more ardent wish than to restore harmony between his Cabinet and Commons, no one denies. It is certain that the House, now that it has had its say and made a clean breast of it, will oblige Government by a grant of indemnity for the past.

By the addition to it of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort, Prussia is raised from 19,225,000 inhabitants and 25,650 sq. miles, to 23,810,743 inhabitants and 30,800 square miles. The small territories to be acquired from Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt are not

included in the above computation. Of trained soldiers there are in the new provinces no more than 64,526 men, who, according to the Prussian standard of conscription, will be shortly increased to a standing force of between 80,000 and 90,000. A large proportion of the men at present embodied in the new provinces will be disbanded as soon as possible, and the gap supplied by so many more recruits. By this means it is hoped that at least 150,000 will before long be available in the annexed territory for war purposes; a calculation which, if correct, would augment the Prussian army to the enormous figure of 800,000 men. Besides these a proportionate addition will accrue from the 3,500,000 people of the minor States belonging to the Northern Bund, the troops of which are now placed under Prussian command. Justly to appreciate the influence which will be exercised by Prussia and its northern allies over the minor States of the South, it is only necessary to compare these figures with the corresponding data on the other side the Main. The Northern Bund has 27,284,737 inhabitants, with an army of from 750,000 to 850,000 men, all organised on the same system, and acknowledging the same head. The South, with only 8,560,000 people, is divided into four separate States, which it is very improbable will enter into any alliance, or if they do, are sure to display only the same amount of fidelity towards each other as manifested in the last campaign. Of these States the two smallest, Darmstadt and Baden, are tied to the Northern Bund, the one by a portion of its territory being situate north of the Main, the other by its sovereign, together with all wealthy and educated people among his subjects, wishing for nothing better than to join Prussia. In Würtemberg, the next in size, Prussian sympathies prevail only in those classes which are not ultramontane or republican; but all parties equally object to intrusting their troops to the guidance of Bavaria, which is the largest, but has proved in the war to be the least efficiently organised, of the whole

quartet. Add to this, that even if united, the troops of the four Southern States, in which the duty of military service is much less onerous than in the north, would amount to no more than 125,000 at the utmost, and it is easy to foresee that in war or peace they will alike gravitate towards Berlin.

The cholera continues its ravages among those spared by the bullet and sword. Of the 34,000 inmates of the Prussian war-hospitals there are only 22,000 wounded, the rest being laid up with disease. Of the wounded, one-half are Austrians. The total of the Austrian prisoners of war, both wounded and others, in Prussia is about 30,000, while the Austrians cannot boast of having captured more than 391 Prussian rank and file, with five officers.

France is endeavouring to conclude a commercial treaty with Austria. When complete, it is to be offered for the acceptance of the Southern States, which are thus to be rendered independent of the Zollverein. The attempt is sure to fail, neither Austria nor France being in a position to indemnify the Southerners for the advantages of the North German market. Even if Austria could resolve to allow southern manufacturers a fair competition with her own, her subjects, being less accustomed to the luxuries of civilisation, have fewer requirements than the North. France, on the other hand, excelling in the manufacture of hardware, haberdashery, and other small articles, which also form the staple commodities of the German South, would offer no market to the latter, even were she to throw open her frontiers. Neither Austria nor France, moreover, would buy a pint of Southern beer or wine, enormous quantities of which find a ready sale in the German North.

A Berlin publisher has begun issuing a translation of the war correspondence in the *Times* both from the Prussian and Austrian camps. The work, when complete, will cost 3*s*.

THE ANNEXATION DEBATE.

Berlin, August 29, 1866.

YESTERDAY the Special Committee of the Lower House on the Annexation bill held another sitting. In it Count Bismarck definitely approved the amendment, which provided that the Prussian Constitution shall become valid in Hanover, Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, and Frankfort, on the 1st of October 1867. He particularly desired the Committee to hasten the completion of the bill, and said:

'It was just possible that Prussia would be called upon to vindicate the possession of what she has now acquired. The first Silesian war produced a second and a third, and there was no telling whether they might not have to go through a similar succession of campaigns in the present instance. He, therefore, wished to have the matter promptly settled, so as to give foreign Powers no farther opportunity for interference. To do a necessary thing at once was to gain a double advantage from it. The Cabinet had difficulties to contend with in various quarters, and might well expect the House to second its action, considering what the circumstances of the times were. The right of Prussia to annex the States mentioned was a more sacred right than that of conquest. It was from the right *Germany* had to live, breathe, and exist that Prussia derived her commission to incorporate with her own body politic such *disjecta membra* of the nation as had been won in honest warfare. The interval between now and the extension of the Prussian Constitution to the new provinces he would employ to proclaim the laws of military service in them, and establish the right of all subjects of the Crown to reside and carry on trade in any part of the united kingdom. He had no doubt that before long all classes in the States annexed would unite in acknowledging the wisdom of this proceeding. This was a transition period, but its attendant difficulties could be easily overcome by the adoption of the proper means. He was not surprised to find that, when people in the minor States had so long enjoyed an existence undisturbed by great political cares, there should be some among them averse to the duties of a more responsible position. But the majority took a more extended view even now, and the rest would come round soon enough. In point of fact, the only choice they had was to become the citizens of a great German State, or to be at the mercy of foreign Powers.'

These sentiments, heartily concurred in by the Committee, will meet with equal approval on the part of the

nation generally. Unity meetings continue as frequent as ever. For eminent speakers and peremptory demands, the one which came off at Leipsic on the 26th is the most remarkable. It was presided over by a liberal member of the Saxon Chamber, and attended by many other deputies and manufacturers from different parts of the kingdom. In the debate it was urged that

'Embodiment with Prussia would be the most desirable fate that could befall Saxony. Should this unfortunately be impossible, the interests of the country required that the Saxon army, at any rate, should cease to exist, and be merged in the Prussian army. To oppose Prussia was absurd for a State whose prosperity depended upon its intimate connection with her, and whose people, in all that regards descent and national peculiarity, were identical with those of the great Northern State. Still, this had long been the sole aim and object of the Saxon Government, and was sure to become so again after the re-institution of either the present sovereign or his son. So the only way of lessening their power for evil was to deprive them of all military resources, and place the executive in the hands of the only State capable of using it for something higher than police purposes. It was true that the condition of the Saxons would be a very unenviable one. They would have to submit to the rigours of the Prussian military conscription without enjoying the privileges awarded to Prussian citizens. But this was unavoidable for the present.'

Resolutions to this effect were unanimously passed. The day before the Leipsic meeting the liberal members of the Saxon Parliament had assembled at Dresden to concert their tactics for the coming Session. The Saxon Parliament, I must here observe, is about the most reactionary in Germany. It was created by Baron Beust, who, after crushing the democratic rebellion of 1849 with the aid of Prussian troops, by a stroke of his pen abolished the Constitution of the kingdom, imposing in its stead a Charter, the like of which has not been often seen even in this region of Parliamentary nondescripts. Under the Beust Charter the First Chamber is composed of landed proprietors, many of them of slender means, and of officials appointed by the King. Of the Second Chamber, one third consists of landed proprietors, and another third

of peasants, the remaining fraction alone being allotted to the representatives of the towns. This is a perverse arrangement in a land where industrial activity has given the burgher class an immense preponderance over all others. Hence the burghers, who have been so long smarting under this infliction, wish to improve the opportunity offered them by the war to recover a due share of influence in the local Parliament. At the Dresden meeting of Liberal members, it was resolved that a protest should be made against the legality of the existing Constitution, and that in case their number, by a few out-standing elections, could be raised to one-third of the whole Parliament, the Liberal party should resign their seats, thus rendering the presence of a constitutional quorum impossible.

The above will explain why, in Saxony, as well as in other minor States, the more stationary elements of society require some time to realise the advantages unity will bring to them, as well as to the rest of the German world. They have been employed by conservative Governments to retard the progress of the Liberal movement for fifteen long years. They have, ever since the close of the revolutionary period of 1848, been allowed a majority of votes in the local Parliaments. The peasants among them had their village roads made at the cost of the towns. The poorer section of the nobility had an education gratis in a public school, with nice little posts to fit in appropriately. The orthodox clergy were at liberty to disregard the views and principles of nine-tenth of their parishioners. All these privileged Conservatives are well aware that the unity party mostly consists of the same Liberals who have long objected to this unfair division of power at home. They naturally apprehend that, were their enemies to carry their programme in one point, they would do so also in the other. They cannot but foresee that the very fact of their local Parliaments being absorbed by a great assembly, whether Prussian or North German,

would deprive them of the local dominion they have hitherto exercised in common with and for the benefit of the smaller dynasties. The non-Prussian peasantry, moreover, are not partial to the idea of serving three years in the Line, and the being liable to be called out ever after; an arrangement not particularly attractive to populations who have been either entirely exempt from military duties or at least allowed to procure substitutes. To produce another secessionist element and one which plays an important *rôle* among the 'Particularists,' as they are called, the bureaucracy, too, are not reconciled to the change. In many minor States the civil service has been a sort of hereditary caste, disposing of the loaves and fishes for the benefit of sons and sons-in-law as a matter of course. It would be asking more than mortal man can compass were we to expect these startled clerks and councillors to hail the advent of an era which will render ancient connections useless, and oblige them to seek fresh patronage in a distant capital. But neither of these classes is active, independent, or even confident enough to be able to offer any serious embarrassment to this Cabinet, if it rely upon the townspeople and the educated and Liberal classes generally. To procure it this valuable support no reforms of an extreme nature are required. The Prussian Government need only be moderately liberal, and public opinion will be satisfied with the change for the better, and willingly allow the Crown the exercise of the considerable power it possesses, and in the present condition of Germany undoubtedly requires to possess, if the country is to be protected from foreign attack.

To revert to the details of the day: the Prussians feel so entirely at their ease concerning the disposition of the Dresdeners, that the arms seized in the beginning of the war are being restored to their owners. Dresden, like most minor capitals in danger of losing the profits derived from a resident Court, was very anti-Prussian at first.

By the alternate application of stringent and lenient measures its opposition, however, has been relaxed. When the Prussians first entered Saxony, they found it difficult to procure hands to construct a few redoubts near the capital; but the other day, when 6,000 men were wanted to resume the work of fortification on a larger scale, the full number were hired at once.

From Hanover interesting intelligence bearing upon the same all-engrossing unity movement has come to hand. On the 24th the Provincial Representative Assembly of Celle, a body transacting local business only, held its regular sitting at the town of the same name. Nearly all the noblemen present mourned the fate of the dynasty, and thought it incumbent upon them, as men of honour, to preserve allegiance to King George. The representatives of the towns, on the other hand, held that there had never existed such a thing as a Hanover nationality, and that the country, though no longer a separate state, would remain as German as ever, and perhaps become even more so. After a long and animated debate, the burgher and peasant members conjointly threw out the motion introduced by the nobility, that the sympathies of the assembly be expressed to King George. Celle, whose sentiments are reflected in this vote, is one of the old provinces of the Hanover dynasty. Osnabruck, Friesland, and partly also Hildesheim, the new provinces acquired fifty years ago, have long petitioned for annexation. Some Hanover clergymen intend to proceed to Vienna to pray King George to release the civil and military officers among his late subjects from the oath taken to him. There is every reason to suppose that the petition will be refused, and that the Hanoverian service, in just repute for the honourable and gentlemanly character of its members, will be eventually obliged to recognise the rule of international law, that a king, on being entirely dispossessed, ceases to be king.

From Flensburg and Apenrade deputations have been sent to the Prussian governor at Kiel to deprecate the contemplated cession of Northern Schleswig. The petitioners contend that, if the landed and house proprietors were to decide the matter, there would be a large majority in favour of their remaining incorporated with Schleswig; while if a *suffrage universel* is to take place, their votes would be swamped by the lower classes, who are Danes, and the reunion of the district with Denmark be inevitable.

In a meeting of the members of the Saxe-Meiningen Parliament, the closest alliance with Prussia has been recommended to the sovereign of that diminutive principality. His Highness presumed to go to war with Prussia, and, like the Dresden and Darmstadt potentates, has been hitherto unable to make his peace.

Mayence, a Darmstadt town, but so long a Federal fortress, has been surrendered by its Bavarian commander to the Prussians, who, two or three days ago, occupied it with 10,000 men. This is one of the many incidents of the war which show how little treaties avail at the end of an unfortunate campaign. As may be remembered, Bavaria had been charged by the southern league with the task of holding the fortress during the war. She never turned it to account, although much might have been made of her position in the place. At the end of the war she yields it up in order to obtain more favourable conditions for herself, utterly unconcerned as to what the Duke of Darmstadt, to whom the place must have reverted on the collapse of the Bund, may say or think about it. The occupation of this important place has elicited a remonstrance from the French Ambassador here, which, however, was not heeded.

The French Envoy to the late Elector of Cassel has, up to this time, stuck to his post, but is now on the eve of departure. The other day he had his furniture sold by auction. As a fitting wind-up to this paragraph, devoted

to the fate of fallen royalty, I may subjoin that the three or four gentlemen who continued playing at German Bund in the dining-hall of the Three Moors at Augsburg have suspended operations at length, and declared both Diet and Confederacy abolished by the war and the various treaties of peace concluding it. The closing scene took place on the 24th, the day after the treaty of peace between Austria and Prussia was signed at Prague.

COST OF WAR.

Berlin, August 30, 1866.

In the first sitting of the special committee on the loan demanded, which was held yesterday, the total cost of war was stated by Government to amount to 88,000,000 thalers. The single items are as follows: 1. Mobilisation of 11 *corps d'armée* at 42,000 men each, 25,500,000 thalers. 2. Current expenditure of the war till the end of August, 33,800,000 thalers. 3. Demobilisation of the troops, 1,700,000 thalers. 4. Resupplying the dépôts of arms and clothing after the war, 27,000,000 thalers. To the total of 88,000,000 resulting from the above must be added 20,000,000 to defray the cost of keeping the army on a war footing till January 1, 1867. The liabilities incurred mostly remain to be liquidated, having hitherto been met only by 20,000,000 of cash taken from the reserve fund, 4,343,000 thalers obtained by the sale of railway stock, and some 12,000,000 thalers of surplus moneys from the finance administration of 1865. Large quantities of victuals and other stores were furnished by Prussian and foreign subjects, but the former, though legally obliged to contribute gratis horses, corn, &c., while the war lasts, must be paid for within a year of its close. The amount

of this and other debts contracted by the Government for railway transport, &c., is not specially mentioned in the reports hitherto published. About one half of the costs will be covered by the sums exacted from the defeated states, estimated at a total of 45,143,000 thalers. Surely the Prussian successes have been cheaply acquired, if about 43,000,000 thalers, with 20,000,000 more to insure the maintenance of peace during the next three months, are all that has had to be actually invested.

To pay off debts and replenish the exchequer, a loan of 60,000,000 thalers has been demanded by Government. The ministers also wish to be empowered to sell some 30,000,000 thalers worth of railway shares belonging to lines hitherto in part the property of Government, but lately disposed of for the above-mentioned sum. Of the money thus realised, 27,500,000 thalers are to be added to the reserve fund, to raise it to the normal height of 40,000,000, while the remainder will be employed on two iron-cased vessels now building, and already partly paid for. Another interesting item of future expenditure occasioned by the war is formed by the contemplated purchase of one more cuirassed vessel for 2,800,000 thalers, and the strengthening of fortresses at a cost of 3,500,000 thalers. To meet these sums the finance minister has in hand 4,000,000 thalers, the contribution levied on Frankfort, and hopes to realise 2,557,000 thalers more from the sale of horses on the demobilisation of the army.

THE HANOVER NOBILITY ADDRESS TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

Berlin, September 7, 1866.

A DEPUTATION composed of Herr von Munchhausen formerly Hanover Minister of State, Herr von Schleppegrell, Vice-President of the Court of Appeal, and Herr von Rossing, a Councillor of the Finance department, lately had

an interview with the King of Prussia, at Berlin, upon which occasion they presented the following address to his Majesty:

'Most gracious King,—We trust that your Majesty will permit us to lay at the foot of your august throne our wishes in respect of the destinies of the kingdom of Hanover, our native country. Numerous addresses, bearing more than 64,000 signatures, have within the last few days been forwarded to your Majesty, in which your equity and wisdom are appealed to for the maintenance of our kingdom under the rule of its hereditary dynasty. It would have been easy to multiply the number of those signatures, had not the Civil Commissioner of your Majesty adopted the severest measures against the preparation of addresses, expressing in the most moderate form the nearly unanimous wishes of the population. But it is not upon that ground that we desire to make any complaint. We know, moreover, how repugnant a proceeding of that nature is to your Majesty's frank and noble mind. We have rather now to express our anxious doubts whether those addresses have really reached your Majesty. The signers of the before-mentioned addresses have up to this time been without any reply, while the newspapers daily report the gracious replies which your Majesty has been pleased to return to addresses conceived in a wholly opposite spirit, and the signers of which cannot, either by reason of their numbers or their personal importance, be considered as the representatives of the Hanoverian people. We conceive that we have, under these circumstances, a legitimate excuse for praying your Majesty to listen to the expression of the sentiments of the vast majority of our fellow-countrymen.

Your Majesty may be assured that whatever may have been the position of some of us during the growth of the so-called German question, yet no doubt remains in many minds, after the brilliant successes of the Prussian arms, that Prussia, and Prussia alone, is destined to be the dominant power in the new Confederation which is about to be established, and that therefore to her must be unreservedly conceded all the privileges requisite for the complete fulfilment of her historic mission. But that the sacrifice of the existence of our State—which even after the unavoidable limitation of its sovereignty, would be imbued with vigorous life—is essential for this purpose is not evident to its inhabitants. Nor do they acknowledge there is any ground for the often-heard assertion, that the Crown of Hanover thus restricted would be an untrustworthy neighbour to the Crown of Prussia. The military supremacy which would be conceded to the latter would suffice to avert any danger, even if, after the solution of the German question, the geographical position of both countries, the similarity of character in their population, the identity of their commercial interests, did not present fully adequate guarantees for the good faith of the weak neighbour. If, farther, no sufficient pledge for reliable

alliance were considered to exist in the person of the present holder of the Hanoverian crown, the latter, as your Majesty's Government is aware, has expressed his readiness to renounce the crown in favour of his heir.

It is our most respectful opinion that the political question, therefore, seems to take this simple shape—whether it is more advantageous to the crown of Prussia to acquire some 2,000,000 of faithful allies, or of unwilling subjects, among whom those sincerely devoted to the old regime will discontentedly withdraw from public affairs, while among the remainder opponents to the crown of your Majesty's own country will find a welcome reinforcement. It is not, however, in especial to your Majesty's political sagacity that we address ourselves, but it is, above all, to the justice and clemency to which your heart is naturally inclined that we feel ourselves in this decisive hour forced in unbounded confidence to appeal. It cannot be agreeable to your Majesty to dethrone a prince whose dynasty have been connected with their country for nearly a thousand years, and who wears his crown by the grace of God—to dethrone him simply because, taking a different view of the federal law, up to that time valid, to the view entertained by your Majesty's advisers, he considered himself legally prevented from unhesitatingly adopting your Majesty's German policy, and thus, by an unfortunate concatenation of circumstances, was ultimately forced to employ his army against your Majesty's troops, whom he had previously never opposed, but by whose side his forces had often victoriously fought in joyful brotherhood of arms.

Your Majesty,—the fate of this Prince, nearly related to your illustrious House, has, by the inscrutable will of God, been placed in your Majesty's hand. At the grave of King Ernest Augustus, your Majesty's royal brother once promised to be a faithful support to his son. We trust your Majesty will redeem this promise of your royal predecessor; and the conquest of many thousands of true and thankful hearts will then offer to your Majesty far more imperishable laurels than the subjection of a weak enemy can ever afford.'

The King of Prussia replied to this address in the following terms:

'I am glad to see you here; for I cannot fail to entertain esteem and respect for Germans who are faithfully attached to the dynasty whose connection with their country has endured for centuries, and has resulted in mutual attachment and devotion. I should have held the Hanoverians in less esteem, if they had not adopted some such step as this to testify their faithful attachment to their hereditary dynasty—a dynasty so closely allied in kinship to my own. For that reason it is that I wish to explain the motives which, contrary to my first intentions, and only after a long struggle against my desire to allow the independence of my former confederates to continue, have induced me to adopt a re-

solution already in course of execution, and therefore irrevocable—the resolution of annexation.

At the time I first entered upon my present position I stated that the intentions I entertained for the benefit of Prussia and of Germany were based upon effecting none other than moral conquests. This expression has been laughed at and scoffed at in many quarters; and yet I now repeat to you, that my plans have never gone beyond this object; and that when, as a man of seventy years of age, I pass to conquests effected by force, I do this only constrained by the force of circumstances, by the incessant attacks of my pretended federal allies, and by my duty towards that Prussia which has been intrusted to my charge. At the establishment of the Germanic Confederation care was taken by those States which foresaw danger to the preservation of their influence, from the position Prussia had even then attained, that her territory should remain separated by independent States. Since the existence of the Bund, this situation has been aggravated by constantly renewed attacks, promoted chiefly by Austrian influence, and by bribing the German, French, and English press. They have managed to excite and keep alive constant apprehension of Prussian violence and lust of conquest, and have made our neighbours offer persistent opposition to our temperate endeavours to infuse into the Bund unity and to enable it to promote the material and moral interests of the nation. All our endeavours have remained fruitless. They have led to an unfriendly attitude of Hanover towards Prussia, interrupted only during the reign of King Ernest Augustus by more intimate relations. During the recent political complications our mutual relations have become absolutely hostile, without any cause being given on the part of Prussia.

This was the condition of affairs when my position in Holstein was again and again attacked by Austria, up to a degree Prussia was no longer able to bear. Before, however, I found myself compelled to resolve upon extreme measures, I succeeded, not in removing, but in once more postponing the danger by the conclusion of the Gastein Convention. During the operation of that convention, the veil was removed which had hitherto concealed the intention of Austria actively to commence the long-threatened and unavoidable contest with Prussia—the contest for preponderating influence in Germany. This influence is the vital element of Prussia's existence, and not to have accepted the struggle would have been to sacrifice her future. Two things were essential to carry out this great contest—1, the conviction of the justice of our claims, which alone could enable us to hope for the protection of the Most High by conferring upon us that success in war which lies in His hand; 2, the instrument by which this was to be effected—viz. the Prussian army. I had no doubt that the instrument was effective; for my whole life had been devoted to the development of the army, and I could trust myself to form an opinion as to its capability. It appeared to me clear that the demands of Prussia were

just, because she could not continue to exist and develop prosperously without their fulfilment; and therefore I determined, with a sorrowful heart, upon the decisive struggle, committing its issue to God. The results that have signalised the contest of two mighty States, undreamt of by me to such an extent, and unexampled for rapidity, indicate a visible interposition of Providence, without which even the best-disciplined army could not have gained such triumphs.

The position of the Government of your country prior to and during the development of these events is known to you. You are aware of the vote passed by the Bund on June 14, and devoid of all foundation in federal law, that only recognises one species of execution—an execution to which, had it been voted, I could not have submitted, but which would have made the breach of the federal ties less evidently hostile to Prussia. You are aware that I repeatedly summoned Hanover to join me. You know all about the expedition of the Hanoverian army and the catastrophe at Langensalza, where I do not say that I was the victor, but which in its consequences led to the annihilation of the Hanoverian army. These wonderful successes have given me the right of freely deciding upon the course to adopt. It did not require either addresses or deputations to make me aware of the importance of the measure which you desire to see withdrawn. Nevertheless, I again offer you my thanks. We have frankly said to each other what we think, and I prefer that, because it holds out a hope of a better understanding in future. The most careful consideration, doubly painful because of my relationship to the House of Hanover, imposes annexation on me as a duty. I owe it to my country to compensate it for the immense sacrifice it has made, and therefore I am bound to render impossible in the future any recurrence of danger from the hostile attitude of Hanover.'

Herr von Munchhausen, in his reply, said:

'If the decision of your Majesty is irrevocable, henceforward the most loyal and reasonable Hanoverian has no other resource but to endeavour to convert the bitterness and excitement partly created by the intention of annexation into a sentiment of hopeless resignation to the unavoidable decrees of Providence.'

Hanover, then, will be annexed; but those of the Hanoverians who require some time before they can make up their minds to transfer their allegiance to another sovereign will be indulgently treated and respected for their fidelity to fallen grandeur. It is easy to foresee, that this policy, uniting resolute action, where action is indispensable, with considerate regard for the feelings of others,

will speedily result in reconciling all parties alike to the change.

For the present, people are satisfied that there is no prospect of any disturbance for a good year to come. In a year so many changes may take place, that some consider all chance of a quarrel as a thing of the past. In the mean time there are plenty of political matters which form abundant subjects of conversation. Besides the numerous questions of internal German politics, there are a variety of external events which promise to keep the diplomatists busy, although the warriors are allowed to rest. The mission of General von Manteuffel to St. Petersburg, and the subsequent lenient treatment of Hesse-Darmstadt, have given rise to the idea that Russia does not look with the most favourable eye upon the consolidation of Northern Germany. Then there are the Danubian Principalities, where Prince Charles of Hohenzollern is endeavouring to establish an empire. The interminable Eastern question seems also likely to crop up again from the insurrection in Candia; and to-day an article has appeared in the *Nord-Deutsche Zeitung*, the semi-official organ of the Government, which has led some people to believe that a Belgian controversy may possibly arise. Many wise heads have been shaken seriously over that article, which, adverting to the hostile tone the Belgian press has lately adopted towards Prussia, asserts that these attacks proceed from the same French-speaking minority in the kingdom, which oppresses the Flemish majority among its countrymen, whose language is a German dialect. The article finishes by advancing the theory that freedom of the press does not exonerate a state from being responsible for what appears in its journals, and advises the ruling nationality of Belgium to recognise this fact.

FRANCE DISAVOWS HER DEMAND OF TERRITORY.

Berlin, September 8, 1866.

FROM the first, the change of Ministry in France had been regarded in Prussia as indicative of a peace-policy on the part of the Emperor Napoleon. Lately the hope of there being no likelihood of any interruption in the friendly relations between the two contiguous States has been enhanced by a letter from the Emperor to M. Lavalette. This letter contains directions as to the news which is to be published in the French journals, and orders the Minister to disavow the existence in the Cabinet of the Tuileries of any intentions of war or territorial aggrandisement. The concluding sentence runs thus:

'The real interest of France is not by any means to obtain an insignificant increase of territory, but to support Germany, so that she may form her Constitution in the manner most advantageous to her own interests, and those of Europe.'

Taking this in connection with the whole letter, and as a sequel to the retirement of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, we are justified in arriving at the conclusion that the Emperor has no intention at present to push by force of arms the claims advanced by his late Minister for Foreign Affairs. Such, at any rate, is the prevalent opinion here. At the same time, some importance is attached to private letters from good authorities in Paris, which say that M. de Moustier's tenure of office is regarded as only very temporary and transient; that the present French Minister for Foreign Affairs will hold his portfolio only until the excitement aroused by late events has subsided; and that then, though probably not until after the close of the Paris Exhibition for 1867, when the French army will have been provided with chassepots, and obtained what is quite as important as the arm itself, skill and aptitude in its use, the real feelings of the French Government with regard to the new state of affairs in Germany will be declared.

EASTERN AGITATION.

Berlin, September 11, 1866.

THE Eastern question, the pale spectre which so lately scared quiet from Europe, seems again about to assume a formidable aspect. It is no longer the insurrection in Candia alone which causes uneasiness. Movements are beginning in Epirus and in the islands of Chios and Cyprus, which look like the prelude to the extension of uneasiness over a wide area. Perhaps they will turn out to be the low rumbling noises which precede an earthquake. The Porte perceives the dangers of the present situation, and is making military endeavours to avert the storm. Negotiations have been also opened between Constantinople and Greece, with the view of preventing a Greek volunteer expedition to Candia; but the Athens Government scarcely finds itself in a position to forbid such an undertaking, even if it had any wish to do so. A Constantinople correspondent of a German paper says that in Candia the whole Grecian population is preparing for a struggle, and that the old men, and the women and children, have been sent to Smyrna and the neighbouring islands. He concludes his letter as follows:

'That Russia is continually stirring the Greek fire is well known here. It is a striking fact, that just at this time the Russian envoy, General Ignatieff, should have undertaken a pleasure-trip through Thessaly, where there are also symptoms of ebullition. The Turkish Ministers of War and Marine have had a conference which lasted through half the night. Roumania also causes us anxiety. Russia bespeaks the protectorate of the Danubian Principalities. Where will this all end?'

The *Correspondance Russe*—a paper semi-officially published at St. Petersburg—defends Russia against such imputations:

'Is Russia to be blamed for the recent disturbances in the East? Just look at the realities of the case. On the one hand, Austria, since her expulsion from Germany, is directed to look eastward by her European

friends, who would place her at the head of all the Slavonian nationalities. On the other hand, Turkey is struggling against dangers exceeding her strength. The Western Powers certainly wish to solve the Eastern question without the participation of Russia: but are we to look on quietly while all is in activity around us? . . . . We wish to make no conquests; we have no intention to stretch our rule into the East. But if Christian peoples rise, who are groaning under the Turkish yoke, shall it be Russia alone which does not recognise them with sympathy? Shall we, their co-religionists, not support their exertions?'

However much Russia may disclaim any ideas of conquest in the East, the races subject to Turkey have been accustomed to count upon her support. Whenever they rise, they do so in the hope of being assisted by their Panslavonian and orthodox friends at St. Petersburg; and they are rising at this moment.

There can be no doubt that the Eastern question just now bears a sinister aspect. English and French ships of war are at Candia, where Greek officers are reported to have arrived to assist the insurgents in their struggle.

THE NORTH GERMAN FRANCHISE.

Berlin, September 13, 1866.

THE Bill for the election of deputies for the North German Parliament was passed yesterday by the Prussian Commons. It is a law of great importance, as the members returned under it will, conjointly with those for the minor States, be called upon to enact the federal treaties and charter of Northern Germany.

Its preamble states:

'As far back as the 9th of April last, the King's Government proposed to the late Germanic Diet a constitutional reform, and the convocation of a Federal Parliament chosen by direct elections. Those propositions are set forth in the 4th article of the draught of a new Federal Pact communicated on June 10th of this year to all the States lately confederated

as well as to the Germanic Diet in its sitting of June 14th. After the dissolution of the Germanic Confederation, Prussia, on July 16th, invited the States of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Saxe-Weimar, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Anhalt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Waldeck, Reuss (the elder and junior branches), Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe, Lubeck, Hamburg, and Bremen, to conclude with her an alliance upon the basis of the above-mentioned draught Constitution, with an obligation of military alliance and a speedy convocation of the Parliament by Prussia. This proposition was declined only by the Governments of Saxe-Meiningen and the elder branch of Reuss. It was not possible while the war was pending to convey to our allies the desire that they should make preparations for parliamentary elections by the division of their territories into electoral districts. In the interval, the relations of the north and of the centre of Germany have been sensibly modified by the war. It will further the consolidation of the new Confederation that the Parliament should assemble speedily. The greater number of the confederate States have addressed communications to the King's Government upon the subject of the preparatory measures they have adopted with a view to the elections, and it is especially necessary that the requisite steps should be taken by Prussia herself. For this purpose the King's Government submits the old statute of April 12, 1849, with some indispensable modifications, as the electoral law for the Parliament of the Confederation of Northern Germany, reserving to itself the right of issuing regulations governing the details of voting.'

The following is a summary of the clauses of the bill as voted by the Prussian Lower House:

'1. A Parliament is to be assembled to discuss a Constitution to be enacted for the North German Confederation.

2. Every man blameless in the eye of the law, who is a citizen of one of the German States united in the Confederation, is to be a voter as soon as he has attained the age of 25.

3. From the right of voting are excluded (1) Persons who are under guardianship or trusteeship. (2) Persons against whose property rules of bankruptcy have been granted, during the term of such bankruptcy. (3) Persons who obtain support as paupers from the funds of the State or of their district, or who have obtained such support during the year preceding the election.

4. As criminals, and therefore excluded from the right of voting, shall be considered those from whom the full and perfect enjoyment of their rights as citizens has been withdrawn by legal sentence, as long as these rights are not restored to them.

5. Any man entitled to vote, who has belonged for at least three

years to one of the States forming the Confederation, may be elected as deputy. Penalties for political offences which have been undergone or remitted do not exclude from election.

6. Persons holding public offices shall not require leave of absence to enter the Parliament.

7. There shall be one deputy for each 100,000 souls upon the total of the population, as ascertained by the last census. Any excess of 50,000 upon the total population shall be reckoned as 100,000. Each deputy to be elected for a distinct electoral district.

8. The electoral districts shall be divided into small sub-districts, in order to facilitate voting.

9. In order to exercise the right of voting in a particular electoral district, a person must be resident at the time within such district. No person can vote for more than one place.

10. In each district registers shall be made out, showing the christian and surnames, the ages, callings, and residences of the electors. Lists shall be publicly exhibited at least four weeks prior to the day of election, in order that any one may examine them. Any objection to such lists must be made within a week after their publication to the proper authority, which will examine into the objections, and which will pronounce upon them within the following fortnight, after which the lists will be considered as closed. Only those persons whose names appear on the lists can take part in the elections.

11. Elections are to be public, and are to take place under the superintendence of persons not filling any official or commercial office. The right of election to be exercised by personally depositing an unsigned voting-paper in a box to be provided for the purpose.

12. Elections are to be direct and are to be determined by an absolute majority of the votes in the respective electoral districts. If at any election an absolute majority of votes shall not be obtained, the candidate having the largest relative number of votes shall be elected. In case of an equality of votes, the election shall be decided by lot.

13. Representatives or proxies from deputies cannot be elected.

14. The polls are to take place at the same time in the whole of the State.

15. The electoral districts, the directors of, and the proceedings at the elections, in so far as they are not determined by the present bill, are to be settled by the Government.

16. The Parliament examines into the privileges of its members, and decides upon the granting of them. It regulates the order of its business, and its discipline.

17. No member of the Parliament can at any time be prosecuted in a court of justice or a police court on account of his vote, or for any utterances made use of in the exercise of his office, or be otherwise rendered responsible outside of the Assembly.'

This Act differs in some points from the form in which it was introduced by the Government.

The first paragraph was prefixed by the committee to whom the bill was referred, it appearing necessary to clearly define the business of the coming *Constituante.*

The second paragraph was likewise framed in committee. The original Government bill proposed that Prussians should be voters only in Prussia, Brunswickers in Brunswick, and so on, every German only in his own state. The committee, however, objecting to this restriction of the franchise, every federal subject will be entitled to vote in every federal State. The clause, as it now stands, makes the citizen of one State a citizen of all the others, as far as the exercise of the franchise is concerned. This is the introduction of a new principle into German law, and the first practical result of unity. Now that it has prevailed at last, this liberal notion of German citizenship will no doubt be by degrees applied to every department of legislation, let particularists resist it ever so much.

The fifth paragraph, originally proposing that only Prussians should be eligible in Prussia, was altered in accordance with the modification introduced into the second.

The twelfth paragraph provides that the deputies are to be elected by the immediate suffrages of the voters. This is not the case in the elections for the Prussian House of Deputies, where the mass of the voters elect electors, who then elect the deputies. The new arrangement adopts the fashionable, though none the less questionable, principle of universal suffrage; whereas the old one, by dividing the voters into three classes, according to the taxes paid, and allowing each an equal number of electors, secures the predominance of the educated portion of society. It remains to be seen how the democratic innovation adopted will work, and whether it will be retained in the new charter to be enacted by the Constituent Assembly.

Not the least interesting portion of the proceedings

was the protest handed in by the Polish deputies. It is as follows:

'In consideration that, by articles 1, 2, and 14 of the Acte Finale of the treaty of Vienna, dated the 9th of June 1815, and articles 1, 2, and 23 of the treaty between Russia and Prussia of the 3d of May 1815, a national separate existence was guaranteed to the districts of the former duchy of Warsaw, which fell to Prussia:

In consideration that the Vistula province, called East Prussia, has never belonged to the German Empire, and therefore not to the German Confederation (article 1 of the Bund Act of the 8th of June 1815); that the right belongs to the Poles of East Prussia to be treated as Poles, by article 28 of the treaty between Russia and Prussia, of the 3d of May 1815, together with the answer of Prince Hardenberg, written by the King's command, to the note of Lord Castlereagh of the 12th of January 1815:

In further consideration that, in a bill brought before the Prussian Parliament, by the King's Government, for the enactment of a law of election for a North German Parliament, the intention is clearly expressed to include the Grand Duchy of Posen in the German Confederation, an intention which is in direct opposition to the above stipulations:

Lastly, in consideration that international treaties cannot be one-sidedly broken, and that, in recognition of this principle, former attempts to extend the territory of the German Bund were protested against by the Cabinets of England, France, and Russia (Notes of 6th of July 1848 and 5th of March 1851):

The undersigned Deputies of the Polish nationality declare that the incorporation of Posen and East Prussia with the North German Confederation would be against their will and wish, and hereby protest most solemnly against the competency of the House of Deputies to destroy international treaties by one-sided decrees, to stamp Germanity upon the Poles of the Polish provinces of Prussia, and to deprive them of their guaranteed national existence.'

No one supposes that this protest will have any more effect on the Government than it had on the House of Deputies. In the first place, the stipulations referred to by the Poles are ambiguously worded and difficult of interpretation. Next, the Posen Poles, in the course of time, have dwindled down to a figure representing about one-half the inhabitants of the province only; in East Prussia they form no more than a fifth. To constitute these provinces into separate States of Polish nationality would cause the

Germans in them to utter the same complaint which we now hear from the Poles. It would, moreover, be bitterly resented by Russia, who finds it no easy task to coerce her own Poles even now, when they have no independent Commonwealth of their own race to rely upon for help and encouragement; and it would be only too readily welcomed by France, who has so often wished to restore Poland, in order to make it her ally against Russia and Germany alike. Under these circumstances, is it to be expected that the treaties of 1815 being regarded as obsolete in every other part of Europe, will be strictly enforced in Posen alone? Still, it is a pity that the State should so little contribute to cultivate and develop the fine language and literature of the Poles. Their literature, reflecting as it does the characteristic features of their bold, quick, and intelligent mind, is not at all deficient in merit, and might have a future, even though an adverse fate has deprived the race of political independence.

PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA.

Berlin, October 15, 1866.

ABOUT a fortnight since, a statement appeared in the semi-official *Journal de St. Pétersbourg* to the effect that this Government had endeavoured to secure Austria's co-operation in an attempt to settle the Eastern question in unison with the interests of Germany. Austria, we were farther told, had replied in the negative, accounting for her refusal by the sarcastic remark, that as she no longer was reckoned among the German States, she would consult her own interests solely in this or any other affair. This statement is correct, as far as it goes. To supply a full account of what had taken place, the Russian journal ought to have

added, that the efforts of the Prussian Government had not been limited to Vienna, but extended to France. The motives of the Prussian Government in suddenly including the East in its diplomatic action, and opposing Russia on the very point so long the keystone of her entire policy, seem to be of a double nature. In the weeks immediately preceding a war which found Prussia a struggling state, and made her into one of the most formidable Powers of the world, Russia sent some special messages to Berlin, to advise this Government to yield and surrender to its presumptuous enemies. Then, when Austria had been overcome, Russia resumed her remonstrance, politely but firmly. It was at the time when the resolves of Napoleon were wavering in the balance, and when it seemed as though the French eagle would quit its eyry to rescue its two-headed Austrian friend. In those days of intense anxiety, Russia energetically endeavoured to obtain better terms for the minor dynasties than might have been otherwise accorded them. Simultaneously with this, the Russian press were allowed to assume a hostile attitude against the unifying policy of this Government. In nearly every paper of St. Petersburg a strong Germany was represented as a dangerous neighbour. The Moscow journals were even more violent, and loudly protested against a first-rate military power superseding the motley group of small and feeble States so long subsisting on their western frontiers. All the while, it is true, the Czar remained on terms of intimacy with the King, and never pressed any wishes upon his revered uncle, except in the form of friendly and confidential requests. Yet what had happened naturally made Prussia all the more disposed to look to number one. Indeed, at so critical a time she could scarcely afford to lose sight of her own interests.

Now Count Bismarck seems to apprehend that Austria meditates disputing with him the supremacy in Germany in a second campaign. He knows best how dubious was the bearing of France in the first, and that he had to thank,

not the benevolent intentions of the Emperor Napoleon, but the unparalleled rapidity and decisiveness of his own victories, if, in addition to the blue trousers, he had not to face the red pantaloons also. What, then, is more natural for a statesman of his enterprise than to conceive the idea of forestalling a new trial of strength by diverting the energies of an eventual enemy and an ambiguous neutral to a new and distant field of action? And what could be more lucky than that Russia, which he has not at present any very cogent reason for obliging, should supply him with an opportunity of employing Austria and France? Russia once again patronises the dissatisfied subjects of the Porte, and raises misgivings that her old hankerings after the Bosphorus have not been laid aside. France and Austria are thus touched to the quick, and must prepare, in the event of a commotion in the East, either to make common cause with Russia, or to fight her again, as so often before.

Of all possible politics, Austria will hardly adopt that of joining Russia in a common adventure in the East, while she can help it. Enfeebled by the international hatred of her polyglot subjects, she cannot wish to increase her embarrassments by acquiring another foreign nationality, another recusant province. Least of all could she wish it, were another portion of the same nationality to be formed into a more or less independent state, under the protection of a cognate and co-religionist power. If she got any of the Turkish Slavonians, the rest being placed under Russian patronage, how long could she hope to retain her acquisition? As long as Austria is strong enough to pursue an independent policy, she will, therefore, not easily be induced to make common cause with Russia in the East. As to France, her German politics link her so closely to Austria, that, for the time being, there is no likelihood of her adopting a course in which her ally cannot follow her. Both, then, will oppose Russia in the Orient.

Yet Count Bismarck's suggestions have not met with particular encouragement either at Paris or Vienna. Apart from their disinclination to become involved in any extensive undertakings during the illness of the Emperor, the French Government evidently deem it unadvisable to prematurely resign the power of interference in Germany by entering into complications in the East. Whether France also believes that the Oriental difficulty is not yet ripe for convenient solution, is a question which will most likely be answered according to the future proceedings of Russia in those unsettled parts. It is by no means impossible that Russia, who, in favouring the first timid essays of the Greeks, counted upon prolonged war in Germany, will think it safer to postpone her designs under the present aspect of things, and call her clients to order. As regards Austria, she will not move in the matter without France. Alone she is neither strong enough nor will she relinquish her German aspirations, as long as France, her probable ally in the next war, does not likewise lay aside all covetous ambition in that direction. On this account, I am led to believe that the negotiations, nipped in the bud as they were, never progressed to that stage in which it would have been necessary to determine what was to become of the Ottoman territory when taken from the Ottomans.

Still, things have gone far enough for us to take some interest in the hopes and apprehensions awakened by the revival of this vexed question. I will subjoin three articles, respectively selected from a Russian, a Ruthenian, and a Polish paper. From their contents, as well as the tone in which they are written, it will appear that the affair is attentively watched in Slavonic countries, and there at all events regarded as a grave one.

The first article is taken from the *Posen Dziennik*. It is entitled 'Russia and Prussia,' and endeavours to make the Polish nobility, whose organ the paper is, profit by the coolness that has lately supervened in the Russo-

Prussian relations. Its great length precludes me from giving more than an extract:

'The late victories of Prussia have inflicted the death-blow to what remained of the Holy Alliance. The immediate consequence of the change is the cessation of the good understanding that has so long subsisted between the Berlin and St. Petersburg Courts, and the recognition of the principle of nationality by the former. Prussia is now a great Power, in the full signification of the term, and aspires to the establishment of an even greater realm than she calls her own since the day of Königgrätz. How imprudent, then, of Russia to maltreat the Poles, and force them to look out for help wherever it is likely to be had! It is easy to foresee that, sooner or later, the incipient estrangement of Prussia from Muscovy will burst out into violent animosity. Even now the semi-official journal of St. Petersburg is highly indignant that "a considerable portion of Germany should have been remodelled to the injury of her neighbours," and that "Prussia should have been allowed to widen her frontiers." The only consolation of the journal in all this is, that "if Prussia establish a new empire by the mere exercise of brute force, she may one day find herself compelled to yield to superior strength, and abandon her victories accordingly." An even more menacing article of the same journal but lately advised the Prussian Government that Russia, irritated by Prussia's want of regard for her feelings, thought herself freed from all obligations towards her former ally, and must claim full liberty of action in future. With this we ought to join two other facts. Only the other day, Count Bismarck told the Prussian Chamber that there was not a Power in Europe but had witnessed the growth of the Prussian Monarchy with feelings of envy and ill will. This was coming out strongly, yet it did not prevent the Czar from receiving the Hanoverian General Knesebeck, who had come to ask for help in the name of his exiled master. Of the language used by the uninspired portion of the Russian press, it would be superfluous to speak. A state of hostility has already obtained, and war will ensue in due course. That war can be decided only in Poland, and the decision will in no small degree be influenced by the Poles. It would, then, benefit Prussia were she to give up at once all idea of annexing the whole of our country this side the Vistula, and were she to befriend us in this early stage of a new era. And what motives could induce Prussia to act differently, now that she no longer cares for the anger of Muscovy, but, on the contrary, had better look out for allies against an enemy with whom she can never hope to be reconciled? Reviewing the treatment of the Poles in Prussia, we find on the whole they had nothing particular to complain of, except when the Government, by their too willing compliance with Russian demands, were driven to acts of persecution. [Here follows a lengthy historical survey, intended to substantiate this assertion.] But the Russo-Prussian

alliance is severed at length, and we may hope that our rights may be restored to us, and that a strong Poland will one day be constituted, to serve as a barrier between civilised Germany and barbarous Muscovy.'

The Germans have long been of opinion that Polish insurrections, if successful, would result in establishing in their rear a permanent ally of France. Too weak to have an independent policy, too impetuous not to like the excitement of war, and too poor to be restrained by the ordinary motives of industrial society, a new Poland, it was thought, would be a thorn in their side. Were Russia ever to become hostile to them, their views on this head might undergo a marked modification. But coolness is not hostility, and diplomatic bickerings do not necessarily estrange two friendly, related and anciently allied courts. As yet anticipations of a Russo-German war are utterly unfounded. As an incidental remark, I may, however, add, that were territorial changes ever to take place in those open and not easily defended parts, the German generals would probably endeavour to possess themselves of the point of confluence of the Nareff, Bug, and Vistula rivers. Remembering that the Polish Parliament, in the last days of its independence, solemnly enacted a chivalrous, but to neighbours not very pleasant, resolution, to the effect, '*Turbulentam malumus libertatem quiam quietam disciplinam*,'—German military men, on a former occasion, advised their Governments to occupy this strategical position, which they think any enemy would find it difficult to wrench from them.

My second extract is from an article in the well-known Moscow review, *Sovremennaya Lyetopis*, signed 'A Traveller:'

'Journeying in Prussia, I found the people so changed that I scarcely recognised them. I had a most interesting conversation with a staff Officer in Berlin, who, with all candour, informed me that a war with Russia was considered imminent by him and his comrades. Such a war, he said, would be popular, successful, and short. It would be confined to the borders, and would be carried on in a locality in which no very

serious resistance could be offered by us. The object of operations would be Wilna, the seizure of which and its railway would cut off Poland from Russia. The Prussian army as it advanced might be easily victualled by transports on the Niemen, and also along the road parallel to that river. While this army would act on the offensive, another stationed in north-eastern Posen, near Bromberg, would suffice to keep in check all the garrisons distributed over the Polish towns and fortresses. The retreat of the invading army would be secured by the fortresses of Königsberg, Lœtzen, and Dantzic, in their rear. Lœtzen has been but lately strengthened by Austrian prisoners of war being set to work on it. In reply to these disclosures, I could not but observe to my gallant informant, that there would be nothing in the occupation of Wilna to compel us to peace. If, I told him, the capture of Moscow in 1813 had not forced us to succumb, we might well do without Wilna for a time in 1866. The officer replied, that wars were not what they had been; that victory must be prepared for in the very outset; and that no Government in the present day represented a single will strong enough to carry everything before it. However that may be, it is evident that Count Bismarck, who knew so well how to deceive Austria at first, and subsequently menaced to let Hungary and Bohemia loose against her, would not hesitate to employ Jesuitical tricks and revolution also against us.'

The Russian traveller might have added, that his country has hitherto found it impossible to collect more than 200,000 men on the frontiers. When the railways are once finished, it will be different.

I conclude my translations with an extract which, although copied from a facetious paper, is, perhaps, the most serious of the three. I draw it from the *Strachopud*, a sort of *Punch* in the Ruthenian language, published at Vienna. This remarkable periodical was founded four years ago in the interest of the Russian Government, and is designed to stir up the Ruthenian peasantry inhabiting Eastern Galicia to resist any encroachment upon their nationality, proceeding from their Polish landlords or their German Government. It idolises the Russian national character (which the Ruthenians or Malo-Russians, who besides peopling Galicia extend over Volhynia, Podolia, and the Ukraine, largely partake), and is edited with no little wit and address. But, what is more to the purpose, it is an organ well up to the mark in all appertaining to

its limited sphere of action. In its last issue there occurs the following:

'CONVERSATION BETWEEN COUNT BISMARCK AND THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON, AS OVERHEARD BY ONE OF THE SECRET AGENTS OF THE "STRACHOPUD:"

Napoleon. What are we to do with Poland, Count?

Bismarck. You know, Sire, I have no great affection for the Poles; I do not think I shall reëstablish them.

Napoleon. I always thought you liked them mightily.

Bismarck. What grounds have you for such a supposition?

Napoleon. Simply this: I always understood you opposed the idea of restoring Poland. Now, that was showing yourself a friend of the Poles; for only their worst enemy could suggest their becoming independent. Besides, a people of 6,000,000 situate between so many more populous countries than themselves would be the slave of the foreigner; and has it never struck you, that in this age, when the principle of national union is everywhere recognised, the Poles have no right to dissever themselves from the great empire of the Slavonic race?

Bismarck. How do you account for the Poles not taking this all in?

Napoleon. You need not be astonished at their singular blindness, remembering how the Germans withstood the unifying efforts of Prussia.

Bismarck. Most true; but then I was opposed by false intriguers, devoid of conscience.

Napoleon. All politics are made up of intrigue. In re-instating Poland, I design to ruin her and Panslavism at the same time.

Bismarck. Excellent! If to re-instate Poland is the same as ruining her, I am your man. Let us begin at once.

Napoleon. That's a bargain. Only there is one difficulty to be got over. With the exception of the nobility, the Poles have no wish to become independent. You are aware that I am the apostle of *suffrage universel.*

Bismarck. I am astonished that the noble and intelligent classes among the Poles, numerous as they are, have been unable to gain the confidence of the people.

Napoleon. Why should you be? Notwithstanding the influence exercised by Western Europe upon Poland for centuries, the best part of her people remain faithful to Slavonian principles, and do not listen to those of their countrymen whose Slavonian hearts have been corrupted by foreign culture. And then the people are so happy under Alexander II. that they instinctively feel he can be no foreigner.

(Enter an Adjutant.)

Adjutant. Sire, Prince Metternich, the Austrian Ambassador, solicits an audience.

Napoleon. Desire him to walk in. (To Bismarck) Metternich understands these things better than you do.'

The last hit of this serio-comic conversation is the unkindest cut of all, aiming, as it does, at the Austrian Emperor, and what his Ruthenian subjects think of him. I need scarcely add, that nothing like the above would have been published in that particular journal, did not Russia suspect that something was going on between Napoleon and Bismarck.

It deserves to be mentioned, that since the mooting of the new Oriental schemes, Napoleon III. has relaxed in his endeavours to shelter the King of Saxony from the consequences of the war. King John, whose ancestors once sat on the throne of Poland, and whose dynasty have never entirely broken off their connection with the magnates of their former dominion, was Napoleon's candidate for the crown of that country at the time of the last insurrection, three years ago. While French notes were vindicating Polish rights at St. Petersburg, revolutionary papers in the Polish language were published in Saxony, and arms and ammunition sent to Warsaw *viâ* Dresden and Leipsic. However, that occurred long enough ago to be obliterated in these eventful times, and if Napoleon to-day does not assist the King of Saxony in Saxony so energetically as he did, he may have many other reasons for his reserve than the vague hope of installing him some day in Poland.

On the 10th inst. General Berg and the leading Generals of the Russian army in Poland were summoned to St. Petersburg by telegraph, to attend a series of military councils to be held there. At the same time it was ordered that large quantities of oats should be bought and stored for army purposes in Poland,—a measure usually confined to periods preceding war. An uncommonly large quantity of lead has been ordered of a Warsaw commercial firm.

AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA.

Berlin, October 20, 1866.

It really seems as though the events of the summer had been too momentous to allow of the autumn becoming what it usually is—the dead season. About a week ago, General Montebello, the French Commandant at Rome, received formal orders from head-quarters touching the evacuation of the Holy City. At the same time, the Pope was promised the more than diplomatic assistance of Spain in case of desertion by France, and, moreover, heard the gladdening intelligence from America that the loan which Messrs. Blunt and Rasen have been raising for him in the United States is all but subscribed. While a great crisis is thus drawing on in the South, symptoms of as serious a nature are noticeable in the North and East. It is now pretty clear why Russia has suddenly countermanded the departure of her troops from Poland. Her press has assumed a menacing tone towards Austria, on account of the avowed intention of the latter to Polonise the Ruthenian (or more correctly Russinian) peasantry of Eastern Galicia. The language employed by the Russian papers in furious unison has been heard also in the council-hall of the Czar, and found a ready echo in the more moderate but no less significant utterances of his diplomatists both at Vienna and St. Petersburg. The effect of this undisguised hostility upon the minds of Austrian statesmen has been strong enough to cause them to apprehend something more than words being contemplated by the Russian Government. I believe I am correct in saying, that the expediency of occupying Galicia with some considerable force has been already discussed by the Ministers of Francis Joseph.

Berlin politicians on their part, closely watching the seething caldron of Oriental affairs, and observing a new

phenomenon in the visible eagerness of Russian diplomacy to make the Russinian grievances a cause of quarrel, cannot help speculating upon the ultimate intentions of their Northern friends. Is it not possible, they ask, that, dreading a European attack in case of her interfering with Turkey, Russia should be preparing to forestall the blow? Does she, perhaps, think of attacking Austria, who would be one of her worst antagonists in such a *mêlée*, and disabling her single-handed before the more comprehensive conflict begins? Or does she not mean to fight, but only wishes to prevent the formation of a league she fears? Does she aim at giving Austria something to do at home, to prevent her taking an active interest in foreign politics? Does she, perchance, patronise the Russinians, merely to prohibit their sovereign from interfering with her own doings in Turkey? Such are the considerations current in political circles in this capital. People are apt to ascribe a good deal of initiative to the Russian Government, and their conjectures are naturally strengthened by the fact that Austria, were she now taken by surprise, alone, and so soon after her recent defeat, might find it no easy matter to hold her ground. While on this subject, it will not be superfluous to remark that the Swedish press, so far as its organs can lay claim to political weight, has suddenly raised an outcry at the Russian lust of conquest, and insists upon their Cabinet entering into alliance with Prussia. The Liberal *Göteborg Gazette* and *Malmö Journal* harmonise on this head with the Liberal-Conservative *Nya Dagligt Allehanda*. Even the Pan-Scandinavian *Aftonbladet*, though it cannot bring itself to befriend Prussia, its enemy since the Danish quarrel, seconds the common action of its contemporaries by sounding the alarm against the Czar. Whatever may have occasioned these warning calls, Russia has manifested no present hankerings after Swedish territory. Is it a mere panic, caused by the heavings and flarings of the European volcano?

General Klapka, the Commander of the late Hungaro-Prussian Legion, has repaired to Paris. On his way thither he had an interview with some other Hungarian exiles, who met him at Cologne. If the *Vienna Gazette* has given us to understand that he has not been thought worthy of any particular regard at the hands of this Government, all I can say is, that the principal object in editing certain official papers seems to be to contradict, at all odds, anything unpleasant.

The King has sanctioned the military organisation of the new provinces. Owing, however, to the leniency to be shown the new subjects for some time to come, the army, it is probable, will not immediately be increased by the figures officially set down. Gentlemen conversant with the indulgent spirit in which the conscription laws of this country are for the present to be exercised in Hanover, Nassau, and Hesse, assure me that the addition to the army from this source will in the next ten months hardly exceed 70,000 men. To this must be added 60,000 men more, which the Northern Confederacy, Saxony included, is expected to raise in the same time. Were no war to break out in the immediate future, the Prussian system, according to the purposes of the King, would be so gradually introduced in the lately-acquired territory, that ten years would have to elapse before the first ban of their Landwehr could be completely organised, and their battalions, both Line and Landwehr, brought to the full complement of 1,002 men. But this is a plan resting on a supposition somewhat Utopian in this iron age. From what I learn, it appears that none of the new regiments will be formed without a Prussian admixture, and that the majority of the staff-officers to be placed at their head will be selected from among the old and tried warriors of the dynasty. In the impending conscription in the new provinces those only are to be included who have attained to the 21st year of their age. This is in accordance with

a regulation prevalent in the minor States, but which deviates from the ordinary law of this country, rendering military service obligatory from the 19th year. In consequence of this exceptional favour accorded them, all those in the new provinces who have completed their 22d year, as well as their seniors, if they have not yet served, will be entirely exempt from doing so, provided there is no war. This liberates the greater part of the population at one stroke, but a small proportion of the able-bodied having been formerly levied in those unwarlike territories. If anything could reconcile the Neo-Prussians to the military laws of this monarchy—the most onerous feature of their altered condition—it would surely be the considerate laxity with which the severe but indispensable duty of defending the land is temporarily enforced upon them.

The King of Hanover has refused the offer of a magnificent income made him by this Government in case he formally resigns his claims. I do not know whether this has anything to do with the Government having resolved to continue the war-tax two months more in the former dominion of King George. It would not be fair to make the whole country pay for the encouragement he derives from the attitude of a few isolated towns.

In Saxony, though its Sovereign has at length made up his mind to arrange matters with this Cabinet, hostile demonstrations against him are still the order of the day. The town-council of Leipsic, by far the largest and most important place in the kingdom, have passed another outspoken resolution, which purports that no peace should be granted to their legitimate master by Prussia, unless it were of a kind to prevent an independent foreign policy being ever again pursued by him. Not content with this, they have expressed their conviction that King John, if he cannot resolve to make the requisite concessions to the central Government of the nation, should summon the Saxon Parliament, and have the question settled under

its auspices. Under the term 'Saxon Parliament,' they do not, however, understand the reactionary assembly created by Baron Beust, after abrogating the Charter of 1848, but a Parliament convened under the old Constitution, which would enable the people to make their voice heard. A petition in the same spirit has been signed by the leading firms of the manufacturing towns of Buchholz and Annaberg, and actually presented to his Saxon Majesty. Though the text frankly informs the reluctant Sovereign that the sacrifice of some of his prerogatives is necessary to make Germany a strong and united country, yet he received the deputation and conversed affably with its members. King John is a highly cultivated and well-intentioned prince; and if he once reconciles himself to the necessity of handing over a portion of his rights to the nation, and to that dynasty, which is the only possible trustee of the nation, he will no doubt become a faithful and most strenuous supporter of the new Confederacy.* The Saxon manufacturers, whose prosperity depends upon being on the most intimate footing with Prussia, have just had another opportunity of convincing themselves of the advantages of their commercial and political creed. In reply to the prayer of some Leipsic firms, who asked for the protection of their interests in a distant land, the Berlin Ministry of Foreign Affairs have declared their willingness to extend their good offices to Saxon subjects, as solicited. The petition, and the reply given it, afford a good illustration of the practical bearing of the unity movement. Are the minor sovereigns to remain independent, when they are powerless to shield their subjects from injury abroad? Or are they to yield up the right of diplomatic representation, which they cannot turn to account, to the only State in Germany strong enough to use it to

* Three years and nine months after this, the Crown Prince of Saxony, at the head of a combined Prussian and Saxon force, took an important part in capturing the Emperor Napoleon and his army at Sedan.

some purpose? Some readers may be interested to learn, that the petitioners in the present instance complained of the alleged iniquity of the Egyptian Government in sheltering native bankrupts from their creditors. Unless, they added, the Viceroy could be prevailed upon to let justice take its course, the European firms at Alexandria, and the many German houses with whom they were connected, would be obliged to withdraw from Egyptian trade altogether. In compliance with their request, Prussia has now ordered her consuls to make the collection of mercantile debts an object of their special care.

According to intelligence received from the eastern shores of Siberia, the works for the construction of the Russo-American telegraph are progressing satisfactorily, but will not be completed for three years. The *Sibirski Vyestnick*, an Irkutsk paper, contains an explicit report upon the late rebellion of the Polish political prisoners, and its tragical issue. If this paper can be trusted, 717 out of the 721 who were captives in the neighbourhood of Lake Baikal, and joined in the insurrection, have been either killed or have fallen again into the hands of the authorities. The slain amount to 34. In another official report it is stated that 38 exiles have succeeded in making their escape from Nertchinsk. Their only road to freedom lies through Japan or Tartary. And yet success has in one remarkable instance attended even such a desperate venture as this. M. Bakunine, if I am not mistaken, years ago returned to the world from Siberia *viâ* Japan.

AUSTRIA, RUSSINIA, AND RUSSIA.

Berlin, December 3, 1866.

NOTWITHSTANDING all asseverations to the contrary contained in the Austrian official press, it may be regarded as a positive fact that troops are about to be concentrated in Galicia. Some of the regiments detailed for this service are already under marching orders, and will leave Vienna in a few days. How large the force is to be, and whether it is destined to protect the Austrian frontiers against the Russians, or to prevent the Poles from precipitating matters and bringing on a premature collision between the two neighbouring Governments, is as yet impossible to discern. Simultaneously with this measure the civil and military authorities of the province have been ordered, in a circular issued by the Governor-General, to watch the attitude of the Russinian inhabitants, and report upon it regularly at head-quarters. The slightest symptom of Russian leanings, or of a disposition to introduce orthodox ceremonies into the United Church of the region, is to be communicated at once to the central Government. The authorities are also specially enjoined to prevent the intrusion of Russian emissaries from the other side of the frontier, as well as the clandestine retreat of men of Russinian extraction to Russia. Another item commended to their particular notice is the intention attributed to the Russian Government of smuggling a large quantity of tobacco over the frontier, and distributing it among the Russinian peasantry as a bribe. Supposing the accusation to be correct, the choice of this commodity is sufficiently accounted for by its being a government monopoly in Austria, and one which, by the lower classes, is regarded as a most onerous and unjustifiable burden upon the subject. The circular goes so far as to assert that the tobacco which is to support the political and religious action of a rival Cabinet is lying ready on the

frontier, awaiting the advent of the winter's frosts to be conveniently sent over and portioned out as an earnest of the Czar's bounty. The Russian Government, who by their numerous agents in the country are no doubt as well informed of the existence of this interesting document as the Austrians pretend to be of the hoarding up of the treacherous weed, retaliate upon the offensive charges by permitting their official papers to speak of the desire of the Russinian population to join the kindred state and church of the Czar. But a few days ago the Volhynian Government *Gazette*, the official organ of the province bordering upon Galicia, published a sarcastic article on this delicate subject.

While this is going on in the loftier spheres, the contest between the two antagonistic nationalities, which have suddenly become instruments in the hands of contending Governments, continues unabated in Galicia. In the provincial Parliament just opened at Lemberg, the Poles, being in the majority, are lording it over the Russinians. As the latter insist upon receiving parliamentary papers in their own idiom, the Poles, unable to refuse the demand, yet unwilling to concede it in its entirety, have ordered the translations to be made, not into the literary language of the Russinians, which is almost identical with the Russian, but into a country dialect, a degree removed from the hated tongue of Muscovy. The protests of the minority are ignored. Another cause of complaint has been afforded the Russinians by the Polish majority requiring that the question, whether the use of the Russinian language is to be retained in the village schools, shall be decided in each separate instance by the authorities. Under the present régime this means neither more nor less than that Russinian is to be banished, if not from all, at least from the majority of the schools in which it would be the national and natural medium of instruction.

The Galician Poles, who have so long reproached the

Czar with Russifying the numerous sections of their countrymen subject to his sway, are now seized with a corresponding mania, and in their papers clamorously demand that all possible means should be adopted to Polonise the Jews and Russinians dwelling among them. Of the two devoted nationalities the latter have certainly no indigenous culture to allege as a reason why they should be allowed to preserve their specific idiom; but as they do not want to become Poles, the great principle, the violation of which by Russia has been so often complained of by the Poles, is in their case deliberately set aside by their oppressed oppressors. As to the Jews, their vernacular is German, and their learning, being fed by the spirited though antiquated literature of their race, of no contemptible kind. But the Poles are too excited with the alluring prospects before them to discriminate too nicely between clashing interests. In the Lemberg as well as in the Cracow and Posen papers the promotion of their national claims by Austria and France is represented as a thing imminent, if not already consummated. No slight encouragement has been lately offered them by the Pope commanding the compilation of a work setting forth the injuries sustained by the Catholic church in Russia during the last few years. It is probable, that unless the Pope had reason to expect that his impotent laments would be echoed from some more powerful quarter, he would have hesitated to aggravate the position of his co-religionists by throwing down the gauntlet to the Czar. Until a short time ago, the cautious Antonelli, and those of his brother cardinals whose policy it is to spare Russia, had decidedly the upper hand in the papal councils. But now a grand *expositio et querimonia* is printing at Rome, and, in all probability, will be issued in January next.

A severer blow than the circulation of a mere pamphlet is contemplated by the Pope in another quarter. Now, as in former ages, the principal field of contest between him and Russia is the East. I learn from a reliable source

that the Pope, or more accurately the Holy Propaganda, forming part of the Jesuit Society, have lately endeavoured to win over the bishops of the Oriental Church, and lead them back to the bosom of the Catholic establishment of Rome. Strange as the news may sound, a number of the bishops have listened to their proposals, and there is some prospect of the rest imitating their example. As you may remember, a previous communication of mine, though it attributed less immediate importance to the movement, stated that it was supported by France. The pious endeavours of the latter State have been recently seconded by Austria, and, if the hopes entertained on this head at Vienna and Paris are not altogether too sanguine, we need not wonder that Russia should be beginning to doubt whether she has not delayed her action in the East too long. The Czar has just presented the Prince of Montenegro with forty bells, which it is believed in suspicious quarters, will be recast on their arrival, and devoted to the less religious but equally sounding purpose of gun-barrels.

King William of Prussia has written an autograph letter to the Pope, to express his sympathy with the perilous position in which his sovereign power has been placed by the unification of Italy. There are no symptoms to judge, how far this Government would be prepared to thwart the dearest aspirations of Italy, whose alliance may serve it in good stead on some future occasion, as it has done before; but if an arrangement could be effected without injuring vital interests of his own, the King, being a Conservative, would probably be happy to enter into an understanding with the leading Sovereigns of the world, to maintain the temporal dignity and ancient grandeur of the Papacy.

I cannot pretend to say what object Lord Clarendon and Mr. Gladstone had in view in advising the Pope the other day to call a European Congress at Rome, to

decide upon the secular prospects of the Holy See. Will Pio Nono be the more likely to take the hint in consequence of Mr. Odo Russell informing him, at about the same time, that a refuge in Malta, offered some years ago, would perhaps be denied under existing circumstances?

The Prince of Hohenzollern Hechingen, the heir of the last Sovereign Duke of Courland, has long been carrying on a lawsuit before the Russian courts, to recover the private property of his late relative, appropriated years ago by the Russian Government. After obtaining several decisions in his favour, he has not been so fortunate in the last, which has now been given against him. Another appeal is, however, admissible, and will no doubt be resorted to, as millions are at stake.

TURKEY, AUSTRIA, AND RUSSIA.

Berlin, December 15, 1866.

THE Russian *Invalide* has received alarming intelligence from Crete. According to the news circulated by this official and specific military organ, the Turkish army has lost a battle near Retimo. In the affray 600 Turks were blown up by the springing of a mine fired by a priest, who perished in the act. Twelve hundred more were lost immediately after, by an Egyptian transport sinking in sight of the isle. The Turco-Egyptian army is now estimated at 60,000 men; but the insurgents receiving constant reinforcements from abroad, the Sultan has sent his own magnificent yacht Taliya, to succour the blockading squadron. France has offered to lend some ships for the same purpose. A large number of wounded arrived at Constantinople on the 4th, the date of the *Invalide's* advices. From other sources I am enabled to add, that the volunteers alluded to in the above are partly Greek and

partly Italians, or rather Garibaldini, dispatched to Crete by some mysterious influence. The Greek Government is organising its feeble resources preparatory to war, having appointed three commanders in Eastern and Western Greece and Corfu respectively. In the latter isle the well-known Spiro Mylios has been intrusted with the direction of military affairs. Ten battalions of irregulars have been formed under Demetrio Bogravi, and endeavours made to secure a coöperation of the Catholic tribes of Albania in an emergency. A portion of the latter, the Mirdites, living under a semi-independent prince, are exasperated at a fair compatriot having been carried off to Constantinople and received into the bosom of El Islam. To calm their minds, a *ci-devant* Polish Jew and watchmaker, metamorphosed into a Turkish Général de Brigade by Omer Pasha's favour, has been sent to Scutari. It is difficult to ascertain, though perhaps easy enough to guess, what hidden agencies are at work in all these ominous symptoms. In recording them we ought not, however, to lose sight of the oft-experienced truth, that in the East, more than anywhere else, a wide gulf separates deed and intent.

But there are clouds gathering in a more European quarter also. In Galicia the concentration of Austrian troops continues, cavalry and artillery having been chiefly sent there of late. As the Lemberg Polish Parliament, in a recent address to the Kaiser, have emphasised the 'national mission' of their province, as connected with its possession by Austria, we shall have no cause for surprise should Russia imitate the example set her, and also strengthen the forces already assembled on her side of the boundary line. What, indeed, can the 'national mission' of Galicia mean, unless that she is to be made a means of revolutionising the Russian Poles? Austria has repeatedly used Galicia for this purpose, and if bent upon withstanding Russia in the East, or anywhere else, is sure to

fight her at the same time on the ancient battle-grounds of Vistula and San.

Naturally enough under these circumstances the Russian people and press continue not a little excited by the alleged oppression of their Russinian co-nationalists by the Austrian Poles. If the Austrian Poles are to be employed in fomenting dissatisfaction among the Russian Poles, what better way is there of retaliating than by rousing the Russinians, *i. e.* the Russians under the Austro-Polish sway, to a sense of their wrongs? So the Russians have set on foot a vehement agitation to make their outraged feelings known to the world, and kindle a glow of national fanaticism against the Kaiser. Some extracts from papers and addresses will better portray the movement, and indicate the pass to which things have come, than an elaborate description. In Moscow, the seat of the Russian national party *par excellence*, an address has been drawn up, and dispatched to the Austrian Russinians, of which the following is a characteristic passage:

'When, centuries ago, your famous countryman Ostap, the Zaporog Cossack, had been taken prisoner by the Poles, and sentenced to suffer death at Warsaw, he was led out and tortured in a public square. An agonised silence reigned amid the assembled crowd when they saw our heroic compatriot undergoing the fearful penalty without uttering a sound. Taras Balba, his father, who was one of the spectators, quietly gazed upon his mutilated son, encouraging him from time to time with the words, 'Well done, my gallant boy! persevere!' On the last and severest torture being applied, the unfortunate man's fortitude wavered, and he looked anxiously around, hoping his eye might rest on one familiar face. The commiserating tears of wife and mother were not what he yearned after. What he wanted was to hear and see a brave and courageous man who could impart to him the consolations of the spirit of freedom before death. Summoning all his strength, he cried out, in a ringing voice, 'Father, father! where are you? Do you hear me?' And there arose a single voice out of the silent multitude, saying, 'I hear you.' Thus you, our Galician brethren, who, for five centuries, have been trampled under foot by the Pole, the enemy of our race, language, and religion, are now calling out for help. They have gainsaid your Russian descent, denied that you are our brethren, and even falsified your name. But your measure of patience is at length exhausted, and, despising their swords and daggers,

you shout aloud, 'We too are Russians! Do you hear us, Russian brethren!' And with one voice we reply, 'We hear you, we hear you!'

The above deliberately revives the memory of a time when the Russians and Poles were still contending for supremacy, and the former in most cases had the worst of it. But that was centuries ago. The injuries now inflicted by the Austrian Poles upon the Russinians, the only Russian tribe remaining under Polish rule, though they ought to be reprehensible in the eyes of such as insist upon the inalienable rights of nationality, are hardly serious enough to justify pathetic allusions being made to the sword, and such like sanguinary means of persuasion.

While thus heating the Russinian mind, the Russians at the same time endeavour to discourage the Poles by representing France, the supposed ally of Austria in her Galician enterprise, as a feeble and unsuccessful State. In no country has the Mexican failure been so dwelt upon by the press as in Russian Poland and in Galician Russinia. The Warsaw official *Dziennik*, for instance, a few days ago, inserted the following correspondence from Paris:

'I do not know of any event in history to be compared to the development of the Mexican tragi-comedy. The Empress Charlotte gone mad, Maximilian running away from the French generals, and France obliged to aid the United States in restoring Juarez to power—the same Juarez who but lately was hunted down and denounced as the most depraved of mankind,—if this be not disgrace and humiliation, I wonder what is. Napoleon I. was in the habit of saying that common sense consisted in being able to discern between the difficult and the impossible. Napoleon III. has certainly failed to perceive the impossibility of his undertaking when sending his legions to Mexico. However, *errare humanum est.*'

A similar subject is treated with as malicious a cunning by the Russinian *Strachopud* (Anglicè, 'Scarecrow,' a comic paper). From its bitter articles I select this one:

'SECRET COMMUNICATION OF HIS MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY SCARECROW I. TO NAPOLEON III.

Sire,—I have a secret of most stupendous importance to communicate. You are betrayed! Nay, you are surrounded by traitors! All

your Ministers, all your Ambassadors, your whole Government, are playing you false. In support of my assertion, I refer you to the testimony of all Europe, as well informed of the facts as myself. The matter is this. You, Sire, being at the head of France in accordance with the "will of the people," have proclaimed yourself the champion of all oppressed nationalities, ready to plead their cause against tyrannic monarchs, polyarchs, and every other caste and class of cruel anarchists. You have striven to liberate the Italians, Mexicans, and Poles, and kindly permitted Bismarck to expel some kinglets for the good of the German people. In a word, you are the man of the people, or rather the peoples, who, in grateful recognition of your deserts, have declared you their chosen champion. Relying upon your generous exertions, and firmly confiding in your power, the Poles rose in 1863. But, alas, no French army ever came to their assistance, your whole campaign being confined to the penning of three notes to St. Petersburg. Since that time your reputation has been gradually dwindling. Last year the unfortunate Greeks, harried beyond endurance by the Turks, rebelled; and, your own Lavalette informing the world that it was right for disintegrated nations to unite, the Cretans were not a little delighted to find that you, as they thought, were beginning to support them morally. At any rate, they fancied they had a right to look forward to some telling notes from your Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Sultan. Being Christians, and having risen against savages and Mussulmans, they could not expect less from the champion of oppressed nationalities. But what occurred? Your Ambassador at Constantinople not only did not interfere in behalf of the unfortunate insurgents, but encouraged the Turks, and, going round to Athens, actually forbade the Government of the "independent Greeks" from succouring their Cretan brethren. You can easily imagine that your Ambassador, thus acting in your name, has compromised your honour, and caused all reflecting people to regard you as a Jesuit and a cunning Pharisee, bent upon luring men on to their destruction. But the public are in the wrong. Strachopud will never believe their calumnies, being firmly convinced that your wicked Ministers, and, above all, M. de Moustier, are the only guilty parties. I venture to hope that your Majesty, upon reading my well-meaning report, will lose no time in sending your present Minister for Foreign Affairs to Cayenne.'

These are clever tactics indeed. The Russinian author, while assuring his countrymen that France is powerless to restore the Poles, strengthens his argument by describing her as too weak and too faithless even to arm in a matter where Christian liberties are to be upheld against Turks. Thus two birds are killed with one stone. The Poles are represented as stripped of allies, and the Servo-Bulgaro-

Greeks given to understand that, though France may desert them, they have other well-wishers left. Resistance to Polish imperiousness in Austrian Galicia is shown to be safe, and the insurrection in Turkey proved to be a hopeful adventure—the one because of the inactivity of France, the other in spite of it.

AUSTRIAN COMMERCIAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICS.

Berlin, December 18, 1866.

THE conclusion of a Treaty of Commerce between Austria and France will, it is supposed, induce the Government of the former State to urge its claims to the completion of a similar instrument, or rather, to the revision of the one nominally existing between it and the Zollverein. As the reader may remember, Prussia, in the late Treaty of Peace, engaged to open negotiations upon the subject whenever required. Availing himself of this slight concession made to his Sovereign, Count Beust three weeks ago addressed a formal note to this Cabinet, requesting that the agreement should be carried out forthwith. Count Bismarck hastened to answer in the affirmative; adding, that he must first take the opinion of the Board of Trade, and communicate with the other Governments of the Customs League. Here the matter rests for the present, and unless mooted afresh by the Imperial Court, is likely to remain *in statu quo* for some time to come.

In Berlin the latest move of the enterprising Minister at the head of Austrian affairs is looked upon as designed to harass this Government, and hold out to the anti-Prussian party in Southern Germany the delusive hope that the Zollverein will be dissolved. That anything serious can come of it, is considered impossible. Even suppose Austria should reduce her prohibitive tariff—an unlikely thing

while the manufacturing interest is so strongly represented by its nobility—Prussia, by her treaties with England, Italy, and France, is prevented from according her any advantages beyond those already granted to the most industrial States, and indeed to all the world. Baron Beust's raking up the matter, according to our politicians, can therefore have no other object than to represent the refusal of this Government to make an impossible concession as a proof of its inveterate hostility to Austrian interests. But does he really hope to revive southern agitation against Prussia on so flimsy a pretext? And can he possibly expect to inflame the southern mind to the degree required to deprive it of discernment in matters pecuniary? Much as a certain party among the Southerners is wont to be swayed by sentiment in politics, they are as competent as the soberest among us to take care of their purses, and invariably cease to indulge in tall talk the moment it becomes a question of florins and kreutzers.

For Austria to derive any real advantage from the contemplated agitation, the South must resolve to leave the Zollverein, and exchange the Prussian market for the Austrian. Is this likely? It is only three years since the southern princes, desirous of freeing themselves from the increasing political influence of this Government, wished to form a new Customs League with the Kaiser, but were prevented by the industrious portion of their subjects from executing this ruinous design. Baron Beust has ever had a propensity for opening diplomatic campaigns without the chance of a practical result, and in many of his famous tilts had apparently no other object than that of showing his uncommon address, and exhibiting a justly admired talent for penning eloquent notes. If the anticipations of the Berlin diplomatists are correct, he is about to confirm his old reputation in his new office.

His activity is not confined to this one point. With

a view to regain for Austria the lost sympathies of the Bavarians and such other Germans as may be inclined to lend him a willing ear, he has advised the Kaiser to turn over a new leaf in the internal administration of the realm, and abate a little in the predilection latterly shown for the Slavonian element. The idea started by the Bohemian Parliament of changing the electoral law of the kingdom, and reducing the number of seats occupied by the Germans, will, in consequence, not be entertained by the Kaiser. To the Hungarians, on the other hand, Count Beust recommends that some more concessions might be made. In his plan for remodelling Austria, he proceeds upon the supposition that to satisfy every discontented nationality, and give each a separate commonwealth, would be to decompose the Empire; while to disregard the demands of all alike would be to deprive the throne of popular support, and bring on graver dangers in the future. To obviate either evil, some privileged nationalities must be favoured in preference to the rest; some must be accorded a certain degree of independence, with permission to lord it over the others. For this exceptional position he has selected the Germans, Magyars, and Poles. The protection of the Germans in Austria is to strengthen his influence upon the Germans in Germany; the Magyars, in return for the prerogative awarded them, are to keep in check the different Slavonian inhabitants of their kingdom, who have latterly betrayed a marked inclination in favour of the Russians, the most powerful race of their ethnographical family; while the Poles are to be held in readiness to be let loose against Russia in an emergency. As to the Czechs, Croats, Servians, Slovakians, Slovenians, Ruthenians, and Rumanians, their interests will not just now be attended to.

THE NORTH GERMAN AND FRENCH ARMIES.

Berlin, December 19, 1866.

THE army of the North German Confederacy will be constitutionally fixed at a peace footing of 1 per cent of the inhabitants—in other words, at 295,000 men. The available reserve, already amounting to as many more, will, after a few years' prevalence of the Prussian institutions in all Northern Germany, attain an enormous figure, effectually securing the independence of the country against East and West. The Prussian officers attach great weight to the circumstance that the many thousands to be trained for military service will be real soldiers, who have gone through three years' service in the line, and been accustomed to a far different discipline and practice than can be possibly reached by the new French reserves. In case of his carrying out the recently-devised scheme, the Emperor Napoleon, it is alleged, would, after a lapse of six years, have an army of 480,000 real soldiers, with a first reserve of 240,000 recruits, who have been under arms only seven months in four years. Both in number and quality Prussia expects to be vastly ahead of this. As to the French second reserve and the mobilised National Guard, even if they should be formed, they are regarded here as no 'troops' in the military sense of the term. Their military organisation is not only thought faulty in itself, but also unsuited to the national character of the Gaul. The German, it is said, though not bellicose by nature, if once under arms, is too much of a man not to merge all personal considerations in the one supreme resolve not to be got the better of; the Frenchman will fight for glory while he has no shop to attend to, but is apt to conceive an inveterate dislike to the musket as soon as he owns a more profitable stake in the world, depending upon his uninterrupted exertions. The Prussian Landwehrman detests war, but likes a pitched battle best of all things, when once in the field; the Frenchman pants for renown,

but remembers his wife, his acres, and his home a little too vividly to become a good soldier when he has once been a worthy citizen. This comparison, as made by the Germans, may not be altogether devoid of self-love, but there is a good deal of truth at the bottom of it.

The French General Castelnau, soon after his arrival in Mexico, seized the luggage of the Emperor Maximilian, lying ready for embarcation at Vera Cruz. It consisted of no less than fifty chests, and was searched to recover certain letters of the Emperor Napoleon, calculated to compromise the writer in the eyes of the Washington Government. Maximilian, who, in his homeward route, had nearly reached Vera Cruz, refused to abdicate or give up the coveted letters. Upon this he was conducted back to Orizaba, where he remains under charge of Marshal Bazaine. He is not allowed to telegraph or send off any letters, except upon the subject of his wife's health. It seems that the French Generals, while expostulating with the Emperor, allowed the last moment to escape in which they might have hoped to send him off safely.

COUNT BISMARCK ON SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN, AND NAPOLEON'S INFLUENCE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND THE TERMS OF PEACE.

Berlin, December 22, 1866.

The reunion of Schleswig-Holstein with Prussia has been sanctioned by the Lower House with a majority of 300 to 30, the latter number including Radicals and Poles. The House on this occasion positively refused to agree to the cession of Northern Schleswig 'at this early date,' leaving the matter to be settled at some future time. Partly to correct the opinions current upon this head, and partly to vindicate his action throughout the entire course of the complicated affair, Count Bismarck delivered a

lengthy speech, which, exhibiting his German politics in a clearer light, deserves to be rendered *in toto*. He said:

'A preceding speaker (Herr Twesten), while declaring that he will vote for annexation under the peculiar circumstances of the case, yet seemed to assert that the Schleswig-Holsteiners have a right to complain of the treatment awarded them at our hands. Before undertaking to disprove his arguments, I must deny that the Prince of Augustenburg ever accepted the conditions on which we, in February 1865, declared our readiness to promote his accession to the throne. Should the false asseverations set forth on this subject be repeated by their original propagators, it will be my duty to publish certain letters in support of my contradictions. The Prince certainly declared his willingness to accept our terms; but he made his formal and definitive sanction dependent upon the assent of the Schleswig-Holstein Estates. Considering how he had behaved from the outset, we could not but doubt his sincerity in promising to obtain that assent; we could not but suspect that the reservation made would be taken advantage of to nullify the whole engagement. I need scarcely tell you how he behaved in 1864, when calling upon me one evening at 9 o'clock, and staying till midnight. But he said he was excited on that occasion. He certainly was; but we parted friends, he telling me that he would think the matter over, and write to me from Dolzig.

In my own personal interest, I will here deny that there was anything in my behaviour during our conversation to justify the excitement of the Prince. I am not in the habit of being uncivil in my own house, and in political discussions have ever striven not to give unnecessary provocation to my opponents. Could I have foreseen that these particulars would be alluded to here to-day, I should have looked over my memoranda, and enabled myself to repel the accusations preferred in a more explicit and circumstantial way. As it is, I can only say that the demands raised by me at the interview were not so comprehensive as the terms we thought it necessary to insist upon in the February of the following year. If the Prince could not then make up his mind to grant us a port and positions at either end of the contemplated canal between the two oceans, it was not very probable that he would approve our later programme. I remember very well, that when I asked him for a port on that summer evening, he indignantly replied, that he could not be expected to cede several square miles. I also deny that I have ever intimated a willingness to assist the Danish dynasty in retaining the Duchies, if they would but exempt them from the operation of the Danish Constitution. I never said that I preferred such an arrangement to the accession of the House of Augustenburg. When a man has received hundreds of deputations, and freely conversed with them, upon the same subject, he ought not perhaps to be too positive in asserting that his words were never liable to misin-

terpretation. I may, however, venture to say that I never held the opinion imputed to me, and that I could have had no possible object in telling those people, who all came from Schleswig-Holstein, that I favoured the Danish dynasty.

The programme to which I adhered was this. I thought that the liberation of the Duchies from the legislative control of the Danish Parliament, even though they might remain under the Danish dynasty, would be preferable to their subjection to the King *and* Representative Assembly of Copenhagen. I held that the establishment in the Duchies of an independent Prince was better still, and I knew that their reunion with Prussia would be best of all. With this programme I entered upon the matter, leaving it for the progress of events to determine the most practicable settlement of the three. I will confess that if the repeal of the Danish Constitution in the Duchies had been the only thing attainable under the then existing circumstances, I should not have thought myself justified in rejecting this instalment upon our claims. However that may be, the Prince of Augustenburg, during the whole year 1864, would not come to terms, but, on the contrary, refused to accept the conditions which his Majesty and his Majesty's Ministers thought would be equally acceptable to him as to us. In 1865 he gave a conditional and altogether unsatisfactory assent to our propositions. Speaking of the part I have taken in disposing of this matter, it occurs to me that but a year ago, finding the Prince of Augustenburg as uncompromising as ever, I requested the good offices of Baron Pforten, the Bavarian Premier, to prevent the outbreak of an open conflict in Germany. It was shortly before the negotiations of Gastein. I told Baron Pforten on this occasion, that if he would induce the Prince to repair to Berlin for negotiations, I should secure him a good reception by the King. Baron Pforten readily complied with my request to mediate between us and the Prince; but, although he addressed him personally, he failed to elicit any reply for several weeks; and when at length he got one, it was a cool and haughty refusal.

Again, it has been said that we did not conquer Schleswig-Holstein in the way we obtained dominion over Hanover. No, we did not. One conquest sufficed to obtain possession of Hanover, but the Duchies we had to take, and did take, twice. We first gained them from the Danes and subsequently from the Prince of Augustenburg, who had chosen to ally himself with our enemies. The Prince of Augustenburg was as much the ally of Austria as the King of Hanover or the Elector of Cassel. He was so more deliberately, though less openly, than any of the other sovereigns. Owing to all this, our situation was rather critical in June. Unless we had acted at once, the Austrians in Holstein would have effected a junction with the Hanover and Augustenburg troops at Stade, and attempted a diversion against Berlin.

As to the animadversions of a preceding speaker (Herr Twesten)

upon the present administration of Schleswig, I have no time to scrutinise the conduct of subordinate officials. I cannot but rely upon the President of the Duchies, Baron Scheel Plessen, and I do rely upon him with perfect confidence. He is the first Schleswig-Holsteiner who, about two years ago, determined to make reunion with Prussia the object of his political activity. He is the same man who so long opposed the Danish Government in the Holstein Diet, and who by personal character, no less than political antecedents, is above the suspicion here uttered of betraying his trust and secretly acting in concert with the Danes in his present high office. I admit that so energetic and resolute a character as Herr von Plessen may occasionally go a little too far, and offend a friend when he aims at an opponent.* But I have been long enough in office to learn that spirited and intrepid men of honourable principles must not be too strictly supervised in their every action. They may be harsh now and then, but it would be imprudent, and indeed unjust, to make it a cause of quarrel or rupture if their sterner tendencies get the better of them in some isolated cases. Are we to depose the highest officials, and change the whole political system of the Government, because of some local complaint? The Prussian Ministry have been so often reproached with attending to the smaller details of the service, that I really cannot undertake at such a time as the present to look after every policeman myself.

I now proceed to another and more serious topic mooted by the preceding speaker. I have been blamed by him for acceding to an arrangement which may result in the cession of a portion of Northern Schleswig. But has not this question been too exclusively viewed by the hon. member from the Schleswig-Holstein point of view? And does he think it possible for a diplomatist to regard the world generally in the light of this one individual question? I will grant him thus much, that were Prussia and Denmark the only two States of the Continent, the objectionable stipulation would not have appeared in the Treaty of Peace. But there are other Powers to be consulted. I must refer back to the history of the past to explain the motives actuating this Government in allowing a condition to be received into the Treaty of Peace so odious to the public mind, and seemingly so much at variance with our military success. The political re-organisation of Europe in 1815 was mainly intended to protect the Continent from the dangers incidental to a French attack. The adoption of this system was a natural consequence of the Napoleonic wars in the beginning of this century. While it lasted, it gave a certain security to the States included in it; but security was coupled with

* Baron Scheel Plessen, a Conservative, threatened to prosecute the editors of two pro-Prussian papers in the Duchies, who had blamed him for appointing to influential offices some gentlemen who had served the Danes till the conquest of Alsen. Their Conservative principles were believed to have recommended them to the Baron.

dependence for some of them, and for none more than for Prussia. While forming part of this defensive league Prussia must be content to hold her own, and could not hope to amend the unfortunate position palmed upon her in 1815. For many years the succeeding Cabinets of this country did not think it right to repeal a system under which they all suffered alike; and when it fell in 1848, it was not our doing, but must be mainly ascribed to the jealous and hostile policy Austria pursued against us. Ever since, we have been so badly treated by Austria that it would have been exceedingly difficult for us to regain the confidence we had formerly placed in her. The Holy Alliance received another blow by Austria taking up a peculiar attitude towards Russia during the Crimean war.

The state of things which ensued was supposed to be one exceedingly unfavourable to this Government. Foreign nations were accustomed to look upon us as abandoned to the tender mercies of France, and to make the permanent necessity of help, under which they fancied we were, their reason for speculating upon our indulgence and modesty. By Austria and a portion of our German allies this speculation on our supposed weakness has been carried very far during the last ten years. But were they at all right in their fond anticipations? War with France is not to the interest of this country. We have little to gain even by beating her. The Emperor Napoleon himself, differing in this from the accepted politics of other French dynasties, wisely recognises that peace and mutual confidence should prevail between the two neighbouring nations. But to maintain such relations with France a strong and independent Prussia is alone competent. If this truth is not admitted by all the subjects of Napoleon III., it is a consolation to know that his Cabinet, at least, thinks differently, and that we—officially, at any rate—have to deal with his Cabinet only. Looking upon this vast country of Germany from the French point of view, his Cabinet cannot but acknowledge to themselves that to combine it again with Austria into one political whole, and make it a realm of 75,000,000 of inhabitants, would be contrary to the French interests. Even if France could make the Rhine her boundary, she would be no match for so formidable a Power, were it ever established beside her. To France it is an advantage that Austria does not participate any longer in our common Germanic institutions, and that a State whose interests conflict with her own in Italy and in the East cannot henceforth constitutionally rely upon our armed assistance in war. It is natural for France to prefer a neighbour of less overwhelming might; a neighbour, in fact, whom 35,000,000 or 38,000,000 of French are quite strong enough to ward off from their boundary line in defensive war. If France justly appreciates her interests, she will as little allow the power of Prussia as that of Austria to be swept away. The present dynasty of France having identified itself with the principle of nationality, always looked upon the question of the Duchies in a temperate way, and from the very outset was less adverse

to our claims than any of the other Powers. You are aware that to carry that principle through on the Dano-German frontier is simply impossible. Germans and Danes so intermingle there that no line of demarcation can be drawn which will separate one race from the other. Yet France, wishing to see her adopted principle acknowledged in this particular instance, as in so many preceding ones, mooted the question, repeatedly bringing on a discussion between us, Denmark, and other Powers. We never took the initiative in a matter which was so distasteful to us. I was, however, always of opinion that people who have no wish to be Prussians, and who cannot be expected to alter their ideas on this head—people who, moreover, declare themselves to be connected nationally with a neighbouring race—do not add to the power of the State from which they wish to separate. There may be imperative reasons of a geographical, ethnographical, or military nature for not listening to their petitions. I will not inquire now how far this applies to the matter in hand. The question was an open one till the war, and is so even now. In all our communications with the Powers we never concealed it from them that we would not allow our line of defence to be impaired by any territorial rearrangement of the kind; but we also intimated that, under certain circumstances, we might be inclined to pay some regard to wishes uttered by the population, provided we could convince ourselves of their sincerity.

Thus the matter stood when, in July last, France was enabled, by the general situation of Europe, to urge her views more forcibly than before. I need not depict the situation of this country at the time I am speaking of. You all know what I mean. Nobody could expect us to carry on two wars at the same time. Peace with Austria had not yet been concluded; were we to imperil the fruits of our glorious campaign by plunging headlong into hostilities with a new, a second enemy? France being called on by Austria to mediate between the contending parties, as a matter of course did not omit to urge some wishes of her own upon us. We had to determine, not whether we thought the terms offered compatible with the expressed desires of the Schleswig-Holsteiners, but whether we were to accept or to reject in a body the overtures of Austria, as imparted through France. Long negotiations were impracticable under the circumstances. Our communications were interrupted, telegrams requiring three, or even six, days to travel from our head-quarters to Berlin. In this condition his Majesty determined to adopt the programme submitted to his decision. It is true we were strongly backed by Italy, who remained true to her engagements, and stood by us with a fidelity which I cannot too highly appreciate and extol. The Italian Government resisted the temptation thrown in its way by Austria of renouncing its alliance with us and suspending military operations against the common enemy. This is a fact which I hope guarantees the continuance of friendly relations between Italy and Germany. But, notwithstanding the valuable aid rendered us by our Italian allies both on the battle-field and in our diplo-

matic negotiations with friend and foe, we did not think ourselves justified in proceeding to extremities, and involving all Europe in war, merely because a single item of the terms proffered was unpalatable. Had we insisted upon having everything our own way, the most serious complications might have arisen. I thought it my duty to advise his Majesty to sanction the terms submitted as they stood, rather than jeopardise our previous successes and gamble for more.

These, gentlemen, are the circumstances to which the oft-mentioned stipulation owes its existence. The vague wording in which it is put allows us a certain latitude in carrying it out. I deem it, however, necessary to observe that, although not opposing the amendment, which leaves the question to be settled at a future time, the Government cannot be released by Parliament from obligations legitimately entered into, and already sanctioned by the House. But we shall so act that the vote to be given by the people of Northern Schleswig, the issue of which is to be the basis of our future action, shall be the indubitable expression of the uninfluenced and definitive will of those voting. If the House should be disposed to prolong this discussion, honourable members will consult the foreign interests of their country by not indulging in party animosities at the present juncture. We should stand back to back, and present a united front to the foreigner. I regret not being able to remain in the House and await the end of the discussion, being obliged to attend a sitting of the North German Plenipotentiaries.'

The frankness of Count Bismarck in explaining the motives which actuated him in yielding to the importunities of France made a very favourable impression upon the House, and occasioned a speedy close of the debate. The result has been mentioned in my introductory lines.

COUNT BISMARCK ON FEDERAL AFFAIRS.

Berlin, December 23, 1866.

THE Berlin *Kreuz Zeitung* has been enabled to publish some private letters, or rather extracts from private letters, written by Count Bismarck from 1856 to 1864. The contents have reference to the German policy of that eminent and successful Minister, proving his opinions on Federal affairs to have been settled long ago, and, indeed, to have been always identical with those acted upon in this year's campaign. Subjoined is a translation of the letters, which will be found to supply valuable materials for the better knowledge of a representative man of the time.

I.

'*Reinfeld, Pomerania, Sept.* 16, 1856.

'In the course of November the Bund will again attend with more benevolence than success to the cause of the Holsteiners. No doubt all members will be at one as far as appearances go. But behind our backs Austria will remain as friendly as ever to the Danes.* Of course its press will be told to indulge in Pan-Germanic phraseology all the same, and charge Prussia with the crime of impeding the action of the Bund. It is

* Anticipating that Prussia would not permit another petty principality to be created on her northern frontiers without claiming a sort of suzerainty over it, Austria from the first was averse to the wish of the Schleswig-Holsteiners to secede from Denmark. She was clever enough to foresee that from the Schleswig-Holstein question might emanate the long-dreaded contingency of German reunion under Prussian leadership. Knowing that the majority of the educated classes had been favourable to Prussia's claim of hegemony all along, and would more particularly approve of her demanding a prerogative in a new principality, exposed to foreign attack, and mainly relying upon *her* for defence, she regarded the Schleswig-Holstein agitation as a first step towards the growing ascendancy of her rival, and on the principle '*principiis obsta,*' determined to do all in her power to nip the matter in the bud. Because of the strength the national movement had already attained in Germany, she could not openly pursue her object. It must be admitted her misgivings were well-founded. When, notwithstanding her underhand opposition, she had been eventually compelled to assist in severing the Elbe Duchies from Denmark, Prussia demanded a certain privileged position for herself in the newly-acquired territory. Austria and the minor princes refusing this, led to the war of 1866, and after their defeat resulted in the reunion with Prussia not only of Schleswig-Holstein, but of all northern, and, in a sense, of southern Germany also.

evident that the matter cannot be settled at Frankfort, but mainly depends on the question whether the Danes can rely upon the assistance of one or several among the non-German powers. If so, they will have no difficulty in discovering a flaw in whatever resolution the Federal Diet may pass.'

II.

'*Frankfort, April* 2, 1858.

'I quite agree with you, that our position in the Zollverein was doomed from the very outset. I go even so far as to say that we must give notice to dissolve the Zollverein on the first opportunity. Little as I wish to see that old and useful League broken up, I maintain that we ought to give notice at the risk of being left alone with Dessau and Sonderhausen. While the Zollverein lasts, we ought to make the most of our time and render its continuance indispensable to the other States, so as to force them to renew the compact on our own conditions. For this purpose it would be advisable to allow them a larger income from the common revenue than they could hope to realise by levying duty on their own several frontiers. We should also try to persuade them that it would be absurd to expect the continuance of the League for any length of time, if each and every of its acts is to be dependent upon the liberum veto of twenty-eight Governments and some fifty Representative Assemblies, as hitherto.* Should the Prussian Chambers interfere in the affairs of the Zollverein, you may be sure that the pride and ridiculous hauteur of the minor Governments will not allow their own Chambers to remain behindhand. They will all long to cut as fine a figure as the Prussians.

To get rid of these interminable difficulties, we should endeavour to establish a Zollverein Parliament, upon the renewal of the League in 1865. Perhaps we might even accord an *itio in partes*, if the others insist upon it. The minor Governments will not like the idea. Yet, if we were bold and true to ourselves, we might accomplish much. Your idea of using the Prussian Chambers as a means of supporting our aspirations to supremacy mainly coincides with my own. Chambers and press might become the most powerful allies of our foreign policy. In the present instance, whatever resolution the minor Governments may arrive at, the damage to Prussia from the League, and the necessity of giving notice, ought to be publicly discussed, and by explicit and well-written articles impressed upon the public generally. Your own letter

* In consequence of this absurd arrangement, modelled upon the pattern of the Bund, and intended to preserve the full and unrestricted sovereignty of each individual State, not a single clause in the tariff could be modified, unless with the consent of every one of the States. A principality with 200,000 inhabitants, therefore, had it in its power to prevent a reform demanded by 16,000,000 Prussians. As Germans like to use the rights they possess, this exorbitant privilege was but too frequently had recourse to by the smallest of the small.

to me should be inserted in the *Kreuz Zeitung*, rather than lie on my table.

If the question of the German tariff were once mooted, and discursively treated from the Prussian point of view by our Chambers and papers, it would attract the attention of Germany, and our Parliament would become a power in the Confederacy. I wish the Zollverein and the Bund, and Prussia's position in both, to be subjected to the most searching criticisms in our Chambers. The King and his Ministers, if at all up to their work, can only profit by it. For the present, I should like to see the increase of the beetroot excise, as desired by the minor Governments, passed with a slight majority in our Chambers; for what we have to do at this moment is to render the flesh-pots of the Zollverein agreeable to the minor Governments, rather than canvass for the sympathies of their subjects. The latter, though they do not like the excise, will be quite as strongly impressed with a sensible and conclusive debate, as they may be irritated by the vote which happens to be taken at its end.'

III.

'*St. Petersburg, August* 22, 1858.

'Home politics are getting quite strange to me. All I hear is through papers and official communications, which do not disclose the hidden causes at work. From the journals I gather that we did not enter into any definitive engagement at Töplitz, but only gave Austria to understand, that if she were to render us some practical services in the field of German politics, we should be glad to assist her in return. I am quite satisfied with that. *Manus manum lavat*, and if once we see the lather of the Vienna soap, we shall be delighted to repay the benefit. But I must tell you that intelligence which has indirectly found its way from other Courts to St. Petersburg does not agree with the version circulated at home: we have concluded no treaty with Austria, yet given an oral promise to support her in the event of France attacking her Italian provinces. Should Austria find herself under the necessity of taking the initiative against France, our vote in the Federal Diet will be given to secure her German assistance. In my opinion, this would be a much more hazardous arrangement than it seems at first sight. If Austria can be sure of our aid in Venice, she will know how to provoke an attack from France. Indeed, I am told that she has assumed a bold and irritating attitude in Italy since the interview in the Bohemia spa. Since Garibaldi's expedition it has been the policy of the Vienna Government to let matters go as they liked in Italy. They hoped the people would become so unruly, that Napoleon himself would deem it necessary to interfere, and help in reëstablishing something like the former state of things. But they may be disappointed in counting upon Napoleon—a probability which seems to have been comprehended by them since the Töplitz interview. So they mean to try the opposite way for the nonce, and secure

their ends against him. In either case, the restless and impassioned fidgetiness of the Austrian policy imperils the continuance of peace.

What will our Chambers think of Töplitz? What of the contemplated increase of our army? On the latter subject all sensible people, I trust, will side with the Government; while, as regards our foreign affairs, we shall have to wait for more accurate information before calculating their effect upon the public mind. A well-informed, but rather Bonapartistic gentleman writes to me from Berlin: "We were gloriously cheated in Töplitz by our loving friends of Vienna. We were sold—positively sold for nothing, not even for a dish of lentils." I hope he is mistaken.

Speaking of Bonapartists, I recollect that the National Association* papers, *Magdeburger Zeitung*, *Ostpreussische Zeitung*, and others of the same bias, have opened a systematic and most malicious campaign against me personally. They assert I have been favourable to some Russo-French idea of exchanging the left side of the Rhine for certain territories in the interior of Germany. I am represented as leaguing with France against Fatherland, acting like a second Count Borries, &c. I engage to pay 1,000 Fredericks d'or to any one who can prove that such a Russo-French proposal has been so much as brought to my cognisance. While I was in Germany, the only advice I gave to the Government was to rely upon our own national resources in the event of a war. Those stupid scribblers of the German press have no inkling, that in attacking me they are neutralising what is sensible in their own endeavours. These attacks, I am told, may be traced to the Coburg Court, and a journalist who has personal spite against me. Were I an Austrian statesman, or a German prince with Austrian reactionary leanings—such as the Duke of Meiningen, for instance—the *Kreuz Zeitung*, no doubt, would have protected my reputation, as the mendacity of those calumnies must be patent to every one of my political friends. But as I am only an old member of our party, and, moreover, am so unfortunate as to have my own opinions upon sundry subjects, with which I flatter myself I am tolerably conversant, I cannot of course expect to be protected by the Conservative press.† In fact, I should not have heard anything of the matter

* 'The National Association' was the name of the great and popular league for excluding Austria from Germany, and uniting the remaining States under Prussian leadership. It was established in 1859, when the helplessness of divided Germany was so clearly demonstrated during the Italian war; and it was dissolved in 1866, after the objects of the society had been mainly accomplished by Prussia.

† Unity being in those days part of the Liberal programme, was regarded as identical with liberalism, and accordingly opposed by the Conservatives. Count Bismarck was the first Conservative who had the courage to approve unity, yet resist the rest of the Liberal platform. Subsequently, when called upon to act, and inaugurate an independent policy, his superior statesmanship led him to adopt so much of the constitutional tenets of the age as was re-

unless somebody had sent me a contradiction of those foolish reports inserted in the *Elberfelder Zeitung*. People who set up for inquisitors are always apt to be unjust, and will not hesitate to condemn those with whom they have messed so long at the same table. Never mind. We ought not to put our trust in men, and I am thankful for everything that strengthens my fortitude.'

IV.

'*Stolpmünde, September* 18, 1861.

'With respect to the Conservative programme, I subscribe to all your censures. They should have avoided announcing their principles in a negative form. A political party cannot always be on the defensive. It must sometimes take the initiative and gain fresh adherents, if it at all wishes to assert itself and exist.

And what is the use of holding forth against the German Republic? All parties alike will have nothing to do with that preposterous idea, especially with the dirt inseparable from it. Some are veracious in their asseverations, some not; but the only opponents of mark we have to fight for the present are really and conscientiously adverse to any such plan.* It cannot but be evident to them, that to advocate a change so far exceeding the requirements of the moment would be either looked upon as idle talk or as an attempt at concealing some secret design.

Among our political friends, there are many pedantic people who want Prussia to protect legitimacy as strenuously in the case of foreign countries as in her own. But this principle of dynastic and conservative legitimacy is a fiction, and a most pernicious one, so long as it is not recognised and honestly acted upon by the sovereign of every country in the world. If carried through by Prussia alone, it is neither more nor less than quixotic, and only tends to disable the King and his Government from fulfilling the more natural task set them by God, of securing Prussia against wrongs from within and without. Unless the Conservative party renounce this principle, we shall have to go the length of applauding the hallucinations of the petty potentates who, supposing they are Powers, avail themselves of the pedestal of our own might to play at kings. And yet all this swindle is unauthorised by the history of the past,† is quite new, unhistorical, and equally opposed to

quired to satisfy the urgent wants of German society, and procure him the amount of popular support necessary for the establishment of a new and reformed German Commonwealth.

* The moderate Liberals, who swayed the National Association. Their name was and is legion, in comparison to the handful of Radicals, their bitter enemies. To attack them with the greater effect, the Conservatives used to denounce the moderate Liberals as a mild description of Republicans.

† In the German Empire the princes of the various States were legally subordinate to the Central Government, represented by Emperor and Parliament.

the teachings of God and the rights of mankind. Our Government are Liberals at home and Legitimists abroad. We shield the prerogative of foreign crowns more zealously than that of our own. We are enthusiastic about the rights of the minor potentates created by Napoleon I. and sanctioned by Metternich, but are blind to the dangers which will threaten the independence of Prussia and Germany while that nonsensical Federal Constitution of ours exists.* That Constitution is only a hothouse for the growth and preservation of revolutionary and secessionist leanings. Instead of the vague diatribe against the German Republic, I should have wished the programme of the Conservative party to contain a plain and intelligible passage bearing upon the reforms to be effected in the federal institutions through the instrumentality of the Bund, or by means of special associations on the pattern of the Zollverein and the military treaty with Coburg.

The twofold duty devolves upon us of owning our disapproval of the existing state of things, and of proclaiming that we mean to effect a lawful change in all that is calculated to promote our safety and prosperity, but will not go beyond that. We require a concentration of the German military forces. We want a new and more practical arrangement, liberating us from the veto of every minor Government in tariff affairs.

* The German Empire included Austria, Prussia, and a large number of minor princes and republics. It was long governed by Austrian sovereigns, who were the most powerful of its members. Excepting Prussia, who, possessing provinces not incorporated with the Empire, enjoyed a more independent position, even before her great Frederick defeated Austria in the field, the members of the Empire were legally subordinate to the Emperor, and obliged to obey his constitutional behests. The dissolution of the Empire took place in consequence of Napoleon I. dethroning many of its potentates, and forcing others to leave the ancient concern and join the newly established Confederation of the Rhine. The members of this Confederation were nominally independent, but in reality vassals of the French Emperor, who, to console them for the loss of their ancient position, conferred upon them the titles of kings, grand dukes, &c., which they had never borne before. Upon Napoleon's dethronement, the German Empire and its Central Government could not be restored. The Prussian dynasty and people having taken the lead in the war against Napoleon, had become too strong to bow to Austria; and the minor princes were encouraged by foreign Powers likewise to claim the preservation of that full and unrestricted independence which, nominally at any rate, they already possessed. Accordingly a German Confederation was instituted, which was no more than an alliance for defensive purposes, and left every minor sovereign as sovereign as he could wish. The unity movement, which subsequently arose, aimed at depriving the minor potentates of this new-fangled sovereignty, and reducing them to the position they had held in the ancient Empire; but as the Liberals, with whom this programme originated, preferred vesting the Central Government of the future in Prussia, rather than Austria, which was Ultramontane, Ultraconservative, and but slightly German, the latter, in past ages the strenuous defender of the suzerainty of the Imperial power, now stood up for the independence of the minor princes.

We need a number of common institutions to protect our material interests from the losses which must otherwise arise from the unnatural configuration of the frontiers of the various German States. We should leave no one in doubt that we mean to ask for these things honestly, but earnestly.

I confess my inability to comprehend why we should be scared by the idea of a representative assembly being attached to the Federal Diet or expressly created for Zollverein purposes. An institution legitimately obtaining in every German State, which the Conservatives themselves would not like to dispense with in Prussia, ought not be regarded as revolutionary if applied to Federal purposes. Moderate concessions on our part would bring a valuable return. We might create a Conservative Federal Parliament, and be thanked for it even by the Liberals.

The noise of my servants packing up disturbs my writing. In case you have an opportunity of speaking of me to our friends, I enclose the draught I read to you some time ago. Pray do not allow the exact wording to transpire. It might be disagreeable to the King, were I to publish those hasty notes of a conversation I had with his Majesty. The more so, as the matter seems to have been followed up.'

V.

'*Berlin, October* 2, 1861.

'I have worked for our German policy here and at Coblentz, and made some impression, as far at least as the feelings and decisions of the moment are concerned. The King ordered me to amplify the sketch I gave him at Baden. I long to be back in my house on the English quay, with the calm look-out upon the ice of the Neva. On the 13th I shall have to be at Königsberg.'

VI.

'*Berlin, May* 16, 1864.

'Much as I appreciate your objections to the address, I think it will exercise a useful pressure in the diplomatic situation of the moment. Of course, I may be mistaken. The longer I am engaged in politics, the less becomes my confidence in human calculations; and if you do not wish to promote the matter, I shall certainly not urge you to do so. I wish, moreover, to be able to say conscientiously that the feelings reflected in the address have not been inspired by the Government. As to my own view of the situation, I think it advisable to let loose at the Conference all dogs given to barking. The Danes should be treated to some noise. Pardon the sporting comparison. The full cry of the whole pack will cause foreigners to look upon the subjection of the Duchies to Denmark as simply impossible, and induce them to take into consideration programmes which it would be inconvenient for the Prussian Government to be the first to moot. With reference to those programmes, I include the Holsteiners, the champions of Augustenburg, and all who are enthu-

siastic for a separate Schleswig-Holstein nationality, in the category of foreigners. The Duchies have been a little too long accustomed to play the part of spoilt children in the German family, and find it the most natural thing in the world to demand that Prussia should sacrifice herself to their interests without presuming to ask for a reward. We ought, they modestly suggest, to stake the existence of Prussia for every individual German in the north of Schleswig. This swindle would be neutralised by the address. I have no fear that its effect would be so strong as to embarrass us. But even if the nation were to become instinct with so ardent a feeling of ambition that the Prussian Government, instead of goading it on, had to restrain it, I should not at all lament such a state of things.

However, human wit is incompetent to fathom these things. From the gratitude I owe to God for the assistance he has so far rendered me springs the confidence that the Lord knows how to turn our errors to our advantage. I realise this more and more daily, and become humbler in heart.

To make you better understand my views, I will add that annexation is by no means my only aim, but would be the most pleasant result of my exertions.—With kind regards to your honoured friends,

Yours, &c.,

BISMARCK.'

The above letters have been reprinted and made the subject of much comment by the whole German press. While the Conservative papers extol the politics, talent, and consistency of the writer, even the Liberal organs, with all their ancient opposition to him, cannot but admit the justice of these encomiums as far as the two latter qualities are concerned.

RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.

Berlin, December 24, 1866.

BARON BEUST, having somewhat modified Austria's policy in the East, has been rewarded by the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* asserting the relations between Czar and Kaiser to be as friendly as ever. Of course, the writers in the semi-official organ are fully aware that, in urging the Sultan to hand over the Turkish fortresses in Servia to the Servians, Baron Beust is far from seconding the action of Russia; but, on the contrary, strives to thwart the designs of his gigantic neighbour by more effective means than those employed by his predecessors. Instead of jogging along in the beaten track of the Austrian policy, and discouraging the fond aspirations of the Turkish Christians, on the mere ground of their being countenanced by Russia, the Austrian Minister has thought it advisable to make friends with those dissatisfied nationalities, the better to direct them in his interests. They have become too unruly to be easily subdued by force; and the day is too near when one may be brought to patronise them openly for a prudent statesmen to withstand them now. Grounding, moreover, his entire policy upon alliance with France, and having already obliged her by calling forth a Polish revival in Galicia, Baron Beust is hardly in a position to disappoint the powerful friend, whose assistance he wishes to secure, by evincing too rigid an adherence to Conservatism in the East. France, without any very direct interest in the state of the East, has always made her Oriental politics subservient to her European schemes. Now that so many important changes have occurred on her very frontiers—changes which she intends to redress some day, if she can—she will be more than ever inclined to

adapt her Oriental doings to her European needs. For the present, she strives to allay the incipient movement on the Balkan peninsula. Not having as yet resolved upon a definite course of action on the Rhine, she cannot wish to see things assume a dangerous aspect on the Danube; but the greater her present quietism, the more imperative the necessity for herself and allies to pacify malcontents, and purchase, by bland mediation, the continuance of peace now, and active coöperation in the future. It was in this sense that Baron Beust told M. Marinovich, the President of the Servian Senate, who came to consult him a few days ago, that he would plead the cause of the Servians at Constantinople, provided they but behaved as good citizens and respected their treaties with the Porte.

This was pleasant intelligence at St. Petersburg. Russia was so delighted at seeing an additional impetus given to the stone she had long vainly endeavoured to set a-rolling as to be comparatively indifferent to the ultimate intentions of those coming to her aid. Let the Turks once evacuate Servia, and it will be the more easy for a Power, counting on the demise of the sick man, to follow up her plans in this the most important centre of Rayah opposition to the Sultan. While Austria in the French interest, no less than her own, endeavours to insure temporary repose by advising concessions, Russia, on her part, looks upon any accession of strength to the Rayah as increasing her facilities for demolishing Turkey. Or, to mention another set of motives: while Austria, by succouring the Servians, would fain make them forget their old feud with the Kaiser, who long sided with the Sultan, Russia, relying upon her ancient influence with a people who are of a cognate religion and race, and have enjoyed her political protection for a century, pretends to be too sure of their friendship to be disquieted by the casual support they receive from a rival. On the contrary, she encour-

ages her rival to go on, by assuring him of her particular gratitude and regard.

In the mean time the party so flattered is unceasingly engaged in getting ready for a serious sequel to its present obliging and pacificatory tactics. Austria is hushing up discontent in the East, the better to prepare for assisting France nearer home, when the day and the hour shall come. Or perhaps Austria and France will decide upon taking Russia first in hand, by way of tempting Prussia to come forward in favour of her only possible ally, and thus bring on an opportunity for avenging the Seven Days' Campaign. In this case, the preparations now making against Russia will be all the more needful. They are certainly being pushed with remarkable energy and expedition. What better means of keeping Russia employed than by threatening attack on her vulnerable Polish flank? And how could this be more effectually done than by giving the Austrian Poles to understand that the day may be drawing near when they will be permitted to help in freeing their brethen under Russian rule? In mid-winter the works of the fortified camp at Cracow, begun during the Prussian campaign, and abandoned after its unfortunate issue, have been resumed. The towns along the line of railway between Cracow and Lemberg, especially Bochnia, Tarnow, Rzeszow, and Przemysl, are being filled with troops. Baron Beust and Count Goluchowski, the latter the governor of Galicia, have held another batch of conferences with Prince Czartoryski and the other popular chiefs in the Polish provinces of the Emperor. To make the Galician Poles still more inclined to coöperate with Count Beust against Russia, the Russinian schools in their province, notwithstanding the remonstrance of the Russian Government, are placed under Polish control, and supplied with books carefully pruned of the many purely Russian words occurring in the literary language of the Russinians. A grand picture, representing the downfall of

Poland, by M. Matejko, a national artist, is exhibiting at Cracow, preparatory to its being sent to Paris, where, in the Palace of Art and Industry, it will appeal to the generous sympathies of the French. To crown all, Baron Beust last week assured a deputation of the Galician parliament who had come to present an address to the Emperor, that he was on the best possible terms with France, and had guarded against Austria being isolated again.

After all this, you will not think it so very unnatural that there are few educated people in Galicia who are not convinced that either the Polish and German, or else the Polish and Eastern questions are approaching a simultaneous solution inimical to the Czar and King William I. When receiving the Galicians, Count Beust went the length of remarking that Galicia would never again be reincorporated with the German provinces of Austria, nor placed under the Vienna Parliament. Coupling this intimation with what they see going on around them, the Galicians are sanguine enough to expect that Archduke Maximilian, their old friend, should the Mexicans allow him to come back, which is by no means certain, will be shortly appointed Viceroy of their country, and the regal dignity of Poland, so to say, approximately revived in him.

The Russian Government are attentive observers of what is going on in their immediate neighbourhood. The Cracow correspondent of the official Warsaw *Dziennik* writes home as follows:

'Our Ultras, knowing Maximilian to be favourable to the Polish cause, hope that he will soon be back from Mexico, when it will not be long before he transfers the seat of our government from Cracow and Lemberg to Warsaw and Kieff, if not farther. I can solemnly assure you that these fantasies are credited by very many persons here, who dream of war by Austria and France against barbarous Muscovy.'

This intelligence is improved upon by the Paris correspondent of the same official organ reporting that the

Polish Committee at the French capital, more impatient than their brethren at home, are organising the cadres of a national army. They too, according to the same authority, flatter themselves with the hope that Maximilian will be shortly made King of Poland by the august party that failed to constitute him Emperor of Mexico.

On the actual state of the Servian question, the St. Petersburg *Golos* inserts the following letter from Belgrade:

'The Servians have long submitted to Ottoman arrogance, but now insist upon the final and definitive evacuation of their fortresses by the Turks. The fortresses situate on their territory, and still garrisoned by Mussulmans, are those of Belgrade, Szabas, Siemiedrae, Klade, Malo Zwarnick, Elisbeth, and Adukal. Of these seven, the only important one is Belgrade, both for size and the number of its garrison; the others are old and unfit for defence. The Turkish Government have no wish to comply with the demand put forward; they endeavour, on the contrary, to retain their hold on Servia, which they regard as their most dangerous enemy in Europe. It is well known that a little while ago a similar demand of the Servians was answered by the bombardment of Belgrade. In the present instance, Servia seems to have determined upon taking up arms, if she cannot obtain a hearing in the ordinary diplomatic way. Including her National Guard, well practised in the use of arms, she has no less than 160,000 men. Her artillery is excellent, and commanded by competent officers educated at Berlin, Brussels, Paris, and St. Petersburg. An ample supply of American rifles, superior even to the Prussian needle-gun, is in the hands of the infantry, and being daily increased by the manufactories at Kraguyewac. Most important of all, the spirit of the Servian nation is roused, and the wish to throw off the disgraceful yoke of its ancient enemy general.'

Though exaggerated, the facts adduced in this letter are true in the main. Everywhere in the East people are on the alert. In the Danubian Principalities a conscription has been ordered, and the reserve called out.

Respecting Crete, the following intelligence has been received by the official Russian *Invalide:*

'*Constantinople, December* 15, 1866.

'Mustapha Rivisli Pasha, with the bulk of his force, has gone to Selinos, where the insurgents are awaiting him. A battle is expected. The Sphakiotes on Crete, hitherto regarded as neutral, are making com-

mon cause with the rural population against the Turks. Yesterday a Turkish steamer brought advices that the whole island, with the exception of Selinos and Kissamos, is pacified. By propagating such news, the Porte endeavours to prevent other outbreaks in its Christian provinces, and European interference in Crete. The trips of the Greek steamer Panhellenion to Crete and back are less frequent than formerly, the Sultan's own yacht having been sent out to watch and capture her. The Greek Government have received advices from Crete announcing the reduction, by the insurgent chief Visautor, of the Fort of Castel, in the eastern extremity of the isle. In Albania, Greek and Roman Catholic villages have been plundered by Turks.'

Russian news from Crete, both official and otherwise, has taken a hopeful view of the insurrection from the very outset.

In Vienna the pecuniary losses consequent upon the past war, and the threatening prospects as regards the future, combine to make the Government give up all immediate hope of restoring a silver standard of coinage. The daily production of one-florin notes amounts to no less than 250,000. To evade control, the old and generally-received practice of numbering the notes has been abandoned.

RUSSIA, GALICIA, AND AUSTRIA.

Berlin, December 26, 1866.

THE Austrian troops in Galicia are being pushed forward from the centre of the country towards the Russian frontier. The province is crowded with horse and foot. The price of provisions has risen, and the movements of travellers, especially in the vicinity of the troops, are watched by a lynx-eyed police. Intercourse between Russian and Austrian Poland, if not absolutely prohibited, has been rendered exceedingly difficult by the two neighbouring Governments jealously warning off visitors from either frontier. Both believe they have sufficient grounds

for protecting themselves against emissaries sent for each other's supervision. A few days ago a Jewish innkeeper living in a Russian border village, who, according to his wont, had gone to make some purchases at Lisowek, a hamlet on Austrian territory, was taken prisoner by a patrol, and narrowly escaped being summarily hung for a spy. Another and even more unmistakable symptom of what is brewing, is the issue, by General St. Quintin, the new Commander-in-Chief in Galicia, of a general order, enjoining his officers to keep a vigilant eye upon Russinian priests, and prevent their enticing any more soldiers to desert and run away to the Russians. The order also makes mention of an officer in a rifle battalion too much under the influence of the Russo-orthodox clergy, who has been drawing away some of his men from their allegiance, and is now summoned before a court-martial.

As a fitting supplement to this intelligence, we hear from Warsaw that the dispatch of troops in a southern direction has been resumed. There is no doubt as to the direction taken; but whether they are placed on the Galician frontier or sent farther down to Bukowina and the country of the Pruth remains to be ascertained. In all probability they are destined to increase the corps stationed not many miles north of Lemberg.

FRANCE AND GERMANY. THE DUKE OF COBURG AND COUNT BISMARCK.

Berlin, December 27, 1866.

By frankly avowing in his speech in the Lower House* the influence France exercised on the conduct of the war, as well as on the terms of peace, Count Bismarck has rendered no little service to Napoleon III. After this the French cannot doubt their having played a more prominent part in the events of the summer than they themselves imagined. Without mobilising a battalion, their Government had authority sufficient to prevent Vienna from being taken, Austria from being dissolved into her component parts, and the Danish districts of Northern Schleswig from being unconditionally embodied with this country. This is something, and should satisfy the most ambitious and glory-loving of the martial sons of Gaul. The weight naturally belonging to a State capable of such signal achievements is farther increased by its being openly acknowledged on the part of a statesman, himself the leader of a great and, in some respects, a rival Power. I believe I am right in saying that the Emperor Napoleon has not hesitated to convey to Count Bismarck his acknowledgment of a candour reflecting equal credit upon both parties alike. With this exchange of courtesies going on between the two Governments, it ought perhaps to be regarded as an auspicious rather than an ominous symptom, that such is the haste of the French War-office to arm their men with breech-loaders, that negotiations have been set on foot with some eminent firms at Suhl, in Prussian Thuringia, for having thousands of ordinary rifles adapted to the new principle. No contract has been as yet concluded, the French Government not having decided which model to accept.

* Vide Letter of December 22d, page 114.

There is reason to believe that Count Bismarck will not adhere too obstinately to his wish to exclude officials from the Federal Parliament. Nor is this the only point on which his conciliatory influence is, or at any rate promises to be, of benefit to the service. The Lords had a longing to reject the budget passed by the Lower House, on the ground of the latter having struck out some items demanded by the Government. But the Count himself went to his over-ardent friends, and, telling them he had had quite enough collisions between the Commons on one side, and the Crown and Lords on the other, deprecated the old game being begun anew. I need scarcely add, the Lords took the hint. They might have occasioned some embarrassment by adopting a more independent course. At the time of the army reform differences, when the increase of the military forces was negatived by the Commons, but approved by the Lords, Government asserted the right to please itself from the inability of the two chambers to guide its decisions by a unanimous vote. Had the Lords behaved similarly on the present occasion, and thrown out the budget passed by the other House, the enactment of any budget, according to the opinions so vigorously defended by the Ministers but a year ago, would have become impossible. But Count Bismarck requiring peace at home to be all the stronger abroad, hindered the Hotspurs of Conservatism from marring his position on either hand.

Before leaving the great affairs of state, which at present are swallowed up in the Count, I have to advert to a matter even more personally his own than the politics of Prussia. In one of his letters recently published by the *Kreuz Zeitung*, he traced to the Coburg Court a calumny propagated against him in 1860. The secretary of the Duke of Coburg now addresses the editor of the *Kreuz Zeitung* to exonerate his master from the implication, and to say that, however much differing upon the

question of constitutional government from the Minister, his Highness even at that early date looked upon him as one of the few energetic statesmen who should be employed in certain emergencies. An equally great but less diplomatic satisfaction the Premier has probably derived from the letter of some Russian boys, pupils in the Moscow and St. Petersburg grammar-schools, who wrote to return thanks 'for his simplifying the political geography of Germany, and adapting this, the most difficult chapter in a troublesome science, to the commonest capacity.'

STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS.

Berlin, December 30, 1866.

THE construction of railways from Harburg, opposite Hamburg, to Stade and Cuxhaven, and from Nordhausen, in Central Germany, to Erfurt, will be immediately proceeded with. Both lines are of the highest strategical importance, and were advocated in vain by this Government in the days of minor States ascendancy, when a thousand jealousies prevented so many needful measures from being carried out. The Stade line will aid in defending an exposed portion of the shore, and render an enemy's landing difficult; the Erfurt line, leading from the north to the vicinity of Jena, facilitates access to a region where so many decisive battles have been fought in the past, and, owing to the geographical configuration of the country, may be fought in the future. The one prevents Berlin being invaded from the North Sea—a precaution exceedingly necessary in these steam-navigation days; the other protects it from a point in the south-west but too easily reached by French armies penetrating east.

THE CROWN PRINCE OF PRUSSIA IN THE WAR OF 1866.

Berlin, January 1, 1867.

The Operations of the Second Army, under the command of his Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Prussia, in the Campaign of 1866, is the title of a pamphlet anonymously published in Berlin, whose author we believe we may mention without incurring the risk of being thought indiscreet. It is Major von Verdy, an officer on the Staff of the Crown Prince, who, from his position at head-quarters, was enabled to obtain an accurate knowledge of the events attending that remarkable episode. We are accustomed to imagine, that whoever has been actively engaged in scenes of strife and contention cannot be regarded as an impartial reporter. But, in the present instance, the victories described are of such unparalleled completeness that no Prussian military author has thought it worth his while, or perhaps found it possible, to exaggerate reality. The work in question is as dispassionate in tone as if treating of the conflicts of a distant past, and so technically distinct as to bear the impress of truth in its every line.

In rough but well-defined outline the author places before us a picture of those fabulous successes. Leaving his story to speak for itself, he does not say in so many words why matters must have fallen out as they did, but by the eloquent logic of facts, informs us nevertheless, with convincing precision, that they could have had no other result. The why and the wherefore may be comprised in a single sentence. The Austrian General underrated his enemy's courage and skill, and the Prussian General, profiting by this unwarrantable presumption, first out-manœuvred, and then, by the superior gallantry of his troops,

crushed his enemy. Field-Marshal Benedek never thought of the Prussians attacking him. Not only was their regular army regarded as too weak for such an enterprise, and the mobilisation of the Landwehr deemed an impossibility; not only is the Austrian frontier nearest to the centre of Prussian power covered by towering hills, accessible only by difficult defiles; but Berlin lay also so exposed to a Hanoverian attack from the north, and from the south could be so easily approached by the Saxons, that the Austrian commander fondly imagined the enemy would need the greater part of his troops to cover his capital. For the rest of the Prussian forces there was abundant employment in protecting the outlying province of Silesia. That this erroneous view formed the basis of General Benedek's tactics may be inferred from the fact that almost up to the moment of the Prussians crossing the frontier, he had but one corps stationed in Bohemia, and another on the Sileso-Moravian border, the two points at which, if the Prussians intended to invade Austria at all, the attempt would most probably be made. The Austrian main force was concentrated in Moravia, whence—to judge from the whole *ordre de bataille*, and also from the proclamations found in the pockets of slain officers—it was to march into the wide-stretching plains of Southern Silesia, and penetrate north, along the course of the Oder.

On the part of the Prussians every precaution had been taken to confirm the hostile Commander-in-chief in his first fatal mistake. While Austria was collecting her formidable army at a single point, the Prussian forces were designedly scattered over a space of from 600 to 700 miles. Two corps were dispatched to Silesia. One corps and a half were united on the Saxon borders. Half a corps was quartered in Central Germany, near Erfurt. Two corps were drawn up on the middle Elbe, near Torgau, and one corps left at Berlin. One and a half corps remained on the Rhine, while the last half corps of the troops mobilised

was required in Holstein. For the more complete dispersion of the army, the two Silesian corps were placed 150 miles from each other, with the Giant Mountains between them. In surveying this disposition of the Silesian corps, the Austrian General not unnaturally accounted for it by assuming them to have been sent so far south to guard the greatest possible extent of the province apparently intrusted to their care. Still more to lead him astray as to the task of this particular body, and make it appear a purely defensive one, the Crown Prince, who had been appointed to the command of Silesian troops, was also nominated Civil Governor of Silesia. Another stratagem, rounding off the harmless picture of the Prussian defensive, was that Prince Frederick Charles, destined to command on the Saxon borders, remained quietly at Berlin, while Benedek was already in camp, and busy marshalling his troops in Moravia. What was more natural than that the Prince, supposing him to be charged with the defence of the capital, should tarry there as long as possible?

Thus matters stood in the first week of June, when a sudden change occurred. Concentration and attack, instead of dispersion and defence, now became the order of the day. Forty thousand Prussians were hurried by rail from Rhineland to Brandenburg; about as many from Brandenburg to Silesia. Day and night the trains ran continuously, each conveying a thousand men. In both provinces the regiments were drawn together in brigades, the brigades into armies. Landwehr regiments were mobilised; a whole Landwehr *corps d'armée* newly-formed and equipped for field purposes at Berlin. All was done in a single week. Even before everything had been arranged, the Prussians, on the 10th of June, had expelled the Austrians from Holstein. On the 16th they invaded both Hanover and Saxony. On the 17th and 18th they were pushing through Saxony

on to the Bohemian frontier. On the 19th, while Prince Frederick Charles was still engaged in the latter movement, the Crown Prince was ordered by the King to send one of his four corps from Neisse as far north as Landshut, and station two others midway between these cities. To conceal this operation, the 4th Corps, likewise under the command of the Crown Prince, was to continue in its former quarters at Neisse, and push forward a few regiments in the direction of the Austrian borders. These orders were carried out with the utmost dispatch. Troops from the Neisse corps crossed over into Austrian Silesia, making the enemy apprehend an invasion of Moravia. In the mean time the bulk of the Crown Prince's army were hastening off, intent upon attacking some 70 or 100 miles north of what the Austrians thought the most exposed point. It is probable that the northward march of General Benedek, which, in consequence of the advance of Prince Frederick Charles from Saxony, had already begun, was delayed by the stratagem of the Neisse corps. To blind him to the last, quarters for the Prussian troops were just then secured in the southern extremity of Silesia.

On the 22d, the same day when Prince Frederick Charles crossed the Austrian frontier from the Saxon side, the Crown Prince marched the three corps of his army, which had been dispatched north, into Bohemia. The fourth was to come up from Neisse by forced marches, and follow in the wake of the others. Prince Frederick Charles operating towards the south, and the Crown Prince in a westerly direction, the two royal commanders were to meet at the angle formed by their lines of march intersecting each other. This was at the little town of Jicin (Gitschin), in Bohemia. In the event of the movement being successful, war would not only be shifted to hostile territory, but the Prussian forces, which to deceive the enemy had been originally disposed over a vast extent of ground,

would be united. Then the moment would arrive for trying a decisive battle.

The greatest promptitude was necessary. If the mountains on their road were to be crossed at all, the Prussians must forestall the enemy in occupying the defiles. Fortunately the Austrians neither gave them credit for so much enterprise, nor, indeed, themselves intended to do anything of the kind. Although harbouring offensive designs, Fieldmarshal Benedek never thought of venturing into those ravines, but, choosing less devious ground, calculated upon marching into the fields and pasture-lands of Southern Silesia. That the Prussians would be bolder than himself, and hazard a passage in a locality where whole divisions could be stopped by regiments, never entered into his head. The Prussians, on the other hand, by stationing their troops everywhere, except where they intended to cross, confirmed him in his error. Now that they suddenly wheeled about and went off north to the hilly frontier, all depended upon their being the first on the spot, and rushing through before the Austrians came up. The defiles in those parts are easily defended by mere battalions; for troops to pass them when opposed by larger bodies is quite out of the question. At this critical moment it seemed as though the Prussian plan would be frustrated. Disquieted by the advance of Prince Frederick Charles into Saxony, General Benedek ordered his troops north. While marching in this direction, he might have easily turned north-east, and closed the defiles on the Silesian frontier. In the very teeth of this possibility the Crown Prince did not hesitate to execute the movement, on which the fate of the campaign depended. His Royal Highness trusted to the marching powers of his troops. Well informed of all that was going on on the other side of the frontier, he foresaw that his men would get over the ground so fast as to meet

no more than 60,000 of the enemy at the very utmost in, or at the opening of, the defiles. It was possible they would fall in with only half this number, and, as the hills could be passed at half a dozen points, a sixth part only of the hostile total would, perhaps, be encountered at once. Basing his strategy upon these calculations, the Crown Prince confidently gave orders to enter the narrow gorges of the Giant Mountains.

The famous race of the two armies, which opened the war in that quarter has been often described. By rail, in carriages, and on foot the four Prussian *corps d'armée*, so long watching the Austrians at Neisse, dashed forward to the north. The Austrians, as many as the simultaneous invasion of Austrian Silesia permitted to be removed, attempted to keep pace with the Prussians on their side of the frontier, but could not. From this time dates the famous complaint of the Vienna press, concerning the 'monkey-like agility' of the Prussians. On the 25th—that is, five and a half days after the arrival of the order to march, and three days after the arrival of the order to invade—the Silesian army stood at those places of the frontier selected for the venturesome experiment. They were four in number, the two extreme points being, as the crow flies, about forty miles distant from each other. On the 26th the first detachment of the Silesian army set foot on hostile territory. It was a brigade of the Guards, marching from Tunschendorf to Johannisburg, with the Crown Prince riding at their head. A few feeble columns of the enemy were met, and easily repulsed. It became evident that the bulk of the Austrian army had not yet come up.

Before setting out for the serious work in hand, the Crown Prince had issued the following general order to the four corps forming the Second Army under his command:

'Soldiers of the Second Army,—You have heard the words of our

King and Lord of war. His Majesty's endeavours to secure a continuance of the blessings of peace to the country have been in vain. With a heavy heart, but strong in purpose, and relying upon the devotion and gallantry of his troops, the King has determined to fight for the honour and independence of Prussia, as well as the re-organisation of Germany, and its formation into a powerful whole. Having by the gracious confidence of my royal father been placed at your head, I am proud, as the King's first servant, to stake my life and my fortune to secure the possession of all that is dearest to our country. Soldiers! for the first time for fifty years, an enemy who is our match stands arrayed against us. Trust in your strength and the tried excellence of your arms. Remember our task is to beat an enemy whom our greatest king defeated with but a small force. Forward, then, with the old Prussian cry, "With God for King and Fatherland!"

Neisse, June 20. FRIEDRICH WILHELM.'

His Royal Highness composed and wrote with his own hand the original of the above order. In its simple earnestness, those who have had occasion to observe his deportment under difficult circumstances will recognise the calm, but essentially manly, character of the Prince.

The Prussians were fast pouring out of the passes, when in the hilly country, where plain and defile meet, the Austrians appeared in considerable strength. The main body of their troops was certainly not present; yet so difficult was the ground, and so many advantages did it offer for defensive purposes, that had the Imperial soldiery fought with the resolute ardour of the Prussians, the latter would not, at least not at all points, have effected their entrance into Bohemia. As it was, the Austrian infantry invariably gave way after a certain amount of firing, when the Prussians scaled the rocks on which the artillery was posted, knocked down the gunners and captured the guns. This was pretty uniformly the case in the encounters previous to Königgrätz. A few instances excepted, the Prussians deny that they are indebted to the rapid fire of the needle-gun for their successes.

According to them, the Austrians, as a rule, were placed on rising ground, and so scattered over hill, dale,

and copse, that the fire of the breech-loading weapon told but little upon them, in comparison to what it ought. Most Prussian officers will tell you they looked forward with delight to the opportunity the plains of Vienna would afford for bringing out the whole efficiency of their weapon, but that while in Bohemia they had to conquer mainly by good generalship and the intelligence and courage of their troops. Certain it is that the Austrians, after in some instances showing a bold front, were eventually driven back everywhere.

On the 27th a sharp action took place at Nachod, twenty miles south of Tunschendorf. It was fought by the Posen troops, under General Steinmetz, who had crossed the hills near the spot selected by the Guards. The Prussians being opposed just as they emerged from the defile, it required the whole energy of that stern leader to take them through. Hardly had their skirmishers appeared in what, comparatively speaking, might be called suitable battle-ground, when progress was stopped by the enemy bearing down upon them in hot haste. Had they been thrust back, and a dozen guns placed in the defile, it is doubtful whether the *corps d'armée*, whose van they were, would ever have effected an entrance into the plain. The struggle was long undecided, and so doubtful for a while, that at a certain moment the Crown Prince, who was on the spot in the capacity of Commander-in-Chief, was impelled to draw his sword and prepare for all contingencies. After a contest of eight hours, during which the Prussian van, slowly gaining ground, allowed of more and more troops issuing into the plain, the Austrians retreated. On this occasion it was that Prussian cavalry for the first time since the last century measured swords with the Austrian horse, and by a brilliant charge eclipsed the ancient renown of the latter.

Meanwhile the other columns of the Crown Prince's army were likewise crossing the hills. On the same 27th

which witnessed the action at Tunschendorf, another fight occurred at Trautenau, fifteen miles north-west of Nachod. The Prussians there engaged were the 1st or East Prussian corps, who had surmounted the Giant Hills at a more northerly point than the Guards or the Posen (5th) *corps d'armée.* There, too, the Prussians had the greatest difficulty in forcing their way. Before getting out of the rocks, and opening a path for the rest of the corps, their advance lost no less than 1,200 men and sixty-three officers.

On the day following, the 28th, the Guards, under the immediate direction of the Crown Prince, did battle and conquered at Soor, about half-way between Nachod and Trautenau. That day also witnessed the struggle at Skalitz, where General Steinmetz, with his Poseners, defeated Archduke Leopold. Here two Austrian corps, one of them fresh for the war, though they had chosen a remarkably good position on the brow of a steep declivity, were routed by one Prussian. On the 29th the Guards, proceeding south-west, again came off victors at Königinhof, the Poseners, who marched in the same direction, but at a short distance farther south, meeting and beating the enemy at Schweinschädel. The 30th was observed as the first day of rest after ten days' incessant marching and four days' hard fighting. On the classical principle, however, of *Nulla dies sine linea*, a communication was effected on that day with Prince Frederick Charles, who, having penetrated into Bohemia from the Saxon side, had already got so far south that both armies could be henceforth employed as one. The junction of Prince Charles's left wing with the Crown Prince's right took place at Miletine, about twenty miles north-west of Königgrätz, and from thirty to forty miles west and south-west of the several points from which the Crown Prince had started when invading the hostile territory. The introductory part of the campaign having thus been got through in five days,

and the Prussians having forced an enemy who intended to seek them out in their home to stand on the defensive in his own country, the Crown Prince recapitulated the events of that glorious week in a short General Order:

'But a few days have elapsed since our entering Bohemia, and already brilliant victories have been won, giving us command over the Elbe, and enabling us to effect a junction with the First Army. With this our primary task is fulfilled. The brave 5th Corps d'Armée, under the command of its heroic leader, on three successive days defeated three different corps of the enemy with great gallantry. The Guards gave battle twice, each time discomfiting the enemy with signal triumph. The 1st Corps d'Armée, under the most trying circumstances, displayed extraordinary bravery. Five colours, two standards, twenty guns, and 8,000 prisoners have been captured by us; many thousand dead and wounded proving the total loss of the foe to be greater than can be now calculated. We, too, have to regret the loss of many a brave comrade, removed by death or wounds from our ranks. The consciousness of dying for king and country and as victors will have given them comfort in death, and will tend to alleviate the anguish of the sufferers. I pray God to grant future victories to our arms. I thank the generals and officers as well as soldiers of the Second Army for their gallantry in battle and their steadiness in overcoming the most adverse circumstances, and I am proud to lead such troops.

Prausnitz, July 1, 1866. FRIEDRICH WILHELM.'

The strategical relations of the two armies at this juncture are thus described by Major von Verdy:

'The Prussian First and Elbe Armies, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, penetrating into Bohemia from Saxony, had been opposed by one Austrian Corps and the Saxon army. At the time of this happening in the north-eastern extremity of Bohemia, Feldzeugmeister Benedek, having with his six other corps left Austrian Silesia and Moravia, marched north, in order to crush Prince Frederick Charles with superior numbers. As his columns advanced, their right flank was attacked by the Crown Prince, invading Bohemia unexpectedly from the east, and by the victories of Nachod, Skalitz, Schweinschädel, Soor, and Königinhof preventing the hostile commander from carrying out his intention and ever getting to fight with Prince Frederick Charles. The latter having in the mean time defeated the troops immediately opposed to him at Podkost, Hühnerwasser (Kuravoda), Podol, Münchengrätz, and Gitschin (Jicin), across these glorious fields had likewise opened for himself a way into Bohemia. The total loss of the enemy up to that date was estimated by us at 40,000 men. This first operation having utterly failed,

we expected General Benedek would concentrate his army on the left bank of the Elbe, and, covered by the river and the fortresses of Josephstadt and Königgrätz, accept a decisive battle. That he would again come to a stand on the right bank of the Elbe, there to satisfy the desire of the Prussian army for a battle in the open field, was hardly probable. On the other hand, it was true enough that, strong as the enemy's position would be for fighting on the left side of the river, his communications would be only by means of his left wing, while his right wing was flanked by the Crown Prince.

Under these circumstances, the Second Army, under command of his Royal Highness, was obliged to wait for farther orders from head-quarters. His Majesty arrived on the morning of the 2d of July at Gitschin. The troops having undergone such unwonted exertions, this day was devoted to rest. On the 3d extensive reconnoitrings had to be made to ascertain the position of the main force of the enemy, for which purpose the First Army was to proceed in the direction of Königgrätz, and the Second Army to march towards Josephstadt. News having been received at the head-quarters of the Second Army that the garrison of Josephstadt was scanty and inefficient, the Crown Prince ordered the 6th Corps d'Armée, then encamped at Gradlitz, to cross over to the right bank of the Elbe, cut off the fortress from all connection with the main force of the enemy, and see whether the commandant would offer resistance. This was the state of things in the night from the 2d to the 3d of July.'

General Benedek yearned to retrieve his fortunes. At first too slow, he now became too hot. He had his troops together, and use them he would without delay. While the Prussians were intruding into the finest of his sovereign's provinces, he had gradually transferred to the north his six Moravian *corps d'armée.* General Clam-Gallas, after his defeat by Prince Frederick Charles in Northern Bohemia, had retreated in the direction of the main army, and, with the Saxons, joined General Benedek. With such a large complement of men—the largest, in fact, ever in the whole course of her long and checkered history united under Austria's martial banners—the Feldzeugmeister rashly determined at once to compensate himself for the six discomfitures sustained at the hands of the Crown Prince, and the four inflicted by Prince Frederick Charles and General Herwarth. He must have known that, by leaving his position at König-

grätz, and marching out to meet one of the two hostile armies surrounding him in a vast semicircle, he ran the risk of being attacked by the other in the flank. The Crown Prince, it is true, was about fifteen miles distant from the point where the collision between the Austrians and Prince Frederick Charles, who stood nearer to them, would ensue; and the probable battle-field was exceedingly favourable for the Austrians, being covered by hills, woods, and valleys, which would have to be taken by the Prussians at the point of the bayonet. But then General Benedek had had such convincing proofs of the marching capabilities of the Prussians that he ought not to have exposed himself to the danger of the Crown Prince arriving in time to take him in flank. Still less ought he to have run that enormous risk without opposing to the Crown Prince a body strong enough to delay his march till the decisive hour was over. Least of all should he have done so without securing a fortified camp in his rear to retreat to in case of defeat. Of all this, General Benedek did the reverse. The result is known throughout Europe. The resolution of the Crown Prince overcame all obstacles in his way, and the destinies of Germany were decided on the battle-field of Sadowa.

KING WILLIAM'S MILITARY FETE.

Berlin, January 2, 1867.

YESTERDAY his Majesty celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of his entrance into the army. Prince Wilhelm of Baden, who, very much against his will, was obliged to command the troops of his State in the late war against Prussia; the Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, father of the Prince of Roumania; the Crown Princes of Anhalt and Schaumburg-Lippe, and many other German royalties, had previously arrived to offer their congratulations on this festal and, after the events of the summer, doubly gratifying occasion. Generals Herwarth, Vogel, Steinmetz, Voight-Rhetz, and some other heroes of the war residing in provincial capitals, had also been invited to attend Court, and by their presence enhance the lustre of the scene. Early in the morning his Majesty went to the garrison church of Potsdam, the burial-place of Frederick II. and the military sanctuary of Prussia. The King subsequently received the members of his family. After granting ceremonial audience to the ministers, generals, and other dignitaries, he returned to Berlin, and having spent the day with his valiant companions in arms, sat down to dinner with a number of chosen guests in the Schloss. Altogether it was a grand day. The principal portion of the ceremonies consisted in H.R.H. the Crown Prince, surrounded by the most eminent generals, presenting to his royal sire the congratulations of the army and navy. The speech delivered by his Royal Highness is a succinct and eloquent recapitulation of the military glories of Prussia in the present century.

'Most illustrious, most powerful King, most gracious King and Lord of war,—Your Royal Majesty's faithful army beg permission to salute you on the sixtieth anniversary of the day on which King Frederick William III., of blessed memory, received you into the ranks of the Prussian army. The soldier's coat which you put on for the first time,

January 1, 1807, an ornament bestowed upon the boy, according to the time-honoured traditions of our House, soon received a more serious significance amid the wars of that calamitous period. Those were hard times in which your Majesty entered upon your military career, and hard indeed were the trials our arms were destined to undergo. But the very greatness of our adversary helped us to develop our strength. The whole people of Prussia became Prussia's army; and when your Royal Majesty, just entering manhood, accompanied our forces to the decisive campaign, you learnt to appreciate the value of our military institutions, and the indomitable strength of a faithful and ardent people in arms. From the field your Majesty brought home the order of the Iron Cross, that venerated decoration of the old soldier, admiringly looked up to by the present generation.

During the period of peace following that great war, your Majesty assiduously contributed to promote the military education of the people, and to heighten the effectiveness of our troops. When, after a long interval, war reasserted its claims, you led on the troops which your royal brother caused to be sent to certain German territories in the interest of order and law. With quick and decisive strokes you overcame, restoring peace and right at once.

In the grave wars at the beginning of this century the victorious power of our military institutions had been put to the test in the presence of your Majesty. Still, it could not escape the attention of so constant and careful an observer of military matters as your Majesty has ever been, that, like all human things, those institutions required farther development, and in the course of time some modification. To your Majesty, above all others, we are indebted for combining the old excellent qualities of our service and discipline with such innovations as were required in the armament, drill, and organisation of the troops.

Upon ascending the throne of your ancestors, your Royal Majesty allowed the army, and through it the whole country, to reap the full benefit of your having the command. The practice of giving all able-bodied men a military education was restored; the best arms of Europe were placed in their hands; and the strict soldier's drill amplified, and every man taught and permitted to move as an independent individual. Three years ago, struggling with the climate, and fighting a sturdy and gallant host, strongly fortified behind earthworks, our soldiers gave brilliant proofs of their efficiency; but no more successful, no more manly and enthusiastic behaviour could have been displayed than that by which, in the great and memorable war of the past year, they rewarded their royal master for his unceasing solicitude in their behalf.

After a fifty years' peace, hardly broken by the firing of a single shot, your Majesty, at the head of the army, defeated a gallant martial enemy, accustomed to victory, and commanded by generals of tried merit. Victory followed close upon victory, faster and more decisive than we could ever

have anticipated. By this war your Majesty's army and entire people returned their thanks for the reform of our military institutions. That which distinguishes us above all other nations is the absence of any distinction between the army and the people. All shed their blood wherever and whenever necessary. Dying before the eyes of their King, they have rendered you their tribute of gratitude with their last breath.

Where thanks have been returned in so sublime a manner, it is scarcely becoming to present a work of human ingenuity as a token of our feelings. Yet we venture to entreat your Majesty to accept it, apologising at the same time for daring in our capacity of soldiers to present the Commander with a gift. In doing so, we beg to express a wish liable to no misinterpretation when coming from a victorious army. It is that God, having crowned you with victory, and conducted you back from a well-contested field, may bestow upon your Majesty long, long years of a peaceful reign.'

The King, who was moved to tears, kissed his son thrice, and uttered a few highly flattering words of acknowledgment for services rendered, to Count Bismarck and Generals Roon and Moltke. After this, Field-Marshal Wrangel presented a silver model of a column to be erected in honour of the King. General Von Webern offered a wreath of golden laurel-leaves.

All day excited and happy crowds were Unter den Linden and in front of the palace, heartily cheering the hale old warrior King whenever they could espy him at the window or in the street. To return thanks, the King, at the dinner-table, proposed a gracious toast, 'The people who have supplied me with my army!'

What a difference between the day when his Majesty entered the service and yesterday's anniversary! On Jan. 1, 1807, the King's father was living at Memel, stripped of the greater part of his realm by the issue of one unfortunate battle; on the 1st of January 1867, after a lapse of sixty years, King William sees Prussia, not only reëstablished in her ancient position, but made paramount in Germany.

The anniversary was marked by the King bestowing the historical names of Bismarck, Moltke, Roon, and Herwarth upon streets in the new fashionable suburb north of the Thier-Garten.

THE 'ALMANACH DE GOTHA' FOR 1867.

Berlin, January 3, 1867.

THE study of the *Almanach de Gotha* has not often been so interesting as in the present year. 1866 has been uncommonly fertile in family and political events affecting the illustrious subjects of the tiny, yet weighty volume. Sixteen deaths are recorded in the sovereign families of Europe, eight of the male sex and eight females, viz. the Landgrave Ferdinand of Hesse-Homburg (last of his race, whose patrimony devolved upon Hesse-Darmstadt, and has since been annexed by Prussia); Don Miguel of Portugal, grand uncle of the King of Portugal; Prince Otto of Italy, son of the King of Italy; Prince Louis Philippe de Condé (son of the Duke d'Aumale, twenty-one years of age); Prince Anton of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (aged twenty-five), who fell at the head of his battalion in the battle of Sadowa; Prince Henry XII. Reuss (junior branch); Prince Sigismund of Prussia (son of the Crown Prince, two years of age); and the youngest son of the Queen of Spain (only three weeks old). The eight females are two dowagers: Queen Marie Amélie, ex-Queen of the French (née Princess of Sicily), and the Countess Caroline de Waldeck (née Baroness Lanstatt); three married Princesses: Princess Louisa von Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg (wife of the Prince Michael Handjeri); Princess Sophy of Lichtenstein (wife of Prince Frederick, née Lowe); and Frau von Frankenberg, morganatic wife of Prince Charles of Bavaria (née Schäller); three unmarried Princesses: Princess Philippine of Reuss-Schleitz (sister of the reigning Prince, aged eighty-five years); Princess Catherine of Oldenburg (twenty years); and Archduchess Elizabeth of Austria (daughter of Archduke Joseph, aged one year). Of cardinals five have died: Scitowsky; the Archbishop of Rheims; Balussi, Bishop of Imola; Matteucci, and Tosti.

The births number eight Princes and five Princesses. Sons were born to the Sultan, to the Queen of Spain (since deceased), to the Infante Sebastian of Spain, to the Grand Duke Michael of Russia, to the Duke of Montpensier, to the Duke of Chartres, to the Prince Charles of Tuscany, and to the Prince August of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (married to a daughter of the Emperor of the Brazils). Daughters were born to the Crown Prince of Prussia, to the Prince Napoleon, to Prince Ludwig of Hesse-Darmstadt, to Prince Frederick of Schleswig-Holstein Sonderburg-Augustenburg, and to Prince Henry XV. Reuss (junior line).

Four marriages were celebrated. The Grand Duke Cesarewitch Alexander of Russia was married to the Princess Dagmar of Denmark; Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein Sonderburg-Augustenburg to Princess Helena of Great Britain; Prince Teck to Princess Mary of Cambridge; and Prince William of Hanau, son of the ex-Elector of Cassel, to Princess Elizabeth of Schaumburg-Lippe.

By the death of the Landgrave of Hesse-Homburg, and the dethronement of the King of Hanover, the Elector of Hesse, and the Duke of Nassau, the number of European sovereigns has been reduced to forty; viz. five Emperors (including the Emperor of Mexico), one Sultan, one Pope, ten Kings, two Queens, six Grand Dukes, five Dukes, ten Princes (including the Prince of Monaco). The oldest sovereign is the Prince of Reuss-Schleitz (past 77). The Pope, the Prince of Schwarzburg-Rudelstadt, and the Duke of Anhalt, are past 70. Of the other crowned heads, five are between 60 and 70, one between 50 and 60, eighteen between 40 and 50, seven between 30 and 40, five between 20 and 30. The youngest is the Prince Reuss (senior line), a minor. The average age of the reigning potentates is 46½ years. Twenty have exceeded this age. The longest reign is that of the Prince of

Schwarzburg-Rudelstadt, who, including the years of his minority, has held the sceptre for 59⅔ years. The Duke of Anhalt, the next in seniority, has been a sovereign for 49½ years. Four have reigned between 30 and 40, five between 20 and 30, fourteen between 10 and 20; all the others, fifteen in number, have succeeded to their thrones within the last ten years—one of them, the Duke of Saxe-Meiningen, in 1866. The average length of reign amounts to 16 years. Fifteen have exceeded this.

Six Sovereigns have never been married; viz. the Pope, the Kings of Bavaria and Greece, the Duke of Brunswick, and the Princes of Lichtenstein and Reuss (senior line). One, the Queen of Great Britain, is a widow. Five, the King of Italy, the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Grand Duke Mecklenburg-Schwerin (the latter for the second time), the Duke of Anhalt, and the Prince of Monaco, are widowers. The Prince of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt is allied to a morganatic wife. The Sultan has many wives. Twenty-four Christian Sovereigns and the Queen of Spain are married to members of royal families, one of them for the second time. Of their consorts, the oldest are the Princess of Reuss-Schleitz and the Queen of Saxony, both passed 60. One is between 50 and 60, eleven between 40 and 50, five between 30 and 40, four between 20 and 30. The youngest, the Queen of Portugal, is 19. The average age is rather above 40 years.

The successors of twenty-four Sovereigns are sons. One, the Emperor of the Brazils, will be succeeded by a daughter; eight (including the Kings of Bavaria, Greece, and Sweden) by brothers; three (including the Sultan) by other relatives; two, the Dukes of Brunswick and Reuss (senior line), are the last of their race. The Pope has an elective successor, and the Emperor of Mexico no heir-apparent at all. Of the thirty-seven heirs to thrones, the oldest, a Prince of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, is 68⅔ years. The three youngest, the Crown-Princes of Bel-

gium, Portugal, and Waldeck, are respectively $7\frac{1}{2}$, $3\frac{1}{2}$, and $1\frac{3}{4}$ years. The average age in this section of royal society is $26\frac{2}{3}$ years. Of the heirs, twelve are married: one, the eldest, is a widower; nine have children. Of their consorts, the oldest is Princess Charles of Hesse-Darmstadt (mother of Prince Ludwig), $51\frac{1}{2}$ years of age; the youngest, the Crown-Princess of Russia, just 19.

RUSSIA AND THE EAST.

Berlin, January 4, 1867.

HOWEVER near or remote a solution of pending difficulties, the papers of the various parties interested in the East have begun skirmishing, and are carrying on wordy warfare as inveterately as if a crisis were at hand. In order to convey an authentic account of the situation, I will let them speak for themselves.

A few weeks ago the *Russische Correspondenz*, a semi-official organ of the St. Petersburg Government, published an article containing the following passage:

'There is not the slightest doubt that the Western Powers, France, and more particularly England, are aspiring to the acquisition of Ottoman territory, and that the execution of their design has been only put off to a more favourable time, when the Christian tribes in the East will have become the tools they want them to be. It is equally certain that both Powers, from a wish to sow discord between the Roumanians and the other Christian tribes of Turkey, patronise the former, but are deaf to the complaints of the Bulgarians, Servians, &c. Russia alone sustains their hopes from disinterested motives, and will resist the spread of Western civilisation among them, and advocate the maintenance of their ancient national traditions.'

Russian editors, writing in Russ, may nowadays be occasionally heard to hold forth against the bad taste, as they call it, of their compatriots in valuing and endeavouring to acquire a culture which is not the growth of their

own native soil; but this is the first time that I have met with this grotesque reproach in a journal destined for perusal abroad. Let us see what the Roumanians, accused of leaguing with the wicked aborigines of the civilised West, have to say in reply. The Bucharest *Romanul*, an organ of the moderate Liberals in the Danubian Principalities, thus retorts:

'What are the old traditions referred to by the *Correspondenz*? Is there any one so ignorant as not to know that their real meaning is subjection to Russia, and acknowledgment, exclusive acknowledgment, of the Power enthroned at St. Petersburg? A most melancholy past has enlightened us upon the signification of that particular term. The occupation of our country for a period of twenty-five years and its treatment as a Russian province, the application of our national resources to the promotion of Russian interests, and the demand to bow down to the fiat of Holy Muscovy, on the mere ground of our having a like religion and descent—the latter assumption more than doubtful—these are the old traditions which Moscow is desirous to maintain with all her might. The past is a mirror in which the future may be seen reflected. Let us, therefore, study the past—we and the other Christian tribes of this peninsula, and we shall then have no difficulty in ascertaining what is best for us. From its teachings we shall certainly learn that there can be no danger in France and England sympathising with our cause. Both are far off, and have many interests to attend to, forbidding them to hold sway in the East.

As regards Roumania more particularly, she is free from apprehension even on the part of Turkey, but has everything to fear from that great Power, our Northern neighbour. That Slavonic and Orthodox Power, speaking to the Slavonians in the name of a common religion and nationality, has her eyes greedily fixed upon us, and her jaws wide open to devour us, all in the name of said religion and nationality. Let us, O peoples of the East, at length realise the obvious truth, that unless we are at one, and stand shoulder to shoulder, our force will not prevail against the dangers menacing every one of us. Let us bear in mind that by adopting that Western civilisation so offensive to the nerves of Muscovy, we shall be rendering ourselves worthy of independent existence, and become an impenetrable barrier to our Northern friends; but, divided, we shall bring on our own decline and fall. As to the Roumanians, we for our part are resolved to live as a free people, on a footing of perfect equality with and fraternal attachment to the rest of the Eastern tribes.

After what we have said, we deem it our duty to direct the attention of the Government and Chambers to what is passing around us. We

are possessed of facts, derived from an official Russian source, clearly foreshadowing what is in store for us. There is no doubt that Russia has taken the Eastern question in hand, and is about to solve it. She is urged on by an irrepressible fear that the East may escape her grasp, and the Polish question, now pressed upon her by Rome, be revived. She is also prompted by a desire to direct the eyes of the world to some distant part, the better to complete the demolition of Poland in the interval. But where can war be more easily kindled than in the East? Where is so much combustible material at hand? Where is a more profitable field for Russian speculation to be found? Russia has always had an eye upon us, and of late more than ever. Her wishes have been recently expressed with the greatest openness in an article of the *Invalide*, copied into to-day's official *Monitorul*. We ought not to forget for a single moment that this country is the high road from Russia to Turkey, that nobody should be allowed to pass through it against our will, and that we must warn off every comer, were it only to carry out the mission intrusted to us by Europe. Should we neglect our task, we shall be discarded as unfit for our work, and have no right to the advantages which may otherwise accrue to us from that war which is inevitable.'

The *Invalide*, in the article quoted, had made a distinction between the Polish and Cretan insurrections. The one, it is said, was diabolical, the other angelic. Respecting the views uttered by the *Romanul*, they may be regarded as reflecting the disposition of the independent and educated classes generally in the Danubian Principalities. But Russia likewise has her partisans among the priesthood and that section of the nobility anxious to participate in the splendours of her wide-reaching realm. The masses are ciphers, while the Government cannot help siding with those who have the independence of the country at heart.

Stronger than in the Danubian Principalities is Russian influence in Servia and the adjacent provinces. Not only have those countries never been exposed to occupation by the Czar, but the language and nationality of the inhabitants are much more intimately related to the Russian than is the case in Moldo-Wallachia. The Servians are Slavonians; the Moldo-Wallachians, a hybrid race with a hybrid language, a jumble of Italian and Slavo-

nian elements. With these, other reasons combine why the Servians, comparatively speaking, are more inclined to avail themselves of Russian assistance for the overthrow of the Turks. A large proportion of their immediate co-nationalists are still smarting under the Ottoman yoke, and they cannot hope to accomplish their delivery without foreign aid. Their Prince is less independent than the Bucharest Sovereign, and in a race hardly touched by the first rays of culture, the sympathetic power of a common faith and tongue naturally predominates over the colder reasonings of the calculating mind. Thus it is that, although there are plenty of people in that Principality who have no wish to become Russians, and would need very little encouragement to avow their sentiments, the *partie d'action* and their papers are arrayed in the colours of St. Petersburg. As a sample, I extract the following from the Belgrade *Svetovid*, the leading national organ :

'Pan-Slavism has ever been a bugbear to non-Slavonians. By representing it as something very terrible, they would blight the development of the Slavonian race. But they are mistaken in this. Development, progress, and consolidation are engrafted in the very nature of the Slavonian. In these southern parts he neither can nor will remain long in his present condition. He has been and will be again his own master. After a short delay he will emerge from his present transition state, and exchange servitude for mastery—mastery not over foreigners, but in his own ancient home. Pan-Germanism and Pan-Romanism have asserted themselves in the world, and broken in subject races to the yoke. The Pan-Germanists wish to remain at the height they have attained, to rule over the divided Slavonians. For this purpose they have deliberately depicted the Slave as a sort of ogre, intent upon swallowing up the world. For this purpose they have called heaven and earth to their help to prevent that terrible enemy Pan-Slavism from rising into existence. But the game has lasted a little too long. There must be an end of it, when right and equity will triumph. On which side these are, let our detractors decide.

The spirit of the age is potent in us, and the chains of our slavery will be cast off. All nations want to become independent. All nations are looking out for liberty, without which life is a blank, and unworthy of man. We have been long accustomed to Western journalism crying

out against Pan-Slavism, and have hardly thought it worth our while to open our lips in reply. But when an Eastern country, when Roumania, so long viewed with fraternal feelings by the Slave, so long overwhelmed by kindnesses, to which she is partly indebted for her present political situation—when such a country reëchoes the nonsensical vociferation of the West, we cannot restrain our surprise. When those, who from being faithful Slavonians have become our enemies, begin to impute motives to M. Marinovitch, the President of the Servian Senate, for going to St. Petersburg at the moment when the evacuation of the Turkish fortresses in Servia is demanded by his Government, we can only advise the Roumanian Government to imitate the example of their Roman ancestors, and to take care what they are about. *Caveant consules.*'

The article adroitly appeals to the ambition of its readers. There are probably not very many people in Servia who know that the Pan-Germanism and Pan-Romanism held up as a model to them do not exist. Servians and Russians are indeed both Slavonians, but their respective languages are far too different for them to read each other's papers and books. In Italy and Germany the unity movement affects national sub-divisions, connected with each other by the ties of a common language, literature, and history; in the East it is solely to be grounded on the common roots of the dictionary, though the races, candidates for unity, speak different languages, and have been separated in the entire course of history. If the purely etymological principle, which demands that Russians and Servians should be formed into one empire, is to hold good in the case of other races also, the Danes, Swedes, Norwegians, Dutch, Swiss, nay even the English and Americans must be embodied with Germany, to which they all are related by a common Teutonic origin. Similarly, France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy must be formed into a single State. Until this consummation takes place the Servians need not lament the fate which keeps them separate from Muscovy. The concluding words of the article are evidently intended to frighten the Moldo-Wallachian Government into a more accommodating conduct.

The same Russophile *Svetovid* is greatly incensed at the French Government endeavouring to put off the day of the contemplated outbreak:

'It is generally known that M. de Moustier, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, sides with Turkey rather than Crete. We will not animadvert upon a fact so incompatible with the avowed tendencies of the French Imperial Government. We will only say that a Court favourable to the cause of Italian and Polish nationality—a Court that has raised its voice in favour of the same principle in Schleswig-Holstein, and not prevented Prussia from pursuing her appointed path,—that such a Court is vindicating an opposite system in the East. French humanity does not seem to extend to the Orient. We do not complain, but are only aroused to a sense of the realities surrounding us. We shall not be stopped on our way, but be only taught a better choice of means. Without, therefore, dilating upon his extraordinary conduct, we proceed to remind M. de Moustier of a speech not long ago delivered by him at Constantinople. He said there were some little States in the East wishing to play the part of a Piedmont in Turkey, but lacking the merits as well as the resources of Piedmont. Adverting to Greece more especially, he observed that she had not justified the expectations of France, nor shown herself worthy of the blood shed for her liberation. All she had done was to create an educated proletariate, which prevented the Government from becoming consolidated, and which, if it continued supporting the Cretans, might cause the country to be occupied by foreign troops. Of these reproaches one is aimed at all Christians in the East, another at Greece exclusively. We will answer them in succession.

We, the Servians, dearly love our South Slavonic brethren, and wish to further their prospects. We also love the Greeks, and take an interest in their growing prosperity. Though we are oppressed, we may yet prove M. de Moustier to be in the wrong. Honour and glory to Piedmont! She has wisely shaped her conduct, and, with the assistance of France, achieved the independence and political unity of the Italians. She has deserved well of Italy. But we, too, are not destitute of merit. We have obliged not only Italy, but all Europe, and, indeed, civilisation all over the world. The South Slavonians and the Greeks have prevented for some centuries the Mussulmans from inundating Europe. That powerful stock of Tartar origin has been shivered to pieces against the rock of our heroic race. Although we may have been involved in the disaster, we barred the Turk's course beyond the Hungarian frontier, and will chase him one day from the Save and the Danube. While we were standing sentinel at her door, Europe found leisure to develop progress, and get civilised.'

The rest of this eloquent article is devoted to the

defence of Greece. The South Slavonians, M. de Mous-tier is assured in conclusion, are strong to endure, and none the less so to act. Since the above was written, its author will have had the satisfaction of perceiving that France has modified her policy, and instead of opposing the Rayah, tries to pacify them by obtaining concessions for their benefit from the Sultan.

Baron Beust has likewise branched off in the same direction as France, and appears in a more friendly mood to the Rayah than formerly. But the Austrian Croats, intently watching the vicissitudes in the fate of their co-nationalists on the other side the frontier, are not likely to be satisfied with anything short of their entire emancipation from the Turk, and, perhaps, reunion with themselves. The recent attempts of the Turkish Government to befriend the Rayah would be abortive, even were they not thwarted by the implacable hatred and fanaticism of the Turkish population.

Among the 2,500,000 Roumanians in South-eastern Hungary and Transylvania a sort of underhand agitation is going on for a reunion with the Danubian Principalities.

The new Austrian law universalising conscription is the official promulgation of a measure begun shortly after the war.

The Russian and Prussian Governments have agreed to construct a railway between Czenstochow, on the Warsaw-Cracow line, and Kandrzin, near Cosel, a station on the South Silesian line. A direct communication will be thus created between Poland and Silesia, the present one running through a few miles of Austro-Galician territory. So important is the branch projected to the Russians, that the snows of a Polish winter have not prevented their setting to work at once.

POLAND AND GERMANY.

Berlin, January 7, 1867.

The more Austria endeavours to instil the hope of coming independence into her Polish subjects, and render them an instrument to be used against her adversaries in the event of a revival of the German or Eastern questions, the more are Russia and Prussia bent upon precautionary measures. Prussia, indeed, having little to dread from her Poles, even though they were to try their worst against her, has contented herself with an order to the Posen authorities enjoining them to watch Austrian Poles travelling in the province. It is said that the number of Galician visitors has recently so increased in the eastern districts of this monarchy as to have aroused the suspicions of the police, ignorant as they were, at first, of what was brewing on the other side of the frontier. When, however, the Posen papers began openly to declare in favour of Hapsburg, pointing to that ancient dynasty as the star of hope which had appeared to their unfortunate race, there could be no doubt as to the object of these hibernal trips, and the above order was accordingly issued. More stringent regulations have been enforced in the Russian section of what formerly was the largest continental kingdom, Poland. Contrary to what was expected a few weeks ago, after the fall of the Milutine or extreme Russian party in the Polish administration, orders have been given to maintain the system introduced after the last rebellion, and to go on injuring and destroying the nobility in favour of the emancipated serf. Not satisfied with this, the Russian Government, as they allege in self-defence, have thought themselves justified in repealing the greater part of those national institutions which, amid all the vicissitudes of the times, had been so long suffered

to preserve the name and appearance of a separate kingdom of Poland, as established under the Vienna Treaties of 1815. With the exception of the School, Church, and Serf Emancipation Departments, to be directed as heretofore by boards located at Warsaw, the central authorities of the 'kingdom' are abolished, and the local officers placed under the immediate orders of the St. Petersburg Cabinet.

Sweeping as the measure is, it looks severer than it will be felt to be. The loss to the Poles from it will not be very perceptible, much as their feelings may be tried by the change. Since 1830, when, after the great rebellion, the Polish Constitution was abolished, and the kingdom subjected to the uncontrolled sway of the Governors-General appointed by the Czar, it has been impossible to speak seriously of Poland as a State enjoying a separate existence, and having nothing in common with Russia but its head. It is true the Governor-General had a number of secretaries attached to him, presiding over the conduct of public affairs in the capacity, if not with the title, of Ministers; it is true, a Polish Exchequer was maintained, and a Polish debt, mostly contracted in former times, allowed to appear as a special item in the reports and accounts of the Russian authorities; but the Viceroy of Poland was the official of the absolute Czar, and practically, if not legally, under the exclusive orders of the Supreme Council of the Empire, just as much as any other Governor-General of the Russian Autocracy. This arrangement abolished the Poland of the Treaties as long as thirty-six years ago. Though it left the Polish bureaucracy concentrated at Warsaw, it made it amenable to inspirations from St. Petersburg; though it preserved the semblance, it did away with the reality of a Polish Government in Poland. Yet, as the leading officials of the Governor-General were still selected from the native population, even this modified system had the advantage of leaving the immediate supervision of the civil service

in the hands of men intimately conversant with the country, and able to adapt the orders from the central Government to the peculiar requirements of their province. Of this latter privilege the Poles were deprived only after the insurrection of 1863. The first thing Russia did after reimposing her rule three years ago, was to dismiss as many Polish officials as could be spared, and supersede them by more genuine and faithful subjects of the Czar from the eastern provinces of the realm. Between the state of things then introduced, and the one enforced by the new ukase, there is hardly any appreciable difference. All that has been done away with now are mere outward forms. The name of the kingdom of Poland is, however, allowed to survive, though the title of Governor-General will be scarcely continued now that the province has been divided into ten counties, each having a separate Governor, almost wholly dependent upon orders from St. Petersburg. General Berg, the present Governor-General—the same who quelled the rebellion, and has since held down contumacious spirits with an iron grasp, though not without a humane wish to mitigate the rigours of the regime—is staying at St. Petersburg, whither he was summoned a short time ago.

The reverse of this picture may be contemplated in Austria. There the Poles—the spoilt pets of the Imperial Government—are fondly hoping for a speedy renewal of ancient splendour. To show their sanguine disposition, and the way they look upon current events, I cannot do better than translate a circular just addressed by the editor of the *Dziennik Lvowski* (Lemberg Journal) to his political friends, and to eminent politicians generally:

'Honoured Sir,—Events rapidly succeeding each other, and of the gravest consequence to our destinies as a race, compel us to look upon politics in a more earnest and serious way than heretofore. The future is pregnant with the most important changes. The Eastern question, fast approaching solution, necessitates Europe to occupy itself with the odious question of Poland. While these consummations are drawing on,

Muscovy and Prussia are using every effort to destroy our nationality, that they may be able to tell the world, when the Polish question becomes the order of the day, that there is not a Pole left in Posen or the Russian border provinces. In order to fulfil our duty in this emergency, we, the inhabitants of a portion of the late Polish Commonwealth, ought to be up and doing; and while omitting nothing required of us in the present, we should prepare for action in the future. Our press should aid in establishing a local and district organisation, and in obtaining the fulfilment of our national demands to the utmost possible extent. Indifference, apathy, or indulgence in capricious views amounts to high treason. Woe unto him who shall be guilty of it! We hope that you, honoured sir, will appreciate our strivings, and coöperate with us through the columns of the *Lemberg Journal*. We shall be happy to receive your communications upon all questions affecting the country, especially in the coming elections, and remain, &c.'

This is but the effusion of an individual, unable, it would appear, to discriminate between the affairs of his unfortunate race and the interests of the journal he happens to edit. Yet it is none the less characteristic of the tone pervading the educated classes of Galicia at this moment.

Whoever has perused the debates of the Galician Parliament just closed, can have no doubt that the inflammable heart of Poland has caught fire once more. Of one sitting, the last, or the last but one, I forget which, I will give you a sample. The subject in hand referred to the relations between Poles and Russinians. The latter, a Russian tribe inhabiting Eastern Galicia, have been recently placed by the Austrian Government under Polish control, and, notwithstanding their violent protestations, have had their schools and churches virtually handed over to Polish direction. Delighted at being able to repay, to a certain extent, to the Russinians what their countrymen in the neighbouring Empire suffer at Russian hands, the Poles have restricted the use of the Russinian language in the schools, and, in an address of the Galician Parliament to the Emperor, intended to ask for permission to continue and even go farther in the same direction. The

first reading of the address was approved by the Polish majority of the Parliament. When the second reading was proposed, the Russinian minority, perceiving that the House would have to be counted out were they to leave, hurried to the door, in order, by a hasty retreat, to prevent the completion of the objectionable document. But the Poles were too many for them. Quickly forestalling their intent, Count Adam Potocki and some other members barred their exit. While their steps were thus impeded, the address was hurried through the second and third readings in double-quick time, abuse being showered upon them during the process. The Rev. N. Malinowski, a Polish priest, who particularly distinguished himself on this occasion, told the defeated minority they deserved to be knouted. Other members called them Russian rascals and blackguards, while some even went so far as to assure them that if they did not learn the civilised language of Poland of their own free will, Count Goluchowski, the new governor of the province, would force them and others to do so before long. Thus terminated a scene animadverted upon with the greatest bitterness in the Warsaw official press.

Simultaneously with the Cracow official *Gazette*, in the German language, its Lemberg counterpart has been discontinued by the Austrian Government. In Austria, at any rate for the moment, *la Pologne est aux Polonais.*

THE NORTH GERMAN ELECTIONS.

Berlin, January 8, 1867.

On the 12th of February the 300 members of the new Federal Parliament of Northern Germany are to be chosen. Yet so quiet is everything, that one is scarcely conscious of the eve of a great election. The Conservative party, though endeavouring to influence the lower class of country people, with whom the decision will rest, as manhood suffrage is the order of the day, deem secrecy indispensable for the success of their efforts. Whether they will come off victorious, is a question depending upon too vague premises to be answered. Sixty per cent of all Prussians are country people, and forty-eight per cent earn their livelihood by agricultural pursuits. Lordly estates are not very numerous, the greater portion of the soil being in the hands of a well-to-do peasantry, possessing it in fee simple; and the average amount of land owned by every rural proprietor is no more than eleven hectares, and the relation of lordly to peasant estates as 1 to 115. But if the country people are independent as regards property and earnings, the old administrative traditions of this kingdom, the moral drill enforced by general liability to conscription, and the aristocratic nature of rural arrangements, vesting as much influence in the proprietor of a single manorial estate as in a whole village, have accustomed the agricultural classes to intellectual submission. Though the late constitutional conflict, and the military and pecuniary questions occasioning it, have in the last few years created some opposition among the peasantry, it baffles calculation, how they and their field-hands will vote, now that patriotic reminiscences have been revived by war and rendered the Minister who began it, the most popular statesman in the country. In all probability the result will be mainly decided by local

influences; a sphere in which the village parson, the superintendent of the district police, and in many cases the proprietor of the nearest lordly estate, are more potent than the Liberal agitators from the towns. This, and the circumstance that in large cities the poorest and most ignorant section of the people will outweigh all others at the poll, has produced a general apathy in regard to the coming elections; and if the apprehensions of the upper strata of society are realised, none but Radicals will be returned in the cities, and none but Conservatives in the smaller boroughs and villages. In my opinion these suppositions are a little too black, and a more temperate issue may be expected from the common sense inherent in the cool and reflective people of Prussia. All I have here said refers to the old provinces of Prussia alone. In the new provinces and in the minor States of the North German Confederacy things wear a different aspect. In them the masses might, by the concession of a more liberal Federal Constitution, be easily induced to support this Government through thick and thin; as regards the Conservatives in those parts, they are, and will be for some time to come, secessionists.

As the Federal Constitution requires the cession to the Federal Parliament of rights now vested in the various local representative assemblies, it must, before it can come into operation, be ratified by the latter. But the local parliaments are elected upon the basis of a much more restricted franchise than the Federal Assembly, and there is consequently the chance, that they will find it difficult to effect an arrangement with the body that is to inherit a portion of their prerogative. Supposing any such conflict to ensue, it would not make much difference to this Government. Its relation to the minor States would not be affected one iota by it. Four-and-a-half millions of people portioned out among twenty States cannot hope to compete with 25,000,000 held in hand by one sove-

reign. The supremacy in Northern Germany would belong to Prussia, even though no North German Parliament be created as a permanent institution, or the North German Bund itself not renewed after the expiry of the treaties in the summer of 1867. And it is to be foreseen, that the minor Parliaments, even if they could not agree on a Federal Constitution, would yet support this Government in all that concerns the power and independence of the nation so long needed and at length acquired. The most valuable fruits of 1866 will be garnered under any circumstances. Though there may be a good many secessionists left, they are a minority, and will not prevail against the vast majority of unity men.

In all Germany, the truth that Prussia must remain the centre of national unity, though she may not immediately satisfy all the cravings of Liberal society, is now so generally acknowledged, that it begins to bear fruit even in the south. In Bavaria a Cabinet has just been appointed, grounding its foreign policy upon alliance with Prussia. Although no entrance into the North German Bund is contemplated for the present, we may confidently look forward to the conclusion of a treaty guaranteeing the independence of the Wittelsbach dynasty, and leaving Prussia the disposal of its forces in war. With reference to Würtemberg, formerly the stronghold of secessionism, we have the testimony of the Stuttgart *Beobachter*, the leading organ of the anti-Prussian party in the South, that the various strata of the educated classes in that kingdom have turned over a new leaf, and unanimously demand its reunion with the new national commonwealth of the north. The Würtemberg officers, more particularly, that paper says, are utterly Prussianised. 'They want to belong to an army in which individual gallantry is not stripped of its reward by the unskilfulness of the commanders, as was their unmerited lot in the late campaign on the Main. The Suabian nobility rely upon Prussia for the

maintenance of the First Chambers in the States. The Protestant clergy regard her Government as the mainstay of the Church; and the whole of the wealthier strata of society, battling in the south-west against an earnest and venomous radicalism, have been converted to the belief that a liberal reorganisation of Germany, unless tempered by the strong hand of the Prussian Kings, would be instrumental in conjuring up revolutionary and, perhaps, socialistic commotions. If such be the tone of opinion in Würtemberg, it is superfluous to speak of Baden, always more inclined to recognise the justice of Prussia's claims.

THE FRENCH DEMAND OF TERRITORY IN 1866.

Berlin, January 13, 1867.

A FEW days ago the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* asserted that, immediately after the conclusion of the Nikolsburg preliminaries of peace, the French Government did not hesitate to demand a cession of territory from this Cabinet. Although it was generally known, and, indeed, has been repeatedly asserted in the course of this Correspondence, that intelligible hints to that effect had been dropped, there was much to surprise us in the above information, both in regard to the magnitude of the alleged demand and the distinctness of the details communicated. I therefore preferred waiting for its corroboration before circulating what might subsequently turn out to be inaccurate intelligence. I regret to say that the news has now been confirmed. Not only have our official and semi-official papers not thought it worth their while to contradict the sensational disclosure, but the *Kreuz Zeitung*, a journal which, though independent,

is in the confidence of the Cabinet, and never speaks lightly of matters diplomatic, has actually admitted that the overtures in question were made, though not in the manner stated. After this, implicit credence may be given to the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*.

The districts included in the demand, then, were neither few nor small. Of her own territory, Prussia was to give up the counties of Saarlouis, Saarbrück, and, with them, the largest coalfields yet worked on the Continent. Besides these, the Transrhenane provinces of Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt, the Palatinate and Rhine Hesse, were likewise to be handed over to that modest and high-principled France which makes no wars except for ideas. These countries are, perhaps, the most fertile and prosperous of all Germany, and boasting, moreover, the fortresses of Landau and Mayence, have the military command over one-half the German Rhine, and a considerable portion of Hesse, Thuringia, and Franconia. With Mayence in her hands, France, with little if any obstruction, might have always pushed her armies up to the fatal and well-remembered field of Jena. It need scarcely be added, that these places and provinces not being in the possession of Prussia, the only engagement the latter could be expected to undertake with regard to them was that she would assist France in taking them from their legitimate owners. Last, not least, Prussia was to resign her right to garrison Luxemburg, thereby abandoning all hope of protecting Cologne unless strong enough herself to assume the offensive. The total of the French claims may be summed up as amounting to no less than a million of inhabitants, three fortresses, numerous coal-mines, and a footing on the middle Rhine.

But Count Bismarck showed himself worthy of his reputation for firmness. Nor could he act differently, if he valued his influence and position in Germany. Yielding to the importunities of France, he had indeed allowed a

number of unpalatable conditions to be received into the Nikolsburg preliminaries of peace. But his forbearance on this occasion was sure to be forgiven by his countrymen. So much else would be secured in any case, that the most ambitious could well dispense with more. Different would it have been had he parted with German soil, and consented to rob German potentates to satisfy the greed of an ambitious foreigner. Had he lent his assistance to any such transaction, he would have lost caste irreparably. He would have incurred the censure of Liberals and Conservatives, Unity men and Secessionists alike. Instead of being regarded as steps towards the unification of Germany, his annexations would have been denounced as mere dynastic conquests, effected with the help, and indeed to the advantage, of the nation's hereditary enemy. Strong in victory, Count Bismarck curtly declined to comply with the demands preferred. France put up with the denial, without formally withdrawing her claims. At the end of it all, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who had sustained this more than diplomatic defeat, had to go out, M. de Lavalette coming in, and issuing the famous circular teeming with conciliatory and disinterested protestations of friendship towards Germany. M. de Lavalette's elevation to ministerial regions was ephemeral. No sooner had he penned the despatch, for the composition of which he had been specially appointed, than he had to give way to M. de Moustier. By this clever arrangement, M. Drouyn de Lhuys' policy has been disavowed without the present Minister of Foreign Affairs being, by the disavowal, committed to a different line of conduct.

And, indeed, we find M. de Moustier briskly following in the footsteps of his enterprising, but, alas, baffled predecessor. If the attempt to divide Germany between French and German rulers failed, there is, in his opinion, the possibility left of perpetuating the division of the country into a northern and a southern half. By way of

showing his bias, he has just addressed an urgent request to the Würtemberg Government, asking it to adopt the French standards of weights, measures, and coinage. As Würtemberg cannot think of introducing so radical a change without her southern neighbours doing the like, it is apparent that a similar wish must have been, or is to be shortly, expressed at Carlsruhe and Munich. Were it assented to, a primary and important step would have been achieved towards breaking up the commercial unity of Germany, dissolving the Zollverein, and preparing the ground for the commercial and political absorption of the South by France. The *naïveté* of M. de Moustier, in supposing the Germans too obtuse to see through his little stratagem, is truly astonishing. Of course, it must be accounted for by the extreme difficulty the diplomates of his nation experience in realising the fact, that this country, for two hundred years divided and weak, is no longer a prey to every comer. Still, one cannot help smiling at the superlative ignorance it betrays of the moral and political condition of modern Germany. After what I have already said as to the growing conviction of the Southerners, and with them the nation at large, that, no matter whether a Liberal or Conservative Government be enthroned at Berlin, their only hope of a prosperous and respectable future lies in sticking to Prussia, you will easily conclude that the proposals of France can have no chance of being accepted. Only were Prussia to indorse them for Northern Germany, the South would be in a position to oblige its would-be protectors on the Seine by a corresponding acquiescence in the French standards. Perhaps some such reform will be effected before long, the idea having been seriously mooted by the Zollverein Governments some years ago.

SWISS MISGIVINGS.

Berlin, January 23, 1867.

SHORTLY after the termination of the late glorious but trying campaign, Generals Moltke and Roon repaired to Switzerland to recover from the fatigues of the field. General Roon, being much indisposed, was greatly in want of rest; General Moltke, a hale and healthy man, only went away to forget, in the enjoyment of nature, the labours and horrors of the Bohemian battle-fields. Some time after their return to Berlin, the Swiss press began to whisper the suspicion that the sojourn of the two generals at the foot of the Alps had less to do with the imbibing of fresh air than the exploration of the country for strategical purposes. The idea of imputing an ulterior motive of the kind appeared so absurd to the German papers, that they did not take the trouble to contradict it. In their opinion Prussia was, and indeed is, so completely engrossed with the organisation of Northern Germany, that she cannot even think of extending her sphere of action to the Southern States, and consequently is still less in a position to cherish plans of dangerous and illegitimate aggrandisement with regard to the German Cantons of Switzerland. Moreover, it seemed too ridiculous to assume that Prussia would send out some of her most renowned generals, whose every movement is recorded by the papers, to reconnoitre the latest aspect of a foreign country. However, such are the apprehensions awakened by reviving Germany in some parts of Switzerland, that the force of these and similar considerations, which might be easily adduced, was overlooked. It appears that the Swiss Government recently instructed their representatives in Vienna and Florence to inquire what the Courts they are living at thought of the journey of the Prussian

generals. In reply, Herr von Tschudi, the Swiss Minister at Vienna, has just informed the President of his Confederacy, that the Austrian Government do believe Herren von Moltke and Roon to have inspected not so much the scenery of the hills and the lakes, as the railways and high roads of the Republic. It remains to be seen whether the Swiss Government will think it behoves them to take farther steps in the matter.

I am in no fear of contradiction when I say that north of the river Main the very idea of reuniting to the old country those free cantons which 500 years ago separated from Hapsburg, and the rest of their German co-nationalists, has been hitherto unknown. If the Radical party in Würtemberg and Baden are dreaming of reunion with Switzerland, they have no wish to advance the Prussian frontiers as far as Italy; but, on the contrary, would like to republicanise Southern Germany, and place it under the sway of the Berne Government. From Germany, then, Switzerland, in the present state of European politics, has nothing to fear.

But perhaps there is reason to watch the course of events in another direction. In Geneva, three-fourths of whose territory is surrounded by France, a new weekly has just been published, for the express purpose of advocating incorporation with *la grande nation*. Its title is *La Presse Suisse*, and it is in reality as good as given away, the 10fr. annual subscription being reimbursed in the form of books or advertisements. Similar experiments have been tried more than once in Neufchatel and the French districts of Berne.

AUSTRIA OBJECTS TO GERMAN UNITY. COUNT BISMARCK ON THE RUSSIAN TARIFF AND POLICE.

Berlin, January 26, 1867.

NOTICING the intention attributed to Bavaria, to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia, the Vienna Government have begged to remind their southern neighbour, in courteous, but significant language, that, whatever measures may be adopted by the German States, they must not infringe upon the articles of peace signed at Prague. Translating this from diplomatic into ordinary language, it simply means that, though international alliances may be set on foot between Northern and Southern Germany, in the same way as between any other two States or groups of States, yet Germany is forbidden to unite the countries north of the river Main with those south of it by any closer or more permanent ties.

I need not dilate upon the feelings awakened here by this premature reference to a stipulation so detrimental to Prussia, and forced upon her by France at a moment when Austria lay at Prussia's feet. More important than the news of fresh animosities is the fact that, with all their undisguised ill-will towards the North German Confederacy, the Austrian Government do not venture to maintain that the future relations between Prussia and Bavaria, as foreshadowed by the latter, violate the enactments of the treaty quoted. As regards the other Southern States, the Baden Government have openly, and, what is even more important, with cordial readiness, recognised the necessity of taking that very step in which Bavaria has forestalled them. In Hesse-Darmstadt, whose Government is Austrian to the back-bone, the Second Chamber have just passed a resolution to the effect that if the North German Constitution should be of a nature to

satisfy the longings of the people for liberty, there would be nothing to prevent, but everything to recommend, their joining Prussia.

In yesterday's sitting of the Lower House, Count Bismarck delivered an interesting speech on the difficulties experienced in crossing the Russian frontier. A Polish member had complained of the restrictions enforced by the Russian Government on the border, when, under the Treaties of 1815, the three sections into which Poland was divided had been guaranteed free intercourse for commercial purposes, and, indeed, promised the same tariff. The Count admitted that

'The Russian system of closing the frontiers against merchandise and travellers, excluding the one by an extravagant tariff, and the other by endless police regulations, had never been approved by Prussia, but had been the subject of unceasing remonstrance for years past. It was lamentably true that, in accordance with a ukase proclaimed a year ago, there were now only five places along the entire extent of the Prusso-Russian frontiers where merchandise was allowed to be imported. This, and the high tariff, resulted in fostering illicit trade. The Russian Government had commended the action of their custom-house officers in levying 3,000,000 roubles more on the Prussian frontier last year than the previous one; but if there had been no smuggling going on, they might have cleared from 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 roubles over and above that sum. They would scarcely succeed in suppressing smuggling, while rendering it so profitable, even though they cut down trees and demolished houses within a couple of miles of the frontier, as they had begun to do. Besides, the most flourishing branch of the smuggling trade was the one termed legal, *i.e.* that carried on with the connivance of the custom-house officers.

Regarding the vexations to which Prussian travellers were so frequently exposed on the frontiers and in the interior of Russia, he could not deny that there was some ground for complaint. It was, however, equally certain that the Russian Government had the right to enact as many regulations as they pleased, and that Prussian travellers had better acquaint themselves with all the various laws and bye-laws bearing upon passports, &c., before setting out. It ought also to be taken into consideration, that Russian officials were in the habit of exacting implicit obedience, whereas Prussian travellers were not at all inclined to submit. A Prussian traveller dealing with Russian officials but too often spoke in the tone which the men of his country nowadays habitually assumed when accosting the Ministers of their King. (*Cries of 'O, O!'*) When

afterwards appealing to his Government for redress, he, as a rule, forgot to add that he had brought trouble on himself by behaving in a somewhat impudent manner. (*Great sensation in the House, betokened by different cries.*)

But, however much the Russian Government might damage Prussia by shutting up the frontiers, they injured themselves the most by maintaining their high tariff. The Russian Government were losing money to the tune of 40,000,000 roubles a year; the Russian people had to pay dear for the ordinary commodities of life; and an acre of land, which on the Prussian side of the frontier was worth eighty thalers, could be got on the Russian for twenty. It was impossible for the Russian Government to accord Poland the same tariff as Posen, but he hoped that reforms, in harmony with the requirements of the times, would be introduced at length.'

The subject was then allowed to drop.

The minor States have sent a number of officers to Berlin to acquaint themselves with the details of the Prussian military service, preparatory to their introduction into the several contingents.

The Bremen ship Maria, Captain Meyer, is shortly expected at Ragusa, with the library, paintings, and other effects of the Empress Charlotte. The cargo consists of 622 chests, insured for 20,000*l.*

A few days ago, being a fine cold day, one Ernest Mahner jumped into the Rhine at Mayence, and swam a considerable distance with the stream. The hardy swimmer has long dubbed himself 'the German Apostle of Health,' and by example, as well as precept, endeavours to make his countrymen as indifferent to cold and fatigue as Tacitus says they were in the unsophisticated days of Thor, Wodan, and Herman the Bold.

THE ZOLLVEREIN AND AUSTRIA.

Berlin, January 27, 1867.

THE negotiations recently opened with Austria for a treaty of commerce are making but little way. Austria is ready to accord some immaterial concessions upon the pattern of those made to England and France. Though a step in the right direction, her offers are hardly sufficient to modify the prohibitive character of the imperial tariff. In return, she demands the reduction of the Prussian duty upon wine from four thalers to two thalers. Wine having become dear in this country since the export trade with England, Russia, and other northern countries has assumed its modern proportions, the Berlin Cabinet very sensibly supposes that by acceding to the Austrian demand they will not injure home producers, but only benefit and immensely oblige home consumers. However, as the concession, if made to Austria, would, under existing treaties, extend to France, and, moreover, be as important to the latter as to Austria herself, the Berlin Cabinet are desirous of exacting from their friends at Paris an equivalent which they have much at heart.

Shortly before the events of last summer, the two Grand Duchies of Mecklenburg, not being included in the Zollverein, entered into a separate commercial treaty with France, in which they engaged that, until the year 1876, their duty on French wines should not be raised beyond a certain nominal rate. Now, Prussia having lately established political unity in Northern Germany, naturally wishes to supplement it by a common tariff, or, in other words, extend the Zollverein league to the few States still out of it. Not to speak of Hamburg and Bremen, which, being international emporiums, will be, perhaps, allowed to retain their privileged position as

free ports, the most important of the States coming under this exceptional category are the two Mecklenburgs; but these are absolutely prevented from joining by the promise given to France. Such being the case, Prussia has offered to reduce the wine duty in the Zollverein to two thalers, on condition that the Mecklenburgers be released from their engagement, and enabled to take part in the Customs League before the expiration of the compact in question. It is remarkable that France has declined to entertain a proposal manifestly advantageous to her, and, moreover, advocated by Austria, her good friend and would-be ally. There can be no doubt that, whatever the imbibing capabilities of the Mecklenburgers are, 700,000 people cannot consume anything like the quantity likely to be disposed of by the 28,000,000 Zollvereiners. Yet France insists upon binding Mecklenburg to her word. The only way of accounting for this self-injurious course is to assume that she prefers pecuniary loss to contributing to the unification—commercial, in this particular instance—of Germany. As usual, Austria has the worst of it.

THE FRENCH EMPEROR ON GERMAN REARRANGEMENTS.

Paris, February 14, 1867.

THE French Legislature was opened to-day by the Emperor in person, who delivered the following speech:

'Messieurs les Sénateurs, Messieurs les Députés,—Since your last session important events have arisen in Europe. Although they may have astonished the world by their rapidity, as by the importance of their results, it appears that, according to the anticipations of the Emperor, there was a fatality in their fulfilment. Napoleon said at St. Helena, "One of my great ideas has been the agglomeration and concentration of the same nations, geographically considered, who have been scattered

piecemeal by revolutions and policy. This agglomeration will take place sooner or later by the force of circumstances. The impulse is given, and I do not think that, after my fall, and the disappearance of my system, there will be any other great adjustment possible than the agglomeration and confederation of great nations."

The transformations that have taken place in Italy and Germany pave the way for the realisation of this vast programme of the union of the European States in one single confederation.

The spectacle of the efforts made by the neighbouring nations to assemble their members, scattered abroad for so many centuries, cannot cause disquiet to a country like ours, all the parts of which are irrevocably bound up with each other, and form a homogeneous and indestructible body. We have been impartial witnesses of the struggle which has been waged on the other side of the Rhine. The country strongly manifested its wish to keep aloof from this conflict. Not only did I defer to this wish, but I used every effort to hasten the conclusion of peace. I did not arm a single additional soldier; I did not move forward a single regiment; and yet the voice of France had influence enough to arrest the conqueror at the gates of Vienna. Our mediation effected an arrangement between the belligerents, which, leaving to Prussia the fruit of her successes, maintained the integrity of the Austrian territory, with the exception of a single province, and by the cession of Venetia completed Italian independence.'*

THE KING OF PRUSSIA ON GERMAN REARRANGEMENTS.

Berlin, February 24, 1867.

THE first session of the North German Parliament was opened to-day in this capital by the King of Prussia in person. On the right of the throne were the Crown Prince and the other royal princes, with the exception of Prince Frederick Charles, who took his place among the members of Parliament. On the left of the throne were the Federal plenipotentiaries, headed by Count Bismarck in military uniform. The Queen, the Crown Princess, and her Royal Highness's eldest son, Princess

* With this speech ought to be compared the official and semi-official utterances of the French Government in 1870.

Frederick Charles, Prince William of Baden, Prince Nicholas of Nassau, Prince Henry of Hesse, and almost all the diplomatic body were present, and the number of spectators was very great.

The King of Prussia, who was received on entering with the most enthusiastic cheers, read the following speech from the throne:

'Illustrious, noble, and honourable Gentlemen of the North German Confederation,—It is an elevating moment in which I come among you. Mighty events have preceded it. Great hopes are bound up with it. I thank Divine Providence, which, by paths we neither chose nor foresaw, has led Germany towards the object desired by her people, for the privilege of giving expression to these hopes in community with an assembly such as has not surrounded any German sovereign for centuries. Relying upon the Divine guidance, we shall attain our object all the earlier the clearer we recognise the causes that have led us and our forefathers away from it.

Formerly powerful, great, and honoured, because united and guided by strong hands, the German Empire did not sink into dissension and weakness without both its head and its members being in fault. Deprived of weight in the councils of Europe, of influence over her own history, Germany became the arena of foreign powers, she giving the blood of her children, the battle-fields, and the prizes of victory. But the longing of the German people for what it had lost has never ceased, and the history of our time relates their efforts to regain the greatness of their past. If these efforts have hitherto not attained their object—if they have only increased dissension in place of healing it, because people allowed themselves to be deceived by hopes or reminiscences as to the value of the present, by ideals as to the importance of facts—we, on our part, recognise the necessity of attempting the reunion of Germany in a more practical way. We will not sacrifice to indefinite aspirations that which is within our reach.

The allied Governments have agreed upon a number of defined and limited, but practically important arrangements, as possible of immediate execution as they are most undoubtedly requisite.

The draught of the Constitution which will be laid before you asks from the individual States only such sacrifices as are indispensable to protect peace, to guarantee the security of the Federal territory, and to develop the prosperity of its inhabitants.

I have to thank my allies for the readiness with which they have met the requirements of the common Fatherland. I express this gratitude with the consciousness that I should have been ready to display the same devotion to the general welfare of Germany, if Providence had not

placed me at the head of that State of the Confederation which, being the most powerful, is the one necessarily called to the leadership of the German Commonwealth. I feel myself strong in the conviction that all the successes of Prussia have tended to promote the restoration and elevation of German power and honour.

Athough the mighty events of the past year have convinced all men of the paramount necessity of reconstructing the German Constitution, thus rendering the public mind more favourably inclined towards such a measure than it had previously been, and perhaps might be at a later period, we have again perceived during the negotiations how difficult is the task of attaining complete unanimity between so many Governments—Governments accustomed to independent action, and which have also to bear in mind the views of their respective Parliaments. The more, gentlemen, you realise these difficulties, the less will you court the dangers that might arise, if the agreement arrived at between the Governments upon the bill laid before you could not be obtained for such alterations as may be demanded by you. What is most important now is to profit by the favourable moment for laying the foundations of the building; its completion can safely be intrusted to the subsequent coöperation of the German sovereigns and people.

The regulation of the relations of the North German Confederation towards our brethren south of the Main has been left by the Peace-treaties of last year to the voluntary agreement of both parties. Our hands will be readily extended to bring about this understanding as soon as the North German Confederation has advanced far enough in the settlement of its Constitution to be empowered to conclude treaties. The preservation of the Zollverein, the common promotion of trade, and a combined guarantee for the security of German territory, will form fundamental conditions of the agreement which, it may be foreseen, will be desired by both parties.

As the German loves peace and the works of peace, so will the Confederation of the German States mainly assume a defensive character. The German movement of recent years involved no hostile tendency towards our neighbours. It arose solely from the necessity of recovering for the broad domains from the Alps to the sea the essential conditions of political progress, of which the events of former centuries had deprived us. Germany unites only for defence, and not for attack. This is generally acknowledged. The mightiest European States see Germany, without apprehension and envy, take possession of those advantages of a great political commonwealth which they themselves have already enjoyed for centuries.

It therefore now only depends upon us—upon our unity and our patriotism—to secure a guarantee to the whole of Germany of a future in which, free from the danger of again falling into dissension and weakness, she will be able by her own decision to further her constitutional

development and prosperity, and to fulfil her peace-loving mission in the council of nations. I trust that posterity, looking back upon our common labours, will say that the experience of former unsuccessful attempts has not been thrown away upon the German people, and that our children will thankfully regard this Parliament as the commencement of the unity, freedom, and power of the Germans.

Gentlemen, all Germany, even beyond the limits of our Confederation, anxiously awaits the decisions that may be arrived at here. May the dream of centuries, the yearning and striving of the last few generations, be realised by our united labours! In the name of the allied Governments—in the name of Germany—I confidently call upon you to help us to carry out rapidly and safely the great national task. And may the blessing of God, upon which everything depends, accompany and promote the patriotic work!'

THE FIRST NORTH GERMAN FEDERAL PARLIAMENT.

Berlin, February 25, 1867.

YESTERDAY at one o'clock the first Parliament of the North German Confederacy was opened in the White Hall of the Berlin Schloss. In honour of the event, the shops and hotels Unter den Linden displayed numerous specimens of the new Federal flag, varied by the national colours of Prussia. There was a crowd in front of the Royal Palace gazing at the carriages of the members as they drove up to the Schloss. The rest of the town did not exhibit any outward signs of interest in the occurrence of the day. Prior to the ceremony a solemn service was held in the chapel of the Schloss. A magnificent octangular building in the Byzantine style, filled with the members of the royal family, the *haute noblesse*, and a numerous array of deputies in uniforms and robes of state, the chapel looked imposing on the occasion. After the Dom Chor had chanted the 100th Psalm, the Rev. Dr. Hoffmann, one of the King's chaplains, preached a sermon on Romans xv. 5, 6: 'Now the God of patience and consolation grant you to be like-minded one toward another, according to Christ

Jesus; that ye may with one mind and one mouth glorify God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.' The congregation then sang a Lutheran choral, imploring the blessing of God upon the deeds of the faithful, and shortly after dispersed. Half-an-hour before the conclusion of the service the White Hall was beginning to fill with Catholic members, who had attended divine service in St. Hedwig's Church, and those Protestants who, not caring to listen to the admonitions of the chaplain royal, had proceeded straight to the place of assembly.

The walls of the time-honoured apartment looked down upon a gathering such as had never before been witnessed there. There met men from the Russian frontier, where winter lasts seven months, with the more fortunate sons of the Rhine, whose climate has little experience of northern rigours. The Schleswiger, a genuine descendant of the Saxon, preferring to this day the homely idiom of his race to the literary language of the common Fatherland, shook hands with the Frank from Coburg, whose ancestors, under Charlemagne, combated and converted to Christianity the tribes of the German North. The Thuringian and Hessian from the central parts of the country, after long years of separation, associated again with the Pomeranian from the Baltic, and the Frisian, the Anglo-Saxon brother of the Englishman, from the North Sea. With the exception of two, the various branches of the German national family were all represented in the Hall; and, though the absence of the missing ones was noticed and commented upon with regret, the hope of soon comprehending the Bavarians and Suabians in the goodly company beat strong in many a loyal heart.

While the members were standing about conversing, not so much upon the prospects of the session, as in an ordinary Parliament, as upon what the late momentous changes promised to the nation at large, Prince Frederick

William, the little son of the Crown Prince, entered with two gentlemen of his suite to take a view of the hall in all its state. If things turn out as they ought, the young prince will have reason to remember the day which, confirming the past greatness of his race, inaugurated an even more brilliant future for himself. Prince William had hardly left when the King, having first conducted the Queen to the stall in close proximity to the throne, passed through the hall to his apartments on the farther side. His Majesty looked radiant with good health and spirits. A little later the Generals and other dignitaries made their appearance, ranging themselves in prescribed order. The Prussian Ministers and the delegates of the Federal Governments appointed to take part in the debates proceeded to the left of the throne; and the Deputies formed a wide semicircle round the symbol of royal dignity. The Crown Princess, the Princesses and maids of honour in rustling silks entered the stalls set apart for the Court. Her Royal Highness Princess Victoria wore a dress of the Prussian national colours. A tribune was occupied by the ambassadors with their ladies, the diplomates, and the foreign princes present. When everything was ready, Count Bismarck, in his white cavalry uniform, repaired to the royal apartment, to inform the King that the first Parliament of the North German Confederacy was awaiting the royal presence.

Then the royal train came into view, more solemn, more numerous, and more richly attired than any that has ever graced a similar display in Prussia. Equerries opened the procession. Pages, chamberlains, and gold-sticks-in-waiting, followed by the maréchaux and grand maréchaux de la cour in their garbs of office, heralded the royal part, strictly speaking, of the ceremonial procession. The sword of state, the same which had witnessed the coronation of the first King of Prussia; the globe, the emblem of universal supremacy, imitated from the pretentious

insignia of the German Empire; and the sceptre, richly adorned with gems, were borne by three Generals abreast. To them succeeded the crown, carried on a cushion of drap d'or by Count Redern, the chief chamberlain, and the royal standard, held aloft by General Wrangel, one of the most aged and renowned soldiers of the army. To the right and left of the royal insignia marched two officers of the Garde du Corps, with swords drawn. Immediately after them appeared the King, in the uniform of a general of infantry, bearing his helmet in his hand. Behind him walked the Crown Prince and the Princes of the blood. Adjutants and adjutants-general, chamberlains and masters of ceremony attached to the Courts of the various Princes, brought up the rear. Prussian uniforms are simple, and the dark blue considerably prevailed over the glitter of lace and silver cord.

His Majesty, having been received with three cheers, mounted the throne and placed himself in front of the iron chair forming the regal seat of the kings of Prussia. While the King was thus standing, surveying the distinguished assembly, the procession broke up and distributed themselves over the hall. With the exception of Prince Frederick Charles, who, as the member for Labian, stood among the deputies, the Princes, with the Crown Prince on the steps of the throne, ranged themselves to the right of his Majesty. The bearers of sword and banner were stationed on the steps of the throne, a little behind the King, those to whom the sceptre, globe, and crown had been intrusted occupying the front portion of the ascent. A few minutes more and the brilliant throng had settled down into calm attention, when the King, taking a manuscript from the hands of the Prime Minister, with a sonorous voice read the speech from the throne. The passages relating to Prussian successes, German unity, and the national ties to be established between Northern and Southern Germany elicited a subdued and solemn, but none the less heartfelt

applause from the assembly. The reading over, the King, who had during the delivery of the speech covered his head, took off his helmet, and amid renewed cheers left the hall with his train. Count Bismarck, in the name of the King of Prussia and his august Allies, then declared the Parliament of the North German Confederacy opened.

COUNT BISMARCK ON THE NORTH GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

Berlin, March 6, 1867.

THE following is an exact version of Count Bismarck's speech when introducing the draught of a Federal Constitution into the Federal Parliament:

'Gentlemen, — In the name of the allied German Governments, I have the honour of laying before the Federal Parliament the draught of a Federal Constitution, agreed upon by the Governments mentioned. To this draught I add authentic copies of the treaties having reference to the establishment of the Confederacy, and also of the minutes of the sittings in which the draught has been discussed by the plenipotentiaries of the allied Governments. In submitting these papers to the decision of this high House, I abstain from amplifying upon the speech the King, my gracious master, delivered when opening the session. One point only I should like to call your attention to. In the provisional treaty of alliance, concluded August 18, 1866, there occurs a clause which is to the following effect: "This alliance is to last until the establishment of new and more permanent Federal relations. Unless a new alliance be concluded before that term, the present one is to last for a year." This means that the existing Federal relations will expire not many months hence. I have no wish to dilate upon what would become of Germany were our work incomplete by August 18th of this year. I hope we shall be spared this predicament. I feel it, however, incumbent upon me to mention that the representative assemblies of the various States, at any rate many of them, having reserved to themselves the right to ratify or reject the result of our deliberations, it will be necessary to convene the Parliaments of the twenty-two allied States directly the sittings of the

Federal Parliament are over. I need scarcely tell you how very desirable it is that this ulterior stage of the matter should likewise be completed by the 18th of August. All these are circumstances which ought to lead us to expedite our labours. Furthermore, it ought to be taken into consideration that the establishment of treaty relations with Southern Germany, such as all of us wish for more or less urgently, will be materially promoted by a rapid consolidation of the North. The wish of the Southern States to join their Northern countrymen will be the more ardent the more promptly we advance towards the attainment of our object. This, gentlemen, should be another incentive for us to come to an early agreement upon such points as might be viewed in a different light by the various political denominations represented in this House.

No doubt there is something unfavourable to unity in our national character, otherwise we should not have lost it, or, at all events, should have recovered it long before this. Looking back to the days of German greatness, the early days of the German empire, we find that no country in Europe was so likely to become strong and united as ours. From Russia, which was portioned out among the descendants of Rurik, to the Visigoths and Arabians of Spain, no European nation amid the vicissitudes of ages had so fair a chance of retaining its unity as Germany. Why, then, did we lose it? Why have we till now failed in recovering it? To express myself briefly, it seems to me there is a certain excess of manly and independent feeling in the German character, prompting each person, corporation, province, or tribe to rely upon himself or itself individually rather than upon the nation to which they belong. We lack the accommodating spirit which in other nations induces individuals as well as tribes to conform themselves to the requirements of the whole, and we have accordingly been prevented from securing the benefits of a strong national commonwealth, so long and so fully possessed by our neighbours. In the present instance, however, the Governments have set you a good example. There was not one among them but had to sacrifice some legitimate objections in order that our common purpose might be realised. Let us, then, follow the precedent given, and prove on our part that Germany, in her history of 600 years' division, has been taught prudence, and that we have taken to heart the teachings inculcated by the abortive attempts to secure unity made at Frankfort and Erfurt.* The failure of these attempts plunged Germany into a state of uncertainty and dissatisfaction, which lasted no less than 16 years, and, as was manifest from the very outset, had to be terminated by some such catastrophe as was experienced last year. God decided in our favour. Germany has a right to expect that we shall obviate the recurrence of such a catastrophe, and I am persuaded that you as well as the allied Governments will do all in your power to fulfil the anticipations of the nation.'

* In 1848 and 1849.

This speech elicited cordial applause from all sides. After a short delay, during which the examination of election papers was continued, and a number of other necessary formalities completed, a resolution was passed that the draught of the Federal Constitution be not referred to a special committee, but discussed immediately by the whole House. The draught, therefore, will be read thrice, and proceeded with very nearly in the same way as is a bill in the British Parliament. This decision was not arrived at without some opposition from the extreme Left, who declared that to be acceptable the Bill must be remodelled in a democratic sense, and urged that it should be handed over to a committee for preliminary sifting. But the majority were too prudent to imperil the consolidation of unity by asking for a greater share of constitutional prerogative for the Federal Parliament than has been hitherto possessed by the representative assemblies of the individual States. Confident that liberty is a plant of steady, though, it may be, tardy growth, they are satisfied with preserving the rights they have got, and limit their present endeavours to the attainment of another, though no less valuable a boon—unity.

The diplomatic instruments alluded to in the speech of Count Bismarck are the various treaties of peace concluded last year, and the minutes of four formal sittings held by the delegates of the North German Governments, when debating the constitutional draught submitted to them by Prussia. In the minutes are contained the multifarious objections at first raised by the minor States. Some of them, being acknowledged by Prussia, were allowed to influence the text of the Constitution; others, less fortunate, were not altogether withdrawn, but will be vindicated by their originators in the impending debates. It ought to be borne in mind, that in permitting the Prussian draught to be laid before the Federal Constitutive Assem-

bly, the minor Sates did not consent to the draught itself, but only to its introduction into the House.

RUSSIA AND CRETE.

Berlin, March 8, 1867.

THE *Journal de St. Petersbourg* gives publication to the following Notes, addressed by the Russian Cabinet to their Ambassador in London:

I.

'*St. Petersburg, August* 20, 1866.*

The insurrection which has broken out in the island of Crete† has assumed a serious character, requiring attentive observation. The Emperor is animated with the most lively desire to prevent, as far as possible, the joint interference of Europe in the internal affairs of the Ottoman State. His Imperial Majesty is of opinion that such interference would

* A Note to the same purport was also dispatched to the Russian Ambassador at Paris. The above translations are from the Russian, whereas the originals were probably in French.

† The Cretan insurrection broke out in the summer of 1866, when the war between Austria and Prussia was expected to lead to ulterior complications, which might have given Eastern malcontents an opportunity for successfully vindicating their politics. The speedy termination of the Austro-Prussian war left the Cretans in the lurch. They were, however, accorded the diplomatic assistance of Russia and Greece; which, being resented by Turkey, eventually brought on the Paris Conference of 1869. It is probably not too venturesome to say, that the Cretan insurrection would not have been permitted to linger two years, had not the unsettled condition of Europe, consequent on the German war, made the rebels hope that though they had missed one opportunity for confronting Turkey with the assistance of a Western ally, they might presently have another. But these hopes came to nothing. Prussia, dreading a coalition of the Western Powers, declined to coöperate with Russia in the East; and Russia, though France all but offered to make common cause with her in Turkey, were she and Austria permitted to please themselves in Germany, did not think it safe to make an enemy of the solid and old-established House of Hohenzollern, merely to acquire the friendship of a Bonaparte. Such, at least, was the determination she ultimately arrived at. If she listened for a short time to the pleasant whispers from Paris, she eventually declared all the more decidedly in favour of Berlin.

only weaken and enfeeble the Turkish Government, without producing results calculated to counterbalance this disadvantage. Our most gracious master is not inclined to point on this occasion to those treaties that could be enforced only by the common consent of Europe, and which in the absence of such consent must eventually lose their validity, having been lately so often and glaringly violated. In forming his conclusions on recent events, his Imperial Majesty is only guided by immediate and urgent interests—interests which, in his Majesty's opinion, are common to all Powers desiring the quiet of the East. Looking upon it from this point of view, the Cretan insurrection is an event of more than local importance, and one which, besides being accompanied with a lamentable amount of bloodshed, inseparable from such occurrences, will also exercise its influence upon neighbouring countries. It has naturally roused Greece, who cannot possibly remain an indifferent spectator of the events going on in a neighbouring and cognate country. The King of the Hellenes has thought it necessary to claim the attention of the protecting Powers for the difficulties arising to his Government out of the Cretan troubles. His Majesty has called upon the great Powers, requesting them to make a common appeal to Turkey on behalf of the legitimate complaints of the Cretans, and thus contribute to the termination of an outbreak which, were it suppressed by force, would only render the ultimate pacification of the country more arduous and less probable. But it is not in Greece alone that the war about to break out in Crete finds a ready echo. In the general excitement noticeable among the greater part of the Christian inhabitants of Turkey, and which is augmented by recent events in Europe, a single spark might kindle a conflagration which human force would be unable to quench.

Under these circumstances, his Majesty the Emperor thinks it both the duty and the common interest of the great Powers not to remain idle spectators of events which may be attended with such important consequences. Europe, on other occasions, has unanimously agreed upon a course of action intended to obviate a crisis which menaced her peace. Though her measures were not always productive of complete results, they have, at any rate, contributed to allay passion, to prevent a rupture, and pacify conflicting interests, while in many cases serious peril has been averted by strenuous coöperation. Remembering this, our most illustrious sovereign, though the feeling of solidarity may have been lately weakened in Europe, deems it advisable to appeal to it in the present emergency, and calls upon the London and Paris Cabinets to support his pacific endeavours. If both these Cabinets think intervention at the present moment as important and indispensable, as we do, it might be resorted to under the compact of 1830. Indeed, when in that year the allied Powers left Crete under Turkish rule, their consent was not unconditional. The three allied Powers declared to the Porte in a solemn Note, dated March 30, 1830, "that, by virtue of a compact concluded between

them, they recognised the necessity of giving the inhabitants of Crete and Samos a guarantee against any measures which might be taken to punish them for their participation in recent events. For this reason, they called upon the Porte to determine upon the measures to be adopted, and by restoring ancient privileges to these isles, or conferring fresh immunities upon them, such as might be recommended by experience, give them an effective guarantee against arbitrary or oppressive administration." In addition to this, we might also refer to the Hatti-Sherif of February 3, 1856, which, although issued by his Highness the Sultan in the exercise of his sovereign capacity, yet became an international act by being quoted in the Treaty of March 18, 1856. These acts constitute a series of moral engagements, binding the Porte, without injury to internal independence, to the great Powers, and obliging it to devise means for securing both its own interests and those of Europe at large, which are equally threatened by any crisis in the East. Although the coexistence of a Christian and Mahometan element in Crete may render the solution of this question a difficult one, it is yet to be hoped that the unanimous exertions of the three Powers will succeed in warding off the movement which seems to be on the point of breaking out, and effect an understanding alike advantageous to both parties.

His Majesty the Emperor considers it incumbent upon him to invite her British Majesty's Government to unite itself to the Imperial Cabinet and his French Majesty's Government for this purpose. You will, therefore, propose to the London Cabinet to supply its representative at Constantinople with the instructions necessary for coöperation with the Russian and French representatives there. We intend to place before the Porte in a friendly and conciliatory spirit the necessity of pacifying the population of Crete, and satisfying their legitimate demands on the ground of existing treaties; for the better attainment of this purpose, we wish to come to an understanding with the Porte respecting the means to be adopted. The representatives of the three Powers at Constantinople would have to act jointly in judging the measures that might be required by the progress of events, preserving a common attitude in deeds and words, so as to secure authority and influence both with the Porte and the Cretans.

We learn from the papers that the French Government has dispatched a man-of-war to Crete. By order of our most illustrious master, we have, by way of Constantinople, informed the representative of his Imperial Majesty at Athens that, should he think it advisable, he will be at liberty to send one of the ships of the Imperial navy now in the Piræus to Crete, with orders to afford our compatriots and Consul such protection as circumstances may demand. It is desirable that the commanders of the different ships sent to Crete, as well as the Consuls there, should act in accordance with the rules to be drawn up by the representatives of the three Courts at Constantinople. I instruct your Excellency to inform her British Majesty's Secretary of State that the representative of his Majesty

the Emperor at Constantinople has been furnished with instructions in this spirit. Your Excellency will not omit to speak of the importance attached by our most illustrious sovereign to the work of pacification, and also of the indispensable necessity of taking the matter in hand at once, and seizing the present moment for its successful furtherance.

Receive, &c.'

II.*

'*St. Petersburg, September* 12, 1866.

'I avail myself of the departure of the English courier to send you some diplomatic documents. In them you will find fresh proofs of the movement manifesting itself among the Christians of the East, and threatening to assume vast proportions, unless stopped by conciliatory measures such as the wisdom of the Cabinets and the moderation of the Sultan may devise. Proofs similar to those enclosed must by this time be in the hands of the English Government. Notwithstanding the indifference lately manifested by that Government to Continental affairs, it could not, in our opinion, remain a passive spectator of the events now menacing the peace of Europe. We wish in this new political crisis to coöperate, if possible, with the Cabinet of St. James.

We do not see any serious impediments in the way of such an agreement. We cannot but suppose that the English Government will be as little inclined as ourselves to cherish any *arrière-pensée*, or to aspire to new acquisitions. Like Russia, England wishes to prevent the movement which is on the point of breaking out. Like Russia, she considers the amelioration of the condition of the Christians living under Turkish rule as a pledge of peace, and also as a moral duty imposed upon her. In our eyes, it is the only means of preserving the power of the Ottoman Government in Europe. We have held this opinion for many years. All our agents in the East have steadily advocated the same, and given advice in accordance. We remain true to our views even now, though we cannot conceal from ourselves that a time when passions are awakened, and thorough changes completed, is not the best fitted to procure a hearing for those who recommend peace. In many countries changes have been effected shaking them to their very foundation. After this, can we expect that tribes which are becoming more and more impatient of foreign coercion will not yield to the temptation and throw off the yoke when so favourable an opportunity seems to present itself?

The task of those Governments desirous of forestalling sudden changes by real, genuine, albeit gradual improvement is getting incomparably more difficult than it was. But in our opinion this should not cause them to relinquish their task altogether. The English Minis-

* This, as well as Nos. III. and IV., is not a Note properly speaking, but a letter from Prince Gortschakoff to Baron Brunnow.

ters are acquainted with Russian traditions. We have never concealed them, nor shall we disavow them now. We do not want, I repeat it, any new acquisitions, nor have we any desire to add to our authority or importance at anybody else's cost. But we never have been, nor are we now, indifferent to the sufferings of our co-religionists, sufferings involving the shedding of rivers of Christian blood. The sympathy we experience for our co-religionists has been frequently misrepresented, and made a pretext for charging us with secret designs. We maintain that the falsehood of these accusations has been proved by events, and that as the chronicles of history are enriched by experience, the notions of mankind, the views of the Cabinets, and the character of their mutual relations must be gradually altered.

In the last few years we have noticed that the English Government was equally anxious to promote the prosperity of the Christians in the East as to uphold the power of the Porte. Nothing could give us greater satisfaction than this. The English Government are simply pursuing the same object with ourselves. With so powerful and enlightened an ally, we might hope for success in a matter begun in the Christian interest, and for the preservation of the existing state of things. We have nothing to say against the integrity of the Ottoman dominion, if the Ottoman Government be only capable of preserving it. From us the Porte has nothing whatever to fear. Yet, as we presume not to predict the solution which Providence may evolve, we cannot but advert to the danger threatening the duration of Turkish rule, from the gradual decomposition of the Empire, the violence of passions, and, may be, some such *arrière-pensées* as will ever be foreign to ourselves.

We are perfectly convinced that the only way for the Porte to prolong its sway is to live in peace with its Christian subjects, and fulfil all their legitimate demands. Not knowing what turn things may take in the East, and what are the intentions of the various Cabinets, we cannot instruct you to make any definite declarations. Our most illustrious monarch being, however, of opinion that the time for an exchange of views has arrived, charges you to converse freely with her British Majesty's Secretary of State respecting the notions we have formed and the principles we recognise. We should be happy were this communication to usher in an understanding which, without prejudicing the requirements of justice, would tend to ward off fresh complications in store for Europe.'

III.

'*St. Petersburg, October* 27, 1866.

'This morning the English Ambassador called upon me. I had but a few minutes to devote to him, having to attend a Cabinet Council at which his Majesty was to preside. Sir A. Buchanan told me that people in London are disquieted by the state of affairs in Servia; that the Porte has lately complied with all legitimate demands of that country; that

the British Government has always counted upon our beneficial influence over Prince Michael, but that it has now reason to think that the Servians are making common cause with the Greeks for the purpose of rousing the whole Christian population against Mussulman rule.

I replied, that I could not give him any information on the latter point. Regarding the alleged satisfaction of the Servian demands by the Porte, I told him that if by this he alluded to the evacuation of Little Zbornik, this was no concession on the part of the Turkish Government, but merely the recognition of a long-disregarded right. We should not cease, I continued, to impress upon the Turkish Government the necessity of showing indulgence towards the Servians, especially under present circumstances. Our advice has hitherto fallen upon deaf ears, and the consequence would be, that the influence we possessed and employed in the cause of moderation would become weaker and weaker.'

IV. (*Extract.*)

'*St. Petersburg, November* 23, 1866.

'. . . We do not think that to keep off impending complications it suffices to wish for the preservation of peace, as the English Cabinet does, and we too. The ferment among the Christian population is such as to menace the Orient with immediate convulsion. If the Governments anxious to prolong the blessings of peace are confining their action to mere platonic and barren wishes, they will not avert the dangers threatening the tranquillity of the world. Like the English Ministers, we desire that the task set us to work out at home should not be hindered by foreign turmoils. Like the English Ministers, we desire to complete the great reforms inaugurated by the Emperor. Still we hold that stoical indifference and passive equanimity are at the present moment out of place. It has always been our implicit belief—a belief now shared, it would seem, by the Vienna Cabinet—that the best way to settle the Eastern question in a just, humane, and pacific manner, and to avoid the bloodshed and commotion which might otherwise ensue, was to advance the material welfare of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, and accord them self-government under the suzerainty of the Porte. By the concession of self-government* only can the Christian population ever gain full confidence in the Turkish Government.

Looking at things as they now stand in Europe, I make bold to say that the views enunciated above are in harmony with the general direction of public opinion, and must be particularly acceptable to those convinced that short-sightedness is the most dangerous of political defects, and that to free us from imminent peril we must try to enlarge the field of our political vision as much as possible.

A mere theoretical approval of our sentiments is of no avail in the

* The word used in the original is *Autonomia, i.e.* autonomy.

present juncture. It is necessary that the great Powers should seriously set to work, and by dint of united effort carry into effect, peacefully, but energetically, what they deem to be just, equitable, and practicable. Without this it will perhaps be impossible to prolong Mussulman rule in Europe. We wish with all our heart that the Powers may arrive at an understanding, and can only repeat that our most illustrious Sovereign is prepared to coöperate with them. In the above I have only been able to glance at this grave affair: but I think I have said enough to explain the principle which we should like to see recognised by the great Powers. On those Powers it will depend to develop our idea, in which case we shall not withhold our support.'

The publication of these documents is accounted for in the *Journal de St. Petersbourg* by the issue of the last French and English Blue-books on foreign affairs.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE TREATIES BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND THE STATES OF SOUTHERN GERMANY.

Berlin, March 19, 1867.

THE Official Gazette publishes identical offensive and defensive treaties of alliance concluded between Prussia and Bavaria on the 22d of August, 1866, and between Prussia and Baden on the 18th of the same month. By these treaties the contracting Powers reciprocally guarantee the integrity of their respective territories, and bind themselves to place at each other's disposal their whole military power in case of war. In time of war both Bavaria and Baden agree to hand over the supreme command of their troops to the King of Prussia. These treaties were at first to be kept secret. The ratifications have been exchanged. This *is* a disclosure.* Practically, then, unity may be said to have existed already since the summer of 1866.

* A corresponding treaty with Würtemberg was divulged a few days later.

THE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE TREATIES. GERMAN RELATIONS TO DENMARK, POLAND, AND HOLLAND.

Berlin, March 20, 1867.

THE publication of the offensive and defensive treaties between Prussia on the one side, and Bavaria and Baden on the other, is intended to serve as the reply of this Government to the assiduous endeavours of France to effect an agreement with the Czar. These endeavours date from the time that France observed a difficulty in staying the course of Russian politics in the East. Absorbed in German politics, and with little strength to spare to oppose the tendencies at work in the Balkan peninsula, France meant to reap the reward of her abstinence by securing the friendship of the party obliged. That such a union, were it completed, would not be conducive to the good of reviving Fatherland, is an opinion not unnaturally entertained at Berlin. When, after many vain attempts, France had at length so far prevailed with her coveted ally as to be allowed a first common step recommending the cession of Crete at Constantinople, Count Bismarck thought it as well to direct the attention of his neighbours to the fact that, long before their planning had begun, Germany had quietly become a strong and united country. The impression likely to be produced by this announcement cannot be estimated too highly. It will be the greater, as nothing like a definite agreement has as yet been arrived at between Russia and France. One of the many knotty points complicating the matter is the desire of France to make Austria share in the duties as well as the possible benefits of the contemplated arrangements. The Russian Cabinet are at a loss to conceive how, in some of the countries within the

range of the contemplated *entente cordiale*, their cherished interests can be reconciled with those of the Kaiser.

I need scarcely say, no little excitement has been caused by the happy intelligence of the day. While all are glad to know that the assistance they ever counted upon from the South has been insured in a formal and definitive way — that section of society which takes an earnest interest in politics, and is acquainted with the motives that have led to the disclosure in yesterday's *Gazette*, realises the necessity of putting off internal differences, and supporting the Government against foreign entanglements. Among the Liberals in the Federal Parliament more particularly, a conviction is gaining ground that, however deficient the proposed Federal Charter from their point of view, the session must not close without a compromise being brought about between the representatives of the people and the dynasties. I believe a friendly settlement — an event which a fortnight ago no one conversant with the then state of things would have been particularly disposed to vouch for—may now be confidently anticipated. The members cannot shut their eyes against the manifest truth, that a moment, at which Count Bismarck deems it necessary to resort to so decided a step as the divulging the above all-important treaties, is not the most fitted to continue domestic bickerings, even though they may be intended to develop popular rights.

Count Bismarck has again spoken repeatedly in the Federal Parliament. The first time he rose was to refute the protest of the Poles in the assembly who object to being embodied with the confederacy of a nation not their own.

'In the province of Posen,' he said, 'there were 700,000 Germans against 800,000 Poles. Of the former it was unnecessary to speak; but even the large majority of the latter would not have elected deputies capable of couching such a protest, unless they had been assured by the priests that embodiment with the North-German Confederacy was tantamount to the abrogation of the Polish language and the Catholic religion.

Poland, in the Seven Years' War, had made common cause with the Russians against this country. Poland, in those days, had enabled the enemy to invade this very province of Brandenburg on more than one occasion. That Prussia, after this, should have availed herself of an opportunity of conquering a portion of Poland would not be surprising, even had Poland herself not been the most aggressive country in the world as long as she existed. Not to speak of the province of Western Prussia—a region colonised by the Germans and subsequently appropriated by the Poles—the latter in the Middle Ages had perpetrated quite as many divisions of Russia as they afterwards suffered divisions of Poland, chiefly at the hands of Russia. Although there exist no more than 7,500,000 people of Polish origin, the provinces formerly subject to them number no less than 24,000,000 inhabitants. Of these nearly 12,000,000 are Russinians, or South-Russians; the rest are Lithuanians, Germans, and Jews.

Was it fair, then, for the Poles to claim the reëstablishment of their ancient independence, and, what to them is the same, the restitution of their former frontiers, on the ground of the nationality principle? Was it fair to demand that the Germans of Western Prussia, part of whom they have Polonised and converted to the Catholic religion by the application of fire and sword, shall be again exposed to their tender mercies? Such a thing would be impossible, even if the Polish peasantry, who form the vast majority of the people, were not vehemently opposed to any innovation calculated to revive the sway of that overbearing nobility who had been, and, in the event of Poland recovering her independence, would strive again to be, the only masters of the land and its soil. In 1848, when the Polish nobility in Posen rebelled, the Prussian Government, who at first employed Polish regiments against them, had, for humanity's sake, eventually to send Germans. The Polish regiments were too eager to slay the Polish nobility.'

On the North Schleswig question Count Bismarck expressed himself to the following effect:

'The two Danish members in the House have as little right to protest against their incorporation with the Confederacy as the rest of their countrymen in Northern Schleswig. The right to ask for a *suffrage universel* in those parts has been conceded to Austria, but to none other; and the time when it is to take place has been left undecided. Though I do not think it of any consequence to us, whether a few Danes, wishing to belong to Denmark, remain under Prussian rule or not, we shall never allow the frontier to be so settled as to damage our strategical position, and perhaps involve the necessity of retaking Alsen and Duppel at some future period. Altogether, I believe that the arena to be ceded is held to be more considerable at Copenhagen than at Berlin. It ought also to

be taken into account that the debt of the Duchies, including the costs of the war, amounts to 60,000,000 thalers, of which sum Denmark, if a portion of Schleswig is restored to her, will have to bear a proportionate quota. If, for instance, she gets 100,000 souls, her share of the debt will be 6,000,000 thalers. Again, as there is no district even in Northern Schleswig where there are not Germans mixed up with the Danish population, the Danish Government, before any cession can be made, will have to give sufficient guarantee that the rights of our countrymen be not again invaded as they were formerly. If they are satisfied with some such arrangement, our assent shall not be wanting. In the mean time, Northern Schleswig is Prussian territory.'

Germany's future relations to Holland having been mentioned by a member, Count Bismarck volunteered a few words upon this obscure topic:

'The King of Holland, in his capacity of Grand Duke of Luxemburg, was legally at war with us in the summer of 1866, not having separated himself from the majority of the then Diet. His Dutch Majesty, however, not wishing to enforce the martial relations in which he found himself to us, we readily agreed that there should be no actual coming to blows. Thus, though we were belligerents, we never exchanged a shot or mobilised a regiment against each other. In consequence we have hitherto not thought it indispensable to conclude peace. Regarding those possessions of the King of Holland formerly embodied with the German Bund, we have, in accordance with his expressed wish, not insisted upon Limburg's joining the North German Confederation. It is Dutch, and has not always belonged to Germany. Luxemburg never having been mentioned in our mutual communications, its fate remains more undecided. Hence it is evident that we have neither demanded that Luxemburg or Limburg should be preserved for Germany, nor have we resigned the right of claiming them. We have no interest in adding to the combustible matter threatening the peace of Europe with conflagration. We have never menaced Holland, nor exposed the Dutch Government to petty molestation, as has been stated in some journals.'

The rumour current here, that the King of Holland meditates the cession of his Grand Duchy of Luxemburg to France, was not adverted to by the Count. The capital of the Grand Duchy, an all but impregnable fortress, is still garrisoned by Prussians, as in the days of the Bund.

CRETE. THE SOUTH GERMAN TREATIES.

Berlin, March 23, 1867.

ENGLAND hesitating to join Austria, Russia, and France* in advising Turkey to cede Crete, has had the effect of causing the three mediating Powers to delay the formal execution of their purpose. In addition to this motive for reconsidering the step they were about to take, the late publication of the offensive and defensive treaties between Northern and Southern Germany will, it is hoped in this capital, tend to prevent an understanding between the three Empires; which, were it to be farther developed, would, in the very nature of things, not be directed against Turkey alone. In the mean time Russian troops are moving south; an event which, in the *Moscow Gazette*, is frankly accounted for by an alleged 'necessity of supporting the demands of the Czar with regard to the condition of the Christian Rayah.'

In Berlin and all Germany Count Bismarck has reached the highest step on the ladder of renown, in consequence of divulging the above-mentioned treaties. Indeed, the merest glance at the situation in which he managed to secure these important arrangements is enough to bring out his diplomatic energy and skill in strong relief. It will be remembered that, notwithstanding Prussia's decided victory in the field, Napoleon's threat to cross the Rhine obliged her Premier to spare Austria, and confine his unifying tendencies to the country north of the river Main. At that juncture, when success and failure were so cruelly blended, the elastic genius of the Count discovered a ready means of redress, and by whispering to Bavaria that but a few days previous a portion of her territory

* When France offered to assist Russia in the East, Austria, who co-operated with France in Germany, at once came forward to support her in Turkey also.

had been demanded by France to secure her consent to Prussia's aggrandisement, easily convinced her on which side her safety lay. The very Prussia which was too strong and too patriotic to purchase her own greatness with handing Bavaria over to the foreigner, now offered to guarantee Bavaria's integrity, provided she would place her armies under Prussian command in the event of war. There is now not much sagacity needed to perceive that to accept this proposition was the safest course for Bavaria to adopt; but there was no common talent displayed in discovering the fact so early in the day, driving the hostile State into a corner, and, with the clangour of arms still resounding, making a useful ally out of an annoying enemy. Austria had proved incompetent to perpetuate that state of things in Germany which had so long insured the independence of the Wittelsbach dynasty, at least in time of peace. France had coolly asked for the Palatinate. What, then, remained for the disappointed statesmen of Munich but to avail themselves of the sensible proposal of the Power still in arms against them, and purchase security at the price of assisting, if need be, their protector? That this compact, although not actually violating the letter of the Prague Treaty of Peace, is by Austria and France regarded as at variance with its spirit, does not, in the eyes of his German admirers, diminish the merit of the statesman who brought it about. The Prague Treaty, and more particularly that stipulation in it referring to the establishment of a separate Confederacy in the South, having been forced upon Count Bismarck by a foreign Power, which jealously and illegitimately interfered in the affairs of Germany, people here are determined to praise Count Bismarck for foiling the intentions of France, and creating military unity in spite of all opposition. Prussia, it is argued, never engaged to establish a Southern Union, but only promised to recognise its existence, were it established by the States immediately con-

cerned. If she did not contribute to that consummation, but, on the contrary, retarded it by concluding treaties with individual Southern States, she is yet ready to suffer its being accomplished, and does not insist upon any constitutional connection between the North and South. She leaves the Southerners either to join herself, or to form a separate Confederacy, just as they please.

KING WILLIAM'S BIRTHDAY.

Berlin, March 23, 1867.

THE King having yesterday attained his seventieth year, rejoicing in good health, and crowned with victory, the day was celebrated with more than usual pomp. Early in the morning the Princes and Princesses of the blood offered their congratulations to the aged monarch. Felicitations were also presented to his Majesty by the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Baden, the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess Dowager of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the Duke and Duchess of Saxe-Meiningen, the Prince, Crown Prince, nd Crown Princess of Hohenzollern, the Crown Prince and Crown Princess of Anhalt, Prince William of Baden, Prince Maurice of Saxe-Altenburg, Prince Henry of Hesse, and other royalties who had come here to grace the occasion with their presence.

The Court, the Ministers, the Generals, Lord Augustus Loftus, M. Benedetti, the President and Vice-Presidents of the Federal Parliament, and the *élite* of the nobility, then had the honour of waiting upon the King likewise. After this the King, Queen, and Court drove through the fashionable quarters of the town, to view the garlands

and flags adorning the principal streets, and were loudly cheered along the route. In the afternoon, while a royal salute of 101 rounds was fired on the Königsplatz, the generals, dignitaries, and high functionaries of state sat down to sumptuous dinners prepared for them in the Schloss, the Home Office, and other official buildings. The King and Royal Family dined at the Crown Prince's, and at a late hour entered their equipages to inspect the illuminations. To-day his Majesty attended a magnificent *carrousel* given in his honour by the aristocracy. Eighty ladies and gentlemen of the Court, in gorgeous fancy costumes and mounted on choice steeds, went through the figures of several quadrilles, and performed numerous other equestrian games and feats, in the presence of *la crême de la crême.* Since the marriage of the late Princess Charlotte with Prince Nicholas of Russia such a splendid spectacle has not been witnessed here. To mark the day in a more serious manner, the King ordered that the new cathedral, begun and left in a very infant state by his predecessor, should be completed. If the original plan is executed, it will be one of the grandest ecclesiastical structures in Germany, and a particular ornament to Berlin—a city too poor in olden, and too lukewarm in modern times, to erect fine churches. As an improvement upon the prevailing system of decorations, a large number of ladies who distinguished themselves in nursing and providing for the sick and wounded during the war were, on the King's birthday, presented with the Order of Queen Louise. This is the first time that such a mark of distinction, hitherto confined to the Court ladies, has been conferred upon the public generally.

The King has now distributed the one million and a half thalers placed at his disposal by a grateful country to endow the heroes of the war. Count Bismarck has received 400,000 thalers (60,000*l.*); General Roon, the Minister of War, 300,000 thalers; and Generals Moltke,

Steinmetz, Vogel, and Herwarth, each 200,000 thalers. In the letters accompanying the gift the King is said to have expressed a hope that the recipients would invest these stipends in landed estates.

FRANCE AND THE SOUTH GERMAN TREATIES.

Berlin, March 27, 1867.

THE Paris correspondents of some German papers have obliged the French Government, by asserting that the treaties between Prussia and the Southern States have been known in Paris since September last. If this statement is credited by the French, they will believe their own Government to have been more fully initiated into the secrets of this Cabinet than, after the latest revelations, they were probably tempted to think was the case; but the comparison of dates does not tend to support the assumption. Had the French Government been cognisant of what occurred behind the scenes last summer, it would have scarcely printed in its last Blue-book a despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, dated August 23d, in which that Minister, a day after the signature of the Prusso-Bavarian Treaty, speaks of his having again charged his Berlin representative to tender his good offices to the Munich Cabinet in its negotiations with Prussia. M. Rouher, too, declared but a few days ago, from the height of the restored tribune, that the mediation of France alone saved Bavaria the loss of a territory with 900,000 inhabitants. Looked upon in the light of the latest disclosures, these are amusing self-delusions. We now know it was Bavaria's entering into an offensive and defensive alliance with her supposed foe which had the effect the French would fain claim for their interested, but, alas, posthumous negotiations. And did not the same M. Rouher, on the

same occasion, congratulate himself on Germany's having been tri-sected by the peace of Prague, when, in reality, the first of those momentous agreements which welded Germany together was completed the day before the conclusion of the above-mentioned compact? Were farther proof needed of France's ignorance of what had taken place behind her back, we might refer to the statement of the Vienna papers, that the Austrian Government was first apprised of the existence of the secret treaties by the Prussian Ambassador on the evening of the 15th of March. This circumstance is irreconcilable with the supposition of France being better informed previous to that date. Austria and France have been too closely connected since the summer of 1866 for one of them to withhold such important intelligence from the other.

In Germany the satisfaction at this happy result of the war is universal. Contrary to what might have been expected from the aspect of things a year ago, it is even more intensely felt in the South than in the North. The latter, being four times as populous and six times as strong as the South, could afford to await future developments with more equanimity than people in Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden. With the exception of the Ultramontane and Republican papers, the South German press is sincerely gratified at this new guarantee of the unity and safety of the nation.

It is likely they will soon have to rejoice in another matter. In addition to the military treaties, new commercial ties are to be formed between the two sections of the national territory directly the Constitution of the Northern Confederacy has been safely housed. And these ties will have not a commercial only, but also a political importance. The Zollverein is to be provided with a Parliament, in which the Northern and Southern delegates will sit side by side and vote by majorities. The Governments too will vote by majorities on questions submitted

to this Parliament. Up to the war all Zollverein business has been dispatched at periodical meetings of the representatives of the various Governments. Nothing could be resolved upon unless unanimously. The slightest modification to be introduced into the tariff had to be agreed upon by all the governments and parliaments conjointly. This certainly left the individual States as sovereign as could be, but subjected Prussia to the *bon plaisir* of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, and made the economical interests of 16,000,000 Prussians dependent on the considerate kindness of 60,000 Reuss-Schleitz-Greizers. Zollverein arrangements, in a word, bore the impress of the absurd institutions of the Bund, and it is therefore only natural that both should fall together.

When, about three weeks ago, M. Benedetti went to Paris to break to his Government the imminent publication of the Southern alliance treaties, France at first intended to make a common protest with Austria against them. But Austria declined to take a step calculated to add to the difficulties of her situation without any immediate advantage accruing. Since then France has taken a decided step. Unwilling to go without territorial aggrandisement when Prussia has become so great and powerful a State, she has renewed her former overtures to the King of Holland, and offered to purchase Luxemburg for money. The King, who owns Luxemburg in his own right, and may dispose of it without any reference to the Dutch Estates, has not absolutely rejected the proposal, but allowed an exchange of communications to take place upon the subject. When matters had reached a certain point, Prussia, directly or indirectly, I know not which, was made aware of it. If it be permitted to draw an inference from the attitude of the Berlin inspired papers, King William will avoid as long as possible uttering a definite opinion upon this mysterious project. It may be relinquished by its originator after operating as a salve

to the wounded feelings of the French, or it may be ultimately negatived at the Hague. Should neither of these alternatives supervene, King William I. will doubtless recollect his having declared, but a few years ago, that not a village should be lost to Germany while he could prevent it. His Majesty will be also influenced by the fact that Luxemburg is a fortress which, in the possession of France, offers still more facilities for an attack upon the Rhine than, garrisoned by Prussians, it presents for a descent upon Paris, from which it is only two hundred miles distant. On the other hand, the King will probably take into consideration that, although inhabited by Germans, and belonging to the German Empire and Bund from time immemorial, Luxemburg has been allowed to keep aloof from the new Confederacy. Before determining upon a mode of action, if the necessity for doing so ever arrives, Prussia would have to ascertain the exact state of the relations between Russia on the one hand, and France and Austria on the other. Should Russia suffer Austria to support the claims of France, no little energy would be required in the Prussian ministers and nation to withstand the desires of their irritated and ambitious neighbour. So much for the political considerations bearing upon the matter.

As regards the question of right, the Grand Duke of Luxemburg, who happens to be also King of Holland, in the common interest of the various German states, consented, in a treaty concluded on the 31st of May 1815, that the fortress of Luxemburg should be garrisoned by Prussia. In a later treaty, bearing the date November 8, 1816, it was stipulated that three-fourths of the garrison should be Prussians, and one-fourth Dutch; and also that the sovereign rights of the Grand Duke should suffer no diminution in consequence of the Prussian occupation. The contradiction involved in these two latter provisos is calculated to create difficulties in the present

state of things. The more as, if I am not mistaken, Dutch troops have never been stationed at Luxemburg, at least not in the fortress. The King Grand-Duke might affirm that, being in the unrestricted enjoyment of his sovereign rights, he is entitled to do what he likes with his own; the King garrisoner of the fortress might reply, that, having a vested interest in the concern, no transfer can be made without his consent. As to the people, it may be foreseen that, should the matter be proceeded with, the problematic benefit of universal suffrage is all that will be conceded them.

Were the Luxemburgers allowed to choose, they would like best to remain what they are. Borderers of indifferent patriotism, they have no particular wish to enter the North German Confederacy, and exchange the amenities of their present easy-going existence for the high taxation and universal conscription of the Bund. But they desire still less to enjoy these fashionable advantages under French rule—an arrangement which would not only deprive them of the modest insignificance they rejoice in, but sever them from the Zollverein into the bargain.

The King of Holland cannot but know the feelings of his German subjects. If, notwithstanding the quieting assurances he caused to be given them in a recent speech from the throne, he should now have not absolutely rejected all idea of entertaining the propositions made, his conduct will here be ascribed to the apprehensions awakened in Holland at Prussia's accession of power. Since the late war, the Dutch press has never ceased to represent the unification of Germany in the light of a robbery, committed by a strong State upon weaker ones. Arguing upon this egregious misconception of the case, it has not scrupled to suspect Prussia of the design of extending her conquests beyond the German frontiers, and swallowing up Holland, Switzerland, and what not, should an opportunity offer. However unfounded these apprehensions may be,

they exist; however strange the ignorance they betray of the state of Germany, they are a fact. They are even sufficiently marked to have claimed the attention of M. Rouher, who, among the various topics touched upon in his recent grand speech, also deemed it incumbent upon him to assure the Dutch of French assistance in case of need.

I can only say, that in Berlin the Prussian Government is not suspected of wishing for the forcible or amicable reunion of the Netherlands with the North German Confederacy; and that, were it otherwise, people would be at a loss to understand how the Federal Constitution, which in its whole configuration is meant for Germans alone, could be made to suit the tastes of the Dutch. If little Luxemburg was not received into the new Confederacy because governed by a foreign sovereign, how can a whole foreign kingdom become embodied with the Bund? Thus much, however, is true, that the German people are beginning to be disquieted at the consequences that may possibly ensue from the present bearing of Holland towards themselves. Little as they know of the Dutch, and long as they have been politically separated from them, they were yet in the habit of looking upon their North-Western neighbours as friends and near relations. If the Dutch are intent upon assuming a hostile attitude towards the Germans, the latter, it is to be apprehended, will ultimately oblige them by reciprocating these feelings, and really get up the animosity now erroneously ascribed to them.

CRETE, SERVIA, LUXEMBURG.

Berlin, March 29, 1867.

RUSSIA, Austria, and France, overcoming the scruples which delayed the execution of their design for a few days, have recommended the Sultan to cede Crete. Such being the case, Prussia in the eleventh hour thought fit to join the three mediating states and do the like. Her conduct excites attention, semi-official papers having long assured us that Germany had no immediate interest in Eastern affairs, and, in consequence, would observe the strictest neutrality until the actual occurrence of a crisis. We shall be hardly wrong in accounting for this change of policy by the assumption, that Prussia did not like to see the Czar exclusively supported by Powers which, were they to nourish hostile designs against herself, would have to count upon Russian connivance for success. One cannot help noticing the fact, that certain acknowledged organs of the Russian Cabinet, which up to a short time ago might be regarded as inimical, not only to the rule, but also to the person of Napoleon III., have suddenly wheeled about, and begun to look upon the Tuileries in a different light. By way of returning the compliment, Napoleon has directed the attention of the Swiss Government to the fact, that Polish revolutionary pamphlets are being printed (or, as he might more accurately have said, have been printing for the last thirty years) in Switzerland. He has, moreover, instructed his envoy at Rome to assist the endeavours of the Russian Cabinet to reopen diplomatic relations with the Pope, at loggerheads with the Czar since the Polish rebellion of 1863. Were the Pope to accept the Russian proposals having this end in view, his Holiness would have to abandon the cause of the Poles, so zealously advocated by him but a short time ago. France too, it will be remembered, was

very friendly to the Poles in 1863; yet Count Stroganoff and M. Kapnist, the Russian semi-official agents at Rome, now enjoy the advantages of French good offices with the Holy See. Similar, and one is tempted to think corresponding, overtures are noticeable in the attitude of the Austrian Government towards Russia. Though of course it would be premature in the present introductory stage of the *rapprochement* to redress Russinian grievances in Galicia, the Polish exiles who, when anti-Russian politics prevailed at Vienna, were suffered to flock to those parts, are suddenly treated with marked severity.

The Russian Government have advised Prince Michael of Servia to repair to Constantinople, to thank the Sultan for the promise to evacuate Belgrade, and inform his Highness, in a friendly way, that the administrative reunion with Servia of the Turkish provinces of Old Servia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina would be the best means of securing the tranquillity of his Slavonian subjects.

To procure the needful required for her enterprising policy, Russia intends selling the Moscow Railway. The railway yields an interest of about nine per cent, and will probably yield twice as much four years hence, when the southern lines are completed. There is not a Russian paper but looks upon the idea of the sale as penny wise and pound foolish. But mere pecuniary considerations cannot be permitted to stay the course of *la haute politique.*

A semi-official *communiqué* in the *Kreuz Zeitung* denies that a treaty has been concluded between France, Holland, and Prussia touching the future of Luxemburg. The paper also deems it improbable that a compact on the same subject has been entered into between any two of the three States mentioned. Upon the whole, the language of the papers in connection with this Government manifests an unmistakable desire to temporise. Prussian inspired journalists are apparently little disquieted about

the matter. Their Austrian semi-official colleagues delight in regarding it as a possible source of war, and beg to inform us, somewhat early in the day, that Baron Beust will generously refrain from assisting France. Possibly there is very little foundation for all this prophetic talk. Yet it may not be altogether premature to mention clauses 1 and 37 of the Constitution under which Luxemburg is held by its sovereign:

'Clause 1. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is an independent, indivisible, and inalienable State.

Clause 37. No portion of the Luxemburg territory can be ceded or exchanged for, and no portion of foreign territory added to, Luxemburg, except by virtue of a law.'

Hence it follows, that the cession of the country to France could not be legally sanctioned by a *suffrage-universel* hoax; but requires the ratification of the Chamber. That this will not be granted is unanimously asserted by the German and Luxemburg journals. While all remains uncertain, the present interval of doubt and anxiety is filled up by the Berlin press inveighing against the 'perfidy and shabbiness' of the King of Holland, and the 'stupid animosity' of the Dutch, which encouraged their Sovereign to harbour designs prejudicial to Germany.

The Emperor Napoleon has allowed recent events to interfere so little with the usages of princely courtesy as to congratulate his Prussian Majesty on the return of his birthday, in an autograph letter. I forgot to mention a curious *contretemps* which the same festive day gave occasion to. At the illuminations there were not a few designs referring to the victories of the past year. For the subjects of the triumphant sovereign it was but natural to revive the memory of the campaign in this luminous style; but what was the astonishment of the sightseers at finding the front of the Austrian embassy decorated with a transparency, showing the words, 'All hail to the Victor!' 'Heil Dir im Sieger's Kranz' is the beginning of

the Prussian national anthem. On an indifferent occasion, it might, perhaps, have with propriety been chosen by the representative of a friendly Power to express regard; but on this day of all others to use congratulatory language seemed a little too generous for a diplomat charged with the care of Austrian interests at this capital. The seeming contradiction was subsequently explained in the simplest way: the owner of the house, who is a Prussian nobleman, having manifested his patriotic feelings in this wise without the cognisance of his ambassadorial tenant.

Among the presents given to the King is one as unique of its kind as the battle it is intended to commemorate. An exact representation of the country about Königgrätz, executed in plaster-of-paris, no less than sixty feet square, was offered his Majesty by the great staff of the army. This piece of art has been modelled after an accurate survey. To render it still more complete, it will receive hosts of lilliputian soldiers, stationed in the exact positions occupied on the decisive day by their gallant prototypes.

Speaking of the late military exploits, you may not object to learn the pass-words and corresponding answers issued by Prince Frederick Charles to his army during the momentous period from June 28th to July 1st, which have just come to light:

	Pass-words.	*Answers.*
June 28 . . .	At them . . .	Fritz.
„ 29 . . .	Follow me . . .	Carl.
„ 30 . . .	Hold him fast . .	Louis.
July 1 . . .	Knock him down .	Ernest.

It will be easily seen that there is a connection between the pass-words and answers, and that the names in the latter refer to the Crown Prince of Prussia, Prince Frederick Charles, Louis Napoleon, and the King of Hanover.

LUXEMBURG PROTECTED.

Berlin, March 30, 1867.

WHILE cautiously trying to put off the day when a final and definite answer will have to be returned to the French proposals respecting the cession of Luxemburg, Prussia has thought it as well to protect the coveted prize against a *coup de main*. Orders have been sent to Luxemburg to prepare the casemates for the reception of troops. The posts in the advanced works have been reinforced, and provided with drummers and trumpeters. A strong detachment has been told-off for work in the fortress arsenal, and all the smithies in the town have received large orders from the commandant. Some persons who manifested their French sympathies in the public thoroughfares, by cries of 'Vive la France!' 'Vive Napoléon III!' were arrested by Prussian patrols.

In the mean time the language of the Government press continues as ambiguous as ever, and it is impossible to tell whether the measures above specified are merely intended to prevent the French bringing pending negotiations to a forcible and premature end, or whether they are destined to usher in the adoption by this Government of a resolute and truly national policy.

The French press are utterly mistaken, to say the least of it, in supposing the embodiment of Holland with the North German Confederacy to have been ever demanded by the German papers. No demand, no wish, no idea of the kind has been so much as breathed in the journals of this country. Not even the incorporation of Luxemburg with the new Bund has, by the Government or the people, been ever regarded as a matter of urgency. Should a quarrel ensue, it will not be owing to Germany provoking Holland. As yet, Germany has no wish beyond uniting the *disjecta membra* of her own nationality under

a common central Government. If she ever become ambitious of foreign conquest, it will be to secure her own safety, and only after she has been attacked by some of her numerous enemies.

The right to garrison Luxemburg was accorded to Prussia, not in the Federal Act of Germany, or the Final Act of Vienna, both abolished in 1866, but in a treaty concluded between Prussia, Holland, and some other Powers a week before the completion of the Federal institutions that were. This treaty was subsequently referred to in, and sanctioned by, the Federal Act, and also became the basis of several other treaties relating to the same subject. Thus, although Luxemburg was a Federal fortress while the old Bund existed, the right of Prussia to occupy the place was not originally derived from the Federal compacts. Among the several objections to a cession of the place raised by this Government is also this, that a portion of the works having been constructed at the expense of the old Bund, Luxemburg cannot be disposed of without the consent of all the States formerly represented at the German Diet.

On the 25th instant, the leading manufacturers of Luxemburg held a meeting, on which occasion resolutions against the annexation of the country by France were passed unanimously. A committee was also elected to vindicate the interests of the mercantile community of Luxemburg. The Grand Duchy belongs to the Zollverein, and has a brisk trade with Western Germany. To adapt its manufactures to the French tariff would entail a radical and very expensive revolution in its entire industrial activity.

FRANCE WANTS LUXEMBURG.

Berlin, March 31, 1867.

LUXEMBURG is fast being worked up into the dignity of a question. I may be permitted to repeat a few pertinent facts. Count Bismarck not only left Luxemburg outside the North German Confederacy, but, in a recent sitting of the Federal Parliament, positively declared that he did not think he had a right to force her to join. He also intimated on the same occasion, that although Luxemburg was a German country, and had been so as far back as history dates, he yet could not shut his eyes to the fact that it was ruled by one who was at the same time the sovereign of a foreign nation, and, if pressed by this Government, might cause a serious complication to arise. 'Prussia,' he wound up his candid remarks, 'had no interest in adding to the combustible matter that threatened the safety of Europe.' The motives inducing this sensible conduct seem to have been misinterpreted by France. What was no more than an act of prudence, dictated by a desire to preserve peace, Napoleon apparently construed into a hint that the country, not having been claimed for the new national Commonwealth established on his frontiers, might eventually be allowed to separate itself entirely from Germany. On more than one occasion since last year's occurrences he has accordingly endeavoured to persuade the King of Holland to consider the feasibility of entering into a commercial arrangement about the object of his desires. To all his proposals evasive replies were returned at first.

The King of Holland is a scion of the German dynasty of Orange, which originated in Nassau, where the elder branch continued to reign till within a few months. Remembering his descent, the King did not wish to part with a possession which, in the great remodelling of con-

tinental affairs fifty years ago, had been allotted to his father in exchange for some ancient Duchies of his house on the Middle Rhine. At one time, in what may be called the introductory period of the present entanglement, he was so firm in his purpose as to cause the Luxemburgers to be assured, in a speech from the throne delivered by the Governor-General, that he would not part with them on any account.

Thus matters stood when France, moved to a more earnest pursuit of her aim by the publication of the Prussian treaties with Southern Germany, again mooted the subject, and in more direct terms. I believe I am pretty correct in saying that to enforce her request it was this time accompanied by an inuendo, that she would not take a refusal under the circumstances which had newly arisen. Political and strategical considerations of an imperative nature, she suggested, made it impossible for her to act otherwise. If, then, the King Grand-Duke was to yield, he might realise a handsome sum, and, moreover, secure the additional advantage of a French guarantee for his Dutch possessions; if, on the contrary, he were to cause a war to break out, he would lose the Duchy under any circumstances, and receive neither guarantee nor money.

This reasoning did not fail to produce the desired impression. The King of Holland, allowing himself to be persuaded that France meant war in the event of sustaining another rebuff, thought it incumbent upon him to relax his resistance, and return a more amenable answer than hitherto. He could not but perceive that if France were in earnest, any opposition Germany might be inclined to offer would be attended with a war, which, even in the event of the Germans coming off victors, might result in the contested territory being taken from him, and handed over to some one more competent to protect it than himself. His resolutions seem to have

been also influenced by the apprehensions entertained, however groundlessly, by his Dutch ministers and subjects, as to the possibility of Prussia's asking them to join the German Confederacy at no very distant date. With regard to this supposition, it may be safely asserted there never has appeared a single paragraph in a German paper, or a single word uttered by a German politician, to justify it. Only the Austrian papers are now busily propagating rumours to this effect, being kindly intent upon fanning the flames, and representing Prussia as the aggressor. Holland is just as little noticed in Germany as in England; and although, should war ensue, she may have cause to regret the nervous misgivings which led her to help in bringing it on, she, up to a few days ago, never formed the subject of any illicit desire, or even of any marked attention, in the press of this country.

Whether the business has been formally completed between Holland and France remains to be seen. If so, there are symptoms justifying the assumption that the execution of this singular contract will be interfered with by the Government now swaying the national destinies of Germany. Of course Count Bismarck is not particularly anxious to engage in a war which might imperil the solidity of the national edifice but lately raised, and, notwithstanding all his unwearied zeal, not yet completed by him. Of course he is the less inclined to run the risk when the possibility of Russia permitting Austria to support France — however improbable, from the rivalry of the two former Powers in the East—is yet on the cards. To prevent such an accumulation of dangers is probably one of the principal objects of Prussian policy at the present moment. If the means chosen for this end are to be equal to the magnitude of the interests at stake, they must be stern and decisive. Should failure attend them, Prussia may possibly deem a discreet policy the most expedient under the circumstances, and for a time submit to what

might be a tough piece of work to hinder; but should success crown her present endeavours in the diplomatic line, she is likely to make a stand, when the peace of the world will depend upon the wisdom of the Emperor of the French. A word from him to the King of Holland, and the danger so suddenly arisen will as quickly disappear.

The Government papers are still using the most guarded language in reference to the question of the day. It is different with the independent journals, which, whatever their political bias, urge the Government to withstand the cupidity of France, and, if necessary, wage war with Napoleon and Francis Joseph at the same time. In the eyes of all political parties, the idea that abject submission to the foreigner shall usher in that unity which was to have insured security, is regarded as perfectly incompatible with the honour of Germany and the station she has recently recovered among the Empires of the world.

LUXEMBURG DEBATE IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL PARLIAMENT.

Berlin, April 1, 1867.

THE plot begins to thicken. In to-day's sitting of the Federal Parliament, Herr von Bennigsen, the well-known Liberal member from Hanover, and President of the Unity and Liberty League (National Verein), rose to direct the attention of the House and Cabinet to the question of Luxemburg. He said:

'Disquieting rumours have been lately afloat with regard to the future of a German State. The Grand Duke of Luxemburg, it is asserted, is meditating the cession of his sovereign rights to a foreign monarch. Luxemburg is German, and has given Emperors and Margraves to the nation; it is a border-country, the defence and preservation of which is a demand of honour; it is a fortress of extreme military importance, the

loss of which would not a little impair our strength. Such being the case, the Luxemburgers are of opinion that the Prussian Cabinet has some interest in protecting them, and that this Government and nation should not suffer them to be estranged from our common Fatherland. They are surprised at finding the matter mooted, day after day, in the papers of a neighbouring country, without any fitting reply on the part of the press or the people of Germany. Surprise has engendered despondency. As the House will see from a letter from Luxemburg, which I am going to read, the Luxemburgers begin to doubt the policy of this Government. (*Reads the letter.*) I have undertaken to claim your attention for this deplorable affair, because I think it our duty to speak openly upon a matter of national import, and to encourage the Luxemburgers to hold out in this critical juncture and rely upon the succour of their countrymen. I have brought forward the matter in the name of the Liberal party; but I trust that in so doing I have the approval of all parties alike. (*Cheers.*)

For a certain Power contiguous to our frontiers the temptation to interfere before our new institutions have been consolidated by time and practice is evidently too great. We want peace. But if France does not hesitate to insult us, the earlier we say that we are all for war the better. It would be sullying our honour, were we to act otherwise; it would be an indelible stain on the national escutcheon, were we to submit to arrogance and cupidity combined. We must call upon Count Bismarck to prove that energy is the best policy under certain circumstances. We must expect that the King, whose promise that "not a single village should be separated from Germany," found a responsive echo in our hearts, will call the nation to arms, if the necessity arises. All party dissension will disappear in such a case, and the new Federal Constitution, which we are discussing here, be completed in a few days.

We wish for nothing better than to live in peace and amity with all our neighbours, and more especially with France. France is large enough to be able to dispense with conquest; and if she would but consider her real interests, would waive all idea of war. Industry, culture, and freedom bid her refrain from an enterprise which, if persisted in, will inflict innumerable evils upon either nation.

Let France pause and consider her course before she acts. Germany seeks no war; but if France will not allow us to become a united country, we are ready to give her the most indubitable proof that the time of our domestic division is past, and that her attempts will be henceforth resisted by the whole nation. (*Tremendous cheering.*)

I now take the liberty to put the following questions to the Cabinet:

Firstly, is there any foundation for the rumours daily growing upon us, that negotiations have been entered upon between the French and Dutch Governments respecting the cession of Luxemburg?

Secondly, is his Majesty's Government in a position to inform the

Federal Parliament, in which all parties are alike determined to prevent a German country being torn off the body politic of the nation,- that Prussia, in conjunction with her allies, will vindicate at all risks the ancient connection of Luxemburg with the rest of Germany, as well as our right to garrison the fortress of the same name?'

To this energetic appeal Count Bismarck replied as follows:

'I deem it my duty to satisfy the natural curiosity of the preceding speaker upon a question of great importance at the present moment. Upon the dissolution of the old Bund, the members of the Confederacy recovered their independence previously limited by the Federal institutions. One of them was the Grand Duke of Luxemburg, who, separating himself from the rest of the Northern potentates, did not choose to enter the new Confederacy subsequently established. His Dutch Majesty's Government, being greatly displeased with our successes, did not think it conducive to their interests to advise their Sovereign to join the North German Bund; while the people of Luxemburg had no wish to bear the burden which would have been imposed by the Federal institutions. In October last, the dissatisfaction prevailing in Dutch official circles was expressed in a Note to this Government, in which it was asserted that Prussia had no right to garrison Luxemburg after the dissolution of the old Bund.

Prussia had to ask herself whether it would be advisable to use her influence to compel the entry of Luxemburg, which is a German country, and a member of the Zollverein, into the North German Confederacy. Taking into consideration that the Grand Duke of Luxemburg is also King of Holland, and remembering the complications that had arisen from similar arrangements in former times, we did not insist upon the Duchy entering the new Bund. I will admit, that due regard for the geographical situation of the Duchy, and the entanglements it might possibly involve us in, was one of the motives which seemed to recommend a cautious course. It is only doing us justice to say, that our policy has been dictated by the double wish to spare the susceptibilities of our neighbours, and to maintain peace.

I shall therefore return no answer to your second question. It is a question such as it may befit a member of a national representative assembly to put; but the wording is hardly in accordance with the language used by diplomatists, so long as peace has not been superseded by war. What I am at liberty to communicate to the House is this: his Majesty's Government has no reason to suppose that a settlement has been already effected; nor do we know whether a settlement is imminent. Indeed, all that has come to my cognisance is, that a few days ago the King of the Netherlands orally inquired of the Prussian Envoy at the Hague

whether he was in a position to tell him what the Prussian Government would think of his parting with the sovereign rights he owned as Grand Duke of Luxemburg. Our Envoy has been instructed to declare in reply, that the Prussian Government and its allies did not think it incumbent upon them to give any opinion upon the matter now; that if future occurrences should induce them to speak out, they would first ascertain the opinion of the Powers who signed the Treaty of 1839, and wait for the representative assemblies and people of Germany to take the matter into consideration; and that in the mean time the King of Holland would be alone responsible for any steps he might think it expedient to take. The Dutch Government then charged their representative at this capital to offer us their good offices, in the event of our needing them, in those negotiations with France which they thought would be shortly occasioned by their ceding the Grand Duchy. (*Laughter and merriment.*) I replied, that Prussia was not in a position to avail herself of the offer, since no negotiations had been opened.

I am unable to say whether the matter has been already completed. So far as I know, no treaty has as yet been concluded. As to the intentions of his Majesty's Government and its allies, you will not expect me to dilate upon them at this moment. The allied Governments hope and trust that no Power harbours the design to invade the indubitable rights of Germany. The allied Governments hope that they will be able to vindicate those rights without an interruption of the peaceful relations existing between them and their neighbours. If, as the preceding speaker aptly hinted, our future deliberations in this House are of a kind to convince foreign Governments of the harmony between the people and Governments of Germany, the eventual fulfilment of our hopes will become all the more probable.'

The House resounded with acclamations upon the conclusion of this speech. A large number of Liberal and Conservative Deputies left their seats to congratulate Count Bismarck upon the announcement of a resolute and unflinching policy, understood to be implied in his words. When the excitement subsided, the Count significantly sat down by General Moltke, with whom he entered into a long conversation. The Crown Prince, with the Grand Duchess of Baden his sister, and Prince William of Baden were present in the royal box. The corps diplomatique mustered strong in the gallery.

THE LUXEMBURG QUESTION.

Berlin, April 2, 1867.

INDUBITABLY as it has been proved by yesterday's speech of the Premier, that whatever arrangements may have been entered into by others, he is not privy to them, the papers in connection with the Government continue to use indefinite language in reference to the question of the day. Comparing their remarks with the wording of the ministerial speech, one arrives at the conclusion, that although to resist the cession of German territory to France would be the policy most congenial to Count Bismarck, he is yet anxious to avoid giving offence by prematurely committing himself to a distinct and irritating line of conduct. The chief difficulty for this Government lies not in the attitude of France, but in that of Austria. Could the neutrality of the latter be counted upon, or could it, at least, be anticipated with any certainty that any hostile intentions entertained by the Kaiser would be eventually restrained by the Czar, the language of the Prussian Cabinet would be probably as resolute as the popular voice demands. As it is, Austria, instead of giving Prussia the positive promises which the latter would be glad to receive, is exhausting herself in friendly assurances, pleasant to the ear, but unserviceable in the way of business; while Russia, though she might possibly avail herself of Austria being employed in a different direction to advance her own interests on the Lower Danube, is yet too little gratified by the establishment of German unity to directly aid in its consolidation, unless she has an object of her own in doing so. If, therefore, Prussia cannot resolve to prepare for the worst, and, if need be, fight single-handed both Austria and France—a tough but not impracticable piece of work for the 800,000 bayonets at her disposal—the fate of Luxem-

burg may be ultimately decided, not at Paris, not at Berlin, but at St. Petersburg. It is not impossible that Russia, deeming German unity too solid to be combated, and Austria too feeble to withstand a hard blow, may seize upon the opportunity to ally herself with a State which, in the event of the Kaiser's siding against it, would necessarily seek its natural friends and supporters among Magyars, Czechians, and Croats.

While these and other considerations concealed from our ken are being calmly weighed in many ministerial Cabinets, the little spot of earth which has occasioned the controversy is the scene of much anxious excitement. French emissaries have appeared in Luxemburg, trying to get up petitions praying for annexation to *la grande nation*. A number of Catholic priests are no doubt in league with these harbingers of the universal-suffrage system, and the mob of the capital, which has never been on a very cordial footing with the Prussian garrison, rejoices in the prospect of having a fling at the soldiers quartered upon them. The immense majority of the inhabitants, however, object to any alteration in their present political status. If this cannot be preserved, the next best thing in their eyes is a treaty with the North German Confederacy, such as has recently been concluded between this Government and the Southern States. I have before me an article from the *Luxemburg Wort*, the paper enjoying the largest circulation in the Duchy, which recommends this way out of the difficulty as the best that can be devised. It is to be foreseen that, after the declarations contained in yesterday's speech of the Premier, this opinion will gain ground among the frightened natives, who have suddenly, and very much against their will, become the apple of discord to their formidable neighbours. The fact that General Brauchitsch, the Prussian Commandant of Luxemburg, in letters to the editors of several journals, has angrily contradicted the rumour

which represented him as having spoken of the cession as possible, will also tend to raise the sunken spirits of the population. The fortress was quietly armed last year, and may receive a considerable increase of troops in a few hours. As much may be said of Saarlouis, the other exposed fortress on the French frontier. While peace prevails, there is, however, nothing to prevent French officers from scouring the country and inspecting the latest alterations in the aspect of the terrain. As the *Kreuz Zeitung* states, these military emissaries have been noticed at Frankfort, Mayence, Coblenz, Hamburg, Wiesbaden, and last, not least, Luxemburg itself.

The discussion of the Federal Constitution is being rapidly proceeded with in Parliament. As the votes are about equally divided between the Opposition and Government party, the most important decisions depend upon the wavering few, oscillating between the two great sections of the House. The side to which they happen to incline carries the day. As each of these 'wild men,' as they are called in the technical language of German Parliamentarism, votes according to his individual taste, it is to-day the Conservative and to-morrow the Liberal interest which comes off victorious. In most instances the majority does not exceed half-a-dozen. Thus, the Liberal amendments authorising the Federal Parliament to ask for the presence of the members of the executive, and to appoint commissioners of inquiry, were rejected, while, as luck would have it, that body was allowed to put questions to Ministers, receive petitions, have its proceedings reported without peril to the press, and insist upon its re-assembly ninety days after dissolution. The most remarkable success the Liberals achieved was the granting of the customary salary to members. In vain Count Bismarck, who personally combated the amendments, conjured the House not to pass this one of all others. In vain did he state it to be the unanimous opinion of the

allied Governments, that the ballot and manhood suffrage system could be maintained only on condition of members being elected whose position made salary no object to them. In vain did he urge that he had devoted the best part of his life and sacrificed his health to the object of establishing those institutions, which they would be spoiling by the introduction of the objectionable clause. Some three or four gentlemen would not be controlled, and the amendment was passed. To describe his state of feeling at that moment, Count Bismarck referred his audience to the speech of Harry Hotspur in the beginning of *Henry IV.*:

> 'But I remember when the fight was done,
> When I was dry with rage and extreme toil, &c.'

The Count quoted only the two first lines in English, and there were probably but few in the House who remembered the context. But they have read it since.

By another resolution the Opposition enacted that existing railway companies shall have no right to prevent the construction of competing lines; a proviso of great consequence in a country where so many lines are owned by the Government.

This morning the Crown Prince of Saxony waited upon the King to report the re-formation of the Saxon army on the Prussian footing. His Royal Highness and the adjutants accompanying him on this occasion wore, for the first time, the Prussian uniform.

As appears from an article in the official *Weimar Gazette*, the duchies of Altenburg, Meiningen, Weimar, Anhalt, Lippe, Schaumburg-Lippe, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, and Reuss have concluded special military treaties with Prussia beyond those implied in the Federal charter. In accordance with these treaties, the armies of the above States are entirely handed over to this Government, who will maintain them upon the payment

by their sovereigns of 162 thalers per head in the first year. Each succeeding year an increase of 9 thalers per head is laid on, until the sum of 225 thalers, even now contributed by those Governments who wish to retain the direction of their military administrative departments, is reached.

LUXEMBURG AND THE POWERS.

Berlin, April 6, 1867.

Is the Luxemburg bubble about to burst? It almost seems so. All the Powers have contributed to allay the difficulty. Prussia inviting the Powers who took an active part in the arrangement of Luxemburg affairs in 1839 to give an opinion upon the annexation of that Duchy to France, Russia immediately responded to the call, and informed the King-Grand-Duke that, according to her interpretation of the treaties, the meditated transfer could not be effected without the concurrence of the *pouvoirs signataires.* England, also, seems to have cautioned the King of Holland against completing a design which may possibly bring on a European crisis. This, and the growing resolve of Prussia to assert her vested rights in the concern, so powerfully worked upon the wavering resolutions of the King-Grand-Duke as to make him abandon his mercantile intentions, at any rate for the present. Under the circumstances, it would have been difficult for him to adopt another resolve. Baffled in the pursuit of her venturesome enterprise, and too cautious to follow it up now that Prussia is assisted by the Czar, France herself confidentially advised the King-Grand-Duke to suspend negotiations for a while, and thereby cover her withdrawal from a bargain, which, after all, cannot be so easily arranged as she imagined it might be. Accordingly communications have

been made to this Government by both the French and Dutch Cabinets, which, intimating a relinquishment of the plan unless a suitable agreement can be effected, endeavour to slur over the whole affair, and represent it as a matter never of much consequence, and of none at all now. Their explanations have been received with a good grace. Will the matter be allowed to drop? Or is it to have some sequel or other before long? However that may be, the incident will not be forgotten in this capital. On the contrary, it is sure to exercise a marked influence upon the policy of this Government. The Prussians need not be the most suspicious of men to regard this Luxemburg bargain as the shadow of coming events. If Napoleon III. deem it conducive to the interests of his dynasty to satisfy the inordinate ambition of the French, the rebuff he sustained in the present affair will only render it the more indispensable for him to engage in some similar venture as soon as he can. If his rashness in publishing so anomalous a design, before making sure of its practicability, has defeated itself, he will be all the more wary the next time, and try to take his neighbours by surprise. Supposing this reasoning to be correct, for Prussia not to take up his challenge now is only to leave him time to arm and choose a more eligible opportunity. The alternative left to this country, therefore, is either to force him to assume the offensive at once, or to divert his action, and induce it to take some other direction. Both these opinions are represented in the Prussian Cabinet. The latter being likely to prevail over the former, we must henceforth expect Prussia to take a lively interest in general Continental politics. With breakers ahead, neighbouring coasts will have to be accurately surveyed and soundings taken in more than one direction. To prepare against every emergency, this Government have even now thought it expedient to raise 33,000,000 thalers out of the total of 63,000,000 thalers allowed them last session for military and other

purposes. As to the rumour of armaments rife in the German papers, it is premature. Except the provisioning of Mayence and Coblenz, no steps of the kind have been taken.

The motives which, after some hesitation, caused the Prussian Government to resist the covetous desires of their neighbours are of a twofold nature. On the one hand, the War Office represented to the King that to surrender Luxemburg would be to shut up the road to Paris through Belgium, and pave the way to the invasion of the Rhenish provinces. A highly interesting article upon the subject, containing the pith of the technical remonstrances offered, has just appeared in the semi-official *Nord-Deutsche Zeitung*. Objections of another description issued from the Foreign Office. Apart from opposing a neighbour apparently intent upon conquest, Prussian diplomatists could not conceal from themselves that to inaugurate unity by territorial loss would be to incur the indignation of the people, and encourage the minor sovereigns to evade the supremacy they have just acknowledged. In the present unsettled condition of Germany, the latter reason necessarily had its weight. If the perpetuation of Napoleonic rule in France be partly dependent upon foreign victories and the acquisition of somebody else's territory, the maintenance of Prussia's position in Germany is no less identified with the protection of the nation's soil and honour from foreign attack. Let Prussia submit to French exactions, and it is to be apprehended that popular discontent will enable those minor Sovereigns who have unwillingly recognised her right to the leadership to attempt a return to the old anarchical condition of the country. There is not a paper in Northern or Southern Germany but deprecates the idea of conceding an inch of German soil to the foreigner. The Bavarian journals are even more vehement in their protestations than the Prussian; and both unite in regarding the scheme as postponed rather than abandoned, and ac-

cordingly urge the Federal Executive to take precautionary measures.

The King of Belgium is expected here towards the end of the month, to be present at the marriage of his brother.* It is confidently hoped that, in the event of hostilities breaking out, Belgium, as well as Italy, will be found among the allies of this Government. Belgium, apprehensive that a victory of France would not conduce to the preservation of her integrity, has certainly no reason for wishing to bring it on; while as regards Italy, the publication of King Victor Emmanuel's flattering letter to Count Bismarck in a recent issue of the *Berlin Gazette* is here looked upon as an *avis au lecteur*, that is, the French *lecteur*.

FRANCE APPARENTLY RENOUNCES LUXEMBURG. GERMAN MILITARY ESTIMATES.

Berlin, April 7, 1867.

THE news of warlike intentions, and a commercial panic prevailing at Paris, is irreconcilable with the intimations conveyed to this capital by Holland and France two days ago. I am necessarily ignorant of the exact wording of the declarations made, and should not be surprised at finding them to be so framed as to admit of the revival of the Luxemburg scheme at no distant date; but their gist undoubtedly secures Prussia against the danger, which was imminent a short while since, that the business would be completed without her cognisance, and the only choice left her be either to surrender the important fortress at stake, or defend it against its new sovereign. Such being

* The Duke of Flanders was married to Princess Mary of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen on April 25, 1867.

the case, and the advantage of coming to an amicable arrangement with the executive power of Germany having been expressly admitted by the two merchant princes, the chief agitators in the bargain, the matter must be regarded as virtually postponed. The most plausible way, then, of accounting for the disquieting rumours afloat in Paris, is by assuming them to be designedly propagated to mask the temporary retreat of the French Government.

Intense satisfaction prevails in Luxemburg at the Duchy's narrow escape from the perils menacing her ancient independence. It is true, people are not quite at ease as to the future; but, having once felt the effect of German protection, they have now reasonable ground to hope that no farther attempt will be made to settle the matter in a stealthy and underhand way. This is something gained, at any rate. The country is not yet entirely free from French emissaries; a circumstance which ought to be kept in mind in estimating the trustworthiness of the Luxemburg news. The intelligence, telegraphic and otherwise, received from the promised land while the crisis was at its height, certainly deserved more credit for inventive genius than diplomatic truth. To cite one instance: it was blazoned forth that the four Prussian regiments in the fortress, being Nassauers, and highly dissatisfied with their recent change of sovereign, had broken out in revolt. But the whole garrison consists of two regiments only. One of these is from Nassau, and so loyal, that, far from allowing their fidelity to be tampered with —a crime which, in this military country, would have ruined every one of them—the men delivered up to their officers the mutinous pamphlets placed in their hands by the foreign promoters of annexation. I am sorry to say the most immediate upshot of it all is likely to be, that the Paris Exhibition will have a few thousand German visitors less than might have been anticipated. Some people are loath to spend money in a country from which such a pro-

vocation has just emanated; while others, and these the majority, think it more prudent to keep their savings against the rainy day, which is sure to occur before long, unless the principles of French international policy are amended.

Yesterday's parliamentary debates contain the decisive vote of the session. It was in favour of the Liberal cause. As has been mentioned in the course of this correspondence, Government demanded that the rate of military conscription, and the sum to be annually expended on the army, should be fixed once for all. This demand was opposed by the Opposition, on the ground that the desired strength of the army, amounting to 1 per cent of the population, and the cost of every soldier to 225 thalers a year, would impose an intolerable burden upon the people, if prolonged for an indefinite time. Another and equally cogent reason was, that the financial prerogative of the Federal Parliament, chiefly referring to army affairs, would be entirely abolished in favour of the Crown, were the permanency of military supplies enacted in the charter. In other words, the controversy did not affect the military budget alone, but on its issue depended the graver question whether the Federal Government to be established in Northern Germany was to be constitutional, as are the Governments of the individual States, or not. It has been decided in accordance with the spirit of the age, and the political convictions of the educated classes: 137 voices against 127 resolved that the military budget, as demanded by the executive, should be valid only till December 31, 1871, when the dangers incidental to the remodelling of Germany will have probably passed away, and the Government be obliged to seek annual military supplies from the Federal Parliament. Up to the very last the vote was opposed by the Minister of War, but being framed in a conciliatory spirit, and leaving the executive full play for five years to come, it will no

doubt be eventually sanctioned by the Prussian as well as the minor dynasties. By another vote, taken in the same sitting, liability to military service was, in accordance with the Goverment proposals, reduced from nineteen to twelve years. Of these, three years or less are allotted for service in the Line. The four succeeding years a man belongs to the Reserve, and the five next to the Landwehr, or second ban of the Reserve. The two latter bodies are, in peace, only called out for occasional drill. This reduction is the first tangible benefit the people derive from the reunion of the German armies under one head. But, as General Moltke told us in the debate preceding this remarkable enactment, that Prussia had 664,000 men under arms a fortnight after the battle of Königgrätz, it is natural that, with the increase she has since received from so many different sources, she can now afford to dispense with the services of those of riper years. In a serious war, she would moreover rely, now as formerly, upon all able-bodied men trained to the use of arms. The speech General Moltke delivered on this occasion was the maiden speech of the renowned leader, and excited no small interest both in and out of the House. It chiefly aimed at proving the necessity of the three years' service in the Line, instead of the two years which have long formed, and, indeed, form even now, the cherished ideal of the Liberal party.

'With a two years' service,' he said, 'one half the men in a battalion would be always recruits; a mode of organisation which was far from insuring that cohesive force without which no battles could be gained. In the last campaign the Austrians fought bravely enough, but having, from the financial embarrassments of their Government, been most of them only one year and a half under arms, did not possess that military feeling and address forming the characteristic of the Prussian troops. To keep the men three years under arms was certainly expensive; but to create an inefficient army was extravagance itself. The Prussian troops took 50,000 prisoners in the late campaign, themselves scarcely losing any men in this way. Of the 3,000 missing, few fell into the hands of the enemy; most were killed, but not found or not identified. If the

proportion of the officers to the rank and file in the Prussian army had been represented as very large, he must deny that this was the case. They had one officer to every fifty men; to reduce their number would be to convert the army into a mere host of armed men. The mettle of the officers might be divined from the fact, that while there was only one to every fifty rank and file, the army in 1866 lost one officer in every twenty killed.'

An interesting speech was made on the same occasion by General von Falkenstein, who, like General von Moltke, proved as well versed in the use of the tongue, the common and most natural weapon of mankind, as last summer he showed himself in the management of whole armies of needle-guns.

The clauses in the Constitution relative to the formation of a Federal navy were opposed by the Hamburg, but defended by the Bremen deputies. M. de Chapeaurouge, from the first-named city, held that German commerce having so long thriven without the protection of men-of-war, it would be merely squandering money to imitate the example of other nations, and build an expensive fleet. Herr Meyer, from Bremen, on the other hand, urged the necessity of spending within the next ten years 100,000,000 thalers in the construction of a navy. This he said would enable Germany to protect her commerce in every sea, and by making her a match on the ocean for Russia, Sweden, and Denmark together, render her alliance in a war between England and France a matter of the utmost consequence to either. Herr Meyer is a director of the Bremen Lloyds, and as such has created a commercial fleet equal in number, and superior in tonnage, to the Prussian navy. In all probability his advice will be followed by the Government, which even now spends nearly 9,000,000 thalers a year on its ships.

Another incident in the debate must not be passed over in silence. A member having observed that the acquisition of colonies alone would justify them in incurring the expense of a naval establishment, Herr Weber,

from the Hanover port of Stade, coolly suggested, that as the King of Holland had a mind to sell Luxemburg, he might perhaps resolve to bring the Netherlands also to the hammer, and, if obtaining his price, consign them to Germany. In that case the Confederacy would have colonies at their command all at once. This is the first time the idea of reclaiming Holland has been broached in a German Parliament. It was, however, regarded as a sarcasm, and elicited no reply.

It is hoped that the Federal charter will be duly completed and the session closed before Easter. Before this desirable issue can be brought about, the amendments introduced into the original draught must be approved by the various Governments; a procedure which will, perhaps, entail some difficulties. Those amendments not approved by the Governments, the House will be requested to reconsider before taking the final vote upon the Constitution as a whole.

By order of the King, numerous alterations suggested by the experience of the late campaign will be introduced into the equipment of the army. The most essential are the increase of the number of cartridges borne by each man from sixty to eighty-one, half of them to be carried in the knapsack; and a lightening of the weight of the helmet.

FRANCE PREFERS FRESH CLAIMS.

Berlin, April 10, 1867.

DESPITE the promising hopes we had a right to indulge in a few days ago, the Luxemburg question has since again assumed a disquieting aspect. Your readers will remember that, finding her intentions resisted by this Government, Holland, in an official communication to the English Cabinet, announced the contemplated sale to have been abandoned. Without Prussia's sanction, it was added, the matter was never intended to be settled. Simultaneously with this, a similar, and even more explicit, intimation from the same quarter reached this Cabinet. It was confirmed by a pacific, though not very definite message on the part of France. This Government therefore thought themselves justified in anticipating an, at least, temporary relinquishment of the scheme. But doubts have since been raised as to the actual fulfilment of their hopes. It appears that, relying upon the tranquillising representations of the French and Dutch Ministers, and being desirous to put an end to the unpleasant business, Prussia intimated a wish to discontinue the correspondence which, in a more critical state of the question, had been opened with the Powers. Most unexpectedly, this conciliatory step did not meet the views of the potent man now swaying the destinies of the French. Instead of consenting to the whole affair being buried in oblivion, he, on the contrary, suddenly changed his policy again, and apparently resuming his scarce-abandoned scheme, now demands that the Luxemburg Treaty of 1839 should be conjointly examined by the Powers.

There are but two ways of explaining this conduct. Either Louis Napoleon is anxious to yield, if to yield he has determined, not to Prussia alone, but to the united

Areopagus of Europe; or he purposes paving the way to a new claim. Though one naturally shrinks from ascribing venturesome resolutions to a man hitherto justly renowned for his calm and well-weighing judgment, yet people here are, on the whole, inclined to doubt the discretion of his present attitude. Apart from other misgivings to be presently alluded to, they are alarmed at noticing the discrepancy between the declarations of Holland made a week ago, and the latest utterances of France. While Holland, according to the testimony of Lord Stanley, even when meditating the sale of the Duchy, never meant to enter into any binding covenant, unless approved by Prussia, France, as M. de Moustier told the Corps Législatif, will be guided by her own view of 'the interests of the Powers.' It certainly does not look very propitious that the Emperor, after the bargain has been deliberately abandoned, and the right of Prussian interference virtually admitted by Holland, is not only intent upon following his 'idea' up all the same, but even ignores the title of this Government to see the matter from its own national and specific point of view. In the interests of peace, we must fain hope that Napoleon's resolve will be either as suddenly withdrawn as it has been taken, or that in expressing an opinion upon the above treaty, the Powers will discover a way out of the perplexity. Any proposal implying the evacuation of Luxemburg, even should it not be occupied at once by the French—and some such idea seems to be on the *tapis*—is more likely to meet with a negative than an affirmative.

Meanwhile the possible duellists deem matters to have proceeded far enough to look out for seconds. About a fortnight ago, France proposed to Austria an offensive alliance against this Government; a fact which endeavours have since been made to obscure under a cloud of rumours reporting the conclusion of an Austro-Prussian league. Napoleon at first did not seem inclined to precipitate the

negotiations thus opened. Now that another phase in his politics has supervened, he is getting impatient, and has summoned the Duc de Gramont to Paris to give personal information touching the course likely to be ultimately adopted by the Kaiser. Herr von Beust, it appears, will not prematurely enter into a league against Fatherland which would fill all German hearts with feelings of implacable hatred against the sovereign and monarchy he serves; and being equally disinclined to deter Napoleon from his contemplated enterprise by a refusal, he prefers temporising till the resolves of his would-be ally can be more accurately discerned. We have reason to believe that the military party at the Vienna Court are disposed to act in a less cautious and cunctatory manner. As to Prussia, she seeks to strengthen her relations with Russia, for the purpose, no doubt, of restraining the possible action of the Kaiser by a diversion on the part of the Czar.

What line of conduct the latter will adopt, no one knows. It deserves, however, to be noticed, that the aristocratic party, for the time being the most influential at the Court of St. Petersburg, has lately relaxed its opposition to war, and would as little object to a bout on the Lower Danube as the liberal and national sections of Russian politicians. Their mouthpiece, the *Vyest*, has altogether reversed its former opinions on the subject. The Russian country papers, too, designed less to produce an impression abroad than at home, have begun to preach war; and, as usual, the Christian subjects of Turkey reëcho the cry, and hope to break Austrian antagonism by their Russian protectors concluding a Prussian alliance. It is another noteworthy symptom, that the many and serious grievances of the Russinians in Galicia are being raked up again by the St. Petersburg press. The idea of the Austrian Government to make that Polo-Russinian province a surer possession by bringing it into political connection with Hungary, will be hardly calcu-

lated to cause the St. Petersburg Government to look with a more friendly eye upon their Imperial neighbour. Yet all these symptoms may be deceptive. Russia's foreign policy is directed by a very few men. They may allow the papers to vent their national antipathies, yet reserve to themselves the right of acting as they choose.

In all Germany, public opinion continues firm in regard to the claims of France. Without underrating the perils of war—considerable even if faced under the most favourable auspices—people unanimously assert the impossibility of yielding up an inch of German soil. Were Luxemburg inhabited by Frenchmen, as Limburg is by Dutch, there would be, I believe, as little objection to cede the one to Napoleon as there was to restore the other to Holland. Meetings have been held at Berlin, Stuttgart, and other cities, to recommend the Government to hold out, and rely upon the support of the nation; but, upon the whole, the tone of public opinion is too serious to be expressed in resolutions, and the determination of all too calm and secure to be vented in speeches. The educated classes are also too fully conversant with the condition of the Paris press to wish to fan the flames by remonstrance. They are silent, lest, by speaking out, they should give seeming cause for an increase of the furious declamations the Napoleonic papers have been ordered to indulge in against this country. They know, moreover, the susceptible vanity of the French, and will not offend it at a time when the unfortunate habit of revelling in *gloire*, so long fostered among their neighbours by the division of Germany, by her reunion is likely to come to a natural and permanent close. That this change may be consummated in a pacific way, is the prayer of this country; that, if necessary, it must be sealed by blood, its determination.

The members of the Bavarian Chamber are signing an address to their Government, insisting in the most uncompromising language upon the preservation of Luxem-

burg to Germany. It is probably noticed in France, that this address includes a vow to aid in faithfully carrying out the offensive and defensive treaty lately concluded between Bavaria and Prussia.

M. de Boigne, the chief of the French emissaries in Luxemburg, has been ostensibly given to understand by the authorities, that they cannot allow him to continue his underhand proceedings. The machinations of inferior agents have, however, not been interfered with. Does not this prove conclusively, that the Government of the Duchy are coöperating with their sovereign in the bargain he meant to conclude? All classes of the population are being canvassed by the Pietris of Napoleon III. The tobacco-manufacturers are promised indemnities in the event of the introduction of the tobacco monopoly, as existing in France; the leather-sellers are given to understand that profitable orders are in store for them the moment they change their nationality; while the country people are deluded by hopes of realising enormous prices for their pomological products at Paris, the luxurious and wealthy. It is also reported from the capital of our amiable neighbour, that all the Luxemburgers there are being hunted up by the police, and offered handsome salaries, if they will return home and represent to their countrymen what a blessing it is to be under the rule of a Bonaparte. To keep the French in ignorance of what the Germans think of these practices, the German papers are almost daily confiscated by the Imperial censors before finding their way out of the post-office.

The Constituent Parliament are in a hurry to finish the debate upon the Federal Constitution. Never German Representative Assembly worked with such dispatch; and never certainly did the general situation of the country more powerfully urge such expedition. Still, there is no wish on the Liberal side to sacrifice constitutional rights. In a recent sitting, the Government, which had

proposed a three years' budget, was defeated again, adherence to the ordinary annual period being resolved upon by the House. *5 o'clock* P.M.

The intrigues of the French emissaries in Luxemburg, and the leniency evinced by the civil authorities in tolerating these practices, continue to be the scandal of the German press. Numerous agents, it is stated, are travelling about and assure the people that the country has been sold, and will shortly be delivered over to the new owner, notwithstanding all official statements to the contrary. These agents pretend to be so fully initiated into the intentions of the French Government as to mention the towns which are to receive garrisons, and the regiments to be quartered upon them. Anti-Prussian proclamations are posted up at night, sentinels insulted, and patrols pelted with stones. Nothing would be easier than to put a stop to this irritating agitation, had the Grand Ducal Government a mind to do so; but, instead of expelling the strangers, whose vile activity may occasion a serious affray, that Government behaves in a manner calculated to bear out the suspicion that, while disowning the idea of a sale, it is playing into the hands of France all the same. A few days ago a petition to the Grand Duke, praying for annexation to France, and purporting to have been signed by a number of Luxemburgers, appeared in the Paris *Patrie*. Though this petition (the *Luxemburg Courier* relates) was utterly unknown in Luxemburg, yet, as to have left it unanswered might have been construed into assent, a committee was formed to circulate a counter-petition and dispatch it to the King-Grand-Duke. While this latter document was being signed, an official telegram was addressed to the Luxemburg Government from the Hague, which ran as follows:

'Represent to the people of Luxemburg that there is no occasion to present petitions. Things are going on favourably.'

This would seem to need no comment.

LUXEMBURG AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL TREATIES.

Berlin, April 11, 1867.

THE Luxemburg question is getting critical. Holland having relinquished the idea of ceding the Duchy, Prussia does not see the advantage of conforming to the expressed desire of France and entering into farther negotiations upon the subject. If the Federal Governments *and* Parliament will support her action, she is apparently resolved to hasten on a conclusion.

As to the Federal Governments, they will be no doubt guided by the advice of the Berlin Cabinet. The question at issue affecting the integrity of the German soil, they cannot in the present aspect of affairs refuse to stand by the only Power competent to vindicate the rights of the nation. In regard to the Federal Parliament, however, a peculiar difficulty has supervened. As we are informed by to-day's official *Provinzial Correspondenz*, the most important of the many constitutional amendments introduced by Liberal members and passed by the House will not be sanctioned by the Crown. Unless, therefore, the House retract its former votes, and, submitting to ministerial dictates, enact the constitution as proposed by Government, there will be no Constitution at all: a pleasant look-out, when the country is possibly on the eve of a war! It ought to be remembered that the treaties providing for the establishment of the Northern Confederacy expire in the course of July, and that the Constitution, the subject of the present controversy, has been devised with a view to replace them prior to that date. In offering the Liberals the alternative of having his Constitution or none at all, Count Bismarck probably anticipates that, in the present state of international relations, they will put up with any domestic arangements rather than run the risk of engaging in a war with the Federal

ties expiring in a few months. Among the Liberals, on the other hand, a conviction prevails that, with or without treaty-obligations, the Federal Governments will be compelled to support and acknowledge the supremacy of Prussia in this emergency. In their opinion, this is the more likely, as the most important among the minor dynasties, such as Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, Saxony, Darmstadt, and others are bound by special military treaties to fight under Prussian command, irrespective of the fate of the Federal Constitution. The smaller potentates, it is thought, will have no choice but to do the same or abdicate.

Such being the views entertained by the Liberals, and the amendments having been expressly voted to secure to the Federal Parliament the right of the purse as hitherto owned by the Prussian Representative Assembly, it is probable that many among the Opposition will not be shaken by the strong pressure now put upon them. However, as the Liberals have only a very small majority in the House, the issue of the decisive vote, to be taken on the third reading of the charter next week, cannot be foreseen with certainty. As little can it be predicted what influence a defeat will have upon the treatment of the Luxemburg affair by Count Bismarck. Whatever he might personally be inclined to do, the Premier's conduct is necessarily affected by the resolutions of the King, the Court, and the War Office.

'Hapsburg on Sale,' is the heading of an advertisement in the Berlin papers, which runs as follows:

'Hapsburg, on the Lake of the Four Cantons, with the ruins of the ancient castle, is to be sold very cheap. Excellent site for a mansion, both in summer and winter. Picturesque neighbourhood. Apply to Herr Franz Beck, Beckenhof, Sursee, Switzerland.'

This is the identical castle owned in days of yore by the ancestors of the Emperor Francis Joseph.

FRANCE DENIES THE RIGHT OF PRUSSIA TO GARRISON LUXEMBURG. AUSTRIA'S INTEREST IN THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE. NAPOLEON AND SPAIN.

Berlin, April 13, 1867.

CARRYING out their latest resolve to proceed with the matter in hand notwithstanding the announced withdrawal of the Dutch propositions, the French Government have now addressed the Powers on the subject of Luxemburg. Their communication neither insists upon the surrender of the disputed territory, nor does it waive the claim originally preferred; but while leaving this, the most important side of the question, in the twilight of an ambiguous reserve, it aims at demonstrating that Prussia is wrong in keeping the fortress occupied after the dissolution of the old Bund. In reply to this charge Prussia is endeavouring to prove to the leading Courts that her right to garrison the place under the treaties of 1815 and 1839 is independent of the discontinuance of the old confederacy, and even of the accession in Luxemburg of any new dynasty whatsoever.

The delicate nature of the affair, and the wish of the two Cabinets immediately concerned not to commit themselves to any definite opinions, may be gathered from the fact that the mode of communication chosen in this introductory stage of the business is the one least calculated to incur responsibility. Since the first appearance of the hitch the diplomatic controversy has been carried on through the medium of oral messages imparted by ministers and envoys. The French Cabinet telegraph to their ambassador here, who pays a visit to Count Bismarck, and in friendly converse tells him what his august Sovereign happens to think of the business at the moment. In like manner are the Prussian views conveyed to Napoleon

and the other Courts, who, imitating the example are equally chary in the use of pen and ink. This kind of correspondence allowing a considerable latitude, enables the illustrious negotiators to modify intentions according to the varying circumstances of the hour. Whether this be an advantage or not, it has within the last few days been profited by pretty largely by the Emperor Napoleon. For the chronicler of current events, this particular fashion of carrying on an important transaction is attended with specific difficulties. Not only are the telegrams swift, and one despatch may be succeeded by another before the first has had time to transpire; but the meaning of the several communications not being very precise, may be easily altered when passing from mouth to mouth.

Of the attitude assumed by the various Powers towards the litigants, suffice it to say that Russia seems to be favourably disposed to this Government; while an impartial, and it is here thought a somewhat suspicious, neutrality is affected by Austria. The official papers of the Russian Government, after oscillating between opposite poles for a fortnight, have ultimately adopted the side of Prussia. To quote one by way of sample, the *Invalide* —the mouthpiece of the St. Petersburg War-office—expresses itself to the following effect:

'Should the Luxemburg question really bring on war, we shall be justified in asserting that never did so insignificant a subject kindle so great a stir. The present conduct of the French Government contradicts all it has formerly said and done. But a short time ago, M. Rouher affirmed that the reorganisation of Germany was not only not dangerous to France, but, on the contrary, advantageous to her. Why, then, does she covet Luxemburg now? But even should Napoleon III. have changed his opinions, and eventually convinced himself that Prussia has become an inconvenient neighbour, how is it possible for him to expect that the acquisition of Luxemburg will protect him from any peril threatening him from that quarter. As the matter now stands, France has not the slightest shadow of right on her side. Luxemburg, it is true, does not belong to the new German Confederacy, but it is German none the less. Again, although the former Federal institutions have been

abrogated, the treaties authorising Prussia to garrison the fortress are as valid as ever, &c.'

Before dismissing Russia, I may add that General Budberg, a confidential aide-de-camp of the Czar, has just arrived here and been received by the King. The Polish fortresses are at this moment being armed with rifled artillery. Of Russia's two neighbours, Prussia is certainly not the one which could be reasonably suspected of harbouring hostile designs just now.

Of Austria's intentions it is difficult to form an exact estimate. She has given this Government to understand that the treaties upon which the European polity was mainly based having been successively abrogated, she cannot be expected to judge the Luxemburg case by the light of what may have been enacted in 1815 and 1839. However sensible this may appear from an abstract point of view, it is, under actual circumstances, none the less calculated to entangle matters. When, perhaps, there may be no other way of preserving peace than by securing the relinquishment of the French pretensions, it can be hardly conducive to the attainment of this desirable end to question the validity of those compacts, the recognition of which on all sides would be the most fitting introduction to such a step. Yet of all the States existing on this ancient, but nowadays rather unstable continent, there is none that has a more vital interest in the preservation of peace than Austria. Whatever the issue of the war, it is likely to affect her detrimentally. If Prussia be victorious, the North German Confederacy will be superseded by one including all the States from Jutland to the Swiss frontier. Germany will be formed into a great empire, powerful in itself, and doubly so by the genial breath of freedom quickening the dormant energies of the race. In a united Germany constitutionalism will either have to be abolished —a monstrous idea—or lead to the reforms required to secure a higher degree of personal liberty for the subject.

If the Northerners, naturally clinging to Prussia for support, as they do, are even now in a fair way of exacting many valuable concessions, the Southerners, who are more passionate, and fancy they are less dependent on this Government, will not long submit to Berlin supremacy, before claiming a new grant of liberty in return. A large proportion of the Southern Conservatives are, moreover, Ultramontanes, who will not always vote with the Prussian Protestant Conservatives; while the Prussian Liberals may in a united Parliament always count upon the votes of their political friends from the other side of the Main. It might take some time to make the two halves of the country work together and to enable them to adapt the Federal Constitution to their wants; but no one that has acquainted himself with the progress of the country during the last twenty years can entertain a doubt as to the ultimate result.

With such a Germany flourishing by her side, Austria might have some difficulty in repressing the leanings already manifested by her German subjects towards the mother country. Does she overlook the signs of the times? In Bohemia the spread of the Irvingite doctrine was the other day officially prohibited on the ground 'that its devotees were agitating in favour of Prussia.' In the same country a respectable club has been denounced to the authorities for singing Prussian war-songs. Nay, at Vienna, in the very centre of the empire, the students are voting ardent addresses to their German comilitons, exhorting them in the name of their 'common country' to defend Luxemburg against the foreigner. On the other hand, if France defeat Germany and reorganise the conquered land according to her own ambitious designs, a succession of wars must necessarily ensue. In the present vigour of the national self-respect, it is inconceivable that the Germans would put up with another Rhein-Bund, and recognise princes themselves tools of a foreign dictator. Rebellion and war would be the

sanguinary harvest of the seed sown. Is Austria strong enough to look with equanimity upon the possible approach of a revolutionary period in a country contiguous to herself? Or would it not be better policy to try and quench the first erratic sparks of the menacing conflagration? Would it not be expedient actively to contribute to the maintenance of peace, and gain time for the internal consolidation of the empire, in order that its cohesion may not be imperilled by the reunion of Germany, if completed at some future period? Of course there is also the alternative of Austria allying herself to France, and the two attempting to beat down Prussia, and demolish her so utterly between them as to do away with the likelihood of her rising again. But the attempt would be hazardous. Prussia might be a match for both, and in the scuffle enable Hungary to win a more secure independence than the one which, judging from precedent, is at present only granted her *pro tem.* Russia, moreover, would probably not suffer Austria to acquire a predominance in this part of the world prejudicial to herself in the East. Revenge is sweet, and, if it can be safely taken, only too natural; but to run the risk of injuring oneself while retaliating is to court the chance of incurring a yet more signal fall.

To add a word upon States not immediately implicated. The formation of a Rattazzi Cabinet in Italy is not regarded as particularly disquieting here. Rattazzi may be favourable to a French alliance, but the Italians are not. They have nothing to gain by joining the enemies of Germany. Needing clerical assistance at home, Napoleon will never hand over the Pope to Italy, while he is strong enough to protect him; and should he cease to be so, the Italians will be at liberty to occupy the capital without paying for it by succouring him in his wars.

As regards Spain, the following curious intelligence is communicated by a Paris correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette*, ordinarily well informed:

'A strange rumour has been lately afloat in diplomatic circles, which I should not touch upon unless it had been confirmed by a person likely to know. The envoy of Queen Isabella at Berlin, it is asserted, recently offered the assistance of his Sovereign in a war against France. The proposal is believed to have been made by order of the Queen, and without the cognisance of the Spanish Ministers. Napoleon III.—and this part of my story I can vouch for—no sooner heard of it than he summoned M. Man, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, to his presence, and inquired into the truth of the statement. M. Man had to avow his entire ignorance. The Emperor then had an interview with M. Olozaga, the fugitive Progressist chief, who admitted the possibility of such a step having been taken by the Queen. The Spanish gentleman to whom I am indebted for this news, himself asked Marshal O'Donnell what he thought of the matter. The Marshal replied, "I do not know what the Queen may have done, but what I know is, that the Emperor believes it."'

So much for the international relations affecting the question of the day. In Germany the minor Cabinets are, upon the whole, inclined to support the resolute policy which is gradually getting the upper hand in the councils of this Government. The assertion made, that, whoever the Sovereign of Luxemburg, the treaties would oblige him to suffer the presence in his capital of a Prussian force, is a symptom that no long-winded negotiations are intended. The King is said to be not a little angry at a foreign Power, in the midst of peace, asking him to evacuate a fortress not its own. The Government, suspecting the ulterior designs of Napoleon III., are considering whether it would not be the safest and most dignified plan to cause him to definitively abandon his claims, or else to leave him no time for enforcing them; while the people, indignant at the foreigner aspiring to a slice of German soil, and unwilling to endure for any length of time the stoppage of business consequent upon the menacing attitude of France, much as they are averse from war, prefer immediate decision to diplomatic bargaining and a prolonged state of uncertainty. In all Germany there is not a paper but deprecates the horrid idea of bloodshed in a war with a civilised nation; but

there are few that do not advise the Government to submit the quarrel to the issue of the sword rather than yield.

Another indication that this Government are no longer very confident on the score of peace became apparent in the last sitting of the Federal Parliament. Upon the House entering on the discussion of that clause in the Federal charter which limits the Confederacy to the Northern States, a Liberal member introduced an amendment to the effect that the Southern States as a whole, or any of them individually, should be admitted if asking for it. This amendment, notwithstanding the threats repeatedly uttered by France against a reunion of all Germany, was approved by the majority, and, which is more remarkable, scarcely resisted by Count Bismarck. The latter merely said, he hoped Austria, who reads the Prague treaty in a sense unfavourable to reunion, would offer no serious impediment to the amendment being acted upon.

Though the King-Grand-Duke repudiates all mercantile intentions now, the Luxemburg semi-official *Union*, in its issue of the 9th or 10th inst., coolly observes that 'there would be no difficulty about obtaining a favourable verdict, by means of universal suffrage, as demanded by France, in the event of a cession.' As the direction of the wind may be known by a straw, can we blame the Prussians for supposing these little incidents to show the real bent of the Paris and Amsterdam minds?

Her Royal Highness the Crown Princess has opened a fancy fair in her palace, in aid of a charity for the support of invalided soldiers. During the six days of admittance it has been numerously visited, and would seem to have realised a very large sum. Among the gifts received for sale was a selection of costly and useful articles contributed by Queen Victoria. The Princess Royal, besides an infinity of other presents, gave some

remarkable paintings by her own hand. During the sale, M. Aristarchi, the Turkish Ambassador, in the true oriental style of gallantry, took a bouquet from one of the stalls and laid down a 1,000 thaler note. A good many halfpenny biscuits were bought at about 1*l.* 10*s.* a-piece.

LUXEMBURG AND AUSTRIA. NAPOLEON HELPS THE ENACTMENT OF THE NORTH GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

Berlin, April 17, 1867.

THE Luxemburg negotiations have entered a rather obscure phase. What is doing now is the secret of the respective Cabinets. Excepting the fact that the exchange of opinion in progress between the various Courts is mainly carried on by word of mouth, nothing reliable is allowed to transpire. Rumours pretending to foreshadow the probable mode of solution must therefore be received with reserve. The news more especially which reaches us from France, that some settlement will be effected involving the evacuation of the fortress by its present garrison, cannot be correct, unless indeed a sudden change has supervened in the resolutions of this Government. It is not many days since that a circular missive was dispatched to the Prussian Ministers abroad maintaining that Luxemburg had been intrusted to the permanent guardianship of this Government, to serve for the protection of both Germany and Belgium. Neither does the attitude of Prussia's German allies betray a visible inclination to back out of the matter. Prince Hohenlohe, the Bavarian Premier, unmoved by the assiduous endeavours of France to make him abandon his solemn

engagements to this country, in reply to a parliamentary address, protests his determination to aid in the defence of Luxemburg. Baden too, in the official *Carlsruhe Gazette*, announces the like resolve, intimating, at the same time, that 'the Cabinets of Germany will be guided on this occasion not by existing treaties alone, but also by the good right of the nation to the whole of the nation's soil.'

Similar views have been expressed at a dozen meetings recently held in the South. In Northern Germany popular demonstrations have been as yet limited to three cities and one class of the population—working men. The other day the committee of the Berlin Engine-Builders Society voted an address to the French labouring classes, which considers war a matter of course, unless the Napoleonic pretensions are withdrawn, yet sensibly reminds their foreign friends that the industrial section of society has least interest in ministering to dynastic whims. A like appeal, grounded upon a true appreciation of the exigencies of culture, is circulating among the students of various Universities. As to the middle classes, they refrain from everything likely to wound the quick susceptibilities of the French, but are the none less determined to repel unjustifiable demands preferred by their Government. They applauded in yesterday's performance at his Majesty's Theatre a sentiment uttered in the course of the piece, that 'not war, but liberty, industry, and culture constitute the force of nations;' but they are a little dissatisfied with the seeming indifference with which the rapid progress of the French military preparations is viewed by the home authorities.

Business is very slack, and the total of losses at the Exchange already amounts to a large sum. This and the indignation experienced at the territorial claims of Napoleon III. are beginning to engender an impatient spirit, which, unless the point is speedily solved, bodes no good.

'We will not wait for that man's decision,' you hear people say. 'We cannot afford to be beggared before going to war. If he has a hankering after German soil, let him come forward at once, or let us force him to do so. Anything is better than the probability that there will be war three months hence.' But the Prussian Government know the efficiency of their military organisation too well to be in a hurry. Apart from some preliminary steps in the subsidiary branches of the service, armaments are as yet confined to the navy, hostile landings being anticipated in the event of war in the North Sea and Baltic. As a necessary complement of existing arrangements, twenty-two new Landwehr battalions are forming in the new provinces out of veteran soldiers—a class which will be far from exhausted by this moderate drain upon its numbers. Should the French continue to call in the men on furlough, similar steps will follow here before long.

As to the intentions of neighbouring Governments, a painfully interesting piece of intelligence has reached me about Austria. When declining to give an immediate reply to the proposal of a French alliance, Baron Beust thus vindicated his conduct against the impetuous yearnings of the military party at the Vienna Court. He urged:

'To attack or even molest Prussia while she was fighting France would be to run the risk of incurring a like treatment at the hands of the Czar. No doubt, there are circumstances conceivable in which to brave this danger might become advisable, or even necessary; but if the interests of Austria could be served without standing the chance of a Russian campaign, this would be infinitely preferable. An opportunity for making the attempt will present itself upon or soon after the actual outbreak of a French-Prussian war. Let Austria then offer to take the Prussian side on condition of the renewal of her former political connection, if not with the whole, at least with Southern Germany, and it is probable that her terms will be accepted at Berlin. Should this, contrary to all reasonable expectations, not be the case, there will always be time to turn round and embrace the opposite cause.' *Sapienti sat.*

I have stated in a previous letter, that for the present

the weight of these representations has been recognised by the Emperor, and an evasive reply given to the overtures of both Prussia and France. The hope expressed by Count Bismarck in a recent sitting of the Federal Parliament, that Austria will not object to the Prague treaty of peace being set aside, and a constitutional reunion of the North and South accomplished, is deliberately discouraged in the letters of Austrian semi-official correspondents.

The Spanish Envoy here has authorised the editor of the *Kreuz Zeitung* to contradict the rumour current at Paris that he offered to this Government the assistance of his sovereign against France.

The Swiss papers, headed by the semi-official *Bund*, all look upon the Luxemburg affair with German eyes. 'France,' ejaculates the *Bund* bluntly, 'wishes for a slice of German soil, by way of reward for having on another occasion been too late to interfere with the reunion of Germany.' Switzerland is too near the borders of France to have any liking for the compensation principle.

Notwithstanding the wish of the King-Grand-Duke of Luxemburg not to be troubled with anti-annexation petitions, another document of the kind is circulating in the Duchy. Its text, vowing eternal fidelity to the 'illustrious House of Orange,' if the said House will only be condescending enough not to sell them, appears in the German press. It was covered with thousands of signatures in a few days, and will be shortly dispatched to the Hague. In the village churches services are being held to implore the Giver of all Good to direct the councils of the *Landesvater*, so willing to part with his children. That he has given up the idea of trafficking in land and men, is no longer believed by any one. The conduct of his administrative officers would be enough to dispel that illusion. The establishment, too, at Luxemburg of a journal called *Das Land*, which advocates annexation, is re-

garded as a sure token that the scheme is being followed up, notwithstanding all denials. If the assertions of the German press can be credited, *Das Land*, though written in the German language, is supported by French money, and, albeit published at Luxemburg, edited in a ministerial office in Paris. Its leaders are regularly reprinted by the French press, to convince the subjects of Napoleon that the Luxemburgers have no more ardent wish than to share their happy lot.

5 o'clock.

Fortunately for the consolidation of German affairs, pending parliamentary differences have been settled in a satisfactory manner. For this auspicious result the country is mainly indebted to the Emperor Napoleon menacing war. With a thunderstorm gathering in the west, the Crown as well as the Federal Parliament could not but acknowledge the imperative necessity of restoring harmony between the constituted authorities of the State. Accordingly, in the eleventh hour, each yielded on some of the points so long and so obstinately disputed. The day before yesterday Count Bismarck informed the House that of the thirty-six amendments introduced into the draft of the Federal Charter by the Liberal majority, thirty-four would be sanctioned by the allied Governments and the royal head of the Confederacy. Among these is included a variety of important provisions, vesting the most indispensable constitutional rights in the Federal Assembly, and declaring the Chancellor of the Confederacy responsible to the Legislative body. On two points, however, Count Bismarck was inexorable. He would not allow salaries to the members of the Federal Parliament, and he did not think his duty permitted him to recommend to the Crown the sanction of that clause by which, from January 1, 1872, the peace-footing of the army will be dependent upon parliamentary votes. The House at once entered upon a reconsideration of the objectionable amend-

ments, and, after a brief debate, abolished the salary usually paid in this country for legislative work. During the debate a speaker, in a brilliant harangue, requested Count Bismarck to resign if unable to conform to the national ideas of liberty. The Count retorted that he was incapacitated by illness from answering the eloquent speech they had heard, but that he would certainly take the advice of the honourable member and quit office, if in this matter, of all others, the House decided against him. Notwithstanding this deliberate threat, a good many members voted for salaries. The Opposition commanded more than a third of the votes given.

Military affairs brought on an even more critical dispute. The sitting had to be closed without any result, and a conference subsequently held between Count Bismarck and the leaders of the moderate Liberal party was equally futile. Thus matters stood when, at the opening of yesterday's sitting, the moderate Conservatives, finding the Liberals firm, made a virtue of necessity, and combined with them for the introduction of a new amendment. While leaving to the Federal Parliament the determination of the peace footing after January 1, 1872, this amendment enjoins the individual Governments to continue to pay over to the Federal Executive the annual amount for military purposes fixed in the charter until another sum shall have been enacted by law. Count Bismarck opposed the amendment. It would, he thought, place the Federal Executive in exactly the same relation to the Federal Parliament in which the Prussian Government had so long, and so very much to the disadvantage of the country, stood to the Prussian Parliament. It would leave the Executive in the enjoyment of continuous military supplies, but after a certain date render the application of the money dependent upon the votes of the House. This was the very arrangement which, a few years ago, had given rise to so much controversy in this monarchy. But the House

would not be influenced by the Minister's arguments, and, on the division taking place, passed the amendment by a majority of 202 to 80. The whole Constitution having then been approved by 230 against 53, Count Bismarck said that he would take the orders of the King, and confer with the plenipotentiaries of the allied Governments upon the votes of the day.

In to-day's sitting he communicated the result of his deliberations with the King and plenipotentiaries. They had yielded, and sanctioned the Constitution in the shape given it by Parliament. Loud applause saluted the welcome message. It was a pregnant one indeed. The financial prerogative in matters military, so long vested in the Prussian Parliament, and which it had been the intention of the Government to abolish altogether on the occasion of its necessary transfer to the Federal Assembly, had been preserved intact, and handed over inviolate to the new Legislative body for all Northern Germany. The Liberals, it is true, had failed to accomplish their old design of extending constitutional rights, while unifying the nation; but, however strong the Government had become after the victories of the Seven Days' War, it had yet been unable to make unification an instrument for the diminution of the popular liberties. Both Government and Liberals had been obliged to put off the struggle for prerogative. Napoleon, unearthing his tomahawk, had forced the contending parties to renounce their favourite crotchets, relax the fists already doubled, and shake hands with open palm. Accordingly the question of parliamentary influence remains in Germany exactly where it stood before the war, and the Liberals, among other favourable openings, must look to the complete reunion of the South with the North for advancing the cause they serve. Such were the thoughts passing through the members' minds when listening to the gratifying words of the Premier.

Two hours later, in the true business style character-

istic of the present Administration, the session of the first or Constitutive Federal Parliament, was closed in the White Hall of the Schloss. In the royal speech the King in simple language congratulates Germany on the recovery of her national strength, which he says will henceforth enable her to maintain peace, defend her rights, and assert her dignity. However brief, this is a complete summary of the address. The ceremony was of the most unpretending kind. To-morrow the members will leave, to be shortly replaced by the Prussian Parliament, convened to ratify the Federal Charter. After the concessions made at the last moment by the Government, there is little doubt that the requisite ratification will be accorded by all the State Parliaments.

A LUXEMBURG WAR IMMINENT.

Berlin, April 20, 1867.

UNFORTUNATELY, I am not in a position to confirm the pacific rumours steadily circulated by the Paris press. Few and indefinite as are the particulars known concerning the present state of negotiations, it is yet positive that France has neither abandoned her novel claim, nor has Prussia declared her readiness to accept a solution involving the evacuation of the fortress. But it is evident that one of these two alternatives must be adopted before peace can be assured. Knowing the horizon to be still very cloudy, Prussian diplomatists are led to apprehend that, in representing the maintenance of peace as extremely probable, the French-inspired newspapers are actuated by a wish to charge Prussia with the guilt of a rupture, should one occur. Though no regular military preparations have, to my knowledge, been ordered as yet in this country, the fact of extensive armaments going on

in France is openly stated, and severely criticised by the semi-official papers of Berlin. The *Nord-Deutsche Zeitung* says that all the French fortresses on the Moselle and Maas are being rapidly placed in a state of defence; the *Kreuz Zeitung* affirms that France is making ready for war on a formidable scale; while the minor papers in connection with the Government are still less reserved in warning their readers against the rainy day possibly impending. That the Prussian Government are aware of the nearness of danger may be gathered from an official announcement in the *Hanover Gazette*, informing the employees of a Government railway in the new province that none of them will be called out in the event of a mobilisation.

To show how the untoward complication is viewed by the public, I will quote a few lines from to-night's *Kreuz Zeitung*, the spokesman, in the present instance, not only of the Conservative, but also the Liberal party:

'We are charged by the French with trespassing upon the rights and insulting the dignity of their country. What rights? The right, perhaps, to offend against the rights of others? What dignity? The dignity, perhaps, surrounding the majestic and infallible dictator of Europe? The dignity of a constituted arbiter of nations, accustomed to close his decisions with the terrible formula, *Roma locuta est*. Away with this silly bombast! Though we do not saddle it upon the French as a nation, but only upon its press, stimulated by a thousand jealousies and party interests, it would yet be better to treat the matter soberly and quietly. However unfavourably the French Government may think of our right to garrison Luxemburg, there is no denying that it is greater than any France can lay claim to. As to our dignity, we are not in the habit of dilating upon that point quite as often as our neighbours; but we fancy that if the heir of the great Napoleon cannot afford to jeopardise the dignity of France, he ought also not to shut his eyes to the fact that the grandson of Frederick the Great will remember the honour of his country. We therefore earnestly request our neighbours to look upon the matter somewhat more calmly. The ridiculous boasts of MM. Girardin and Co. have no power to move us, nor do they, in our opinion, contribute to the authority of the country these people pretend to serve.'

The weak point in this argument is, in the Liberal

papers, strengthened by the assertion that, independent of treaty stipulations, Prussia must keep her hold of Luxemburg, to prevent its being ceded to the foreigner. The same view is rife among the public generally. It is the provoking idea of one foreign and one semi-foreign Sovereign combining to estrange a territory so long embodied with the nation's soil, which renders them unanimous upon the subject. If there are any taking a cooler view of the case, and contending that Luxemburg is scarcely worth all this commotion, they are silenced by the retort, that to gratify the ambition of our neighbours in a single instance would be only giving an edge to their inordinate appetite. Right or wrong, the whole entanglement is here attributed to the domestic difficulties of the Emperor Napoleon, coupled with the issue of the Mexican affair. It is on account of these sentiments strongly imbuing the public mind, that the Prussian Government, though in a position to adopt any policy it pleases, will probably not consent to change its intents and purposes.

A few days ago Count Tauffkirchen, of the Bavarian Foreign-office, passed through this city *en route* for Vienna. He had come to urge the advantage of a German-Austrian alliance in this serious emergency, and, having received an affirmative answer, left for Vienna to complete his mission. But his eloquence will scarcely succeed in shaking the resolves of the Imperial Cabinet. Austria is bent upon neutrality in the present stage of the matter. The only price, at which she will sell her assistance, is readmission to Germany.

THE LUXEMBURG COMPROMISE.

Berlin, April 27, 1867.

THE Vienna telegrams were inaccurate when representing France as having, of her own free will, modified the terms of the compromise proposed by Austria. Upon Austria suggesting that Luxemburg should be disposed of by annexation to Belgium, and France in her turn receive a morsel of the latter's territory, Napoleon made no reply at all. It was only when the King of the Belgians, during his recent visits to Paris and Berlin, deprecated the idea of being mixed up with the dangerous business, that Louis Napoleon disowned, or rather amended, the Austrian project. As the King refused to cede Marienburg to France, and accept the doubtful advantage of receiving Luxemburg from Holland, little else, in the present introductory stage of the proceedings, remained for the potent Sovereign on the Seine but to take the hint, and reject the scheme in the form submitted by his Vienna friends. Accordingly, he gave some of the Courts concerned to understand, that if the King of the Belgians could resolve to take Luxemburg unto himself, he, Louis Napoleon, might be satisfied with this arrangement, even though he had to go without any compensation. The rejection of this proposal being implied in the first refusal of the King, it, as a matter of course, produced no result. The controversy then reverted to the original point at issue—the question as to who is to own, and who is to garrison, Luxemburg. As the wish to purchase the Duchy could not, after the declaration made by its Sovereign, be avowed afresh by Napoleon, the right of Prussia to garrison it was more vigorously than ever made the point of attack.

Thus affairs stood when Count Bismarck, the day be-

fore yesterday, returned from the country. Since then a sudden change has supervened. Unexpectedly, it must be owned, Count Bismarck, in the last *pourparlers* upon the subject, no longer absolutely negatived the possibility of Prussia's evacuating the fortress. If, he intimated, it were arranged that the Duchy should be neutralised, as England wishes, and its independence placed under an effective guarantee of the Powers, as Russia counselled in reply to the application of the contending parties, this Government would not object to removing the bone of contention by abandoning the coveted forts, if not immediately, at least after a short time. In the interval, other forts are, I believe, to be constructed on the neighbouring Prussian frontier. Whether this change of opinion is the harbinger of peace, or the last deceptive flicker of the popular hopes, remains to be seen. For the present, the duty devolves upon France of receiving the Prussian overtures in a conciliatory spirit likely to facilitate the settlement of details. Under the Prussian proposal, France will not only have to renounce, in a binding and definitive way, the idea of owning Luxemburg now or in future, but also to acquiesce in a European barrier being erected to guard against the contingency of her renewing the bargain she was about to complete a few weeks ago. Lord Loftus, by his representations to the King, actively contributed to bring about the present pacific turn of affairs.

Meanwhile, Prussia does not seem to be losing time. Agreements have been concluded with the States of Southern Germany, stipulating the number of troops to be placed under Prussian command in the event of war. It will not be a very imposing array, the Bavarian and Würtemberg armies having scarcely entered upon that reorganisation, the necessity of which was so clearly demonstrated in last year's campaign. Bavaria, who met the wishes of this Cabinet in a brotherly and cordial way, at the same time had to avow her inability to supply more

than 25,000 men at a moment's notice. The rest of her available force will be employed for the protection of Ulm. In Würtemberg the Prussian demand to concert the most indispensable arrangements for the contest led to a ministerial crisis. Herr von Neurath, one of the Ministers, actually advised the King to set aside the offensive and defensive treaty concluded with this Government nine months ago. Herr von Varnbüter, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, insisted upon the treaty being carried out, and after some hesitation on the part of the King and the Queen, ultimately succeeded in the necessary preparations being ordered. Herr von Neurath had to resign. Should Würtemberg be called upon to take up arms during the next two months or so, she will scarcely send above 15,000 men to the German army. Twice as many being contributed by Baden and Darmstadt, the total Prussia may immediately count upon from her Southern allies may be reckoned at 60,000. It is, however, expected that 100,000 more men will be gradually supplied by the South, should hostilities be of any long duration.

Prussian politicians profess to be but little disquieted regarding the possible attitude of Denmark, Sweden, Italy, and Holland. 'Should the two former,' it is argued, 'be rash enough to attack us in the rear, the worst that can befall is the relinquishment of part, or perhaps the whole of Schleswig. Still, whether this province will ultimately change hands will not be decided by a skirmish in the North, but be dependent on the issue of the pitched battles to be fought in Lorraine, and, may be, Rhineland. Should we be beaten there by the French, we may have to cede Schleswig, even though not reconquered by the Danes; in the opposite event, Denmark would rue the day she again made an enemy of us.' In reply to a recent offer from this Government, Denmark has refused to promise neutrality, on condition of receiving

back a portion of Northern Schleswig. But the language of the Copenhagen and Stockholm papers, as many of them as are connected with their respective Governments, is caution itself. The Danish *Rigstidende*, for instance, while rebuking a Radical paper clamouring for war, contends that for Denmark to prove a turbulent neighbour to the Prussians would only result in making the latter cherish ideas of conquest not now entertained, and plunge the country into endless misery. Our own *Kreuz Zeitung*, itself an organ initiated into the intentions of the Government it supports, while reprinting this passage from the Danish inspired journal, does not fail to express its unqualified concurrence in the sentiment. With regard to Italy, it is known in this capital that Prince Napoleon, during his recent mission to the home of his consort, failed to conclude an alliance with the Ministers of his royal father-in-law. He seems, however, to have elicited a more or less binding promise that, should Austria actively support France, Italy will not avail herself of this opportunity for occupying Trent or Trieste. Such an understanding would seriously affect the interests of this Government, were it not that Prussia relies upon Russia rather than Italy to restrain the movements of the Kaiser. Whatever Russia's sentiments towards Berlin may be, while she cannot make up her mind to make common cause with Paris, she cannot afford to suffer Vienna to become so powerful in Germany as to be able to resist her own policy in the East. Holland is suspected to be in league with France. The report is probably unfounded. Holland's coöperation cannot seriously damage Prussia by land, and in the matter of ships it is not required to give France undisputed dominion over the German seas. The greater the apprehension of the Dutch, that united Germany may some day re-claim them as citizens of the old Empire, the more carefully they will probably guard against bringing on, by premature hostility, the very fate they wish to avoid.

Their Sovereign's conduct in the Luxemburg entanglement, a dark but not unintelligible matter from the very outset, might certainly be more circumspect. Now that his Dutch Ministers, having once burnt their fingers, have got him to appoint special diplomatists for the Grand Duchy, he has made a notorious annexationist Luxemburg envoy at Paris. For Berlin he has no more fitting representative to spare than a country judge, a gentleman little known out of his own district. The inference drawn from this is, that to sell is still the all-powerful word at the Hague. The prejudicial influence this exercises upon pending negotiations is incalculable.

In Prussia no reserves are called out, no horses bought, no guns transported to the possible scene of action. But, while preserving her equanimity, despite the haste with which the French armaments are being carried on, Prussia is yet cautious enough to take some preliminary steps in case of the worst. Conditional contracts are being concluded with horse, corn, and provision dealers, furloughs refused, and certain Railway Companies ordered to keep in readiness for the transport of troops. On the ramparts of Mayence, the great western bulwark of the country, fascines are being placed with all dispatch. In Saxony the recruits which were to be draughted in July have been ordered to join at once. From Baden, the most exposed State of all, we learn that the stronghold of Rastadt is being made ready. The journals of the Grand Duchy have been officially cautioned against reporting military movements, and the dispatch of political telegrams to foreign parts is in all Northern Germany made subject to the sanction of the Berlin authorities. By this latter measure, which can be accounted for only by the stress of circumstances, if you wish to telegraph from Frankfort to London on current events, the message has first to be transmitted to Berlin, where it is examined, and, if considered innocuous, sent on.

Zeidler's Correspondenz, a semi-official Berlin paper, says that French agents have been noticed inquiring in Hanover whether a force of 20,000 or 30,000 men, were it landed on the shores of the country, might count upon the support of the inhabitants against the Prussians. I should not have deemed the French Government capable of indulging in such absurd delusions. Doubtless there is a certain amount of petty opposition against the Prussian authorities in a few cities of what formerly was the kingdom of Hanover. But to mistake it for a bitter feeling of enmity, or to think it violent enough to be of any advantage to a foreign foe, is to be lamentably ignorant of the actual moral and political condition of this race. If the French were not determined to overlook facts, they would have no difficulty in ascertaining the real state of things. Only a few days ago the Hanover deputies to the Federal Parliament, about a third of whom were considered King George men now and ever, combined to petition this Government for an assembly of notables, to prepare for the gradual introduction into their province of the Prussian laws. The Berlin Government itself so fully relies upon the troops of the annexed province, that the Hanover regiments have but a slight admixture of the Prussian element now, and being exclusively recruited from their own country, will three years hence lose even the little they have.

It is astonishing with what suicidal facility the French manage to conceal from themselves whatever does not suit their little game. Intent upon undoing the reunion of Germany, they attach an exaggerated importance to the squabbles between her various States, and entirely shut their eyes to the common national patriotism which binds them together.

In Hanover—nay, in Bavaria and Baden—a man would be simply regarded as an outcast, were he to support the French against any German State, no matter what its name or repute. These sentiments are loudly preached

even by the Ultramontane press of the South, however hostile in many respects to the Protestant Hohenzollerns. In Würtemberg alone, the remnant of the republican faction, formerly rampant in those parts, is suspected of preferring anything to the establishment of the decent constitutionalism which will be the consequence of Prussia's extending the Federal ties over the whole of Germany. But this extreme party is numerically small, and, from the contemplative habits of the particular tribe to which it is confined—the Swabians are the model Germans, with all the weak and strong sides of the national character fully developed—is slow to identify theory and action.

MEDIATION AND ARMAMENTS.

Berlin, April 29, 1867.

THE resolve of this Cabinet to revoke its former absolute refusal, and to signify a disposition to discuss the possibility of the evacuation of Luxemburg, is partly attributable to a letter from Queen Victoria to King William I. In this communication, her Majesty uses her influence, as a Queen and an affectionate relative, to urge the King to leave no means untried to preserve the blessings of peace to this quarter of the world. Similar advice, though in a more diplomatic strain, seems to have been tendered by the Czar.

Much, however, remains to be done before the dogs of war can be chained up again. As yet there is little beyond an uncertain chance of success. So far from causing military preparations to be viewed as superfluous, the pacific turn in the policy of this Cabinet has been accompanied by a stir in the War Department greater

than before. General Moltke has repaired to Mayence, to supervise the armament of the fortress destined to play an important part in the event of war. At the same time, the journalists of Mayence have been summoned before the authorities, and prohibited mentioning any of the measures going on before their eyes. In Schleswig-Holstein and Nassau, where a conscription was to be made in June, recruits have been ordered to join in the beginning of May; in Electoral Hesse the reserves are on the point of being called out for drill; and in Königsberg a number of Landwehr artillery-officers, ordered for service at this unusual time of the year, are busy practising with the new rifled guns. While these facts are reported from the various parts of Prussia, we learn that the re-organisation of the cavalry, so long expected and so often delayed in the minor States, is in progress in Mecklenburg and Bavaria. It seems also correct that 10,000 needle-guns have been lent the Grand Duke of Darmstadt by this Government, and that Berlin firms, who have undertaken to provision the army, are already looking out for sub-contractors in Rhineland. Prince Ludwig of Hesse, the new commander of the Darmstadt division, and General Bothmer, the new Quartermaster-General of the Bavarian forces, have been summoned to Berlin by telegraph. Generals Buz and Kratzeisen, the commandants of the fortresses of Landau and Germersheim, situate in the Bavarian Palatinate, close to the French frontier, have received equally summary notices to repair to Munich. General Wàag has been appointed Commandant of the Baden fortress of Rastadt; a post which, since the dissolution of the old Bund, has been only nominally filled. I may couple this intelligence with the fact that steps are being taken to insure the services of American privateers against the French mercantile navy.

M. Garnier-Pagès, the member for Paris in the French

Legislative Assembly, and some of his political friends, have arrived here in the interests of peace. It is their intention to assure our Liberals, that far from desiring a war which would be a disgrace to this civilised age, the educated portion of their countrymen are eagerly wishing for some suitable compromise. The tone of French society certainly does not seem to bear out this assertion.

Northern Germany is very quiet; but in Würtemberg excited meetings continue to be held.

THE LUXEMBURG COMPROMISE.

Berlin, May 1, 1867.

THE day before yesterday a Cabinet Council was held to decide whether the reserves should be called in or not. On the question being negatived, and a communication to that effect made to M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador here, a similar abandonment of military measures was a few hours later resolved upon in Paris. The latter fact is mentioned in to-night's official and semi-official organs, coupled with the expression of a hope that the steps announced in the *Moniteur* will be really and unreservedly carried out.

Though Prussia avoids giving any positive intimations as to the course she means to pursue, it is understood that the continuance of Luxemburg as an independent State, and the protection of the German nationality of the inhabitants from the dangers incidental to the position of a border country, will be insisted upon at the Conference. On the former point a European guarantee will be demanded, care being taken to render it more effective than

a corresponding engagement of the Powers with regard to Northern Savoy proved a few years ago. These preliminaries duly arranged, Prussia it is likely will ask a respite before evacuating the fortress, to enable her to construct some other work of defence in the adjacent district under her sway. Should this delay be objected to, on the ground that a conjoint guarantee of the Powers does not require the additional support of a circumvallated camp, the retort will be probably forthcoming, that while the French fortress of Metz remains in undiminished strength but six hours distant from Luxemburg, the Prussian frontier must not be deprived of a like protection. But on these latter particulars, the views of this Government probably admit of modification. The right of the Conference to discuss Prussia's title to garrison Luxemburg will, however, not be easily recognised by Count Bismarck. If all goes well, the King and the Count intend repairing to Paris about five weeks hence to have a look at the Exhibition, and an hour's private *tête-à-tête* with Napoleon III.

As there can be no doubt that Count Bismarck is sincerely bent upon peace, the precautions still being taken are supposed to be the result of a military, and, so to say, technical, necessity, to create a counterpoise to the doings of France. The works of Luxemburg are being slowly but steadily got ready. That fortress, as well as Mayence, Coblentz, Cologne, and Rastadt, are being provisioned for a short period, and contracts concluded to secure a full complement of stores in good time. The new additions to Coblentz, or more correctly Ehrenbreitstein, are being vigorously pushed forward, and a complete register made of the vehicles available in the towns and villages of certain districts on and near the Rhine. That nothing may be forgotten in this respect, the finishing stroke has just been given to the redoubts of Düppel and Sonderburg, and a very large quantity of

ammunition sent both west and north. General Herewarth and Admiral Jachmann are travelling in Schleswig on a tour of inspection. Disquieted by these and similar symptoms, the Hamburg ship-owners have begun to insure their vessels against the multiplied hazards of war. The rumour current here, that the American monitor Dunderberg has been purchased by this Government, requires confirmation.

To add a few words on a kindred subject in neighbouring States: the girdle of detached forts which is to surround Cracow is approaching completion. Of the Russian troops stationed in the western and south-western provinces of the Empire, the men on furlough have, in consequence of a general order, joined their respective regiments. No more furloughs are granted, or, indeed, asked for, the men themselves anticipating some imminent conflict with Turkey, or perhaps Austria, or peradventure France. In St. Petersburg a society has just been founded, under the patronage of the Empress, to aid in the relief of the wounded in war. The operations of this new brotherhood are to be immediately extended over the whole of Russia. The Russian agitation in the Russinian districts of Galicia has been resumed with renewed vigour. By way of promoting the connection between the Slavonian subjects of the Kaiser and those of the Czar, all Austrian Slaves intending to visit the ethnographical exhibition at Moscow may secure a viaticum on application to M. Rajewski, Chaplain to the Russian Embassy at Vienna. I apprehend that the issue to-day of a new Russian journal at Vienna belongs to the same category of facts. The ostensible purpose is to gain over the Slavonian subjects of Turkey to the Austrian sceptre; but there are probably few Austrians who, with this object in view, would think of furthering it by means of the Russian idiom.

The *Warsaw Dziennik*—that paragon of official papers,

which is fully initiated into the plans of the Polish conspirators, and sufficiently communicative to betray their designs to the world at large—believes itself in a position to affirm that the Polish emigrants at Paris have offered their services to the French Government in the event of a war with Prussia. Full particulars are given, and the names of the gentlemen added who have undertaken to revolutionise Posen. One 'General' Rochebrun, a French subordinate officer, mixed up with the last Polish insurrection, is affirmed to have been granted the assistance of some Government officials to draw-up a long memorandum on this interesting subject.

If one-half we learn about a new cannon recently experimented upon at Paris be true, it is the most formidable weapon ever invented, and will go far to render war impossible. M. Gustav Struve, a German republican, and late political *emigré*, has published a discursive article on this sanguinary topic in the *Beobachter*, a Stuttgart paper of advanced leanings. The gun, he states, has been twice offered him for purchase, to aid, no doubt, in the effective realisation of his republican ideals. But on both occasions, which occurred in 1850 and 1861, he had not the money to spend. He saw the gun at work in London as early as 1849, when a specimen called a two-pounder discharged 300 balls in a minute; while another, a twelve-pounder, threw from fifty to sixty. Propulsion is caused by means of a tourniquet, very much like the handle of a coffee-mill, set in motion either by the hand or by steam. There is neither rebound nor report, nor even smoke. The barrel not becoming heated, the machine may be in full activity for hours, spitting balls with a continuity similar to that of the water issuing from the hose of a fire-engine. The gentleman who is our authority for this marvellous tale has on another occasion seen the balls flying over the Hudson River, where its width exceeds a mile, and was told by those in the secret, that twelve and

eighteen pounders could hurl missiles four times that distance. A whole battalion, if properly flanked by a battery of this novel description, could be destroyed in a minute. Another circumstance mentioned by him, and which will scarcely serve to render his account more credible than the known laws of natural philosophy would seem to make it, is that the Washington Government being offered the invention at the beginning of the late civil war, scorned the idea of decimating their Southern brethren with this diabolical machine. In some respects the cannon seems to be not unlike that of Mr. Gatling, now exhibiting at Paris, and also offered to the Emperor Napoleon for sale.

THE LUXEMBURG CONFERENCE.

Berlin, May 4, 1867.

On the 1st instant, a note of the Luxemburg Government was delivered here. It requests the participation of this Cabinet in a Conference of the Powers which signed the treaty of April 19, 1839, for the rearrangement of Luxemburg affairs. The Conference, to be opened at London on the 7th instant, is to supersede the right of Prussia to garrison Luxemburg by a neutralisation of the Duchy under the guarantee of the Powers. Such, I believe, is the language employed in the note. The extension of the debates to other subjects, not immediately connected with the question in hand, which would have suited Austria and France, was opposed by England, and would, no doubt, have been contrary to the wishes of this Government also. Prussia has no desire to see the Prague treaty of peace, and the domestic arrangements dependent upon it, brought under the cognisance of a European tribunal. At the Conference, Russia, Prussia, and France will be represented by their ambassadors in

London; Holland by Baron Tornaco, the Minister at the head of the Luxemburg Government, and Count Zuylen, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs; and England by Lord Stanley, who will preside over the sittings. After the satisfactory settlement of the guarantee, the question whether Luxemburg is to remain in the Zollverein, and who is to defray the cost of razing the fortress, will, with other relevant matter, form the principal subject of the debate. Our official *Provinzial Correspondenz*, while cordially welcoming the pacific turn affairs have latterly taken, is yet not altogether at ease concerning the future. It says:

'For a nation in which every man is a soldier, it is impossible to wish for war merely for the sake of it. Such a nation will only take up arms to secure a continuance of the blessings of peace. The Germans, moreover, are too quiet, too industriously inclined, and too deeply imbued with the civilising ideas of the age, not to prefer competition in the arts of peace to the sanguinary emulation of the battle-field. Still, should it be impossible to maintain friendly and mutually-advantageous relations with the powerful States around them, the Prussians and the Germans at large will confidently await whatever destiny Providence may have in store for them.'

Semi-official and other papers complain that the cessation of armaments, announced by France, has been adopted only 'on principle.' The *Kreuz Zeitung* states that the French War Office have recently ordered large quantities of shot at the foundries of Styring, prefecture Forbach, département de la Moselle. That paper likewise says that enormous provision stores are still being bought by the same parties. This intelligence is supplemented by the Berlin *Spenersche Zeitung*, a respectable journal in the habit of deriving a certain category of information from official sources, affirming that the purchase of oats and wheat for the French Government continues in England, and that no abatement has taken place in the buying of horses. The *Cologne Gazette* relates that the military baking ovens at the fortress of Thionville

(*Germanicè*, Diedenhofen), close to the Luxemburg frontier, cease their work neither day nor night. Similar news respecting the fortress of Hüningen is contained in the *Baden Zeitung*; while, if we are to believe the papers of Northern Switzerland, all the maires in Alsace have been asked how many men can be quartered in their respective localities. But this seems to have taken place a day before the above momentous change happened at Berlin. That a large number of pontoons have been lately conveyed from Lyons and Besançon to Hüningen and Belfort is certain.

As to Prussia, her preparations remain confined to a few indispensable preliminaries. Thus, military plenipotentiaries are being attached to her Embassies in Southern Germany, to serve as a medium for all communications incidental to the execution of the offensive and defensive treaties concluded seven months ago. In the province of Electoral Hesse a conscription is being enforced, and so vigorously that, while in the Hessian times ten per cent only of those liable to serve were draughted, the same proportion indicates all now released. Orders have been also issued respecting the mode of transporting bread in time of war, this article having, in the last campaign, but too frequently reached the troops in a mouldy state. Experiments are being made with the new double-barrelled cannon of Herr von Dreyse, the inventor of the needle-gun, of which a small number of specimens seem to have been manufactured. The cannon is said to be completely successful, and perhaps will soon be called upon to measure its powers with the new mitraille weapons of the Emperor Napoleon.

The mystery enveloping these homicidal instruments has been solved at length. They are guns surpassing all others in the frequency of their discharges. Like the 'organ-pipe cannon' of the Middle Ages, they combine a number of barrels, and hurl a continuous hailstorm of

rifle-bullets. One — the most curious invention of the kind—has just been tested at Paris. It is a cannon without powder, smoke, or report. Figure to yourself an iron plate of a circular shape, sunk in the middle. This cavity is filled with bullets, which, on the plate being set in motion, are propelled along a groove radiating to the edge, where they are received into one or several barrels. The centrifugal force with which they leave the disk, being on mathematical principles twelve times as great as the celerity attained by the revolving edge, exceeds anything achieved by rifles. The disk, which has a close-fitting covering and several other addenda to facilitate the aim, is set in motion by a wheel, worked either by a single man, or, in the case of heavier balls, by a steam-engine. This novel catapult, constructed upon the principle of centrifugal force active in man's oldest projectile, the sling, may, it is asserted, be made to hurl from sixty to several hundred balls towards one point in a minute. It is the invention of Dr. Steinheil, Professor of Natural Philosophy at the University of Munich, well known in the scientific world for having laid down the first electric telegraph after the discovery of the principle by Professors Gauss and Weber, at Göttingen. The first specimen of his gun Steinheil submitted to the inspection of the Bavarian War-office as early as 1832. Sixteen years later he produced another and heavier machine of the same sort, throwing grape and requiring a steam-engine to work it. In both instances the Bavarian War Office passed a favourable opinion upon the cannon, but did not think it adapted for other purposes than the defence of fortresses and ships. The secret of the invention then transpiring, the machine appears to have been imitated and perfected in several quarters, and also got to America, whence it reached the Emperor of the French. In Germany the Brothers Eberhardt, at Ulm, have just turned out an offensive weapon, operating on this principle, but having four barrels instead

of one, as is the case with the French 'infantry cannon.' Each barrel is stated to be capable of sixty discharges in a minute.

Should all this be confirmed by the experiments sure to be made in more than one place, it is perhaps not too sanguine to entertain a hope that war will become more and more rare, owing to the dreadful perfection of the instruments intended to further it. Romantic as it may seem to dream of a utopian age at a time when Europe is actually bristling with bayonets, a more gigantic stride towards civilisation would never have been made.

En attendant I have to report that Würtemberg, preparing for those wars that may still be inevitable, and giving up the petty opposition she has so long offered to this Government, has adopted the Prussian needle-gun.

Many Hamburg merchants, dreading the contingencies of the immediate future, prefer shipping goods for distant lands in French rather than German ships. Should the two countries come to blows after all, these cautious traders may have their property seized by privateers of their own nation.

The other day about forty Opposition members entertained M. Garnier-Pagès at a banquet. The speeches delivered in honour of the venerable apostle of peace were so many messages of goodwill and amity to the French. M. Garnier-Pagès responded in the same strain. It is a pity that neither party, though exhausting themselves in assurances of mutual respect, had the courage to look the Luxemburg question in the face. They denounced war as unworthy of the age, but did not even mention the name of the territory in dispute. It is not by euphonious compliments that the controversy will be settled.

On the evening of the 29th ult., the reply of the King of Prussia to her British Majesty's mediating letter was dispatched to London.

MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN FRANCE. FRENCH TAUNTS AND GERMAN RESERVE.

Berlin, May 8, 1867.

THE Prussian Government are seriously alarmed at the uninterrupted progress of military preparations in France. The Ministers believe they have reason to apprehend that, notwithstanding the promise to the contrary given in a recent number of the *Moniteur*, warlike preparations continue unabated on the other side of the frontier. In their daily intercourse with diplomates and members of Parliament, they loudly assert that, short of the wholesale embodiment of reserves, every preparatory step to a campaign is being taken with the utmost dispatch by the Power recently prevented from purchasing Luxemburg. The disappointment apparently experienced by them is the more acute, inasmuch as the preservation of peace, if not confidently anticipated, had been at least ardently wished for since the day when they resolved to evacuate the disputed territory on certain conditions. It was also expected that the disinterested mediation of England, and the more selfish perhaps, but none the less sincere endeavours of Russia, would stay the disquieting measures of France, if not altogether, at any rate while the Conference sat. In the opinion of this Government, no such thing has been the case.

As matters now stand, I am afraid I shall be but too fully borne out by future events when I say that, unless an immediate understanding can be effected, orders will be issued for the mobilisation of the North German troops. This Government have evidently no mind to allow themselves to be taken by surprise. It is only just to state that until now they have not called out a single man, nor bought an additional horse; but it would be wrong to conceal that, unless their fears are allayed within a

very few days, a disposition prevails to prepare for the worst. With 800,000 men once under arms on this side the Rhine, the task of the Conference will become rather onerous. Much, therefore, depends on the deliberations issuing in a speedy result; and as much, or perhaps even more, on the French Government not deeming it superfluous to convince this Cabinet that no harm is intended. To urge the necessity of this latter step, Major von Burg, one of the two military members of the Prussian Embassy at Paris, has been dispatched to London. It is supposed here that the decisive sitting of the Conference will be held on Saturday. In the event of its turning out unfavourably, the Emperor of Russia will think it unnecessary to repair to Paris.

In this anxious interval the German papers, official and semi-official no less than independent, abound with particulars intended to prove the charge of continued armaments in France. Of the numerous details given, I will cite but a few. The *Kreuz Zeitung* states that certain railway directors have been asked to prepare to convey 5000 Hungarian horses to France. The exportation of horses from the latter country has for the last few days been practically prohibited. According to the same paper, warlike *matériel* is being transported in four daily trains to the camp of Chalons, and preparations made at Paris for the dispatch of 50,000 men per diem. Reserves are being called out far beyond the number required to restore the full peace footing after the Mexican and other losses. The great Conservative journal, which in the present instance must be supposed to derive its intelligence from the Government direct, winds up its sensational tale with an apostrophe to the French authorities:

'We beg the Imperial officials,' it says, 'to grant us the exceptional advantage of not confiscating to-day's issue of our paper. If the French editors are enabled to read our remarks, they will perhaps be kind enough to make a reply.'

The *Cologne Gazette* is informed by a correspondent at Metz that guns have been sent to arm the works of Thionville, Longwy, and Bitsch; and that thousands of women are busy making cartridges in the arsenals of Metz and other places. Twelve thousand horses have been transferred from the gendarmerie to the army, to be replaced by the new purchases abroad. With reference to the latter circumstance, the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* remarks that 15,000 horses have within the last few months been exported from Germany to France. The *Breslauer Zeitung* learns that, to accelerate the equipment of the army with the chassepot gun, recourse has been had even to Spanish manufacturers, and an order for 35,000 specimens given to a well-known iron foundry at Placenzia. At Belfort, in Alsace, earthworks, according to the *Journal de Genève*, are being thrown up with such rapidity that wages in a few days rose considerably. Pontoons sufficient to construct four bridges over the Rhine have arrived at the latter place, which is also remarkable for the making of cartridges, and a variety of other uncanny things. Add to this, that, according to the *Spener Zeitung*, the Belgian Government have also begun to buy horses, and you may imagine the impression produced by these accumulated indications of danger. It is also noticed with no little excitement, that while the French Government are beginning to treat for peace at London, the language of their official press in the Departments is red-hot with war.

'*The French Government*,' ejaculates the organ of the Prefect of Angoulême, '*cannot renounce the principle of compensation. This country will only congratulate itself upon the maintenance of peace, if the way to glory is not blocked up.*'

Improving even upon this language, the *Nancy Moniteur* boasts:

'*Bismarck pours water into his wine. It was high time for him to do so. We have fought the Austrians without hatred, and beaten the Russians, not without commiseration. But as to the Prussians*, nous

autres Français *do not like them. The army and the entire nation burn with desire to have a shy at them. But yesterday,* 150 *veteran soldiers agreed near Saarburg to form a volunteer corps against the Prussians. An old soldier of the First Empire said, "Before I die, let me kill one Prussian more."*'

There is a good deal of self-control required in the people of this country to stand these disgraceful taunts. The process, it is true, is facilitated by the contempt felt for these literary *agents provocateurs.*

As to Prussian precautions, I know of none other to-day, save that the Gefion frigate, a vessel taken from the Danes in 1849, has been dismantled and unrigged, to be sunk, it is supposed, at the entrance of Kiel harbour. The ships not employed for privateers and coast observation will be probably sheltered in that port. Walking on the ramparts has been forbidden in Luxemburg; and an order sent to Munich for 40,000 copies of the excellent maps of Southern Germany possessed by the Bavarian War Office. This is all that has recently transpired. But the less demonstrative the Government, the more uneasy the people. Anxious expectancy is beginning to give way to the cry for some settlement or other. The nerves of the mercantile community more particularly have been so long and so cruelly on the rack, that a fidgety longing for a decision is, at least in the larger towns, the prevailing sentiment of the day. As you were informed on the first appearance of the question, public opinion was originally opposed to any, even the slightest, concession to France. But the nearer the dreadful reality of war approached, and the less the Luxemburgers, whose lukewarmness in this emergency is denounced as simply despicable, came up to the patriotic ideal, the more people accustomed themselves to the notion of compromising the matter in a pacific and business-like way. Short of ceding the Duchy to France, anything might have been accepted, provided peace could have been purchased in return.

I will not say, that this conciliatory mood has been

in turn superseded by a relapse into the first and more unyielding propensities, but the danger of hostility begotten of distrust is imminent. Dissatisfaction among the governed as well as the governors is strengthened by the notable circumstance that France, after the Conference had been agreed to by all parties, but before it met, coolly desired this Cabinet to evacuate the fortress without any more ado. The wish was politely negatived at the time. Had it been granted, it might have resulted in a surrender of the coveted prize without, as is now apprehended, securing peace in return. Here and there meetings and societies are still voting amicable addresses to the French, extolling the blessings of peace, and depicting war as the delight of despots, and the ruin of the industrious, enlightened, and liberty-loving among the people. But the generality have too correct an appreciation of the influence likely to be exercised by their words to take the trouble to express any formal opinion at all. The last addresses mentioned in the papers are from a Working Men's Society in Berlin, resonant with anathemas against the sanguinary practices of the Middle Ages; from a meeting at Canstadt in Würtemberg, deprecating war as a crime against civilisation; and from a meeting at Lindau in Bavaria, affirming that Germany has no wish to conquer France, and desiring the French to be equally abstemious.

Scarcely had the King of Holland thanked the Luxemburgers for the petitions soliciting the continuance of the present independent condition of the country, when the diminutive capital of the duchy sends him another address, praying for some compensation for the losses consequent upon the probable withdrawal of the Prussian garrison. 'The town of Luxemburg,' it is stated in this document, of which a copy will be presented to the London Conference, 'has 13,000 inhabitants. The Prussian garrison, consisting of 4,000 men, spending, it is calculated, about

1,000,000 thalers a year, was the chief support of the worthy burghers. If ordered away, the value of real property will be diminished by one-half,' &c. I wonder whether the Luxemburgers imagine that Europe ought to pay them so much per year for the loss of their profitable, though, while they had them, not particularly cherished, guests. If their feelings had been a little more patriotic, it is probable the Napoleonic claim would never have been raised.

It is thought here that Belgium, being itself a neutralised country, will be hardly in a position to give an armed guarantee for Luxemburg. Russia, it is asserted by the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, is striving to induce England, Sweden, and Denmark to insist upon the neutrality of the Baltic in the event of a war. The *Kreuz Zeitung*, a few days ago, went so far as to assure its readers that this notable advantage had been already secured for Prussia. However that may be, the Czar, who, if hostilities break out, may be expected to support this Government to a certain extent, does not seem to have given up the idea of arranging matters amicably with France. Orders have just been given to set at liberty all the French prisoners languishing in Siberian wilds for participating in the last Polish rebellion. It is a less satisfactory symptom that the number of Russian army-surgeons should have been increased at this time of all others, and regulations issued respecting the formation of military hospitals in case of war.

The tone of the Russian press on Eastern affairs continues very threatening. Of course, a European difficulty is always an Oriental opportunity. The Czar has again recommended to the Sultan to cede Crete to Greece; and the Russian journals are earnestly inviting the public to assist the future son-in-law of their sovereign by taking up his latest loan. 'It is safe as a financial speculation,' avers the *Moscow Gazette;* 'only political antipathies to

Greece, and the wish to defer the settlement of the Eastern question, can prevent its being favourably received.' The meaning of these words, pretty clear in themselves, is farther illustrated by the semi-official *Russische Correspondenz* announcing that Russia will not undertake any fresh guarantee for the integrity of the Turkish Empire, 'such as seems to be intended by England and France.' The Prince of Montenegro, encouraged by the success of his brother of Servia, has asked the Porte for a harbour and some land on the river Morava.

On the 3d inst., Duke Ernest of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, brother of the late Prince-Consort, with his wife Princess Alexandrine of Baden, celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of their marriage. The illustrious couple passed the day in quiet retirement at the hunting-lodge Oberhof, near Gotha, whose citizens presented their sovereign with a valuable piece of plate.

WAR AGAIN IMMINENT.

Berlin, May 11, 1867.

But for the arrival yesterday of pacific intelligence from London, orders for the mobilisation of the German armies would have been issued to-morrow at the very latest. The crisis was imminent indeed. Already had the generals in command of the several *corps d'armée* been summoned to Berlin, and every other preparatory step taken to insure a speedy execution of the pregnant resolve. There can be no doubt that the motive counselling so extreme a measure was the alarm created by the incessant armaments of France. Napoleon having continued, and even accelerated, his preparations after the convention of the Conference, it was apprehended he did not wish the common deliberations to result in the consolida-

tion of peace. Notwithstanding these unpleasant forebodings, Prussia did not at first increase her available strength. Though, in the opinion of more generals than one, the danger of a surprise was at her very door, she would not aggravate matters by buckling on her armour. When, however, the Conference met, she gave the plenipotentiaries to understand that, unless the controversy could be adjusted within a week, considerations of self-defence would compel her to arm. Fortunately for the interests of civilisation, this necessity has not arisen. Still the danger will not have been entirely averted until the surplus of troops and *matériel*, lately collected in the eastern provinces of France, is withdrawn. Without this pledge of fair intentions, suspicion will not be allayed. It is very desirable that future entanglements should be obviated by the Conference enacting, not only the main features of an arrangement, but also stipulating clearly and concisely for details. As far as I know, a different course had been at first marked out, it being intended to touch upon the principal points only at the Conference, leaving the minor ones to the decision of the two Courts principally concerned.

Regarding French military measures, the following particulars are derived from official and semi-official papers at the disposal of this Government. The directors of the French Great Eastern Railway have been commanded to keep in readiness trains for the transport of two armies to Chalons and Metz, towards the middle of this month. The army of Chalons is to amount to 100,000, the other to 80,000 men, ammunition and all necessaries of a campaign being at the same time provided for both those armies. In addition to these troops, of which numerous detachments have already appeared in the neighbourhood of their ultimate destination, 15,000 men have been dispatched from Lyons to Mühlhausen and farther north. Again, the reserve of the year 1864, as may be seen from

an order published in the *Journal de Rouen* of May 2, has been actually called out, notwithstanding the cancelling of a previous order to the same effect in the *Moniteur* of April 30th. By this measure, the French army is brought to a total of from 450,000 to 475,000 men—a figure greatly in excess of the peace footing. The money for the purchase of 15,000 horses has been paid over to the War-office. Immense quantities of corn and oats have been bought in Austria, especially at Vienna. Belfort, in Upper Alsace, is being transformed into a fortified camp, and a huge war-dépôt established within its precincts. In the same province, the fortress of Neu-Breisach is being armed. Entrance to the citadel of Strasburg is prohibited on account of the large stores of powder lately deposited there. Fifteen new batteries of about ten guns each have been organised, sailors and recruits levied for the navy, and the fleet at Brest and Cherbourg got ready to land troops on the shores of the North Sea. Of other items related in independent papers, I will only mention that, according to the testimony of a good many German travellers who seem to be scouring France at this time, scarcely a single train was observed in the eastern departments that did not carry troops.

LUXEMBURG TO BE EVACUATED BY THE PRUSSIANS.

Berlin, May 15, 1867.

THE speech of M. de Moustier in the French Chamber would seem to bear out my intelligence, that though a date has been fixed for the Prussians to begin the evacuation of Luxemburg, no time is mentioned in the newly concluded treaty when that operation must be completed.*

* The Luxemburg Treaty was signed in London on May 11. It provided that Prussia should cease to garrison Luxemburg. Being placed under the common guarantee of the Powers, the duchy was also secured from appropriation by France.

The fears of a future entanglement, which might be awakened in the minds of the apprehensive by this omission, will be perhaps allayed by France and Prussia recognising, in some form or other, the inviolability of their existing frontiers. In the mean time it is satisfactory to know that no sooner had the Conference led to a tangible result than M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador, assured this Government of the pacific intentions uniformly entertained by his Sovereign. This assurance has been succeeded by a slight reduction of the French available forces.

In Prussian eyes the latter measure, although sincerely welcomed as an earnest of what is to follow in the same direction, yet does not seem to be sufficient in itself totally to remove the misgivings aroused by the extent of the French armaments. I learn that a few days ago orders were issued here to call out the entire reserves of two *corps d'armée* and a portion of those of a third. There is, for the present, no probability of the measure being revoked. The serious import of this step is, however, diminished by the circumstance, that the men to be embodied, belonging to the new provinces, require inurement to the peculiarities of the Prussian drill. Indeed, the reason given for this extraordinary muster is the alleged necessity of subjecting the rank and file of the freshly acquired contingents to two months' exercise. Whether the simultaneous concentration of the battalions of each regiment stationed in the above provinces is indispensable for the purpose assigned, I leave for those wise in military matters to decide. Anyhow, it is natural to presume that, should the Emperor Napoleon think fit to decrease still farther the number of his troops, the Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, and Schleswig-Holstein reserves will be accorded a corresponding reduction of their tactical studies.

In order to give an idea of the contradictory feelings with which the labours of the London Conference are

viewed by the German public, I cannot do better than translate the following passage from the *Elberfeld Zeitung*.

'Though the possibility of war had been contemplated with a heavy heart by all classes of the population alike, the feeling of satisfaction now prevalent is not without its alloy. People are neither thoroughly content with the settlement arrived at, nor entirely at their ease as to the future. The demands preferred by France in the Luxemburg affair have greatly contributed to rouse the susceptibilities of our countrymen, and the arrangement devised by the Powers is certainly not of a nature to pour oil upon our irritated feelings. However true it may be that Europe, having appointed Prussia the guardian of Luxemburg fifty years ago, is entitled to withdraw the privilege under a change of circumstances, still the people, too simple-minded to appreciate diplomatic niceties, are alive only to the fact of our evacuating the fortress after all. And are we to think lightly of the definitive exclusion of Luxemburg from the German Commonwealth? After such a loss what a poor consolation that the country has not fallen into the hands of France! Apart, however, from our own feelings of mortification, it is easy to foresee that the enemies of Prussia, both in Northern and Southern Germany, will not scruple to make use of this opportunity for the most vehement attacks. Indeed, a portion of the Saxon press already assures us that in the days of the old Confederacy, when Austria was one with the nation, such a solution of the Luxemburg difficulty would have been impossible.

The latter statement might be amplified by extracts from Bavarian and other papers, some of them connected with the Austrian Government, which mournfully complain of 'the disgrace inflicted upon Germany under Prussian guidance.' To hear them, what the Roman suffered when passing under the Caudine Forks is nothing in comparison to the ignominy which attaches to Germany, under this last stroke of European diplomacy. The fact that Luxemburg, in the course of her chequered history, has experienced a more than ordinary share of the vicissitudes incidental to a border country, and, in consequence, has been long morally estranged from Germany, is not so much as adverted to by these ardent, though rather doubtful, patriots. But the weakness of their reasoning, and the motives inspiring this strain of affected lamentation, are tolerably well seen through here; and if the Prussian

public could but persuade themselves that peace had been secured at the cheap price exacted by the Powers, they would not heed the selfish denunciations of their Sovereign's policy.

But, alas, the only difference of opinion prevalent on the critical question of the day is, for how long or how short a time war has been postponed. Even the sanguine will not allow there is more than a year's respite to depend upon. The suspicions raised by the pretensions of France, and the general uneasiness created by what has occurred within the last few weeks, combine to steep the public mind in ominous forebodings. Exaggerated in their presumptive certainty as these predictions undoubtedly are, their existence is yet a fact which statesmen should not overlook.

The danger just blown over has roused the Southern Governments from their sluggish indifference to military affairs. In Baden and Würtemberg laws generalising the duty of conscription are being prepared, and there is even a chance that the new Army-bill devised by the Bavarian Ministers will be suffered to be proceeded with in a short time. Würtemberg is negotiating with this Cabinet for the loan or the sale of a number of needle-guns. Of the North German armies not subject to the direct control of the Berlin military authorities, the Saxon is the first whose this year's recruits have sworn an oath of fidelity to the King of Prussia. A detachment of engineers and a shipload of powder has been sent to Luxemburg, preparatory, it is surmised, to the razing of the works. Part of the latter being hewn out of the living rock, it will be impossible altogether to destroy the military importance of the place.

The Crown Prince and Crown Princess, who have secured an hotel at the Isle of Nordeney for the first half of the season, will leave for Paris in a few days. Little more than a week after their departure will find the King

bound for the same destination. In his whole life his Majesty has been but once to the gay capital of the French. In 1814 he visited it by the side of his royal father and at the head of a victorious army.

PRUSSIAN UTTERANCE ON THE LUXEMBURG CONFERENCE.

Berlin, May 18, 1867.

THE Prussian Parliament does not meet for some days to come. Government, therefore, have thought it necessary to acquaint us with the results of the London Conference in an article which I extract from the official *Provinzial Correspondenz:*

'According to all human probability, peace has been reëstablished on a permanent basis. Henceforth Luxemburg will form a neutral State, under the collective guarantee of the Powers. The capital of the Duchy ceases to be a fortress. The works will be razed, the Grand Duke engaging to reduce the garrison to a number just sufficient to maintain order. On these conditions the King of Prussia has announced that the Prussian troops will receive orders to evacuate the fortress as soon as the new treaty has been ratified. The removal of the artillery and *matériel* is to commence at the same time. The ratifications are to be exchanged within four weeks at the latest. These provisions entirely agree with the views of the Prussian Government. The independence of Luxemburg having been guaranteed by all Europe, and the idea of a bargain with France renounced by her Sovereign, public opinion in Germany will no doubt be satisfied with this solution of the difficulty. Prussia withdraws her garrison, but in return receives the collective guarantee of the Powers for the concession she makes. That guarantee, rendering an invasion of our territory by way of Luxemburg impossible, must be of equal value to us with the right formerly vested in ourselves of preventing such an attack. The terms being settled thus, Prussia has no interest of a military nature in keeping Luxemburg occupied any longer; while as regards the ties binding Luxemburg to Germany, they have been sufficiently strengthened by the continuance of the Duchy in the Zollverein. By the new treaty, then, Prussia obtains everything she had occasion to ask for in her own or the German interests. Such being the case, the Prussian and the German

people at large will all the more appreciate her moderation in removing, by means of a pacific arrangement, the danger which threatened to arise out of this affair.

The demeanour of France at the Conference is another proof of that earnest and sincere love of peace which has more and more gained for the Imperial Government the respect and confidence of Europe. For some time past the warlike preparations of France were not, indeed, in unison with the conciliatory tone uniformly displayed by her diplomates in the past negotiations. But the latest resolutions of the Imperial Government have been of a kind to increase our confidence in the maintenance of peace, and the circumstances under which a friendly understanding between France and Prussia has been reëstablished guarantee the sincerity with which both Powers are desirous of pursuing a peace-policy. This policy will be confirmed and hallowed by the visits which the King of Prussia and the most powerful Sovereigns of Europe are, on the occasion of the International Exhibition, about to pay to the court of the Emperor Napoleon.'

This hopeful account is followed up by some particulars relative to the Conference and its results:

'The only remaining business of the London Conference will be the exchange of ratifications; a formality which, though under the text of the treaty it might be delayed for a month, will probably take place at an earlier date. The statement preferred by some papers, that farther negotiations will take place at the Conference between all or some of the Powers represented in it, is erroneous. Orders for the evacuation of the fortress will be so timed as to enable us to carry out the treaty with as little delay as possible. The transport of the artillery and the other very abundant *matériel* will require much time, owing to its weight and the necessity of conveying it by rail. With due regard to the difficulties of this operation, the Conference, at the instance of Prussia, has omitted fixing a date for the completion of the task.'

In curious contrast to this officially sonorous language is an article in the *Nord-Deutsche Zeitung*, the unacknowledged and more free-spoken organ of Count Bismarck:

'After the unequivocal communication of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in a recent sitting of the Corps Législatif, it is to be expected that his importunate friends in Luxemburg will cease to agitate for reunion with France. We should be inclined to take exception to certain passages of M. de Moustier's speech, and more particularly to the one asserting our presence in Luxemburg to have been contrary to international law, and a menace directed against France. But instead of renewing

the controversy, we readily acknowledge the necessity under which M. de Moustier found himself of representing the results of the London Conference as a success flattering to the French national sentiment. In Germany people look differently upon the matter. If the principal object of France was that Prussia should leave Luxemburg, *our* interests mainly demanded that the Duchy should not be sacrificed to that Chauvinism which, by being gratified in one instance, might have been encouraged to ask for more. Whatever the intentions of the Emperor Napoleon, Germany has not alone to deal with him, but must so shape her policy as to suit the requirements not only of the present, but also of the future, when the destinies of France will perhaps be directed by somebody else. This, the chief point in view, has been secured by us at the Conference; and as we never wished for anything beyond warding off unjustifiable claims, it is natural that with the relinquishment of these pretensions we may hope for peace.

We are bound to admit that, in issuing orders for a gradual return of the army to the peace footing, the French Government is facilitating the restoration of public confidence. In view of this fact, it is merely as a matter of historical interest that we mention a circumstance belonging to the records of the past week. While a Polish legion was about to be formed at Paris for the purpose of being employed against us, another corps of the same nationality was on the eve of organisation in Italy, to enter the lists in our behalf under Mazzini.'

The latter piece of intelligence is sure to be noticed by the exalted party to whom it seems to be personally addressed. It conveys a plain hint. If Napoleon lets loose the nationality hydra against this Government, the lion of the Republic will be unchained and set upon him. From private sources I am in a position to supplement the above details of the treaty. The new compact, which is brevity itself, enacts that the crown of the Duchy be vested in the Dutch line of the House of Orange, with the reversion to the senior or Nassau line, as heretofore. The ex-Duke of Nassau being, since the events of 1866, dependent for his income upon this Government, this is an important feature of the arrangement. In his late disclosures M. de Moustier omitted mentioning it. Belgium, as a neutral State, has no share in the guarantee of the Powers. The walls and ramparts of the fortress are, as far as necessary, to be dismantled at the expense of the Grand Duke. The

ambiguous wording of this provision permitting a portion of the works to be preserved, is regarded as an advantage to the Grand Duke, or, as German popular suspicion will have it, France. The large sums expended on the fortification of the place by Germany during the last twenty years will not be refunded.

About a fortnight since, when the war-fever was at its height, a number of Strasburg students sent a glowing address to their German colleagues. Advocating the maintenance of peace as a sacred demand of humanity, it at the same time averred that the honour of both nations must be preserved intact in the coming compromise. This missive has met with a reception very different from what the writers expected. The Berlin Burschenschaft—a branch of a numerous and patriotic student society—finds fault, not indeed with the principle enounced, but its application in the present instance.

'How dare you,' they exclaim in a ferocious reply,—'how dare you to represent the honour of France as involved in a quarrel created by French insolence alone? How dare you, as men who ought to be able to distinguish between *meum* and *tuum*, speak of the nationality of Luxemburg as questionable? And pray, what business have you, the Strasburgers, to address us in behalf of France? Are you not yourselves Germans, although torn from us at a time our internal divisions rendered us defenceless? Are you not the subjects of a foreign race, despised by your masters, and habitually called *ces grosses têtes d'Allemands* by those whose honour you pretend to defend? Alsace has belonged to Germany for a thousand years. It was none of our worst provinces, and is inalienably our own, whatever may have come and gone,' &c.

Alsace had been almost forgotten by the Germans, and would not now be remembered, had not Luxemburg been asked for.

RUSSIA, PRUSSIA, AUSTRIA, AND FRANCE.

Berlin, May 22, 1867.

In accordance with a wish expressed by the Emperor Napoleon, the King of Prussia will arrive at Paris a few days after the Emperor of Russia. The motives of this peculiar request can only be surmised. Perhaps there is a vague hope that the overtures which Napoleon supposes will be forthcoming on the part of the Czar can be turned to better account, if the King of Prussia is not present at the first flash of the Conference. As the reader will remember, France, shortly before starting the Luxemburg affair, gently sounded the St. Petersburg Cabinet about the expediency of a Gallo-Russo-Austrian understanding upon the various questions of the day. A mutually profitable agreement respecting the affairs of Germany and the East was pretty plainly hinted at in these overtures. In reply Russia intimated a willingness to enter into some such arrangement provided the word 'Prussia' were substituted for that other name less sonorous to her ears—Austria. After this, finding herself baffled in her favourite scheme of gaining prestige at the expense of Germany, France limited her aim to one particular point on her eastern frontier, and, without making sure of allies, tried to surprise Prussia by a *fait accompli.* Luxemburg was precipitately taken in hand.

The conduct of Russia in this crisis was not a little adroit. Her object being to preserve peace, and with it the possibility of entering at some later period into the arrangement proposed by herself a few months previously, she alternately brought her influence to bear upon one or other of the contending parties. By offering to cover the rear of Prussia against an Austrian attack, she led Prussia

to withstand the pretensions of France; by withdrawing her assistance so soon as France had reduced her claim and proposed a compromise, she persuaded Prussia to yield on her part, strain a point, and consent to an amicable solution of the difficulty. In this manner the Russian Cabinet paved the way for future diplomacy. Noticing the considerate regard with which he was treated, and witnessing Russia's active proceedings in the East, Napoleon could not but conclude, that though declined in their original form, his overtures would lead to ulterior communications on the part of the Czar. It is notorious that Russian troops have been collected in the south-western provinces of the empire, and, with the slow dispatch attending operations in those latitudes, are being increased up to this date. Taking her stand upon this military pedestal, Russia has once more addressed the Powers on the affairs of Crete, pointing out the dangers likely to arise from what she deems the culpable obstinacy of the Porte in not giving up the insurgent isle. An explicit memorandum upon the subject has just been left with the Courts of Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, by the King of Greece, the future son-in-law of the Czar. With a view to meet the Czar half way, France has at once adopted the reasoning of this memorandum, and gone the length of recommending to the Sultan to part with his rebel subjects. She has taken this step, notwithstanding that similar advice, tendered a short time ago by some Powers conjointly, has had no effect, and that her isolated mediation, in consequence, is hopeless in the extreme. As she cannot be supposed to court rebuff, must we not account for her importunity by assuming it to be intended to give Russia an earnest of her willingness to coöperate in the East, were she allowed to carry out her ancient designs in Germany? As a matter of course, the Porte has not the remotest idea of submitting to the request.

A particularly interesting point is Austria's attitude in this pregnant juncture. After what has been briefly alluded to in the above, the reader will understand that Baron Beust and Fuad Pasha believe they have reason to look upon the Czar's journey to Paris with some apprehension. To prevent agreements being concluded prejudicial to Austria, Baron Beust has repeatedly stated his readiness to aid in the abolition of the terms imposed upon Russia in 1856, and to endeavour to convene a Conference for this purpose. Not content with this, Baron Beust has also made a move in London, and undertaken to convince the English Government of the advisability of obviating complications by causing the Porte to cede Crete.

Such is the aspect of affairs at the time of the Czar's preparing to set out for Paris. Future developments will be greatly influenced by the, as yet, unanswerable question, whether Russia aspires only to a revision of the treaty forced upon her eleven years ago, or whether she has any ulterior designs in view.

Although the preceding remarks require no confirmation from newspaper extracts, it may yet be interesting to note that the *Journal de St. Petersbourg*, the semi-official organ of Prince Gortschakoff, thinks the present times particularly suited to sweep the Eastern difficulty clean out of the way. According to this inspired paper, an immediate settlement of the matter is not alone indispensable, but also very possible, now that the Luxemburg storm has happily blown over. The Ottoman disease, it says, is not incurable, if the patient will but swallow the medicine of his European physicians; if he refuse, his blood be on his own head. The *Invalide*, the organ of the St. Petersburg War-office, inserts whole essays on the deficiencies of the Turkish Government; and the *Moscow Gazette*, always gifted with a fine scent when foreign policy is in the wind, expresses itself as follows:

'The Paris Exhibition is becoming an event of great political importance. The European horizon having cleared up again, the most powerful potentates have chosen the capital of France for a rendezvous. The old Congress dream of the Emperor Napoleon is about to be realised to a certain extent. Although the meeting takes place without a formal programme, the interview of the Kings and Emperors cannot remain unfruitful of consequences at a period when so many political questions are awaiting decision. The pacific policy of Russia will now manifest itself in all its might, and be the more successful the less she is implicated in pending entanglements. Russia is desirous of no support, but able and ready to support others. In the present juncture the Emperor, while sojourning abroad, will, with the divine assistance, be in a position to exalt our station in the world, and to restore to us the proper amount of influence on European affairs. Russia's Sovereign seeks no aid from others. His journey to Paris can be only the result of a calm and unshaken confidence in his own resources. Thanks to the policy adopted by this Government during the last few years, and also in consequence of events which have materially changed the condition of Europe, the longing gaze of the various Governments is now principally turned towards Russia. If sanguinary commotions can be at all averted in the immediate future, it is to our Sovereign alone that Europe will be indebted for this invaluable service. In France more particularly will the visit of the Emperor of All the Russias be prized as it deserves to be.'

In a more popular style the same feelings are vented by the Russinian satirical paper *Strachopud.* One of its recent caricatures represents the Russian bear majestically seated in his woods, his head covered with a Cossack cap. Three men approach him in fear and trembling, the two hindmost catching hold of their leader's coat-tails. The leader bears the features of Baron Beust; the second, those of the Emperor Napoleon; the third, with haggard look and hanging whiskers, being intended to portray the Russinian idea of an Englishman. Baron Beust, while offering the beast a propitiatory sop, on which is inscribed 'Revision of the Treaties of 1856,' utters the following jeremiad: 'Hang it, but the fellow looks dangerous, and seems to have a prodigious appetite! Would it not be as well to throw him a morsel? He might otherwise make short work of us, and poor me will be the first he will pounce upon!'

It is scarcely an accidental coincidence that the wrath of the Russian press, long roused by the alleged maltreatment of the Austrian Slavonians, should just now have risen to an unprecedented height. Official, semi-official, and independent papers vie with each other in this objurgatory campaign. Their zeal is increased by a great national display about to be made at Moscow. A Slavonic Ethnographical Exhibition has just been opened in the ancient capital of the Czars. The exhibition comprehends several hundred figures, the size of life, setting forth the characteristic types and national costumes of the various tribes inhabiting the wide provinces of Russia. By way of useful appendage, figures illustrative of the manners and customs of the non-Russian Slavonians have been likewise admitted. Explanatory lectures are to supply a sort of commentary upon the interesting display. To improve this occasion for the strengthening of Panslavonic sentiment, deputies from all Slavonic nationalities in the world have been invited to repair to Moscow, and grace the exhibition by their presence. About sixty Austrian subjects, a couple of Prussians, and I do not know how many patriotic individuals from the Turkish Rayah, have obeyed the summons. The Austrians are Czechians, Croatians, and Russinians, with a sprinkling of Slovenians, Slovackians, and Dalmatians; the Prussians are Vindians, the aboriginals of Brandenburg, of which some 80,000 survive to this day; the Turkish subjects will probably hail from Bulgaria. The Poles, always antagonistic to Panslavism, and superciliously declaring the Russians to be of Mongolian rather than Slavonian descent, have refused to join. In vain MM. Palacky and Riger, two leading patriots of Czechia, a fortnight ago expressly went to Paris to induce the Polish emigrants to take part in the common pilgrimage to the Slavonian Mecca. Their pleadings failed to convince the recusants, and the sons of Lyach remain separated, now as ever, from the children

of Russ. While these abortive negotiations were going on, the Austrian members of the deputation assembled at Prague; and, having been provided with the needful by Russian committees, pursued their route to Warsaw. There they were courteously received, and entertained for several days, by the Russian residents, including General Berg, the governor of the kingdom, and the highest dignitaries of the place. To give an idea of the spirit prevailing among hosts and guests, I will quote a passage from the semi-official *Wilna Wiestnik:*

'In the course of the last few years the Slavonic tribes, scattered over a variety of countries, have felt themselves more and more powerfully attracted to Russia, their representative and protector. The Slaves now travelling to Moscow will there receive a new proof of the fraternal sentiments we entertain towards them, as well as the millions of their compatriots suffering oppression in foreign lands. Perhaps the date is not so very distant when we shall be able to act up to these feelings.'

The same paper, in another passage, delivers itself even more unreservedly: 'The moment is drawing near when Russia will announce her indomitable will in the face of all Europe.'

Should the Austrian guests be imbued with similar aspirations, they will yet probably be more reticent. There is reason to believe that a fair proportion of the ethnographical travellers have set out for Moscow, not so much with the view to fraternise with their foreign co-nationalists, as for the less patriotic object of watching, on behalf of the Austrian government, those that do.

Prussia regarding three months as the very shortest term for the evacuation of Luxemburg, the fate of the Paris negotiations will have been long decided before the last of her sentries has been removed from the walls. The Hanover reserves have just been embodied. At Harburg, opposite Hamburg, where a landing had been apprehended in the event of war, the country is being surveyed for the establishment of a fortified camp. The purchase in Galicia

of corn and oats for the Prussian and Russian Governments, begun some time ago, still continues. Under the military conventions Prussia concluded with the South German States when the Luxemburg question was at its height, the latter are obliged to place within a certain time a certain number of troops, ready equipped for war, at the disposal of this Government, even though there should be no immediate employment for them. It is for the special object of superintending the execution of this contract that Prussian military plenipotentiaries have just been stationed at Munich, Stuttgart, and Carlsruhe. Bavarian, Würtemberg, and Baden officers and soldiers have arrived here, partly to join different regiments of the Guards, to acquaint themselves with Prussian tactics, partly to attend the rifle-practice going on at Spandau.

In Hanover a conspiracy against the existing Government has been discovered. According to Prussian papers, some gentlemen of the nobility, connected with the former Court, and dependent upon its favour for the maintenance of their position in society, have sought to enlist a number of peasant lads, and to form them into a legion on foreign soil. In return for bounty-money given, the promise was exacted that they would go to Arnheim, in Holland; thence, if the French landed at Harburg, they were to invade Hanover, and proclaim the re-accession of King George. Some score of ignorant people had no objection to pocket the money. The Prussian police seem to have been fully aware of what was going on, and, promptly interfering, secured at one blow all the principal agents in the scheme. Baron Halle, the head of the conspiracy, who was arrested, with several other gentlemen of rank, managed to escape a few hours afterwards. A leading banker of Hanover was taken into custody on the charge of concealing money, the property of King George, and apparently destined for the furtherance of unlawful intents. Another banker had his offices searched on a simi-

lar charge, and some 40,000 thalers (left in his keeping by the ex-king) sequestered. If, as Prussian official papers assert, it is true that King George was privy to this scheme, his queen, who is still staying at her chateau of Marienburg, near Hildesheim, will be probably requested to retire from the soil of her husband's former kingdom.

THE KING OF PRUSSIA ALLUDES TO THE CONTINGENCY OF A WAR WITH FRANCE. A HANOVER CONSPIRACY. GREECE COÖPERATING WITH RUSSIA.

Berlin, May 25, 1867.

On the 21st inst., when receiving M. Heer, the new Swiss Minister accredited to this Court, the King alluded to the contingency of a war with France. Should such an event occur, he said, he would conscientiously respect the neutrality of Switzerland; a proceeding equally in accordance with existing treaties and conducive to the interests of this country. He hoped, however, that Switzerland would not be remiss in employing the proper means for her own protection. This is but a verbal repetition of the message General Rœder, the Prussian Envoy at Bern, was charged to impart to the President of the Republic previous to the settlement of the Luxemburg affair.

In more than one respect this Government seems to be acting on the time-honoured adage, *Si vis pacem, para bellum.* The works of Minden and Wesel, in the Lower Rhine country, are to be immediately strengthened. The establishment of a fortified camp at Trèves, on the

Middle Rhine, is contemplated. At Neisse, Glatz, and Königsberg, in the eastern provinces of the realm, as well as at Kiel and in other parts of the Duchies, redoubled energy is displayed in erecting new redoubts and adapting old ones to the requirements created by the new artillery of the epoch. At Geestemünde, north of Bremen, one battery has been finished; two others are about to be taken in hand. To leave no part of the national defences unattended to, orders have been given to try the newly perfected sub-marine ship of M. Bauer. As the former inventions of the same gentleman in this line have proved so many abortions, his latest device must promise better success to have had a trial accorded it.

The Hanover conspiracy has spread farther than was at first admitted by the papers. From what is gradually allowed to transpire, it appears that a dozen noblemen, among them some belonging to old and wealthy families, have been arrested. Baron Stockhausen, who represented Hanover at this capital up to the date of its extinction as an independent State, is of the number. Herr von dem Busche, a Hanoverian subject, who in right of his Prussian estates has long been a member of the Berlin Upper House, in which latter capacity he lodged a protest against the dethronement of King George, has been sought for by the police, but in vain. As to the peasants implicated, they were mostly privates or sergeants in the disbanded force of the country, and, if the intelligence in the papers can be trusted, were seduced by the ringleaders assuring them that the deposition of King George was never meant to extend beyond a year. The number of these victims of fidelity to their hereditary 'lord of war'—a virtue innate in the German soldier—is not specified. Of the middle classes scarcely a man seems to have joined the plot. The discovery was made by the capture of a messenger going between King George and his adherents. The prisoner, in the lining of

whose coat-collar were found the offensive despatches, is a footman of Count Wedel, a noble sharing the exile of his master at Vienna. He was arrested at Frankfort, having attracted attention by a clumsy attempt to pass himself off as an English gentleman.

While staying at St. Petersburg the King of Greece paid a solemn visit to the Greek church there. In the porch he and his Imperial host, who accompanied him on the occasion, were met by the clergy, with the Archimandrite at their head. After the performance of the ordinary ceremonies, the Archimandrite, whose church-name is Neophyte, delivered the following speech to King George:

'Christian King,—While meeting thee at the entrance of this orthodox church, in which thy faithful Hellenes are wont to send up fervent prayers for thee and the kingdom given thee by God, we cannot but remember with feelings of deep emotion that the orthodox belief in the course of nine centuries has always constituted a spiritual tie between the country governed by thee and the one to which thou hast now directed thy royal steps. The object of thy visit to this capital of divinely-blessed Russia is a manifest proof of the sacred links joining the two countries together. "The Lord shall preserve thy going out and thy coming in from this time forth and even for evermore." We receive thee with the cross, the symbol of victory, in our hand, praying that God may grant the longing desires of thy heart, so that thy sojourn here may be beneficial to thee, to thy realm, and to the whole orthodox Orient. May God bless thee and thy most orthodox affianced bride! May she become the consolation, the glory, and the happiness of all orthodox Hellenes, like her namesake St. Olga, the first of the Russian Grand Duchesses who embraced orthodoxy in Greece! Amen.'

Then, turning to the Czar, the Archimandrite thus held forth in Russian:

'Most orthodox Monarch,—While saluting thee in this temple, whither the devout feelings of thy heart—one virtue among the many distinguishing thee—have led thee, we thank God for according us the light of thy countenance. Every genuine Hellene, every orthodox Christian cannot but rejoice at the sight of the great and sole protector of orthodoxy, the powerful and most glorious monarch of the country which is our only hope and liberator, the son of the immortal defender of our just cause, the great monarch Nicholas I. Penetrated with this inex-

pressible feeling of joy, we pray from the very bottom of our hearts that the Almighty may cover thee, thy most worthy Queen, and thy whole reigning house with his outstretched wings, and grant all the wishes of thy heart. May thy name be blessed, and the glory of Russia be augmented from age to age! Amen."

The above harangues are remarkable for the political allusions they contain; a thing most unusual in the rare and brief addresses permitted to be made by the orthodox clergy.

The Slavonian deputies, seventy-five in number, have arrived in St. Petersburg. After a ceremonial reception at the terminus, they were conducted to an hotel, and now are the lions of the day. Banquets alternate with sight-seeing. If the fervent cordiality vouchsafed them is at all equal to the consideration with which they are treated by the official press, these sons of Slovackia, Slovenia, and Russinia will take back very pleasant recollections to their humble homes. So intense is the gratification of the Russians at having to exercise the duties of hospitality towards these specimens of their Slavonian co-nationalists abroad, that even the *Invalide*, the organ of the strict and staid War-office, allows its joy to run away with its discretion. In describing the features of a certain Russinian gentleman who has long written bitterly against the Austrian Government, to which he owes allegiance, that paper actually remarks that the Austrian police would give much if there were less power and sarcasm visible in the physiognomy of this talented person. The travellers will soon leave for Moscow, where the Panslavonic Congress is to be held. There can be no debates, as the majority of the members, though professing to belong to one nationality, do not understand each other's idiom. The principal medium of intercourse between the travellers is German, which most educated Slavonians speak.

After long ignoring the concentration of troops in

Russian Poland, the fact is at last admitted by the Galician papers. The Posen journals flatter themselves with the hope that, if asked to support the Czar in the East, Napoleon will exact the restoration of Poland as the price of his aid. Are there any limits to the sanguine flights of Polish fancy? Ten times rebuffed by dire reality, they ever again relapse into fond phantasies.

A PANSLAVONIC MEETING AT ST. PETERSBURG.

Berlin, May 29, 1867.

THE enthusiastic reception given to the Slavonian travellers in the Russian capital culminated in demonstrative interviews and festivities on the 22d, 23d, and 26th of May. On the first of the days mentioned a deputation of the fêted guests waited upon Prince Gortschakoff, Vice-Chancellor of the Empire and Minister of Foreign Affairs. After a preliminary interview with M. Stremonchoff, director of the Asiatic department at the Foreign-office, they were introduced to the Prince, who, using the French language, saluted them in the most cordial manner. Of the speeches exchanged the following fragment, which is all that has appeared in the papers, sufficiently indicates the spirit animating the actors in this remarkable display. Turning to the Servian members of the deputation, the Prince expressed himself thus:

'The Servians are a youthful nation, and one having a great destiny to fulfil. I am old, and perhaps shall not live to see the day when my prophecy shall be borne out by fact; but, depend upon it, my successors will have the interests of the Servian people as much at heart as I have.'

Then, addressing the whole deputation, he continued:

'The Russian people have welcomed you so heartily to their country that there remains nothing for the Government to do. I am sorry I shall not be able to see you after your return from Moscow, having the Emperor's commands to accompany him to Paris.'

It was a pleasing symptom to the deputation that, in predicting their glorious future, the Prince avoided using the word 'Servian' alone, but always employed it coupled with 'nation.' 'The Servian nation' in Slavonian parlance includes not only the inhabitants of the semi-independent principality of Servia, but also the free Montenegrins and the people living in several contiguous provinces under the Turkish and Austrian sceptres.

On the 23d, the day devoted to the memory of the Slavonian Apostles Cyril and Methodius, the travellers were entertained by the aristocracy at the Nobility Club. The hall had been decorated with the flags of all the various tribes of Slavonian descent. Between the standards were suspended shields bearing devices and names and dates memorable in their history. The Russian colours waved protectingly over the Servian flag, and inscriptions noting Russian victories over the Turks alternated with the armorial bearings of tribes who expect the improvement of their fortunes from future defeats of the Porte. The peace of Kudjuk Kainardshee and the defeat of the Poles in 1612 were among the most prominent dates figuring in the variegated decorations along the walls; and the motto 'The Russian and other Slavonian languages are identical,' stared the revellers in the face whenever they raised their eyes high enough to catch the scroll showing forth this linguistic assertion. Philologically the dictum is true enough; politically it means not much. The Slavonian dialects are mutually unintelligible. The Russian does not understand the Pole; neither of them can make out the meaning of the Servian, nor is the Slovak capable of conversing with the Croat or Bulgarian. The Slavonians are in exactly the same predicament in this respect as the nations of Teutonic origin, who, whether German, Dutch, Flemish, English, Danish, Swedish, or Icelandic, have for many centuries ceased to comprehend each other's idioms. On the present occasion, therefore,

as on every other when the members of different Slavonian tribes have met in friendly conclave, their medium of intercourse has not been one of the Slavonian dialects, but some language of Western Europe with which civilisation has rendered all conversant alike. If the speeches at the dinner in the Nobility Club were mostly delivered in Russian, this is only a seeming exception to the rule, it having been concerted that a few Czechians and Croats who have studied Russian as a foreign tongue should represent their less instructed brethren on this significant day. As there was no Servian in the company able to express himself in the language of his hosts, their spokesman had to be accorded the privilege of using his own idiom.

Having premised so much, I proceed to render some of the speeches made. After the toast to the Emperor, proposed by M. Pogreboff, the mayor of the capital, Count Tolstoy, the Minister of Education, addressed the assembly in these words:

'Being myself a guest here, I have to thank the committee for kindly honouring me with an invitation, and permitting me to speak first. I highly value the distinction conferred upon me, because it affords me an opportunity of being the first to express those sentiments animating us all towards our Slavonian brethren and guests. (*Here the Count shook hands with the Czechians Palacki and Riger seated on his right and left. The hall resounded with cheers at this token of goodwill.*) These cheers confirm my word, and forestall all I have left to say. True feeling is never manifested so much in words as in the flash of the eye, and the features of the human countenance divine. (*Cheers.*) You, our beloved guests, have been accompanied with applause all the way from the Russian frontier to St. Petersburg. Applause surrounds you at present and awaits you at our ancient capital of Moscow, whither you will soon bend your steps. Were you to roam from one end to the other of this vast empire, on which the sun never sets, you would carry with you the sympathies of the 70,000,000 of the Czar's subjects. Our sympathy comes straight from our hearts; there is nothing affected, designed, and, so to say, political, in it. You are not the deputies of your several tribes, elected under the institutions of your countries, nor are we here in any official capacity. We have simply come together as northern, southern, eastern, and western Slavonians. But the absence of political aims does not diminish the solemn import of this Assembly. On the

contrary, it only shows that we have been led hither by the impulse of our hearts, not by any formal or merely accidental circumstances. It is the consciousness of the brotherly ties binding us together which has brought you to St. Petersburg. The ties of the history of a thousand years, the ties of blood, language, and the Panslavonic idea have asserted their rights. (*Clapping of hands.*) Listen, respected guests, to the beatings of the Russian heart, and ask yourselves whether the hearts of foreigners could so beat in your presence. (*Clapping of hands.*) No, gentlemen, nobody can give himself a brother. Providence alone can do this, and spurious brothers are easily distinguished from those hallowed by the ties of consanguinity. (*Clapping of hands.*) Let us strengthen these ties by unity of spirit and the creation of a common science. If science has the power to make different nations approach each other, it will be all the more able to establish a connecting link between us and you. We, the Russians, cannot fully comprehend our own selves without you, nor can you yourselves without us. (*Tremendous applause.*) The scientific study of the Russian language is impossible without the knowledge of the Slavonian dialects, just as the study of Russian history is incomplete without an insight into the simultaneous development of related nations. The ties between you and us, therefore, are not alone physical, but also moral and spiritual. (*Applause.*) Is there anybody sceptical enough to doubt the durability of these ties, to doubt that Providence has a grand future in store for the great Slavonian race?'

Loud applause followed the utterance of the Minister, which said much, and yet was understood to imply more than it said. Next rose M. Markewitch, a Russian, who recited a poem, which I subjoin in prose:

'Cordial salutations to you, O brethren, who have come from the four corners of the Slavonian world. In this country the family repast has been spread for you all. It is for no insignificant cause that Russia has called you to this festival of peace and love; but though invited, you are not guests, you are at home.

You are at home in this country, and, in fact, more at home here than in your own lands, ruled by the foreigner. Here the king and the subject speak the same language, and to be a Slave is not accounted a crime.*

Although torn asunder by envious fate, we yet have never ceased to be one nation, the sons of one mother. It is this which the world cannot pardon in us; yet you will never desert Russia, nor will Russia desert you.

The world is frightened at all Slavonians standing together and addressing it as one. Having long subjected us to injury and insult, and knowing well that the remembrance of our sufferings will never be

* A hit at the Austrian dynasty and government.

effaced from our hearts, the world is scared by the awakening of Slavonian self-consciousness, and dreads the judgments of God.

Long have lies been propagated about us on European soil; long has a Pharisean science used false weight and measure in estimating our claims. The foreigner demanded for himself law and justice, but never tired of inflicting upon us violence and treachery. The very fact of our having been so long exposed to oppression was regarded as a good reason why we should be allowed no better inheritance.

And the treatment awarded to us for centuries is not yet altered. Upon many of those assembled here, marks of the old Slavonian disease are still discernible. As yet the field of Kossof and the battle of the White Hill remain unavenged.*

Of all Slavonians, that nation only has found sympathy with the world which has ever and everywhere betrayed us. That tribe in our midst,† which has always played the part of Judas, has been respected and flattered by foreigners. Fallen race! when will your day of grace arise? We trust in Providence, to whom day and hour are known.

Belief in divine justice will never be smothered in our breasts, whatever sacrifices be demanded of us. God lives, and the shout, "All hail to the Czar-Liberator!"‡ will some day be heard beyond the Russian confines.'

This effusion is an interesting commentary upon the real meaning of the spiritual and scientific reunion, as desired by Count Tolstoy. What, according to the official speaker, was to be a mere intellectual bond between the different races of Slavonian origin, in the mouth of the first independent orator that succeeds him becomes the promise that Russia will free all other Slavonian races subject to non-Slavonian rulers.

M. Riger, a Czechian leader from Prague, returned thanks in the name of the guests:

'Slavonian Brethren, Children of the powerful Empire of Russia,—Permit me to thank you for the hospitable and truly Slavonian reception you have given us in your country. From various and distant parts

* At Kossof the Servians were beaten by the Turks; at the White Hill the Czechians by the Austrian Emperor. The overthrow of the Servian and Czechian empires dates from these battles.

† Poland.

‡ In Russia this motto dates from the emancipation of the peasantry; beyond the Russian confines it would, in the poet's opinion, apply to the alienation of Czechians, Servians, &c. from Kaiser and Sultan.

of the Slavonian world we have assembled here for the first time, and met with a most brotherly welcome. We have had ample opportunity of remarking how deeply the Panslavonian idea is rooted in your hearts, and have learnt to feel at home in your midst. The Slavonian race, which for so many centuries had to shed its blood in the interest of other European countries, has not been fortunate enough to become a great historical whole. But though long divided into several tribes, the day has now arrived when we may gather strength from the conviction that all the various Slavonians are but a single people, and that if we but assist each other, we shall be mighty. The fate of the Slavonian tribes was not a happy one. Upon them it devolved to protect Europe from the inroad of Tartars, Mongolians, and Turks, and much did they suffer in the work. Europe owes them thanks for this. While some of our tribes were fighting Turks and Mongolians, others had to contend with Germans, and again others were able to preserve their independence. But all were alike weak, having lost their political and spiritual unity. If it be impossible to effect a political reunion, let us at least strive for the establishment of an intellectual alliance. Being the most numerous of all nations, we stand a fair chance of becoming, with the assistance of progressive enlightenment, the most highly civilised of all. What we want is harmony; the rest will follow in its train. To accomplish this is our primary task. You, Russian brethren, are the only independent race among us all, and can therefore easily play your part in our common enterprise. Remember the sacred duty imposed upon you by Providence, and endeavour to fulfil it, for the sake not only of Slavonianism, but humanity itself. To this your great task I wish success, and drink to the welfare of the Russian people. Hurrah!'

M. Militinovitsch, a Servian priest, then solicited the assistance of the Russians against the Turks. After him M. Polit, a Croatian agitator from the dominion of the Kaiser, made what was considered the speech of the evening:

'Gentlemen and beloved Brethren,—When the news of the Moscow Ethnographic Exhibition spread on Servian soil,* when we were told that the Russians had summoned their Slavonian brethren to a friendly meeting, every Servian heart leapt for joy, and every man burned with desire to embrace those who have ever been our brethren by blood and descent, our highly valued relations. Yes, gentlemen, in the Servian

* Croats and Servians have lately begun to call themselves one people, being, indeed, distinguished only by a difference of religion. The Croats are Roman Catholics, the Servians orthodox.

heart love to the Russian is innate. In our very cradles our mothers sing our lullabies in songs of Russian magnificence. While Russia lives we perish not. Upon her we have reckoned even when she had not as yet risen to the height of a great Slavonian Power. Thank God, our journey to Russia, our presence in its capital, proves that she is justly called the Panslavonic Power. This is a phenomenon of huge importance, and one which may be productive of the most striking consequences. The creative task of Russia lies not only in Asia, but on what may be called the threshold to her house—the European East. The liberation of the European East is the great deed reserved for her. Turks, Magyars, or Austro-Germans, or whatever may be the name of foreigners ruling over Slavonian people, must be stopped in the exercise of their unjustifiable authority. Races must henceforth be independent. The battle of Sadowa has decided the destinies of the European East. In consequence of it, the German world has been separated from the Slavonian. What remains to be done is to solve the Slavonian question—a task to be fulfilled by the Slavonians themselves, and chiefly by Russia. Russia, gentlemen, is no longer Russian, it is Slavonian—nay, Panslavonian. The resources at her disposal are not only material, but also moral. Slavonic Russia is no menace to civilisation, but only prepares Europe for witnessing the reunion of the Slavonian family. The first blow in the great struggle must be the cutting through the Eastern knot. This is a matter affecting as much the honour of the Russian people as the interests of the Russian Empire. We, the Eastern Slavonians—we, the Eastern orthodox Christians—we, the Servians, hope and trust that Russia will not forget the catastrophe of Kossof, but soon do her duty and commence her appointed work. I propose the speedy solution of the Eastern question.'

After this I need not trouble you with quotations from any more speeches, or from the glowing leaders written upon them in official or unofficial journals. It only remains to be told that the Emperor and Empress, surrounded by the younger members of their family, received a deputation of the honoured guests on the 26th. For this purpose the whole of the travellers repaired to Zarsko-Selo, though only some twenty had been selected for admission to the presence. On arriving at the chateau, they were first led to the chapel to attend holy mass. This preliminary of all Russian state actions being over, the deputation was conducted to the hall of reception, the rest of the invited brethren grouping themselves along

the gallery through which his Majesty had to pass. The Emperor and Imperial family did not keep the deputation waiting. Entering the hall a few moments after their arrival, his Majesty wished them good-morning, and signed to the Lord Chamberlain, Prince Lieven, to introduce the individual members to him. As their names were successively mentioned by the Court functionary, his Majesty addressed a few questions to some of them. One Militshevitsh, from Servia, he asked whether the Turks had already evacuated Belgrade when he set off for St. Petersburg. The question having been answered in the affirmative, his Majesty replied, 'It is well that the affair has been brought to a conclusion at length.' Dr. Polit, from Agram, who had made the flaming speech already cited, also attracted Imperial attention, his Majesty asking him whether he understood Russian. 'I am learning it,' said Dr. Polit. M. Schafarik, a Czechian living in Servia, was honoured with the like question, and on informing the royal querist that he spoke only a little, received the following gracious reply: 'You speak it well enough; we perfectly understand each other.'

The same gentleman had then the honour of presenting an address in the name of the Servian members of the deputation, which was to the following effect:

'Your Imperial Majesty,—We thank your Majesty for having graciously condescended to grant us the light of thy countenance; this token of Imperial goodwill fills the heart of all Slavonians with grateful joy. It particularly rejoices our more immediate compatriots, the inhabitants of the principality of Servia, who with true devotion have always looked up to the great monarchs of Russia as their kind and potent protectors. We pray God to grant your Majesty many happy years to come, not alone for the welfare of the Russian people, which under your enlightened sceptre is so rapidly advancing in the path of progress, but also for the prosperity and consolation of all Slavonic tribes.'

The Emperor replied:

'I thank you for your good wishes. We have always looked upon the Servians as our own brothers; and I hope that God will allow your

affairs to take a more favourable turn at no distant future. God grant that all your wishes be speedily fulfilled!'

Upon which the Czechians cried *Slava*, the Servians *Zivio*, and the other races according to their speech. As the Austrian Kaiser might have objected to any of his subjects presenting a petition to a foreign potentate, the Servians, who owe but a sort of hybrid allegiance to the Sultan, were the only ones from whom an address was accepted. In the conversation that ensued the Empress deigned to express her regret that the Slavonian peoples had not a common alphabet and orthography. The Emperor dismissed the deputation with the following words:

'Farewell, gentlemen. I salute you, my dear Slavonian brethren, on this our common Slavonian soil. I hope you will be satisfied with your reception here and at Moscow. *Au revoir!*'

Before leaving the palace the deputies were shown over the state apartments, and entertained at an exquisite *déjeuner à la fourchette.*

INTERNATIONAL COURTESIES QUALIFIED BY ARMAMENTS.

RUSSIA ADMONISHES TURKEY.

Berlin, May 31, 1867.

YESTERDAY afternoon the Emperor of Russia and the Grand Duke Vladimir arrived at Potsdam, in company with the King, who had joined them at the Berlin terminus. The royal travellers were ceremoniously received by the Princes of the blood, the generals of the garrison, and the great dignitaries of State. This afternoon his Russian Majesty, whose suite includes the most distinguished names of the Empire, such as Adlerberg, Schuvaloff, and Dolgoroukoff, will continue his journey

to Paris. That he is also attended by Prince Gortschakoff and Privy Councillor von Hamburger, the Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is, perhaps, the most significant feature of the trip. Baron Talleyrand and Count Revertera, respectively the French and Austrian ambassadors at St. Petersburg, passed through Berlin two days ago, *en route* for Paris and Vienna.

King William, too, has made up his mind to visit Paris, and will set out on the 4th proximo. To reconcile his wish of viewing the Exhibition in company with the Czar, and the desire expressed by Napoleon to receive the two august guests separately, the King will arrive a few days after his nephew, and, it seems, leave a day or two before him. This latter intention is, however, not unalterably fixed. King William will be accompanied by Generals von Moltke and Treskow, Count Goltz, Adjutants Count Lehndorf and Prince Anton Radzivil, and last, not least, Count Bismarck and two of his confidential assistants in the Foreign Office.

Count Bismarck, at first rather unwilling to be of the party, determined to go only in consequence of the King's orders. When his presence at the triple interview had been decided upon, the *Kreuz Zeitung* published a few lines against a recent article in the semi-official *Pays* deprecating the visit of the Count because he had mystified France in 1866. 'That the policy of this eminent statesman'—the *Kreuz Zeitung* retorted—'had tended to benefit his own country rather than foreign States, and was more highly praised by his compatriots than by the French, was a circumstance not likely to be blamed in any civilised part of the world.' The *Pays* having farther observed, that if the Count were inconsiderate enough to come, he would be treated with respectful courtesy, notwithstanding all that had gone before, the *Kreuz Zeitung* also took occasion to remark, that 'respect on the part of the *Pays* would be more desirable than familiarity.'

Count Bismarck, the angry reply concluded, was in the happy position of one who could afford to dispense with the affection of the *Pays*, while he had the grateful acknowledgments of Germany. A strange prologue to the journey, this bandying of words between the two ministerial papers.

But the uncertain relations between Prussia and France are reflected in more than one government organ. It has excited no little attention, for instance, that the *Journal de l'Empire* was ordered, and the *Presse* suffered, to publish gratuitous attacks against the Crown Prince during his few days' sojourn in Paris. It would really appear that more is required than the evacuation of Luxemburg to restore cordiality between Bonaparte and Hohenzollern. This also peeps out in a chance hit of the *Kreuz Zeitung*. Repeating the rumour that Napoleon will visit Berlin and St. Petersburg in the course of September, the 'inspired' journal finishes it off with the addition, 'scarcely matured as yet.'

No, not as yet. The result of the Paris interview must be awaited before even the intention can have birth. Russia's connection with the Berlin Court is a peculiar one. Though sure to support Prussia to the extent of preventing Austria from recruiting her strength at the former's expense, Russia will not spare the feelings of this Government in matters comparatively secondary, but in themselves important enough. Russia does not favour the absorption of the Southern States by Austria, but is as little disposed to promote their accepting the Prussian protectorate. Again, in a German war with France, she would have no wish to see Denmark ranked among the enemies of this nation, but at the same time grumbles at the delay which has taken place in the cession of Northern Schleswig. In a word, Russia neither wishes Prussia to succumb nor to grow: the one would restore the strength of Austria, Russia's principal antagonist, the other might render

Prussia a more formidable neighbour than desirable. From all which we may gather that Napoleon will not find it very easy to conclude a bargain at the impending Conference. To make an agreement possible between Paris and St. Petersburg, the former would have to give up all idea of damaging Berlin. But why should Paris support Petersburg at Constantinople, unless rewarded at Cologne? What else has Petersburg to offer?

Speaking of North Schleswig, Count Bismarck, at a time when a peaceable solution of the Luxemburg controversy could not be foreseen with any certainty, thought it as well to sound the Danish Cabinet on this point. Among other inquiries, he begged to ascertain whether the Danish Cabinet were prepared to assume the responsibility of a certain amount of the Schleswig debt, and also to give guarantees that the national rights of the German inhabitants of Northern Schleswig would not be invaded after the reversion of that district to Denmark. To these uncanny questions the Danish Government made no distinct reply, preferring to consult the Powers before committing themselves to any definite course. This is the aspect of things at the present moment; one which, in diplomatic language, is styled 'pending negotiations.'

Journals which this Government occasionally prompts continue watching the progress of French armaments with breathless vigilance. The *Spener Zeitung* says, that the reduction of the French army, consequent upon the favourable issue of the London Conference, does not amount to more than 18,000. The increase in the preceding month is estimated at little less than 80,000. The same journal learns that 40,000 horses have been lately bought by the French Government in Hungary, and 3,000 more ordered after the close of the Conference. The quantity of corn and oats exported to France from Germany and Poland within the last two months is stated by the *Spener Zeitung* to be far greater than the provisions

required from abroad in years of scarcity; and the dictum is appended, that the lust of war does not seem to be much allayed in Paris. Independent organs, of which I will only quote the *Frankfort Journal*, are assured by their Paris correspondents that trains carrying ammunition and other material are still being frequently dispatched to Strasburg and Metz. Without pretending to sift the correctness of these reports, I deem it but fair to counterbalance them by adding that, according to the *Augsburg Gazette*, 6,000 horses have been bought by Prussia in Hungary. The Nassau and Hesse-Cassel reserves have been embodied.

General Ignatieff, the Russian Envoy at Constantinople, has been raised to the ambassadorial rank. On presenting his new credentials to the Sultan, the General made the following characteristic speech:

'His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, being desirous to give a solemn expression to the importance he attaches to the political relations between two empires connected by so many interests, has been pleased to promote me to the dignity of an ambassador. I have been among the first dispatched to this capital to pay the tribute of honour due to the generous intentions loudly proclaimed by your Majesty on your accession to the throne. On two memorable occasions I had the supreme happiness of receiving from your Majesty's own lips the assurance that all your subjects, irrespective of creed and race, will be henceforth the sole object of your solicitude, and that their welfare is to be the aim of your Majesty's Government now and ever. The development of the natural resources of this beautiful country, and the well-being of the different nations inhabiting it, will be fully secured from the day when your Majesty's paternal intentions are carried out in the interior of the realm. Russia does not harbour any selfish designs. Bound, however, as she is by a common religion, tradition, and nationality to a considerable portion of your Majesty's subjects, she takes a most earnest interest in everything really calculated to promote their welfare. After a three years' residence at Constantinople, I cannot consider myself a stranger here. I should be happy were I to succeed in advancing the friendly relations between the two adjoining countries.'

To this admonitory harangue the Sultan replied:

'I thank his Majesty the Emperor for this new proof of his desire to strengthen the ties of friendship and goodwill existing between the two

contiguous nations. My whole attention will be ever directed to the welfare of my subjects, and I shall assiduously endeavour to consolidate my friendly relations with the Russian Empire. Fully recognising your uncommon gifts, I have learnt with particular satisfaction your appointment to the office of ambassador.'

The meaning of the ambassadorial address is not liable to misapprehension on the part of any one conversant with the recent proceedings of Russian diplomacy in the East. To guard against its being considered mere phraseology even by the uninitiated, the semi-official *Journal de St. Petersbourg* accompanies it with the complaint that none of the Sultan's promises have been kept.

With Russia, France for the present coöperates. Both have just proposed to the Powers to address an identical Note to the Porte touching the affairs of Crete. In it the Porte is to be advised, first, to conclude an armistice with the insurgents, each party retaining possession of the territory respectively held by them; secondly, to put the question to the vote whether they wish to remain Turkish subjects or not; and thirdly, to allow this act of universal suffrage to take place under the superintendence of European Commissaries. Should England countenance this Gallo-Russian device, it is sure to be supported by Austria.

THE KING OF PRUSSIA AT PARIS. MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND FINANCIAL REORGANISATION OF GERMANY. NORTH SCHLESWIG.

Berlin, June 5, 1867.

YESTERDAY afternoon the King left for Paris. The immediate cause of his Majesty's journey is not the original invitation of Napoleon III. Qualified as it was by the subsequent wish that his arrival should not be simul-

taneous with that of the Czar, it is doubtful whether it would have been accepted. If his Majesty has determined to go, it is in consequence of a second request, sent at the particular desire of the Czar, who did not like the idea that his journey should interfere with that of his royal uncle. The second invitation of Napoleon III. was transmitted to his Majesty through the Crown Prince.

A few days ago the *Nord-Deutsche Zeitung* charged France with forcing this country, and indeed the entire Continent, to maintain their armies on the present expensive footing. The semi-official paper sarcastically added:

'But perhaps we ought not to ask France to conform to the ordinary rules of humanity. It cannot be expected that a country whose specific civilising mission brought on wars in the East and Italy, and compelled it to carry its colours to Rome, Syria, China, Cochin China, and Mexico, will quiet European anxieties by giving the signal for a general disarmament.'

The anxiety caused by the constant dread of war has made emigration rise to an unprecedented pitch. The Germans are nowadays leaving the old country at the rate of 225,000 a year. Far from feeling safely housed beneath the shelter of their new institutions, people are still yearning for better days to come. It was this restless trepidation of the public mind which a few weeks since preferred downright war to a state of prolonged uncertainty, and which even now is pining for some great change in European affairs, that shall establish peace on a more durable and endurable basis. When the war does come, the Germans will be sure to carry it on with an energy commensurate to the indignation they experience at the frivolity with which it is being conjured up.

While the million are thus being swayed by vague hopes and apprehensions, leading politicians are endeavouring to weld the North well together, preparatory to its being linked to the South. Last week witnessed some remarkable steps in this direction. The second vote on

the Federal Constitution was passed by the Prussian Commons, the Liberals declaring that they will no longer oppose its many deficiencies, but heartily coöperate in carrying it out. Progress in the matter of parliamentary prerogative would be desirable; progress in the matter of unity is indispensable. The three Hanse Towns consented to merge their contingents in the Prussian army in consideration of this Government bearing a portion of the expense. To suit the peculiar needs of their seafaring inhabitants, Prussia agreed that Bremeners, Hamburgers, and Lubeckers shall not be troubled with service in the reserve or Landwehr, while living in transoceanic ports. As a matter of course, the like privilege will be accorded to the citizens of all other North German States.

The day before yesterday the leading Ministers of the four Southern States met at Berlin to confer with Count Bismarck on the reorganisation of the Zollverein, rendered necessary by the new Federal institutions of the North. Under the old arrangements of the Customs Union, modelled on the absurd pattern of the former Federal charter, every member of the League had an absolute veto accorded him, no matter what the dimensions of his territory or the necessity of the alterations contemplated by his allies. The Northern States have been deprived of this preposterous privilege by the new Federal charter handing over tariff affairs to the central Government, and thereby making them dependent upon majority votes in the Parliament and the Executive Committee of the Confederacy. To extend this reform to the remaining part of the national territory, the four Southern Governments have been invited to appoint members to the Executive Committee, and allow deputies to be sent from their respective countries to the Federal Parliament, there to sit and vote whenever tariff and excise are on the tapis. As Count Bismarck left yesterday with the King, an understanding seems to have been speedily arrived at.

That this commercial reunion will be immediately followed by the adhesion of the South to the Northern political institutions is more than can be expected at this juncture. On the one hand, Prussia is not at all inclined to provoke the wrath of France by precipitating affairs, so long as she may indulge a reasonable hope of avoiding war by discreet and temperate policy. On the other hand, three out of the four Southern Governments decline to hasten on the day when the revival of the nation will have to be consummated by their acknowledging the supremacy of Hohenzollern. In the interest of self-preservation they have engaged to resign their armies to Prussia in the event of war; but to maintain as much of their former independence as is possible under the circumstances, they shrink from any more intimate connection with this Government, and will not allow their subjects to participate in the common institutions of the North. They have pacified Prussia at the end of the Seven Days' Campaign, and purchased her protection against foreign foes, by promising to recognise her command in matters military; but they mean to stop at this concession as long as they can.

One of these Governments does not scruple to avow that it would not object to reclaim what has been given away, in case it were favoured by circumstances. The other day the Darmstadt Chamber asked for the recall of the Hessian Envoy at Paris, and the entire abrogation of his office, which, they held, might be appropriately blended with that of the Prussian representative. To these suggestions Herr von Dalwigk, the leading minister of the Grand Duchy, made a reply which will not easily be forgotten:

'There might be an international conflict some day,' he hinted, 'when it would be to the advantage of Hesse to be on good terms with France. Hesse-Darmstadt had certain interests of her own, which could not be properly represented by the envoys of Prussia or the North German Con-

federacy. She must keep up friendly relations with all the Powers her neighbours, and if entering into a political alliance at all, had better join States nearer her own size than the great military empires prevailing at this time. This might be regrettable; but it was the necessary consequence of the war which had cut Germany in twain, and which, among so many other painful results, had now led to the loss of a portion of the nation's soil—Luxemburg.'

It is not a little bold in Herr von Dalwigk, that he should blame Prussia for evacuating Luxemburg while half announcing an intention to make a common cause with France, if an opportunity offers. By way of giving him to understand what they thought of his politics, the Chamber passed a motion, that the southern half of Hesse should follow the example of the northern, and join the Confederacy at once. Of course, their vote will not receive the sanction of the Sovereign that employs Herr von Dalwigk.

Not finding her policy supported in every quarter, France has given up advocating the plan that an identical Note of the Powers, recommending the cession of Crete, should be presented to the Porte. At the same time she has brought forward another proposal, tending, perhaps, to a similar end, but following it up in a more cautious manner. What she wishes now is, that the Sultan should be asked to allow the state of the insurgent isle to be inquired into by commissaries of the Powers, acting in concert with some of his own choice. Austria acquiesces in the scheme, and the concurrence of Russia is a matter of course. As the official *Invalide* says, in a telegram from Constantinople, an understanding has been established between the Paris and St. Petersburg Cabinets concerning the affairs of the East, and the Sultan's journey will be mainly undertaken to weaken its effects.

The Slavonian deputies have arrived at Moscow, the reception being as demonstrative as at St. Petersburg.

The Danish Cabinet have signified to this Government that before giving an opinion upon the overtures con-

cerning the cession of Northern Schleswig, farther details must be communicated to them. This probably means, they will put off mentioning terms till the eve of war, when they may hope to exact favourable conditions from Prussia or France, accordingly as they befriend the one or the other.

It is asserted that the recruits enlisted for the legion of King George exceed 200. In consequence of the discovery of the plot, Queen Mary, the consort of King George, has been left the option of either quitting Hanover or accepting the attendance of unsuspected persons, to be selected by the Prussian Government. I need scarcely add, that her Majesty has chosen to join her husband at Vienna.

THE CZAR'S LIFE ATTEMPTED BY A POLE AT PARIS.

Berlin, June 8, 1867.

Of the several thousand Poles eating the bread of exile in France, one has aimed a shot at the Czar. It appears, the melancholy colony has been in a state of intense excitement ever since the arrival of the Sovereign whom they regard as their one uncompromising enemy upon earth. Accustomed to persecution on the part of Russia, and to support on that of France, they were provoked at witnessing a cordial meeting between the rulers of the two very countries they thought least likely to join in friendly intercourse. Was France, beloved France, suddenly to abandon their cause, casting in her lot with their hereditary foe? Was Napoleon, the nephew of the uncle they had served so well, to throw them overboard after all, and ally himself to their adversary? Heated by the arrival of the Czar, irritated by the courtesies shown him, the more ardent spirits among them were

positively maddened by the fear of losing the only chance they believed they had of recovering independence. Personal rancour aggravated political hatred, and the recollections of the immediate past did not tend to allay their anger. They knew they bore love to no Russian man; but they felt particularly aggravated at Alexander exhibiting himself to their gaze when he had so recently crushed them with an iron hand.

The feelings prevailing among the fugitives before the attempt may be guessed at from a correspondence in the *Posen Dziennik*. It is dated Paris, June 2, and runs as follows:

'Yesterday arrived the Czar. It was a sorrowful day for the Poles in Paris. The streets he had to pass through were decorated with garlands and colours. Here and there, especially in front of elegant shops patronised by Russian customers, the two-headed eagle was displayed on a golden escutcheon. As the Czar left the terminus the troops presented arms, the band striking up the Russian national hymn. Mournfully fell the sounds upon the Polish ear. Our hearts sank within us, and we remembered the Psalmist complaining that the friends he had loved had deserted him, and those whom his soul had yearned after had done him violence. While some of our Slavonic brethren are banqueting at Moscow with the Moscovites, denouncing Poland, and in drunken tones singing, "God preserve the Czar!" the same hymn resounds on the banks of the Seine, amid those that are our brethren in the spirit, though not in race and descent. The successor of the great Emperor, whose cause we supported to the last moment of his rule, welcomes the Czar, whose hands are stained with Polish blood. God and the peoples, who give power to kings, will some day pronounce judgment upon the unscrupulous levity with which serious interests are being sacrificed to diplomatic considerations. It is certain that not only the Poles, but the hearts of many, very many Frenchmen, have been sorely wounded by the display at the terminus. When Mickiewicz died—and that is not so very long ago either—there was nothing to be seen of the Russian St. Andrew's riband, nor do we remember hearing the Russian hymn on that mournful and solemn day.'

To the above no more striking contrast can be imagined than yesterday's leader in the official *Warsaw Dziennik*. It so happens that the 5th of June is the anniversary of the Czar's preservation from the hand of a previous as-

sassin. Alluding to this fortunate escape, the Warsaw government journalist thus describes the feelings of his Polish countrymen on the occasion:

'The anniversary of the all-auspicious day when our most august Sovereign was miraculously saved from an assassin's criminal attack on his Imperial Majesty's valuable life has been commemorated by divine service and deeds of charity in the kingdom of Poland. At Siedlce the clerks in the Financial Department, in accordance with the proposal of their chief, requested permission to place and keep up a lamp before the miraculous image of the Mother of God, preserved in the Treasury building there. At Rieloe the clerks of the various branches of the service united in sending a telegram to the Governor-General of the kingdom, requesting his good offices to lay their congratulations at the feet of his Imperial Majesty. In Wloszozaff the Jewish community drew up a most humble address. Processions were made and prayers offered up in all churches and synagogues in the province of Lublin. At Suwalki there was divine service in the Orthodox as well as the Lutheran and Catholic churches. The inhabitants of the district of Walkowyszki manifested a wish to build a hospital, and call it after the Emperor Alexander; while officials and peasants opened a subscription in aid of the erection of an Orthodox church at Kibarty. The inhabitants of Lipno, in the province of Plock, besides attending thanksgiving services in their various churches and dispatching a most humble address, entertained the soldiers and officials in the townhall and the square in front. His Imperial Majesty, having been informed of these loyal manifestations, graciously condescended to command that his thanks should be expressed to the persons and communities who had taken part in them.'

What a difference between the Posen and the Warsaw article! The one portrays the feelings of the fugitives; the other represents the people as dutifully attached to a Sovereign who certainly meant well by them, though he would not restore them the only boon they value—national independence. The Posen editor, living under the clement sceptre of Prussia, is at liberty to insert correspondence betraying his bent; the Warsaw journalist, wielding his pen in the service of the local authorities, would be set down as a traitor, were he to take any but the Russian point of view.

It is to this diversity of treatment accorded to the severed fragments of the unfortunate race that we are indebted

for an expression of Polish opinion on the last amnesty of the Czar. Having on his journey to Paris got as far as Wierzboloff, the last station on Russian territory,* Alexander II. accorded a conditional amnesty to certain classes of Polish political criminals. The place and time of this act of sovereign grace led some to think that it was intended to oblige the French, the patrons of Poland, previous to the Czar's arrival in Paris. A more generous explanation represented the Czar as wishing to intimate to the Polish refugees he was about to meet, that he would be happy to forget the past and let bygones be bygones, if they would only loyally accept his rule. Certain it is that endeavours have been making in the Polish colony to draw up a conciliatory address, to be presented to the Czar during his sojourn at the Tuileries. But the number of signatures obtained seems to have been too small to warrant the idea being carried out. Why the Poles did not look upon the amnesty as sufficient to blot out the remembrance of the past appears from a leader in the *Posen Dziennik*, which I subjoin in part:

'Not belonging to those who make opposition for opposition's sake, we had hoped that the new amnesty would be an act of political generosity, and alleviate the miseries of our brethren under Muscovite rule. However well acquainted with the illusory character of similar favours recently proclaimed, we yet were inclined to take an optimistic view in the present instance. But a glance at the text of the document in question has disappointed our hopes. The only real concessions made in it are contained in the first and last paragraphs. By virtue of these clauses no fresh prosecutions are to be instituted, and proceedings pending in the courts discontinued, if the crime alleged refer to the last insurrection. There will be many a prison-door opened, many anxious fears be set at rest, many extortions prevented, if this provision be really acted upon. Beyond this, no *bonâ-fide* favour is conferred. Neither those sentenced to transportation, nor those serving in "penal battalions," or placed in the ranks without the right of promotion, will derive any advantage from the amnesty. Of the condemned, the only persons benefited are those sent to live in distant parts of the Empire without judicial sentence or inquiry. As if this restriction of Imperial favour were not enough, clergymen are alto-

* Wirballen, opposite the Prussian hamlet of Eydkuhnen.

gether excepted. The very number of the *Official Gazette* in which the amnesty is published, contains a decree deposing the Bishop of Podlachia, and uniting his diocese with that of Lublin.

The present amnesty, therefore, is as deceptive as the various similar acts that have preceded it. It only differs from them in that the motives prompting its issue are more easily seen through. After allowing so many toasts to be drunk to Panslavonic fraternity at Moscow and St. Petersburg, it was necessary to quiet the misgivings of the Slavonian heart by a crust thrown to the Poles. Another incentive was, the wish to produce an effect upon the French. People at Paris have long denounced the treatment accorded us, and, with genuine candour, had begun to avow their sentiments as soon as they heard of the Emperor's intention to visit their city. As to ourselves, we know what to think of Muscovite forgiveness. Far from admitting that any alteration has taken place in the system pursued for the extermination of our race, we, on the contrary, maintain that the tens of thousands of Polish convicts will not be in the least affected by this act of the Czar.'

Napoleon, too, comes in for a share of Polish wrath. Having shaken hands with the Sovereign whom some years ago he had a mind to fight on the nationality principle, the *Cracow Czas* treats him to the following remarks:

'The victor in an advantageous lawsuit can afford to make peace with his defeated adversary. He may pay him a friendly visit, sit down with him in chatty confab, and disarm him by a cheap generosity. The Emperor Napoleon has been worsted in two processes. The one, instituted against Prussia, referred to the affairs of Germany; the other, in which the Czar was his antagonist, had something to do with Poland. So his victors may well be polite, and call upon him at his own capital. That there is not much consolation derivable from their visits is, however, certain. France is scarcely blind enough to cheat herself into the belief that they are meant as an honour conferred upon her. Even if she were, Napoleon would be too shrewd to share her fallacies. On the contrary, the royal travellers have only appeared at Paris because their triumph is too manifest to permit of their journey being regarded as an act of homage. To wait upon the conqueror would have been humiliation; to salute the routed is magnanimous. Napoleon III. cannot but remember that the foreign princes who used to visit his uncle were placed in a different position to that now occupied by William and Alexander towards him.

Yes, France has ceased to be formidable to those who, when promenading in the Boulevard Sebastopol, can afford to smile at the name of that beautiful street, remembering, as they do, that they were strong enough to laugh at French intercession for Poland. Yes, France no

longer scares those others, who, when standing upon the Pont de Jena, may glory in the thought that whatever unpleasantnesses may have occurred in the past, they were blotted out at Waterloo, and obliterated at Königgrätz. It is true, though they no longer fear France, they may yet require her services. The principle of nationality proclaimed by France has been turned to good account by Russia and Prussia. What wonder, then, that the two latter, before proceeding farther, and venturing upon another decided step, should try to secure the goodwill of the Paris Cabinet? We do not know whether Napoleon, so long an unwilling instrument in their hands, will now allow himself to be made a conscious tool; but should he entertain their overtures, the Foreign Ministers of his guests are at hand, everything may be committed to paper at once, an arrangement be properly drawn up,' &c. &c.

The above is the worst that has ever been said of this, or indeed any previous Napoleon, in a Polish paper. It is a good illustration of partners quarrelling on the collapse of a joint enterprise. Having failed to oblige *them*, Napoleon is taunted by the Poles with impotence to assert *himself*.

RUSSIA AND POLAND.

Berlin, June 12, 1867.

THE following depositions of Berezowski—the assassin who attempted the life of the Czar at Paris—have been officially promulgated at St. Petersburg:

'My name is Anthony Berezowski. I was born at Ruteski, Volhynia. I am twenty years old. I am a mechanic. I left Russia after the last insurrection. I went to Paris, where I have lived for two years. My family has been banished to the eastern provinces of the empire, having been implicated in the insurrection. I confess to having fired at the Czar on his return from the review. Since my infancy I have meditated this blow, and the deliverance of my country. My determination to shoot him in Paris dates from two weeks back. I did not communicate it to any one, but went alone to the review. I bought the pistol on the Boulevard Sébastopol the day before the attempt, between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, and paid nine francs for it. I had saved a

little money from my earnings, and also pawned an overcoat for eight francs. On the day of the deed I rose at four o'clock and recast my bullets, those I had bought being too small. I had no intercourse with any one that morning. When the bullets were ready, I went out to breakfast, and then proceeded to the Champs Elysées. Not having shot at the Czar on his way to the parade, as I intended, I determined to carry out my resolve when he came back. So when the imperial carriage drove past, I fired. I should have done it three days previously at the Opera, if I had had a pistol with me. I observed the Emperor closely at that time to make sure of his identity.'

The first telegram published at the Russian capital stated the assassin to be 'apparently a Frenchman.' The wildest suspicions were generated by this mistake. On the truth becoming known, public excitement somewhat subsided: after all, it was only a Pole. Among the upper classes, the disposition to generalise and charge the deed of one man upon the entire race to which he belongs was pretty notable; the lower orders being awe-struck, did not allow any marked demonstration of sentiment to escape them. To thank the Almighty for the preservation of the Emperor, solemn services were performed in St. Isaac's Cathedral and other churches, all well attended.

The day after the arrival of the intelligence the official *Invalide* gave unreserved utterance to the feelings aroused in the Government and people:

'The whole population of this capital is engrossed by one thought, one feeling. The horror which filled all hearts on learning the sad news soon gave way to unbounded gratitude to Providence, who had so visibly guarded the precious life of the Czar. Whoever has seen the Russian people at such moments of loyal enthusiasm can estimate their love for our hereditary Monarch—a love which, arising out of the best traditions of our past, has been enhanced and deepened by so many recent benefits. Crowds congregated in the streets to listen to the melancholy reports. There was not a man among them but uncovered his head and devoutly crossed himself on hearing the miraculous preservation of the Czar. Louder than noisy demonstrations could have done did those silent prayers testify to the warm and grateful emotions awakened in the subjects of the Czar Liberator.

The criminal is a Pole from the province of Volhynia, and emigrated two years ago. In these few words enough is comprised to account for

the enormity committed by him. His attempt is one of the fruits ripened in that colony of emigrants which has set itself the task of rendering Russia odious to the nations of the earth, which has repeatedly infested Poland with its emissaries, and, alas, found but too many adherents there. Perhaps it will be urged, that the Pole Berezowski has no accomplices among his compatriots. But as long as these Poles are lurking about everywhere in Europe, devoured by the one idea of destroying Russia, her people, and her Government, we shall hold them one and all responsible for this nefarious action. Granting that Berezowski did not play a prominent part among the exiles, we assert, nevertheless, that the poisonous atmosphere in which he lived, and which has already hatched so many conspiracies, exercised its baneful influence upon his poor muddled brain.

His Majesty the Emperor arrived in Paris almost simultaneously with the news of the amnesty generously accorded to the criminals of the last insurrection. Berezowski's deed is the answer of the Polish faction to the desire for reconciliation so often manifested in our midst. Only a fanaticism like the Polish could produce a fanatic like Berezowski. But the intrigues of our enemies will only serve to swell the triumph of Russia. By miraculously saving his life, God affords us an indication that the Czar has chosen the right path, and that, while he treads it, the protection of the Most High and the unfathomable love of his people will not fail our august Monarch.'

Little as the reader may suspect it, the last sentence is aimed against Russians rather than Poles. It implies a severe criticism on the aristocratic party in the Government, who, disapproving recent attempts to exterminate the Polish nobility as a class, have recommended reconciliation with the subject race. The innuendo has been felt to strike home. Powerful as the aristocrats are on many other points, their influence upon the affairs of Poland will be smaller than ever after this attempt. The Russian nationality party, who look upon the tolerance of foreign tongues and religions as prejudicial, will now have it all their own way. Of the Polish papers appearing on Russian territory none have been suffered to dilate upon the event of the day. The bare fact alone is divulged. The first and hitherto only telegram officially published at Warsaw was in French, and ran as follows:

'*Paris, 7 Juin.*

'La Providence a veillé sur notre Souverain hier. Au retour de la grande

revue au bois de Boulogne, on a tiré contre voiture occupée par les deux Empereurs et nos deux Grands Ducs. Personne heureusement n'a été atteint. Le misérable est Polonais.

Comte Berg, Varsovie. ADLERBERG.'

Count Berg, the Governor-General of the kingdom, having instantly replied by transmitting his own congratulations and those of the city of Warsaw to the Emperor, the latter responded in another telegram:

'*Paris*, 8 *Juin*, *à* 2*h*. 20*m*.

'Je vous remercie de vos deux télégrammes au nom de la société Russe et des habitants Polonais de Varsovie, et vous charge de leur exprimer ma reconnaisance de leurs sentiments et vœux.

Maréchal, Comte Berg. ALEXANDRE.'

The Polish papers published on Austrian and Prussian territory unite in condemning the deed. The *Cracow Czas*, the leading organ of Galicia, has the following:

'Having but too frequently had occasion to speak of designs aiming at the murder of Kings, we need not now say that we repudiate them, whatever the motive, or whoever the perpetrator. From a religious and moral point of view, it is a grievous crime to kill a king; politically the atrocity of the act is equally great. The assassination attempted in Paris, a sinful act in itself, is, politically weighed, even a graver mistake than many similar enterprises of the kind. The perpetrator is a Pole, and the crime was committed on hospitable soil. Despair alone could thus forget the gratitude we owe to France. But Providence has graciously averted the blow. Let us thank God for his benevolent interposition. No Pole as yet has soiled his hands with royal blood. France will forgive the desperate folly of the man. By permitting such a crime Providence does not resign its government of the world. It only punishes some, cautions others, and imparts wholesome instruction to all. It is with an aching heart that we indite these words. Does not Europe perceive the dreadful harvest which is being reaped from the seeds of injustice? Does not Europe notice the hate and distracted frenzy engendered in a nation whose millions are oppressed in their religion, robbed of their country, and dispossessed of their worldly goods?'

The same sentiment is more explicitly avowed by the *Posen Dziennik*:

'We shall not engage in any moral reflections upon the assassination of kings. The subject is one of those that have been treated *usque ad nauseam*, and our own opinion upon it cannot be doubtful. Nor shall we

account for the present attempt because of the barbarous oppression of Poland by Muscovy; that oppression not being the work of a single person, but rather of a hundred-headed hydra. Leaving these two questions on one side, we are yet obliged to say that, from the Polish political point of view, the attempt is one of the worst calamities our cause has sustained, even in these latter years of uninterrupted misfortune. The cause of Poland had just begun to command public attention again. Even at the Slavonian meeting in Moscow voices were heard pleading in our behalf in a tone different to that prevailing in Russia. In another extremity of Europe, on the Seine, Polish sympathies were reviving. With the exception of the Court, restrained by the ordinary considerations of etiquette, and some sordid shopkeepers, all Paris received the Emperor with the cry "*Vive la Pologne!*" Each hour of the Czar's sojourn witnessed the increase of these demonstrations. Unceasingly they reminded the Czar that there can be no understanding between him and France while the claims of justice and Poland remain unsatisfied. Already had the significant displays of sentiment in the Musée at Cluny, in front of the Opera, and elsewhere, roused the ire and awakened the fears of the Muscovite papers. But now comes this fatal shot, the offspring of such flagrant sin and evident madness, that we are almost tempted to ascribe it to some secret Muscovite agency, and frees the Czar from his embarrassed situation,' &c.

The article goes on to hope that France will not saddle this guilt of a single individual upon Poland.

'As little,' it winds up, 'as the attempts of the Pianoris and Orsinis on the life of Napoleon himself have prevented France from liberating Italy, as little, we trust, will Berezowski deprive Poland of French sympathies.'

NEGOTIATIONS IN VARIOUS QUARTERS.

Berlin, June 15, 1867.

RUSSIAN and French diplomates are learning but slowly to understand each other. The Paris Conference does not seem to have been very prolific. All the negotiators have hitherto been able to agree upon is, to combine to advocate the appointment of an International Commission to inquire into the state of Crete. Not to be out-

done by France in courtesy, Prussia has approved the step. England will probably do the same, without, however, engaging to act on the recommendation of the Commission. Why should England oppose a measure, harmless in itself, and agreed upon by three other Powers? A similar policy will be adhered to by Austria.

The Danish Government have declined entering into any engagement to respect the nationality of the German ingredient among the inhabitants of Northern Schleswig. In the opinion of the Copenhagen Cabinet such a guarantee would give rise to endless conflicts. This anticipation is probably correct; but the Germans in Northern Schleswig belonging as a rule to the well-to-do and educated classes, public opinion here highly approves of the foresight displayed in protecting them against the Danish country people.

Of the four South German States not included in the new Bund, three have agreed to join the common constitution of the North in all that regards Zollverein matters. Accordingly the representatives of their Governments will be admitted to the Federal Council, and the deputies of their people to the Federal Parliament, there to sit and vote whenever the tariff is under debate. To guard against her being outvoted in the Federal Council, Prussia reserves to herself a veto. The treaty embodying these arrangements, which are paving the way for the ultimate reunion of the South with the North, has just been completed in Berlin. One important point has not been allowed to transpire. We are ignorant of the date when the agreement is to come into operation. Is its validity, perhaps, made to depend upon the adhesion of Bavaria, which still keeps aloof? If so, this would be a harmless proviso. As none of the Southern States can afford to be expelled the Zollverein, nothing will remain, even for the largest of them, but to yield. Let Bavaria be ever so coy, let her Ministers be ever so willing to listen to Austrian whispers,

which do not cease to dissuade from unity, the penalty of leaving the Zollvercin would be too heavy to be borne. Her production as well as her consumption has been too long adapted to the common tariff of Germany to allow of a change.

Queen Mary of Hanover has received peremptory directions from her royal husband to remain on the soil of his former kingdom, until expelled by the authorities.

POLISH AND RUSSIAN RECRIMINATIONS.

Berlin, June 15, 1867.

BEREZOWSKI'S vindictive attempt to murder the Czar has fanned afresh the slumbering embers of animosity between rulers and ruled. Russian and Polish papers resound with mutual denunciations. What the Poles feel at this trying moment is apparent from a Warsaw correspondence in the *Posen Dziennik:*

'What shall I tell you as to the impression produced by the news of that unfortunate attempt? On the one hand, people are deeply afflicted at the thought that the noble hospitality of France, which has dried so many of our tears and healed so many of our aching wounds, should have been requited by an act of desperate madness; on the other hand, the many years of oppression, the executions, confiscations, and banishments to which we, helpless victims, have been so long subjected—are we to forget that these are the real causes of the crime? When so many hearts are panting for revenge, must we not attribute to reckless exasperation a deed which has fallen like a thunderbolt upon our hopes?'

But not all Warsaw is Polish and disaffected. There is a Russian club in that capital, whose members are devoted subjects, and have materially assisted in curbing the unruly spirits of the nation among whom they live. No sooner had the terrible tidings been received from Paris than the club passed an address thanking God for averting the assassin's ball, and entreating his Majesty to relin-

quish the idea of stopping at Warsaw on his way home. The address did not, however, reach its destination. General Berg, the Governor of the kingdom, to whom it had to be handed for transmission, declined to send it off. He could not, he urged, be expected to forward a paper indirectly charging him with allowing Warsaw to continue in a state which rendered it perilous for the Czar to visit the place. That the General is not disposed to look leniently upon the Poles at such a juncture, need be scarcely observed. After being strangely reticent upon the subject for some time, his organ, the *Warsaw Dziennik*, at length inserts a fierce correspondence from Paris:

'Our Polish emigrants here, including the correspondents of the *Cracow Czas*, the *Posen Dziennik*, and the *Lemberg Narodovka*, are quite as astute as they are malicious. They have couched a protest against the murderous attack upon the Czar. Coming from them, this protest is an act of the grossest effrontery. They were probably afraid of losing the pecuniary assistance they are in the habit of deriving from the French Government, and so made up their minds to throw Berezowski overboard. In reality they all are systematically employed in inoculating regicide. Two days ago these miserable fellows were only classed with calumniators; to-day they are the associates of a murderer. Berezowski confesses that it was their sarcasms, and the impertinent language daily indulged in by these scribblers, which had a powerful effect in urging him on to the commission of his crime. Berezowski also admits that he was a *gendarme pendeur* during the late insurrection, and that the perusal of the Polish journals made him meditate an imitation of the act for which his countrymen some time ago so much extolled Karakosoff. The emigrants have long denounced us for unjustly charging them with sanguinary doctrines, and the French press has seconded them. What will they say now that our accusations are confirmed by the report of the Polish pistol? With his own eyes Napoleon witnessed the fury of the people, bent upon tearing to pieces the individual who committed the atrocity in the Bois de Boulogne. He saw the tears of the French ladies, one of whom was wounded by the Polish bullet. He heard the cries of his gallant troops, "Down with Poland!" and "Death to the murderer!" "*Vive le Czar!*" The French people are convulsed with rage at having been led astray by the Poles.

Such is the situation of the moment. Young Poles at school at St. Cyr have been expelled the institution for not going to the review. The representative committee of the emigrants dares not assemble, the ring-

leaders having either absconded or been arrested. It is said that between the 6th and the 8th eighty Poles have been imprisoned. The trial of Berezowsky will be a short one, the rascal having declared that he has no accomplices, and that, were he to be pardoned, he would do it again. I was present at one of his examinations. He is about twenty-three, tall of stature, with harsh features and bloodthirsty eyes. His answers are marked with the most barefaced effrontery.'

There is a painful tendency to generalise in all this. An official organ, printed at the expense of the Polish Treasury, and intended to impart the opinion of the Polish Government to the Polish people, charges the Poles indiscriminately with having applauded Karakozoff. Nor is the wholesale accusation of Polish journalism justifiable. That Polish depression borders upon despair, and is becoming capable of anything, we know from the admission of the Poles themselves; but while all the leading organs and representative men of the nation deprecate murder, it is not a little hard to charge them with opposite tendencies, and mention individuals as virtually responsible for a deed which they have been the first to blame.

LORD STANLEY COMMENTS ON THE LUXEMBURG GUARANTEE. NORTH SCHLESWIG. THE PANSLAVONIC CONGRESS.

Berlin, June 22, 1867.

Lord Stanley's elucidations respecting the character of the guarantee contained in the Luxemburg treaty have been made the subject of vehement attack in this country.* The Liberal papers began, the Conservatives followed suit, until at length the journals connected with the Government joined in. If the Prussian Parliament, which is to

* Lord Stanley, then foreign secretary, in reply to a question from Mr. Labouchere, declared that the signatory Powers had acquired the right, but did not acknowledge the duty, of interference in the event of an infraction of the treaty by one of their number.

assemble shortly, is not too early adjourned, the matter will be brought forward for discussion.

Once more this Government has formally inquired of the Danish Cabinet what security they will give for respecting the nationality of those German inhabitants of Schleswig who would have to change their allegiance, if a portion of that polyglot country were restored to its former owners. Should the Danes again refuse to enter into an engagement on this head, it is not improbable they will be offered a small slice of land nevertheless, although in that case it will be very small indeed. The Danish Liberal papers, not having given up all hopes of a speedy collision between France and Prussia, are pretty unanimous in recommending their Government to decline unsatisfactory proposals, and wait for the time when better ones may be exacted by threats, or, if necessary, by force of arms.

That Bavaria submits to the Prussian veto in tariff and excise affairs is the most decided victory of the unity movement since last summer. The only concession obtained by the Munich Cabinet is the right to 'advise' this Government in drawing up commercial treaties with any of the States of Southern Europe. But how slight is this privilege in comparison to the engagement entered into by Bavaria, to allow all commercial innovations to be ultimately decided by Prussia, and to permit the representatives of her people to attend the Federal Parliament when Zollverein matters are discussed!

The Panslavonic Congress has concluded its sittings with a manifesto repudiating political designs, and stating its debates to have been of a purely scientific nature. Enough has been communicated in these Letters to enable the reader to judge the consistency of this asseveration. Nor were the parting speeches as exclusively devoted to learned lore as the farewell address would lead us to infer. At the last dinner, at Moscow, M. Riger, a Czechian, called upon the Russians to 'liberate the Slavonian sub-

jects of Turkey; a feat which would make all tribes of Slavonian descent bow down before their potent brethren of the North.' In reply, M. Lokoloff, a Russian, assured the foreign guests that Russia would chastise all those that might dare to offer insult or injury to any Slavonian tribe. Similar sentiments were expressed at the entertainment which closed the proceedings at St. Petersburg. M. Lamansky, the last speaker on that occasion, said 'that the Slavonic idea, from a mere phantasy, had risen to be a solid and substantial fact. It had left the privacy of the scholar's study, and appeared in the public street, in the church, and in the theatre. It had become a Russian, nay, a European question.' In point of plainness this leaves nothing to desire. It is not only politics, but *haute politique.*

Of the numerous interesting incidents connected with the Congress, one ought to be mentioned. In an enthusiastic telegram, dispatched at the close of the sittings, the Moscow Ethnographic Society, with whom the whole display originated, hailed the Prince of Montenegro as the future liberator of the Christian subjects of Turkey. Not to Montenegro alone, to Southern Slavonia generally, and also to the adjoining multi-national provinces of the Austrian Empire, shall we have to look for the effects of the extraordinary meeting just witnessed. Already the Belgrade papers teem with glowing articles upon the speeches made and the promises implied in them. The Prague *Narodni Listy* and *Swoboda* are eloquent upon the same attractive theme; the Slovenian press reëchoes the same wishes and hopes; and the *Zastava*, a Servian journal representing the Servo-Croatian interest at Pesth, contains about as many articles against the Magyars and the Kaiser as for the Russians and the Czar. According to the St. Petersburg correspondent of this latter organ, who is a member of the Congress, 'the Russians reckon with certainty that the whole Balkan peninsula will be in

a blaze and enveloped in fire and smoke before the summer is over.' In such an event, it is intimated, the help of the Russians will not be wanting to their 'Christian friends and co-nationalists. The prophecy will prove premature, as on so many similar occasions before. But even erroneous prophecies become a power, when popular sentiment prompts their constant repetition. A practical supplement to the Congress is the order given by the Russian Government, to facilitate in every way the admission of South Slavonian students to Russian schools and universities. The grammar-schools of Nicholayeffsk and the academy at Odessa have been especially assigned to these foreign scholars.

So eager is Russia to complete the south-western section of her railways, that a loan recently raised by the Kursk-Kieff Company is not only guaranteed by the Crown, but permitted to be issued at the rate of 75, making it a more profitable investment than Government stock. There is no precedent in Russian financial history of the Crown's prejudicing the sale of its own *métalliques*.

A SERVIAN GOVERNMENT PAPER ON THE PROJECT OF A RUSSO-FRENCH ALLIANCE. NAPOLEON DISSATISFIED WITH RUSSIA.

Berlin, June 24, 1867.

A FORTNIGHT ago, when the Czar was on his way to Paris, the Russian papers, and still more the papers of some minor nationalities under Russian patronage, expressed a hope that the journey would result in the conclusion of a Russo-French, or perhaps even a Russo-Prusso-French alliance. As an interesting specimen of the articles written under the influence of this intoxicating

idea, I subjoin one from the Belgrade *Vidov Dan*, a semi-official organ of the Servian Government. It is a leader published on the 8th of June, and runs as follows:

'His Majesty the Czar, on his way to Paris, has had an interview with his illustrious uncle, William I., at Potsdam; Prince Gortschakoff and Count Bismarck were present; and the conversation took an eminently political turn. The main points discussed are pretty clearly reflected in the intelligence, reaching us from different quarters, that a triple alliance between Russia, Prussia, and France, will in all probability be shortly concluded at Paris. While admitting that the news may be premature after all, we are yet inclined to think it likely enough. There are but two among the European Powers whose action can be anticipated with any degree of certainty, and these are Russia and Prussia. England's policy has been latterly swayed by considerations of a purely practical nature. England abstains from interfering where she has nothing to hope or apprehend, and, in point of fact, has scarcely any but commercial interests to guard. She takes delight in selling goods to the amount of so and so many millions a year to the East, but does not much care about which Power rules her customers. As to Austria, her influence is nowhere in these days, and to acquire her friendship can hardly enter into the plans of Napoleon III.

So nothing remains for the Cabinet of the Tuileries but to approach Russia and Prussia a little more closely. There is, of course, a considerable difference between *rapprochement* and alliance; but it is not considerable enough to constitute an impassable gulf, provided some valuable service is rendered the Czar. If, for instance, the Paris Treaty of 1856 were revised, and the Black Sea, which Nestor, the father of Russian chroniclers, even in his time called the Russian Sea, were reopened for the development of Russian power, this might be an acceptable offering. It is true, a proposition of this kind has been already made on the part of Herr von Beust. But Napoleon might seize the idea and turn it to his own purposes. He ought to do so the more readily, as Austria, being too feeble to oppose the policy of her neighbours, has taken pains to assume such a position as will at any time enable her to side with them. If, as we suppose, Napoleon does not like Austria's adopting so dubious a demeanour towards himself, this may be another reason why he imitates her example and makes overtures to the Berlin and St. Petersburg Courts. On these grounds we are led to believe that there is something in the report of a Russo-Prusso-French alliance. But in these things there is always something unfathomable to the uninitiated. Though the Russian and Prussian Sovereigns are now travelling to Paris—nay, though there is no question as to Napoleon's wishing to befriend the Czar—we ought not to indulge in too sanguine expectations beforehand.'

I presume not. For what says the *Moscow Gazette*, the stormy-petrel of the Russian Foreign Office, now that the Czar is journeying homewards:

'Can it be true that the resolve to send a Commission of Inquiry to Crete is the last word of diplomacy, the only effect of Christian interference in the East? Although sufficiently prepared for such an issue by the ambiguous character of preceding transactions, we cannot, in the interest of humanity, do otherwise than mourn that it should be so. For above a year the Cretans have been struggling like heroes; the Blue-books and Yellow-books of all nations have been filled with despatches, and this is the result.'

Indeed, it is becoming apparent that the Russian overtures have not been very warmly received at the Tuileries. Though no positive denial was given, the cautious and laconic answers returned were not of a nature to satisfy the ardent questioners among the northern visitors. It is scarcely necessary to add, that if France did not choose to enter into intimate relations with a Power which will not hand over Prussia to her tender mercies, she was still less inclined to hold out the hand of good fellowship to Prussia herself. As Russia cannot make up her mind entirely to detach herself from Prussia, and as France does not see the good of obliging the former, unless she is permitted to prey upon the latter, the negotiations between Czar and Emperor were hopeless from the outset. Why assist Russia on the Danube, when she is not to help herself on the Rhine? What can reward in distant parts avail her, when her heart is set upon a prize nearer home? Unpalatable propositions do not become more acceptable because made by leading personages. It would, however, be saying too much to affirm that the relations between the two northern Powers and France have undergone an alteration for the worse in consequence of the triple interview. On the contrary, the interview has restored former courtesy between the Sovereigns and their respective Cabinets; only they do not now expect much more

of each other than before the friendly *tête-à-tête*, and the conversations to which it led. Louis Napoleon seems disappointed: his papers, at any rate, are angry and irritable. They have indirectly contradicted the asseveration of the Prussian inspired press, that a great festival of international love and peace has just been celebrated at Paris. I do not know whether it ought to be ascribed to Prussian official indignation at this conduct, that the *Kreuz Zeitung*, which only a month ago ceased to denounce the continuance of French armaments, is again harping on its old string, and complains that more horses and corn are being bought in Hungary.

With reference to Crete, the Porte has abandoned all opposition to the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. It will sit at Constantinople, and consist of the ambassadors and envoys of the six Powers which recommended the step, with an admixture of Turkish members. England, in the preliminary stage of the proceedings, has cautiously refrained from identifying her policy with that of the other Powers. Like all Europe, she urged the expediency of a Commission; but she did so in a separate Note, and without joining the common action of the other Cabinets.

A PRUSSIAN SEMI-OFFICIAL ORGAN ON LORD STANLEY'S EXPLANATION OF THE LUXEMBURG GUARANTEE.

Berlin, June 25, 1867.

SUBJOINED is an article from the semi-official *North German Gazette* upon the explanations given by Lords Derby and Stanley concerning the nature of England's guarantee to the Luxemburg treaty:

'The declarations made by Lord Stanley in the House of Commons, and by Lord Derby in the House of Lords, as to the bearing of the English guarantee for the neutrality of Luxemburg and some other countries

could not fail to arouse a certain amount of attention. From the fact that several Powers have taken part in the treaty, and given what is called a collective guarantee, Lord Stanley deduces a weakening of its efficiency. This is a peculiar view. Hitherto people have been of opinion that neutrality was rendered the more valuable and the less assailable, the greater the number of the Powers guaranteeing it.

To come to a clear understanding upon the question raised, we must ascertain what does the guarantee of the neutrality of a country mean? Now, it cannot be doubted, that neutrality involving a limitation of the sovereign right of making war, the guarantee of neutrality is nothing else than a defensive alliance against possible attacks. As in all such cases, the question whether the *casus fœderis* exists or not is decisive as to the action developing itself out of the guarantee of neutrality. Setting aside this international question, it is indubitable, that except the neutralised State has provoked war by unlawfully attacking another party, the guarantee can be appealed to upon any violation.

If, therefore, for instance, England alone had guaranteed the neutrality, she would unquestionably be bound to afford military assistance as an ally in any case of attack, come it whence it might, from one State or from several. Thus the support of at least one great Power would be secured to the neutralised State.

Now, when Lord Stanley says, collective guarantee means that "in the event of the neutral State being violated, all the treaty Powers may be called upon to take collective action without any one of them alone being bound to intervene," he thereby asserts nothing less than that the guarantee of one great Power is of greater weight than that of all the great Powers taken together. The impossibility of Lord Stanley's theory is clear from the impossibility of its being a logical conclusion.

The statement made by Lord Derby upon the same question on the 20th inst. in the House of Lords, is still more extraordinary. According to the noble lord's opinion, if the neutrality of Luxemburg should ever be assailed by one of the treaty Powers, none of them would be bound to step forward in its defence.

Lord Granville justly asked, in reply to this opinion, why Prussia, then, had made so utterly worthless a guarantee a *sine quâ non* of her participation in the Conference, and why Lord Stanley had so long hesitated to undertake an obligation which apparently contained no meaning whatever.

Earl Russell considered, that in case of a breach of the treaty the other European Powers were bound to intervene. Were it otherwise, we should be tempted to think that it has been intended to guarantee the neutrality of Luxemburg only against Lichtenstein, Greece, and Mexico.

The more impossible the consequences to be deduced, the rather do we find ourselves constrained to put the question, what can have induced the noble lord to lay down this hitherto unheard-of theory, in the correct.

ness of which he himself can hardly believe? It almost seems all Lord Stanley aimed at was to represent the deviation from the cherished policy of non-intervention, which he exceptionally recommended in this instance, as too slight to be of any account. His great object being to reconcile Parliament to the treaty, he put his own impossible construction upon it.

It is only when we look at the matter in this light that we are able to understand how a Minister of the British Crown could utter such a sentence as that the decision whether war should be entered into for the Luxemburg guarantee rested, after all, with Parliament, which might grant or withhold supplies. Why, all the world knows that the English Crown has the privilege of declaring war, and that it is not customary to ask Parliament whether war shall be waged or not. On the contrary, the outbreak of war is simply notified to Parliament, which, in exercising the right to grant supplies, is mainly guided by patriotism and the sense of what is due to England. Looking at the motives prompting them, we may find the statements of the English Minister intelligible enough; but we cannot possibly bring ourselves to regard them as seriously intended to limit a treaty obligation, quite plain and unambiguous, if read in the sense hitherto universally attributed to it.'

CRETE. BISMARCK A DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

Berlin, June 26, 1867.

THE consent by the Turkish Government to the institution of an international commission to inquire into the affairs of Crete, has been accompanied by a distinct refusal to suspend hostilities while the investigation is going on. Such a respite, the Turkish Government considers, would be beneficial only to the insurgents, who might use it for collecting reinforcements and provender.

A few days ago the University of Halle celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of its reunion with the more ancient College of Wittenberg. At the beginning of this century, the latter, from the famous place wherein Luther resided and taught, had dwindled into insignificance and was fused with the neighbouring College of Halle. On the festal anniversary on this occasion Count Bismarck and Generals

von Roon and von Moltke have been promoted to the degree of Philosophæ Doctor artiumque liberalium Magister.

The financial negotiations pending for some time between this Government and King George of Hanover are broken off, the King having again refused to affix his signature to any act implying abdication.

The Hanoverian Legion business has led to some unpleasant correspondence between the Berlin and the Amsterdam Cabinets. Prussia demanded that the fugitive adherents of King George who had escaped to Dutch soil should be extradited. Holland declined complying, but eventually yielded so far as to order the refugees to quit her territory. Accordingly the poor fellows, the victims of the unwarrantable illusions of their betters, have had to leave the town of Arnheim, where they assembled six weeks ago, and are on their way to Paris, London, or America.

RENEWED APPREHENSIONS.

Berlin, August 10, 1867.

Divers omissions and commissions on the part of the Paris Cabinet have served to revive the apprehension, that the international conflict, which a year ago threatened to attend the political remodelling of this country, has not been obviated for good. Fears of this nature have been aroused during the last few weeks in more than one part of the Continent. So far as Germany is concerned, any anxieties awakened on this score are neither so great nor so widely extended as the tone of the papers and telegrams would lead one to suppose. Yet as a portion of our public cannot forbear indulging in ominous anticipations, and in their mercantile and political doings are sensibly influenced by what they suppose to be the precursory shadows of coming events, it may not be superfluous to

explain the reasons adduced for this anxious and, as many hold, too gloomy view of the case.

There is a section of German society which will not erase it from their memories, that France, a year ago, by protecting Southern Germany from being overrun by the Prussian troops, strove to confine the new national commonwealth to the North only. The same people refuse to forget that the fee-simple of some German provinces was asked for by the French Cabinet in 1866, and that, unsuccessful at the time, the rebuff did not prevent it from preferring a similar demand with regard to Luxemburg a few months back, and compelling a sort of territorial concession at the point of the bayonet. 'If,' it is argued by our suspicious friends, 'these are the sentiments of the French Imperator towards reviving Germany, his growing domestic embarrassments are but too likely to force a foreign diversion upon him at a not distant date; and, as he is really forming new companies and new batteries in a somewhat hasty manner, it would almost seem as though the interval which separates peace from war is considered even shorter by him than by us, his censorious critics.' This reasoning is supported by a reference to the latest attitude of the French diplomacy and press. The peace, it is well known, which freed Austria from the presence on her soil of an invading host was but nominally the work of the Kaiser and his victorious relative and enemy. In reality the terms were settled between Prussia and France. Austria had fallen too low to be able to dispense with the good offices of a mediating friend, and Prussia had her hands too full to refuse the intervention of France. Among the terms then agreed upon, there occurs a proviso stipulating for the restoration to Denmark of some slice of Schleswig, the site and extent of which are left all but undefined. Profiting by the vague wording of the clause, Prussia has made the execution of this engagement dependent on the fulfilment of certain condi-

tions on the part of Denmark, which the latter declines to accept. Austria, on her part, from a fear to wound the susceptibilities not only of Prussia, but all Germany, in a matter on which the nation has always been particularly sensitive, hesitates to urge this Government to yield; but France, though the Prussian engagement was not entered into with *her*, deems herself entitled to insist upon the fulfilment of a promise made, at her request, to Austria. A French despatch to this effect was read at the Prussian Foreign Office a few weeks since. It naturally resulted in some animosity between the two would-be friendly Courts. For, whatever the dereliction of Prussia in not accelerating a settlement, the renewed interference of France is contrary to diplomatic etiquette, and little calculated to heighten the authority of this Government as an independent Power. The offensive character of this improper remonstrance was deeply felt. Still, having no wish to conjure up another war, Count Bismarck's answer was so cautiously laconic as to preclude the possibility of its being taken in a hostile sense. 'But how long,' the croakers ask, 'will he be able to hold a pacific course, if France is intent upon hurrying on a crisis? Is not French diplomacy ever active at Munich to hinder the reorganisation of the Bavarian army, now that its services are secured to Prussia in time of war? Has not the same baneful influence been recently at work at Stuttgart? If it had not the same effect there as at Munich, is Prussia not mainly indebted for this to the St. Petersburg Cabinet, whose politics, ever paramount in the Suabian monarchy, have not been over favourable to France since the recent failure of negotiations at Paris? Worst of all, is not the silence of the Tuileries on the actual state of the Luxemburg affair an even more eloquent indication of hostility than the language of its diplomatists on other and less prominent topics?'

Apropos of Luxemburg, there can be no doubt that

the Prussian Government experience some difficulty in completing the removal of their stores from a fortress which, but the other day, bade fair to supply their jealous neighbours with a *casus belli*. In this matter a friendly hint might be pardonable, and avert future complications; if passed over now, is it perhaps because intended to be brought forward as a serious cause of complaint on some future and pre-determined day of reckoning? Is it not strange that the French Government press, so busily engaged in raking up all sorts of imaginary grievances against this Cabinet and country, should leave this one point entirely unnoticed? Nay, having consented to quit the fortress, would Prussia act as she does unless apprehensive of imminent danger?

This, if I may so express myself, constitutes the case for the alarmists. Many of them belong to the upper classes, and some are supposed to have superior channels of information; whereas those inclined to take a more auspicious view form a vast majority among the middle and lower strata of society, and ground their opinions on a common-sense view of notorious facts, rather than an intimate acquaintance with recondite details. In the first place, the peace prophets urge, it is idle to speculate on an eventuality mainly dependent upon the resolves of a single inscrutable individual. That Napoleon every now and then allows his journalists to represent this country as inimical to himself and subjects, may be true enough; that he orders his diplomatists to harass, thwart, and disquiet it, is likewise undeniable: but what then? All this is not necessarily a symptom of an impending conflict. It may be a dodge, devised to occupy the unruly spirits of the French, and display before their delighted eyes bright visions of future *gloire* never meant to be realised. Or it may be a ruse to intimidate Prussia, and obtain some slight diplomatic advantage by the threat of a great sanguinary ordeal. What, the adherents of these

confident notions ask, what is there to induce him to war? However much inclined to apply the traditional recipe of his family, and drown home embarrassments in foreign combat, the reigning Napoleon cannot conceal from himself that the expedient chosen would be as perilous as the crisis sought to be evaded. To attack Germany, would in any case subject him to an exhausting struggle. Even were he to vanquish her and appropriate a portion of her soil, this would only burden him with another Venetia, and entail a constant dread of reprisals. Can he reasonably expect to subdue a nation as numerous, brave, and patriotic as his own? Can he hope to destroy German unity, when he is sure to complete and consolidate it by the merest indication of an attack? If it be urged, that Austria will second a French invasion, is it really so certain that the Kaiser will join the foreigner against a Cabinet now identified with Germany—that Germany whose language is spoken, and whose prosperity is prayed for, by the most solid and intelligent portion of his own subjects? But suppose the Kaiser to be thirsting for revenge, will he not wait for France to achieve a great military success before he takes the hazardous step of joining her openly? Would not failure in a second war against Prussia expose the Kaiser to the loss of his German provinces, if not of his crown? And ought he not to act with all the more circumspection in such a contingency, as by assisting France he is almost certain to bring Russia down upon him? Russia being Austria's enemy in the East, is not likely to allow her to recruit her failing strength at the expense of a dynasty so long and so closely connected with successive Czars as that of the Hohenzollerns. But it is altogether too early to calculate the chances of an Austro-French alliance. Only the other day Russia pursued the plan of re-arranging the East in conjunction with Louis Napoleon. If she succeeds, this will be tantamount to securing a prolongation of peace for Prussia. Prince Gortschakoff is known to be

advocating the practicability of some such combination, notwithstanding the failure of his late personal endeavours at Paris. Why, then, apprehend a French alliance with Austria, Russia's natural antagonist? Why suppose France to contemplate war with Germany in the hope of deriving succour from the Hapsburg dynasty? It is evidently premature to entertain fears on this head.

I will add but a few words to the above account of opposite opinions. I have reason to believe that advocates on either side are not wanting in the inner radii of the courtly and ministerial spheres. Count Bismarck undoubtedly endeavours to preserve peace. War might crown his victorious brow with another chaplet of military and diplomatic laurels; but if the struggle became severe, it might be a terrible trial, and moreover result in his having to modify his domestic politics. The leading generals are less confident about the preservation of peace than the leading minister. With them side some of the princes. The King himself, a calm and stout-hearted gentleman, is said to look upon matters as not particularly disquieting, yet industriously devotes himself to his own task of completing and equipping the new Federal corps.

As a characteristic sign of the times, it may be noted that Herr Schulze, the well-known Democratic member of the Prussian House of Deputies, has refused to attend the Peace Conference at Paris. While the French will not leave off interfering in German affairs, Germans have no occasion to join a peace demonstration of doubtful sincerity in the capital of their adversaries. No member of a German representative assembly who values his seat could venture to countenance a thing in German eyes so inconsistent as is just now a Peace Congress at Paris.

NAPOLEON'S VISIT DECLINED. DANO-FRENCH DEMONSTRATION. PRUSSIAN MILITARY TACTICS ADOPTED IN SOUTHERN GERMANY.

Berlin, August 17, 1867.

THE Emperor Napoleon has sounded this Court as to whether it would be agreeable to the King to receive him at Baden-Baden on his return from Salzburg. The answer was in the negative; the King being of opinion that, having called upon his Imperial Majesty in his own capital, the visit could be properly returned only at Berlin. Napoleon thus finds himself placed in an unpleasant alternative. If, fresh from his interview with the Kaiser, he betakes himself to Berlin, the popular surmise, that the Salzburg Conference has an alliance for its object will be invalidated, and the French party at the Austrian Court disappointed; if, on the other hand, he should hesitate to take the hint of the Prussian Sovereign, and leave Germany without reciprocating his courtesy, the suspicion that something beyond an exchange of compliments was intended at Salzburg will spread to exalted circles hitherto uninfected.

In the mean time the good relations between the French and Prussian Cabinets, ostensibly restored a few days ago, continue. France has suspended her untiring endeavours to wrest Bavaria from the Zollverein. At the request of this Government she has even had the kindness to order away from Hanover a gentleman formerly attached to her embassy in that capital, and unaccountably prolonging his presence there, though the embassy and the Court it was accredited to have long ceased to exist. I suppose the length of M. de Fourcade's stay would have been indifferent to this Government, had he not occasionally relapsed into the habit of viséing passports; thereby fostering a belief among the vulgar that Hanover was still

regarded as an independent State by France. However, as I said, he is gone at length, and his departure is considered another symptom of improved understanding between the Government he serves and the one he was instructed to defy.

It will perhaps be said that the Copenhagen demonstration would not have been set on foot, did the Emperor Napoleon care about the feelings of his neighbours. But it is probable that the journey north of the *vingt députés et journalistes Français* had been arranged some time ago, and being concerted with a Danish committee of respectable standing, could not be countermanded on the assumption of a more amicable attitude towards Russia. Whether Denmark will be benefited by it, is questionable. Danish ex-ministers and political leaders have certainly hastened to welcome the children of *la grande nation*, and regaled them with speeches pointing to their cherished ideal of an anti-German alliance between Denmark and France. But it is well known that Danish royalty, however naturally bent upon recovering Schleswig, is most intimately connected with the Russian Court, and in a French war against Germany will hardly venture to take up with any but the side chosen by Russia. That this will not be the side of the French is easily foreseen. What good, then, can accrue to France from rousing deceptive hopes of alliance in the excitable people on the Sound? What certain or probable good to justify a course which, while it is but too likely to end in another disappointment of the Danes, is sure to aggravate the ill-will borne them at Berlin? The utmost advantage the French can expect to reap from this oratorical trip is small in comparison to the injury they may probably inflict on their entertainers. No doubt the travellers, and with them a good many of their aspiring compatriots, will have sweet satisfaction in hearing themselves called the greatest nation in the world by their Copenhagen

hosts; but the Danes in Schleswig will have to pay the piper.

Wonderfully slow as the increase of the army is in Bavaria and Würtemberg, one decisive step has at last been taken by those minor principalities. The Prussian system of drill and manœuvre has been adopted by both. One would have imagined this to be a necessary and immediate consequence of the treaties providing for the co-operation of the Southern with the North German armies in the event of war; but German political logic is not yet entirely pruned of the absurdities so rampant in the Federal institutions of the olden times. Although they have engaged to fight by the side of Prussia, a desire to retain their independence, if not in great, at least in small things, kept the Southern kings from a measure without which coöperation in the field would have lost half its worth. This point has been settled at length, but many others are still in abeyance. At the rate the reorganisation of the Würtemberg and Bavarian armies progresses, the whole South could not supply above 100,000 combatants, were hostilities opened to-morrow. Of these the Badeners and Darmstadters only would be armed with needle-guns. In Würtemberg no more than 4,000 specimens of this useful implement are to be found; in Bavaria none. The Munich authorities prefer sticking to a breech-loader of their own invention—excellent, it is true, but sadly out of keeping with the desirable uniformity in military matters. Prussia's activity in the homicidal department of mechanics shines out as usual. The experiments with the new grenade rifle are drawing to an end; and it is said they are so satisfactory as to have caused the War-office to propose its immediate adoption by a number of light battalions.

NAPOLEON'S JOURNEY IN SOUTHERN GERMANY.

Berlin, August 22, 1867.

His French Majesty's journey to Salzburg—the journey, independent of his stay there—is remarkable in several respects. In the first place, it deserves notice that, Stuttgart excepted, the railway termini touched by the Imperial train were closed against the public. At Stuttgart, where the people were admitted to the platform, the Emperor, while traversing the few steps between the carriage and the waiting-room, was guarded by three Würtemberg officers, marching in front with drawn swords. Everywhere else, the million were refused a sight of the distinguished traveller, files of soldiery surrounding the terminus and lining the permanent way for some distance from it.

Under these circumstances, there could not be much in the way of reception given to his Majesty by the public. At Carlsruhe, the capital of Baden, a select few of rank and position were admitted to the station. They preserved a respectful silence while the train stopped. At Stuttgart, the next capital he passed, the Emperor was received by a large concourse of people. The Suabian sightseers were much divided in their opinion about him. From the intelligence received, it would appear that a number of royal servants, being placed opposite the Imperial cars, began to cheer vehemently on the arrival of the train. A portion of the public chimed in. They were Republicans, the Liberal papers assert, who, having been told that unity with Prussia meant the consolidation of the constitutional Government they hate, applauded the man supposed to wish to retard the completion of the German destinies. They were a sight-seeing mob—the Republican papers indignantly reply—who cheered for the excitement of the thing, and would as willingly hurrah for any other man of note, king or republican. However this

may be, this demonstration, in turn, aroused shouts of a different import, which cannot but have jarred harshly upon the Imperial ear. The account given of the scene by the *Beobachter*, the leading Radical paper of Würtemberg, is so curious in its details, as well as in the quiet sarcasm of its tone, that I think it will bear translation:

"On Saturday night a foreign gentleman with his wife arrived from Paris *incognito*. He came in an extra train, comprising eight carriages, all belonging to himself. Herr von Varnbüler (Würtemberg prime-minister), and old father Taubenheim (equerry to the King), had gone to meet the anonymous couple on the frontier. A regiment of infantry happened to be stationed at the terminus, and the band happened to be playing, as Mr. Y. Z. drove up. There were also many thousands of Stuttgarters on their legs, who at that very hour had taken it into their heads to look at the new station, the pride and glory of the capital. Most naturally he of Paris likewise wished to acquaint himself with the architectural beauties of that magnificent structure, and accordingly he walked along the platform while the engine took in water. Before him went two Würtemberg military officers with swords unsheathed—an arrangement evidently intended to heighten the *incognito* of the mysterious tourist. But the most remarkable thing was, that on a few boys beginning to cheer, the whole respectable portion of the public joined in, crying out "Hoch!" Only a few wicked and ungentlemanly beings—democrats, we should say—opposed the shout, bawling out, in their turn, "For shame!" or "Silence; there goes a tyrant!" or "Are you Germans?" or "Down with the traitors!" Remonstrances, however, were drowned in the acclamations of a vociferous majority, and of course not heeded by him of Paris, who politely thanked and bowed.

On returning to his wife in her magnificent carriage, both gazed at the platform for a little while, chatting with some noble and distinguished personages of this city till the train left. At that moment the band happened to strike up again, and the Stuttgarters, wishing to oblige the wife of Mr. Y. Z., sitting so dove-like in her black bewitching bonnet by the side of her husband, gave them a parting hurrah. Of course it was clearly perceptible that the couple were not exactly on their marriage trip; but then they seemed to be so fond of each other, that the ladies of our good town could not help rejoicing thereat. Some persons, it is true, were struck with the appearance of the gentlemen in the same carriage with Mr. Y. Z. Those adorned with the most orders looked decidedly like policemen or gendarmes in undress; while those in the other carriages, apparently servants, had among them so many sharp and knowing faces, as to give rise to divers conjectures as to their calling. Few of them wore livery; and there was an old man seen fidgeting

about, so encased in gold, that he seemed to be made of it. This probably indicated the superior and unadulterated quality of his fidelity. *Au reste*, the company in the train evinced no slight self-control, none of them smiling at the honest Suabians' cry of "Hurrah!" though you could see how they were tickled by it. No doubt they gave vent to their pent-up feelings in a good hearty laugh directly the train got off.

It is dreadful to think of the consequences this demonstration may possibly bring upon Würtemberg. The Berliners are always cross when the Würtembergers show any partiality for the French; and it is not at all unlikely that the next time they occupy this neighbourhood they will force us to present each of their martial men with sixteen cigars a day, instead of the eight exacted a year ago. Misunderstandings of this disagreeable kind occur quite as easily at Stuttgart as at Cassel or Frankfort. To smooth over things, we recommend that the King of Prussia should pay an early and likewise *incognito* visit to this capital, when we guarantee him a glorious reception, and no end of jubilant shouts, at the same terminus, and by the same people who yesterday saluted him at Paris.

If this is the explanation given by the journalistic representatives of the only party suspected of a political motive in greeting the foreign potentate, it seems that he has no particular reason to deduce favourable inferences from the event. As to the spirit in which the above article is written, it would be useless to conceal the fact that it simply reflects the tone in which royalty is nowadays habitually spoken of in the Republican press of the South.

Let us resume our journey. We now come to Augsburg, the next place of importance where the Imperial train stopped. Augsburg, as late as fifty years ago one of the free towns of the Empire, is now embodied with Bavaria, but has not entirely lost the wealth, the industry, and the enterprise which in past ages placed it at the head of continental commerce. It is a proud city, too, and mindful of its ancient glories. When, therefore, a few persons—by no means the majority, as at Stuttgart—gave expression to the feelings of admiration animating them in regard to the illustrious personage on his travels, a storm of indignation arose in the multitude that had awaited his arrival. Friendly shouts were drowned in hisses and yells. If there were any hurrahs, they were for the Bavarian

Palatinate, one province among the many which the Emperor asked for, but failed to obtain, a year ago. All this occurred outside the terminus, as his Majesty was driving to the famous inn of the Three Moors, where he intended to put up for the night. So frightened was his escort by this vociferous conflict of opinion, that they ordered the coachman to drive down back streets to avoid the crowd occupying the principal thoroughfares.

On the morning after, the Imperial couple heard divine mass in the chapel of the Inn; the service, at the Emperor's request, being performed by Father Berthold, a playfellow of his when at school in Augsburg. The Emperor and Empress, with a long cavalcade, next repaired to St. Anne's grammar-school. This is the scholastic establishment visited when a boy by his Majesty, then a sort of enchanted prince, with no hope of breaking the spell that deprived him of his regal inheritance. Dr. Mezger, the head master, and a Latin inscription over the portal, received the former pupil, who, with his wife on his arm, viewed the rooms in which he had learnt his irregular verbs. While making the round of the building, which remains much as it was, the Emperor pointed out to his wife his name, and the date 1823, cut into a window-sill by himself. He has since gone in for more aspiring memorials. They then went to the grounds, where, true to old associations, the Emperor broke off a twig as a remembrance of the place. A still more interesting visit was paid to an unpretending house in Holy-Cross-street, thirty years ago the residence of the Emperor and his banished mother, the beautiful and renowned Queen Hortense. Throughout this commemorative circuit, the Empress evinced a lively sympathy with the early reminiscences of her husband. Moved by the memories of the past crowding upon him, Napoleon waived his habitual taciturnity, became pleasantly communicative, and spoke German like a native with the attendants.

On his return to the station he was met by the King of Bavaria, who accompanied him almost all the way to Salzburg. Precautions had been taken to prevent a recurrence of the Augsburg scene at Munich, where the train stopped for a few minutes. Four gentlemen of the French Embassy, with their ladies, were all allowed to get near the terminus.

Of the four southern Sovereigns, each adopted a different line of conduct on the occasion of this memorable trip. The Grand Duke of Baden, the son-in-law of the King of Prussia, paid his respects to the traveller during the few minutes' delay at Carlsruhe, his capital. The King of Würtemberg, the Czar's brother-in-law, and in consequence of late on a tolerable footing with this Government, neither received the Imperial traveller on the borders of his kingdom nor in his capital, but contented himself with seeing him for a minute at the Ulm terminus, just as Napoleon was leaving his dominions. Of the King of Bavaria I have spoken above. The Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, the avowed friend of Austria, was the most demonstrative in his courtesies. Napoleon not having to pass through his State, the Grand Duke took care to find himself in the neighbourhood of Salzburg, and, as a matter of course, received an invitation to add to the *éclat* of the meeting by his presence. As his Royal Highness is a member of the North German Confederacy, he would, it must be presumed, have chosen an opposite course, did he care to oblige the chief of that national commonwealth.

With reference to the object of the Imperial interview, I may observe that the more people reflect on the actual condition of the Continent, the less are they inclined to be prematurely disquieted by it. To engage in a war with Germany would be so extremely venturesome for the two Emperors, that the conclusion of a serious agreement of the kind is no longer apprehended here. If our

politicians are correct, the two allied Sovereigns will content themselves with encouraging each other in the resistance they have hitherto offered to all steps tending to accelerate the eventual reunion of the South with the North. But unless carried to the extent of loosening the military and commercial ties already existing between the two halves of the nation, this cannot bring on a conflict. The King of Prussia is perfectly satisfied with what he has been able to effect, and, for reasons of external and internal policy, does not evince any particular anxiety to accomplish the political reunion of Northern and Southern Germany for the time being. I should be, however, conveying an erroneous impression, were I to assert that the news of Baron Beust holding daily conferences with the Emperor Napoleon has been heard here with particular unction.

That the Eastern question, as demonstratively telegraphed from Salzburg, has also occupied the attention of hosts and guests is thought very probable. More risings than one are at this moment being agitated in Turkey, and a committee in aid of the Bulgarian rebels has just been instituted at St. Petersburg.

So anxious are the French Government to provide for the better protection of their western frontier, that 500 stonemasons have been engaged at Basel to be employed on the works of Belfort in Alsace.

THE SALZBURG INTERVIEW.

Berlin, August 24, 1867.

As yet the disquieting intelligence from Salzburg, propagated by papers in connection with the Austrian and Prussian Governments, has failed to impress the

public with the sense of coming trouble. For a year past the cry of 'Wolf!' has been too often raised by the over-vigilant dogs of the flock to cause its repetition in the present instance to create much alarm among the sheep. Otherwise, it must be confessed, the language of the inspired organs would have an ugly look. The Vienna semi-official *Debatte* tells us that a perfect understanding has been established between Austria and France upon all pending questions; that the result of their deliberations will be submitted to the other Powers for indorsement; and that if unfortunately it is not accepted, the two august allies would not shrink from resorting to extreme measures to vindicate their own particular views. Now it is plain that to advertise such a course is in itself a provocation. To act upon it would be war. Whatever France and Austria may have agreed upon, if they mean peace, they will guard against bringing on dissension by requiring others to adopt their own views. Such a regard for the convictions of neighbours is rendered the more necessary, if all the *Debatte* tells us of the nature of the agreement arrived at is true.

Among the items enumerated by that journal, there is one providing that the Prague Treaty of Peace is to be henceforth regarded as the basis of the political organisation of Germany. This seems to be an innocent demand. Yet it is not so. At the conclusion of a victorious war, which left three-fourths of Germany in her power, Prussia, without raising the ire of the German nation against her, could engage to permit the formation of a separate Southern Confederacy. But what she could afford to do then, and in a compact with an enemy long accounted German, she would not be able to repeat now, and towards foreigners. In other words, unless prepared to forfeit the esteem of Germany, Prussia cannot give a promise to France that she will never unite the severed limbs of this great and self-respecting people; nor can she

bind herself to look *in perpetuum* upon the Germans south of the Main as a different race from those north of that river. The mere idea that such a request might be preferred is so irritating to the statesmen and journalists of this country, that we need not wonder at the *Kreuz Zeitung* somewhat hastily meeting it with the shout, 'To arms!' The same paper — I do not know whether on good authority, or merely from suspicions engendered by the revelations of the *Debatte*—asserts that the real object of the Salzburg agreement is not to perpetuate the Prague Treaty of Peace, but, on the contrary, to abolish it by making Austria a member of a future South German Confederacy. How much may be true of all this, will soon appear. In the mean time, it is scarcely premature to express an apprehension that, supposing the policy of our neighbours to have been correctly foreshadowed by the papers in their service, this Government and people may deem it unsafe to await attack.

NAPOLEON DISAPPOINTED AT SALZBURG. GERMANY RALLIES ROUND PRUSSIA.

Berlin, August 28, 1867.

SINCE my last, the question whether anything, and if anything, what, has been agreed upon at Salzburg, has assumed another aspect. The official and acknowledged organs of the very Governments whose semi-official papers endeavoured to fill the world with anxious forebodings, now deny that anything serious has occurred. Assuming the contradiction to be more reliable than the assertion it is intended to efface, there still remains the fact, that the Vienna and Saxon Governments have not

hesitated to cause war to be announced in a portion of their literary organs as very possible indeed. Perhaps they did not exactly mean what they said. Yet the world will not easily forget that at one time they thought it conducive to their interests to make us believe in impending troubles, disquiet the people of this country, and encourage those wishing for the downfall of the Northern Confederacy.

And what is the truth in this contradictory mass of affirmation and recantation? So far as it can be known at present, the history of the Salzburg interview may be condensed in a few words. The Emperor Napoleon wishing to confer with the Emperor Francis Joseph on the affairs of Germany and the East, the French Embassy at Vienna caused those remarkable articles to be published in the *Débats*, which a fortnight since excited so much attention throughout the political world. These ingenious speculations on the state of the Continent had a twofold object. While informing Austria of the course she was expected to take, they, in their studious animosity against Prussia, prepared the journalistic assault which was to follow in the wake of Salzburg. But some things did not turn out as anticipated. The Emperor Napoleon expected the South German Sovereigns, by their presence, to invest the interview with additional importance. When, however, it came to the muster, it was found that the Grand Duke of Hesse alone had been persuaded to attend. King Ludwig of Bavaria had indeed a mind to invite the Emperors to his palace of Berchtesgaden. On the 21st inst. everything had been prepared for his driving over to call upon those august personages, and take them back with him to his country seat. But in the eleventh hour a protest from Prince Hohenlohe, his prime minister, prevented the execution of the design. On the part of Bavaria, therefore, the two Emperors had to content themselves with a dinner given them by Ludwig I.,

the grandfather of the reigning Sovereign, who happened to be at Salzburg, where he usually spends part of the summer. Whether the King of Würtemberg likewise thought of repairing to the trysting-place, is a question variously answered by the chroniclers of Court events. In any case he did not go. The Grand Duke of Baden certainly never meditated a step which might be misconstrued as implying opposition to his Prussian father-in-law. This cautious reserve on the part of the Southern Sovereigns, as it indicated an unwillingness to set aside the treaties identifying their armies and tariff with those of Prussia, did not contribute to the maturing of any very definite results at Salzburg.

Notwithstanding this inaugural disappointment, it is, however, probable that the allied Emperors got on sufficiently well together to concur as to the expediency of continuing the resistance they have hitherto offered to the realisation of the German unity programme. How far they will deem it safe to push operations can, of course, not be foreseen. It is a matter which will depend on circumstances, passions, and temperaments. Nor would the opening of a diplomatic campaign against this Government be fraught with any immediate danger to the continuance of peace. For the present, Count Bismarck has no wish to improve upon the military and commercial treaties already existing between Northern and Southern Germany, and, until provoked by an attempt to undo what has been done, will scarcely be roused from the smiling equanimity with which he can afford to view the alternate threats and apologies of his friends on the Seine and Danube. Some cause for apprehension, it is true, may be discerned in the opinions spreading among the higher military and commercial circles of Berlin. The attempt to intimidate them by sensational intelligence has been abortive; but if too sceptical to be deceived by irrational menaces, they are none the less indignant

at the continuous recurrence of episodes prejudicial to industry, and offensive to their national honour. That Louis Napoleon and Francis Joseph will run the mad risk of attacking them some day, is a notion few in this country, comparatively speaking, entertain; but many manufacturers doubt whether trade can endure the incessant anxieties consequent upon the tiresome interference of the French; and many military and political people insist that, with the prolonged drag upon commerce, and the constant reiteration of diplomatic thrusts and cuts, war, even if not actually intended, is sure to be brought on in course of time. Upon the convictions of these men Louis Napoleon breathing peace and amity at Arras, after allowing bellicose reports to get abroad during his stay at Salzburg, has no influence at all. Were Government to find it necessary to adopt a more determined attitude, this section of society would be inclined to urge the advantage of an immediate decision.

The better to illustrate these remarks on the prevailing bias of the day, I subjoin a few extracts from the German press. Though selected from papers published in different parts of the country and addicted to diverse politics, they will alike serve to show the resentment universally felt at what, according to the first Austrian semi-official relations, has been doing at Salzburg.

The Berlin *Kreuz Zeitung*, a Conservative paper, assumed to be in connection with the Prussian Government, vents its anger in these vehement terms:

'The establishment of a South German Confederacy, then, has been resolved upon at Salzburg! A Confederacy to be directed and participated in by Austria, to be patronised and protected by the Emperor of the French! We do not stay to inquire whether Austria, under the Prague Treaty of Peace, is entitled to form one in a constitutional reunion of the Southern States. Nor do we think it worth our while to ascertain just now whether the offensive and defensive treaties concluded between those Southern States and Prussia but a year ago, would not have to be violated before any such Confederacy could be set a-going.

The only thing we beg to ask is, whether Germany will permit the Emperor of the French to interfere in her domestic affairs? Does it concern the Tuileries on what sort of a footing the North and South of Germany stand? Would not the Tuileries be amazed at our impertinence were we to meddle with the relations between their northern and southern provinces? What right has Louis Napoleon to interpose between Northern and Southern Germany, who are arranging their military and commercial affairs to their own taste? What would he say to our obstructing his own scheme of military reform, although certainly aimed against ourselves? What, were we to pretend to impede the tariff arrangements between Belgium and France? There are but few traitors to be found in Germany infamous enough to hope for any good to be wafted towards their country, or rather towards themselves, from Paris. We shall knock them on the head when the time has come to reward treason. Of one thing, however, we would warn the Tuileries even at this early stage. As we have not been gulled by flattery, neither shall we be overawed by threats. We have no wish to direct the policy of other States, but we shall resist every attempt to bend our will. 'Whatever may have been resolved upon at Salzburg, it is not we that shall bow to a European dictatorship. We know exactly what we want, and we shall remain firm, irrespective of approval or disapproval.'

In another article the same journal desires his Austrian Majesty, before trusting himself to a French alliance, to remember a certain scrap of paper Napoleon drew out of his pocket when closeted with his august friend in the historical cottage at Villafranca. That paper, which purported to be a telegram from a French diplomate then stationed at Berlin, attributed to this Government the intention of profiting by the Italian war for the spoliation, if not the destruction of Austria. Its contents subsequently proved utterly false, but at the moment they had the power of hurrying Francis Joseph into a disadvantageous and ill-guaranteed peace.

The *Cologne Gazette*, the leading Rhenish paper (moderate Liberal in politics), comprises its views in a few telling words:

'We cannot believe in the possibility of any German princes accepting the protection of France. We cannot believe that the disgraceful times of the Rhine Bund are about to be renewed. The Kings of Bavaria and

Würtemberg have thus far shown no predilection for an experiment which, were it tried, might end in raising house-rent at Hitzing.'

Hitzing, a village near Vienna, has been chosen as a retreat by the ex-King George of Hanover.

In the *Stuttgart Mercury*, the old-established leading paper of Würtemberg (moderate Liberal), I find the following:

'No South German Minister has deigned to confer with Beust, that old schemer of notorious character. As yet the offensive and defensive treaties between Prussia and Southern Germany retain validity; as yet the two sections of the nation enjoy the inestimable advantage of a common tariff. The new Customs Parliament, which is to comprise deputies from either side of the Main, will be opened shortly, and the South German troops are preparing to adopt the organisation and equipment of their northern brethren. No journey of the Emperor Napoleon can lessen the importance of these facts—facts which result from the historical revolution of 1866, and have been established at no small sacrifice. German national policy is not so easily changed into Rhine Bund politics.'

The *Stuttgart Volks Zeitung*, a Liberal paper advocating speedy reunion with the North, once more adverts to the reception given the Emperor Napoleon at the station of that capital:

'Anything more revolting than the spectacle witnessed on that Saturday night cannot well be imagined. We saw a hoary tyrant, pale, and casting furtive looks about him, as though he expected every moment to feel the assassin's knife in his ribs. We saw a prince, whose mere appearance among us was sufficient to change peace into war, the soldiers stationed for his protection along the line of rails having been ordered to load with ball-cartridge. We saw a man the very impersonation of all that is hostile to liberty, a conspirator against the quiet of Europe, a tourist travelling in our own country to concoct mischief against us and the rest of Germany. Such a man as this was cheered by a mob, which, contrary to custom, had been admitted without payment to the inner precincts of the station. There is little satisfaction in some few having tried to silence the mob by cries of "Shame!" "Down with the rascals!" and the like; but there is comfort in the consciousness that 600,000 North German bayonets are ready at a moment's notice to dispose of the blackguards who applaud such a,' &c. &c.

Another Stuttgart paper, the Republican *Beobachter*,

sends a volley of satirical remarks after the Imperial traveller:

'He is gone at last! Who? He. He has left Germany, and it is advisable to open the window and let in a little fresh air. No doubt, our South German kings did not feel quite at their ease during the infliction of his visit. It cannot have been over agreeable to be so near the nephew of the man they are indebted to for their royal titles and dignities, as much, that is to say, as they have. However, it must be owned, they did not swerve from the strict line of decorum. Only the most indispensable rules of courtesy were observed. Our own King of Würtemberg merely saluted him, and then wheeled to the right-about. We democrats cannot but be gratified by our constitutional Sovereigns giving the Corsican despot to understand that they do not wish to have any dealings with him. Times have greatly changed. As late as in the days of King William, the predecessor of the present King of Würtemberg, Louis Napoleon experienced a very different reception. But we had then no offensive and defensive treaty with Prussia, no guarantee of our integrity by Hohenzollern. As to honest Herr von Beust, he is simply an old fool. Too good a German, we suppose, to conclude an anti-German alliance, he is too bad a diplomate to have had any well-defined object in welcoming Napoleon to Salzburg.'

The Munich *Neuste Nachrichten*, the paper which has by far the largest circulation in Bavaria, offers some remarks on the subject of a separate Southern Confederacy under Austrian auspices:

'We have always been in favour of Prussia's becoming the head of Germany. In Prussia absolutism is accidental; in Austria it is a necessity. The Vienna Court has not only been governed for centuries by priests and ultra-aristocrats, but by the very composition of the realm is prevented from letting constitutionalism become a reality. Both his Hungarian and German subjects have been promised constitutional government by the Kaiser; but while the Croats, Czechians, and Poles keep aloof, it is manifestly impossible to dispense with absolute government. There is not a race in the empire but seeks to dissever itself from the rest. Even in Hungary, loyal as it seems, it is only the magnates that are satisfied. The bulk of the Magyars have not forgotten the gallows of Arad. In sheer self-defence, then, the Austrian dynasty must govern absolutely, if not all the various races subject to it, at least the Slavonians. The better to enable it to hold its own, the resources of Southern Germany are to be placed at its disposal. This is the object of the South German Confederacy under Austrian auspices, as planned by the Paris and Vienna Governments. Of course it cannot be set afloat with-

out another Prussian war. If France and Austria are victorious, the former will get a morsel of German soil, and the latter recover her old preponderance in the South. The South, instead of some day accepting the North German Federal charter, will then be presented with Austrian despotism. Instead of paying Prussian taxes, it will have to liquidate Austrian debts. Instead of fighting under Prussian command for the honour and integrity of the German soil, it will be employed in holding foreign races under the Austrian sceptre. And what will be the fate of the southern Sovereigns in such a case? They will not, indeed, be obliged to cede a portion of their prerogative to Prussia. But they will receive orders from Paris, injunctions from Vienna, and be cursed by future generations, and branded by history as traitors. On the other hand, should Prussia come off best, the least the southern Sovereigns have to fear is the loss of their crowns. But this may not be all. There are a good many people in the South who account alliance with France as tantamount to treason.'

In a country where such an article can be printed, without being prosecuted, the danger it points out is not likely to occur.

Very hopeful of victory is the Bremen *Weser Zeitung:*

'What France and Austria want is evident enough; and the most effective way of realising it would be to collect a million of men, and pounce down upon Northern Germany *viribus unitis*. The only disagreeable feature in the matter is the probability that Northern Germany will show fight. Indeed, there is no telling who may prove the strongest. With all their gallantry, the people of Austria are not particularly disposed to engage in such a tournament as this. As to France, her mission is of course the loftiest in the world; but she objects to running risks in fulfilling it. Moreover, there is no telling how Southern Germany would look upon those would-be liberators from Prussian influence. Though they have no particular liking for Prussia, the Southerners are even less enamoured with the asinine *rôle* assigned them by Hapsburg-Bonaparte.

It is very probable that, on the first symptom of foreign intermeddling, the two halves of Germany, like a quarrelsome couple forgetting matrimonial differences upon the interference of a stranger, will shake hands, make common cause against the intruding busybody, and give him a tremendous hiding for his pains. We confess, that we long for the day. If the worst is to come to the worst, if peace *is* to be disturbed, if they are really determined not to let us alone, it would be a goodly sight to see all German fists striking a common blow for Fatherland. The whole youth of a people of 40,000,000 under arms; it would be a spectacle for the gods, but no joke for our neighbours. But, no doubt, the august per-

sonages at Salzburg have not lost sight of this eventuality; and it is more than a mere supposition that in parting they promised each other to reconsider the matter more maturely, and postpone action in the interim.'

With the sole exception of the *Kreuz Zeitung*, all the papers above cited are Liberal, and more or less opposed to the Prussian Government in domestic politics; but the mere shadow of a French war looming in the distance instantaneously makes them rally round the common flag. Apart from a few insignificant Ultramontane journals, there is not a German periodical but has responded in the same patriotic key to the alarm sounded.

PLAYING WITH FIRE.

Berlin, August 31, 1867.

THE Emperor Napoleon announces the preservation of peace, yet allows his press to perplex the world by contradictory statements upon the same all-important subject. The Germans, upon the whole are inclined to credit the recent asseveration of his French Majesty, that his domestic difficulties are scarcely great enough to force him to seek shelter in the patriotic excitement of a war. At the same time, they think his embarrassments about sufficient to lead him to amuse a small but inflammable section of the French by worrying his neighbours. It is not the attributing to him any very sinister designs, but the fear that playing with fire may kindle a conflagration even against the will of the sportive pyrotechnist, which occasions uneasiness in this country. It is the apprehension that the too active interest he takes in the internal politics of this independent people will not always be met in a responsive spirit, and that, were he to experience a rebuff, the warlike expectations he has raised

at home might drive him farther than he intended. If Baron Beust will follow him in this slippery track—and he *has* followed him by representing the Salzburg interview as the prelude to a momentous alliance—he will, it is thought, do more to tickle the feelings of some proud and vindictive courtiers than to promote the interests of the Sovereign and State he professes to serve.

One passage above all others constantly recurring in the Austrian and French papers shows the design of enveloping the Imperial *entrevue* in a veil of ambiguous obscurity. The two allied Sovereigns, it is said, have agreed to resist any infraction of the Prague Treaty of Peace. Now, these two Sovereigns must be aware that this Government have no wish to infringe the treaty in question. By their words and deeds the Prussian Government have proved, that to include the South in the political institutions of the North does not enter into their present intentions. They have discouraged Baden, who wished to join the confederacy, and in some other Southern States do not object to the continuance in office of men who will never sign a unity treaty if they can help it. And why should they wish for a more rapid completion of the great national work? Have they not already secured the command of the Southern troops? And were political reunion brought about before the Trans-Moenan States have become somewhat more settled, would it not strengthen the Liberal party in Parliament beyond what might appear desirable? The Prussian Conservatives are too patriotic not to admit the South to the confederacy, the moment the safety of the nation shall require it: but if Germany can for the present be protected without that experiment, why make it prematurely? For the Emperors Napoleon and Francis Joseph, therefore, to announce an intention to enforce the observance of the Prague Treaty, if it implies a resolution to maintain the present political division of the country, is entirely superfluous: if it means

more, it is indicative of a design to construe the Prague Treaty in a sense hostile to this country and Government. It will be remembered, that though Count Bismarck engaged not to force the Southerners to join the Northern Bund, he thought himself entitled to guarantee their integrity, to enter with them into an offensive and defensive alliance, and to renew the Zollverein, as of old. Upon these arrangements being first disclosed, the journalistic representatives of the French and Austrian Governments unanimously viewed them as incompatible with the obligations Prussia had taken upon herself in the Prague Treaty of Peace. However, no active resistance being intended at the time, literary remonstrance soon died out. It is strange, that now, when the Prague stipulations are made the basis of their entire foreign policy by the same Cabinets, this delicate point of all others should not be touched upon. One quieting remark in this respect would outweigh a bushel of unmeaning generalities.

With characteristic prudence, the minor Governments, so intimately concerned in all this wrangling of the major ones, have kept out of sight during the stir. The official papers of Munich, Darmstadt, and Carlsruhe have nothing to say about the contemplated 'Süd Bund.' Though it is their own States and Cabinets who are to be formed into that political nondescript, they neither know whether the thing is actually to come off, nor are they in a position to say whether Austria is to take the lead. The Stuttgart official *Gazette* alone forms an exception, by declaring the idea absurd. But even this paper does not satisfy our curiosity as to whether it has been recently broached or not.

Two other official utterances upon the topic of the day I have come across: one in the Berlin *Provincial Correspondenz*, and another in a proclamation of the Berne Government to the people of their Canton. In the former, electors are admonished to return Conservatives in to-

day's poll, and so enable the Government 'to discourage the designs of our foreign adversaries, pretty clearly manifested of late, and repel them, if followed up by action.' This warning is in the Radical press treated as a mere election dodge. The Berne Government, in a proclamation issued on the recurrence of their annual day of fasting and prayer, express themselves as follows:

'We are all grievously disquieted by the state of things in Europe. Apprehensions universally entertained point to another conflict between great potentates, which may result in superseding right by might, and subordinating the liberty and prosperity of nations to the selfish hankerings of a few. Such being the case, it is not impossible that our own freedom and independence will be imperilled, and the people of this country called upon to undergo one of those trials in which men are obliged to fight for their most precious of earthly possessions.'

This apprehension is merely theoretical, as far as the Swiss are concerned. As yet no one has thought of imperilling their neutrality.

In the independent German papers, articles on the combined interview and peace question abound. Although occasioned by the arrival of no more than a dozen courtly Frenchmen, they accurately foreshadow what the opinions of the writers and the public at large would be, should the guests ever come in greater numbers, wearing uniforms instead of dress-coats. As so many literary kickings against invasion, these effusions are invested with an interest which will justify a few extracts in addition to those already communicated. The Berlin *National Zeitung*, a well-known paper of moderate-Liberal politics, has no very high idea of the wisdom and consistency of the French Sovereign:

'Although he has gone to Salzburg to league with Austria, it is very possible that, on second thoughts, he will give up the enterprise. He has quite fallen into a habit of eating his own words and retracing his own steps. Never wise, he has always had a superfluity of cunning, a dangerous quality in advanced years, when the reasoning powers diminish. Of late he has regularly fallen into the snares laid for others. He thought himself very sharp in letting the war break out last year, hoping to govern

its course; but though he was sorely disappointed on that head, he never ceased to assure the world that everything had turned out according to his wishes. At the same time, he has done all in his power to counteract the results of the campaign. The same vacillation is noticeable in many of his other acts. But yesterday he exchanged vows of friendship with the Sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, and in the Exhibition announced an era of peace. Then came the shots of Queretaro,* animating him with a sudden desire to see the Kaiser, and condole with him on his brother's death. Notwithstanding this was to be the sole object of his journey, he is no sooner at Salzburg than that most private and consolatory visit becomes changed into a grand diplomatic conference, destined to dispose of all political questions that are or will be. A moment after the world has been startled by this announcement, it is denied that any important agreement has been arrived at. His cunning, forsooth, seems to be at an end, and he has not now even the courage to abide by any opinion.'

In the Leipsic *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, a paper of moderate tenets, circulating among the respectable classes exclusively, Napoleon is charged with ignorance of the state of Germany:

'Nothing, then, has been settled at Salzburg. The will was not wanting, but the means were not at hand. Napoleon committed the slight mistake of accounting the German nation infamous, and the South German Sovereigns disloyal and unpatriotic. The man evidently thought he need only show himself, to revive that spirit of miserable servility which made the Southern Courts lick the dust before Napoleon I. But times have changed since then; and Louis Napoleon, not being able to distinguish between 1807 and 1867, only proves that Germany to him is a book with seven seals. Still, if nothing has been concerted at Salzburg, endeavours to effect an arrangement are sure to be continued, and it remains to be seen whether Austria will be sensible enough to withdraw.'

These views are not confined to Germany proper. In the German provinces of Austria too, old sympathies have been re-awakened on this occasion. Witness this, from the *Gratz Telegraph*, the organ of the German party in the Empire:

* Maximilian, Emperor of the Mexicans, was executed at Queretaro on June 19, 1867. The French army which established his government were, by the threats of the United States, forced to evacuate Mexico on March 6. General Bazaine, their commander-in-chief, left Vera Cruz on March 12.

'Some people in Austria had better relinquish their delusions respecting the future of Germany. German unity is an accomplished fact, and one that will not be overthrown. Such opposition as still exists, whether coming from Vienna, Southern Germany, or the new provinces of Prussia, the Berlin Government will find it easy to vanquish. As regards ourselves, the Germans in Austria, we for the present must content ourselves with sending our best wishes to our brethren in Germany. May Germany become great and happy under Prussian auspices, if it cannot be achieved by other means! Perhaps the day is drawing near that will reunite us with Germany.'

Even more strenuously the idea of Austria meddling with German affairs is opposed by her Slavonian subjects. Look at the notions set forth in the *Moravska Orlice*, a paper of the Czechian party, during the days of the Salzburg interview:

'So it has been resolved that Austria should again stretch forth her hand to grasp Germany! So it is intended that Germany is again to become the alpha and omega of Austrian policy! For years past Austria has thrown away millions in her pursuit of the German phantom. The day fortunately dawned when she was obliged to desist, and found herself thrust out of Germany. But the inveterate enemies of Prussia in our midst are incorrigible, and the game is to be begun again with French assistance. We can readily comprehend the interest of France in weakening Prussia; but Austria is staking her very existence on the experiment.'

Similar arguments are urged by the rest of the Austro-Slavonian press. With the exception of the Polish papers, all Slavonian journals of the Empire insist that, as she includes three times as many Slavonians as Germans, Austria has no right to spend the money and blood of her subjects on Teutonic affairs. With the Poles, who date the revival of their national hopes from an Austro-French alliance against Berlin and St. Petersburg, sides a fraction of the party now in office in Hungary. Fear of Russia befriending their Croat and other dependents of Slavonian tongue makes some Hungarians oppose a Power which, they fancy, will have to go hand in hand with Russia for some years to come.

REITERATED MENACES OF WAR FROM VARIOUS QUARTERS.

Berlin, September 4, 1867.

WHILE Prussia is preparing to withdraw the last lingering remnant of her garrison from Luxemburg, a force of some 60,000 men is being assembled in the north-eastern provinces of France. Such is the latest intelligence officially received here. I believe I am right in saying that, although the Prussian Government give their neighbour too much credit for sagacity to suppose him to be meditating the occupation of the coveted forts as soon as evacuated by them, this concentration will yet cause them to remind Holland of her engagement to raze the works without loss of time. As I have had to express myself on some previous occasions of the kind, it is not on the ground of any immediate apprehensions that such a step is likely to be adopted; but, on the one hand, there is the ugly reminiscence that a *coup de main* was actually thought of not many months since; and, on the other, Prussia probably deems she owes it to herself to notice a measure almost amounting to a threat. There is a growing conviction in these parts, that if Napoleon will not cease diverting the more restless among his subjects by treating them to indefinite foreshadowings of war, it might be neither expedient nor honourable for this Government to ignore his conduct entirely. The most painful feature of the affair is its occurrence a week after the disavowals of the Salzburg alliance, and the delivery of the pacific speeches at Arras, Lille, and Amiens. Contradictions following each other so very rapidly have a tendency to disquiet the public. However convinced the more initiated may be that, in the position of Napoleon III., to feign a lunge at a neighbour is by no means necessarily premonitory of a thrust, still there is something desperate in this playing with edged tools.

To mark their sense of the importance of the Salzburg Conference, the Prussian Government a fortnight ago ordered home their ambassadors from Paris, Petersburg, and Florence. There can be little doubt as to the readiness of the Russian Government to profit by the ambiguous attitude of France to improve their connection with Prussia. From the semi-official *Journal de St. Petersbourg* down to the country papers, the Russian press have expressed supreme indifference to the results of the Salzburg conference, whatever they may be. At the same time the language of the Russian Government journals in regard to France and her rulers has reached a pitch of which the following will give you an idea. Alluding to one of the many mishaps of Marquis de Moustier, the official *Warsaw Dziennik* says:

'The French Minister of Foreign Affairs has again placed himself in a false position. But, after what occurred in the Mexican and Luxemburg affairs, his Excellency, we suppose, must be quite accustomed to that sort of thing. The Mexican expedition cost the French Government not 300,000,000f. but 600,000,000f., in addition to which the French creditors of the unfortunate empire are likely to lose 300,000,000f. more. Is France really rich enough to pay so heavily for her disgrace? The future will answer this question.'

By the same papers Prussia is not a little petted just now. One of them goes so far as to revive the old story of a possible cession of Western Poland to this Government. Two remarkable leaders on this contingency have appeared in the St. Petersburg *Vedomosti*. The thing is, of course, about the most improbable that could happen; but it could not have been mooted in a Russian organ without authority, nor would such authority have been granted without a motive. Those articles must have been written with the intention to please somebody here. Perhaps the Russians believe our Conservatives would not blame their distinguished friends in office, were they ever to add to the Polish possessions of Prussia. But the rumour to this

effect is hardly well founded. The vast majority of all political parties in this monarchy would not relish the ungracious task of keeping down foreigners. There is little to tempt them in the prospect of having a foreign ingredient in Parliament, that does not enter into their political aspirations; and foreign battalions, with little patriotism and much discipline, in the field.

Another consequence of the interview between the two Emperors at Salzburg is the resumption of negotiations on Eastern affairs. Upon this subject an exchange of opinion has taken place between Vienna and Paris, the results of which will be communicated to the London Cabinet. Possibly Baron Beust will repair to England after his master's visit to Paris to expose his views orally.

In Germany the impulse given to the unity movement by an Austrian Kaiser avowedly conferring with a French Emperor on the affairs of Fatherland, is unabated. Some of the effects wrought are worth recording. On the 31st of August, the celebration of some politico-religious anniversary took place at the Wartburg, the famous old castle where Luther translated the Bible. Among the guests was the Rev. von Grüneisen, chaplain in ordinary to the King of Würtemberg. Standing in Luther's own church and pulpit he delivered the sermon of the day. It was a perfect eulogium upon the 'Heaven-blessed House of Hohenzollern' for cementing the broken fragments of the nation, and paving the way for the reacquisition of Germany's old grandeur. I hardly think I shall be contradicted when I say that since the rise of minor potentates this is the first instance of a Court-preacher to one of them, and that a Southern one, and that a Würtemberg one of all Southern ones, daring to extol the unity labours of this dynasty on a public occasion. In Munich, the Volksverein, a political club, whose debates are regularly reported in the Bavarian papers, has passed a resolution that Bavaria shall lose no time in joining the Northern Bund, stipulat-

ing, however, for an amendment of the Federal Constitution in a Liberal sense.

On the 25th ult. the officers' club at Copenhagen gave their anniversary dinner, when the Secretary for War delivered a speech that could not but attract attention. Among other things of a similar character, he said that the army must prepare to serve the King to the best of their ability, in the event of a chance offering to reconquer what had been lost. The King of Denmark was present at the dinner. The Prussian Cabinet, finding these sentiments to prevail at Copenhagen, at once deputed one of their members to Schleswig to accept ever so many dinners at the hands of the German party in the northern districts of the Duchy. As the upshot of it all, we are in receipt of a due quantum of telegrams, informing us that, in districts which if anything is to be restored to Denmark must be included in the gift, large numbers object to the process. The allusion to future conquest at a moment when pacific restoration is on the tapis will probably cost the Danes a portion of what they might have otherwise acquired without much ado.

With greater caution than the Danish are the Swedish politics conducted. As the *Kreuz Zeitung* tells us, King Charles XV., during his recent stay at Paris, had sundry searching questions put to him. They did not, however, elicit any more definite reply than that for second-class powers it was advisable in these critical times to maintain neutrality as long as possible. On his way home, the King, whose wife is a niece of King William of Prussia, passed through Berlin, but was prevented by illness from remaining as long as he meant.

THE CROWN PRINCE OF PRUSSIA ON GERMAN UNITY.

Berlin, September 7, 1867.

On the 2d inst. two battalions of Prussian infantry and a detachment of field artillery left Luxemburg. There still remains one battalion, under marching orders for the 9th.

The French and Austrian Governments having issued circular notes representing the Salzburg interview as intensely pacific, Count Bismarck has not been slow to profit by this assurance, and in notes of his own gladly accepts and repeats the asseveration proffered. Should public confidence be disturbed again, he will be able to refer to this, the latest product of his pen, to prove the satisfaction he experienced at the preservation of peace. The official *Provincial Correspondenz*, too, avows itself exceedingly gratified by the declarations made, adding that the Prussian Government never shared the apprehensions awakened by the Imperial interview. Remembering that the same organ, but a week ago, most unreservedly denounced 'the foreign adversaries of unity, now again so busily at work,' the only way to reconcile the two apparently opposite utterances is to assume that the Government, though aware of the designs of its neighbours all along, was never afraid of them. Even less elaborate conjectures are required to explain the language of other papers in the confidence of the Government. The *Kreuz Zeitung* receives the pacificatory note with a growl fiercely importing that if no harm was intended, the august apologists next time had better rein in the ardour of their journalistic employees, with whom the disquieting rumours originated.

While the diplomatic storm is rolling gently away in the distance, the Crown Prince of Prussia has manfully availed himself of the first favourable opportunity to defy

the Powers that brewed it. On the 4th inst. the people of Cologne celebrated the 25th anniversary of the day on which their majestic cathedral, after remaining for centuries in a half-finished state, was again taken in hand. What has been achieved since is the delight of every traveller. Of the temporary partitions separating the central portion of the nave from its incomplete terminations east and west, two have been removed, displaying the grand plan of the whole, and indicating what it will be when the last remaining wall is taken down. Referring to this gradual rise of a noble structure as symbolising the progress of the unity movement in Germany, his Royal Highness, who attended the festivities, introduced the following remarks into his speech on the Dom-Platz:

'Since laying the foundation of the new cathedral works in 1842, we have been enabled to resume another piece of architecture—a piece of political architecture—the building up of Fatherland. We have laid the corner-stone of future greatness under the auspices of our wise and beneficent Kings, and we hope that the rest will follow, and towering domes be raised on high.'

In another speech on the same day, his Royal Highness, using the like metaphor, called upon all present to build on and hold out until the Cathedral and Fatherland were complete. His Royal Highness, in the few instances in which he has avowed his political sentiments in public, has never cared to oblige the adversaries of a steady and constitutional progress towards unity.

In a few days the King will repair to his ancestral castle of Hohenzollern, when the Salzburg rendezvous is likely to have its counterpart in the Southern Sovereigns meeting the chief of the Northern Confederacy. That the Grand Duke of Baden and the King of Würtemberg will wait upon his Majesty on the road seems to be certain.

RUSSIA PROFITING BY THE CONTINUED HOSTILITY OF FRANCE TO GERMANY.

Berlin, September 11, 1867.

SUBJOINED is an article from the Russian *Invalide*, in which the Croats, Servians, Montenegrins, and other South Slavonian tribes, are called to arms against the Sultan:

'Who does not know, especially in Russia, that among all tribes of Slavonic origin none are unhappier than the Bulgarians? All Slavonians subject to foreign rule have suffered more or less. Some, according to the melancholy enumeration of Count Medo-Puchich, the favourite Servian poet, have been oppressed by the Magyar, the wild nomad of the steppe; others have been crushed by the German, our old questionable benefactor; others, again, have been plundered by the prodigal Turk, who took their property, kissed their women, and destroyed their homes. The Czechians, surrounded by the locust-like swarms of Germany, have had to defend every inch of their soil, every word of their native dictionary, against the aggressive usurpation of their neighbours. The long struggle was not without its attendant reverses, and while the best patriots, such as Havlitchek, died in exile, Germans were heard to swagger in the Czechian Parliament like Kadis in a Bosnian bazaar.* The Croats, after rendering so many services to the Germans, and but lately saving Vienna from Magyar attack, have been handed over by those very Germans to the tender mercies of these very Magyars. Their right to a national existence is trodden under foot, and their magistrates are placed under the supervision of German and Magyar corporals. The Russians* in Hungary and Galicia have fared as badly. To this day they are tyrannised over by Magyars, Germans, and, above all, by Poles—those monstrous nondescripts and un-Slavonic Slavonians, who insist upon separating themselves from the great family from whom they come. As to the Servians, they were formerly, most of them, under the Turkish yoke. Driven to despair, they rebelled at last, and established the prosperous principality bearing their name. The Montenegrins have been hunted down by the Turks like birds or beasts of prey. It is not the fault of the Turks if they have not been exterminated, or at least deprived of their freedom

But the most terrible fate has befallen the Bulgarians. The first to succumb to Turkish rule, they are the last to shake it off. The other

* Ordinarily called Russinians or Ruthenians, speaking the dialect of the south-western provinces of the Russian empire.

tributary Slavonians managed to preserve their language and national institutions; the Bulgarians had so much to do to elude the blows and fetters of the Turks, that they could not protect their church, faith, and vernacular from the encroachments of the Fanariot Greeks. Their misery was so overwhelming, that, after struggling for a while, they became indifferent to their lot. They were passive, until their very name was blotted out from the remembrance of Europe. But at length they have been goaded by the Turks beyond the limits of endurance. They have risen in rebellion, and are facing their old oppressors. Without leaders, without arms, without fortresses except their native rocks, it is to be feared their desperate attempt will be in vain. The villages sheltering the families of those that have taken to the woods will fall into the hands of the Turks, and the insurgents be disheartened by the imprisonment of their wives and children. Already the Turks, exasperated by the prolonged resistance of the Cretans, and considering the new rebellion a mere Russian intrigue, have begun to wreak signal vengeance upon the Bulgarians. They are confirmed in their inveteracy by the Polish renegades in their midst. The well-known Czaikoffski, formerly a Polish novelist, and now a Turkish general bearing the name of Sadyk Pasha—the famous Langevitch, late dictator and chief of midnight murderers, now a great luminary among the Bashi Bazouks—and many others of the same calibre, are maliciously driving the Turks to extremes. People under arms, and people too weak to bear arms, are cut down indiscriminately. Mithad Pasha of Rustchuk is a more sanguinary despot than that historical Ali, the terrible wolf of Janina. In the dark casemates of Rustchuk and other fortresses are imprisoned many Bulgarian patriots, among them Tchatranoff, Gristaki, Dr. Pavloff, and Professor Mankevitch. Yordanoff has been hung, and rewards are offered for the heads of others. All Bulgarians who have ever been in Russia are set down as Russian agents, and outlawed. Such, for instance, is the fate of Karaveloff, well known as a contributor to Russian journals, Kessyanoff, Christovitch, and others. Were our renowned scholar, Palansoff, the author of the essay on the Bulgarian King Simon, to make his appearance in Turkey, the mere fact of his being a Bulgarian by birth would no doubt expose him to the like treatment. The enterprise of the Bulgarians, therefore, is a most hazardous one. Despair alone could have incited them to such an unequal struggle with an enemy tenfold their number.

Critical is the task of the Candiotes; more critical will be that of the Bulgarians. The former are Greeks, descendants of a classical people, and as such command the sympathies of civilised Europe. Committees have been everywhere formed for their support, and the ships of many European and non-European Powers are cruising off their isle, to provide them with victuals and weapons, and assist them in various ways. In their favour, speeches have been made in European Parliaments, meetings, and banquet-halls. Candiote women and children have been re-

moved from the scene of danger, and volunteers from all countries are hastening to their aid. Garibaldi himself—though, it is true, he did not keep his promise—at one time let them know that he would sail to Crete in a tub, if he could not get a ship to take him there. But the Bulgarians are left to their own resources. They are neither supported by voluntary contributions, nor encouraged by speeches and addresses. There are, it seems, races, as well as individuals, who find but little favour in the eyes of the world, and the Bulgarians, unfortunately, belong to that class. Europe neither knows them, nor does it evince any desire to make their acquaintance. Encountering the Turk single-handed as they do, they must prepare for a hot day's work. The few volunteers from other Slavonian countries who, according to the latest intelligence, have joined the insurgents, will scarcely turn the scale. The Turkish battalions are too numerous to be easily vanquished; and being, moreover, commanded by Polish runaways, they possess the advantage, if not of having particular talent at their head, at least of serving under leaders acquainted with European tactics. The Bulgarians, on the other hand, are so innocent of the art of warfare, that it is but lately firearms have made their appearance in their ranks. As a matter of course the Polish renegades say, and their Turkish masters believe, that these muskets came from Russia. Be this as it may, without allies the Bulgarians cannot cope with their adversaries.

The Russians have the deepest sympathy with these their brethren alike in language, faith, and tradition. They are prepared, as they ever have been, to afford them their moral support. And how, indeed, could it be otherwise? Has not the flame of intellectual life been kindled in Russia by missionaries from Bulgaria? Were not the first books the Russians ever set eyes on imported from Bulgaria, as they are now imported from London, Paris, Brussels, and Leipsic? Have we not been christianised by Bulgarians? Still, such is the state of things, that active assistance can be rendered the Bulgarians only by their nearest neighbours of Slavonian origin, both those under Turkish rule, and those that are not. It would not be the first time that the South Slavonians in a body vindicated their independence against the Turk. It is to be hoped they may display more unanimity of purpose this time than on previous occasions, when, after making common resistance for a while, they were eventually overcome in detail. Freedom must be won by all South Slavonian tribes acting conjointly. They all have to settle a common account with the Turk, and in common they must set to work.'

So far as can be done with paper and ink, the summons conveyed in the above official article has been responded to by one of the races addressed. A fortnight ago two persons, the one a Servian, the other a Rouman,

were killed by Turkish soldiers on board an Austrian steamer on the Danube. The Turks, it seems, took them for Russian agents, and, resistance being offered, shots were exchanged, which ended fatally. The sanguinary affair created no little sensation, and has now been made the subject of a Servian Note to the Turkish Government. In what tone may be inferred from the following article in the Belgrade official *Srbske Novine:*

'The travellers whose deaths we have to lament, being on board an Austrian steamer near Rustchuk, were not under Turkish control. What right had the Turks to arrest them? What right had the Turks to disregard the fact of their being provided with passports? What right had they to resort to main force? It was the consciousness of the right being on their side which made the travellers offer resistance. They opposed force to force, driven on by their feeling as independent citizens and by despair. It is but too well known that Mithad Pasha at Rustchuk is in the habit of hanging people on mere suspicion, and without the slightest proof against them. The victims to this murderous assault fell as heroes, while defending the principles of civilisation and legality. They fell vindicating those laws and usages which distinguish a civilised being from a barbarian. Turkey stands before us as having committed a most barbarous, cruel, and wholly inexcusable act. The Servian Government will not overlook it; it cannot and it dare not overlook it. It will not allow so atrocious a crime committed against one of its subjects to remain unpunished. It will no longer permit Servian passports to be ignored; a practice of frequent occurrence in Bosnia. Turkey thus violating the rights of this country, as well as the European treaties, the Servian Government is determined to put a stop to it. The question must be settled at length, whether or not the property, the liberty, and the life of Servian subjects are to be respected by the Turkish authorities. The provocations offered us by Turkey have given rise to the most serious deliberations in the Servian Government.'

The Rustchuk affair is being worked in the same sense by the whole Slavonian press.

Is the Bulgarian rebellion the spontaneous outbreak of an oppressed race? Or has it been artificially fomented and called forth by foreign interested parties? The future will reveal.

EVACUATION OF LUXEMBURG.

Berlin, September 14, 1867.

On the 9th inst. the last Prussian battalion left Luxemburg. Before evacuating the place the troops were drawn up in the market-square, where the civic authorities met them to exchange farewell compliments with the colonel in command. They then defiled past Prince Henry of the Netherlands, the governor of the Grand Duchy, and, with band playing, marched out of the town. On the evening of the same day the town was occupied by a detachment of native militia.

PRUSSIAN NOTE ON THE SALZBURG INTERVIEW.

Berlin, September 19, 1867.

The *Stuttgart Mercury* gives publication to the Circular Note Count Bismarck addressed to the Prussian representatives abroad on the advertised meaning of the Salzburg Conference being explained away by Austria and France:

Berlin, September 7, 1867.

'Your Excellency has been already made acquainted with the utterances of Austria and France respecting the object and character of the Salzburg interview. We could not but accept them with satisfaction. It was to be foreseen that it would be exceedingly difficult to convince the public that such a fact as the interview of the two powerful Monarchs had no deeper import, and would have no ulterior consequences, in the present state of European politics. Nor was the news—at first studiously propagated and apparently derived from authentic sources—respecting the resolves taken or proposed in the field of politics, at all calculated to remove doubts concerning the objects of the interview. We have been all the more gratified by receiving, in the Austrian and French declarations, the assurance that the visit of the Emperor Napoleon solely originated in a motive which we respect, and with which we sympathise, and that nothing occurred at the interview of the two Sovereigns to alter its preconcerted character. The domestic affairs of Germany, then, have not been the object of political conversation at Salzburg, at least not in the way

the first news led us to suppose. We rejoice the more at this, inasmuch as the reception given to that news and those suppositions in all Germany has again demonstrated the fact, that German national sentiment cannot endure the idea that the affairs of the nation should be placed under the superintendence of foreign intruders, or conducted so as to suit other interests than our own.

It has always been our aim so to direct the stream of the national movement in Germany as to cause it to fertilise, not to destroy. We have avoided everything calculated to precipitate the evolution of the national destinies. We have endeavoured not to irritate, but to calm and quiet. We may hope that our efforts in this direction will be successful, if foreign Powers are as careful to avoid all which might lead the Germans to apprehend foreign plans of interference, and which, in consequence, might arouse in them a just sense of offended dignity and independence. In the interest of the quiet development of our affairs, therefore, we receive with the most lively satisfaction the disavowal of any intention to interfere with the domestic concerns of Germany. The South German Governments themselves will bear testimony to the fact, that we have abstained from all attempts to exercise a moral pressure upon their resolves, and that more especially we have, in the treaty of the 8th of July 1867, resigned the power of so doing which the condition of the Zollverein might have offered us. We shall adhere to the same policy in the future. The North German Confederacy will readily meet the South German Governments when requiring to extend and cement the national relations between the North and South of Germany, but we shall always leave it to the free and unbiassed determination of our South German allies to decide the degree to which the mutual *rapprochement* is to advance. We are the more confident in maintaining this policy, as, the North and South of Germany being allied by treaties as well as by the completion of the Zollverein, a lawful and substantial basis has been created for the independent development of the national interests of the German people.

I request your Excellency to express yourself in this sense in communicating with the Government to which you are accredited, authorising you, at the same time, to read the above to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BISMARCK.'

I believe I am right in saying that the Note is entirely the composition of the illustrious statesman who signs it. In it we have an authentic confirmation of the reserved policy Prussia has pursued since the war. By thus leaving the Southern Governments to their own spontaneous initiative Count Bismarck does not curry favour with the

more advanced Liberals, who would prefer seeing him encourage the unity party in the as yet unattached States.

A SOUTH GERMAN PARLIAMENT ON UNITY.

Berlin, September 21, 1867.

WERE it, after all that has happened, necessary to prove that the unity movement is none of Prussia's making, but the spontaneous result of the entire history of Germany, the following document would convince us of this important fact. In reply to their Sovereign's patriotic speech from the throne, the Second Chamber of the Grand Duchy of Baden have passed this address:

'With sincere gratitude the representatives of the country have listened to the words of welcome uttered by your Royal Highness on opening the debates. Amid the changes resulting from the events of the past year, your Royal Highness ever manifested your oft-displayed devotion to the common interests of the German nation, your desire to see it great and happy, your resolve to sacrifice everything to the attainment of this object. This noble example set by their illustrious Sovereign the people of Baden will ever cheerfully imitate. The dissolution of the German Confederacy has for the present separated Baden, together with the other states of Southern Germany, from all constitutional connection with our compatriots on the other side of the Main. But we trust that we shall not long lack a permanent and organic tie with the North German Confederacy, recently established under the auspices of the most powerful of the German States. We trust that the revival of Germany will thus be completed, and the nation restored to that position in the world which it has missed so long. Continued separation from the North would be incompatible with the rights of a free people; incompatible, more especially, with the history of Germany. The constitutional reunion of Southern Germany with the North German Confederacy, and the establishment of solid institutions, which, while securing the prosperity of the whole, leave some room for the independent life of the individual States, cannot violate foreign interests. It is the steady aim and object of the German nation. It is an indispensable necessity of its existence, and will amply repay whatever sacrifices may be required to secure it. We deeply lament the many impediments still obstructing the path, but are nevertheless convinced that internal and external opposition will be soon over-

come by the growing insight, the resolute courage, and the irrepressible longing of the nation for a united Fatherland.

In the mean time we rejoice in the fact that the South German States are already united with the North in the sacred duty of defending our territory against attack from abroad. We look upon the consolidation of the Zollverein, and the creation of a common German Parliament to direct the tariff and excise concerns of the nation, as a first step towards financial unity, which we hope will serve as a fresh incitement to the perfection of our national arrangements. We are equally gratified in witnessing the adoption by the South German States of a new and common system of military organisation. In the present condition of Europe, Germany owes it to herself to assume an attitude which shall command respect and enable her to meet all foreign dangers. That the South German States should not be behind Northern Germany in the fulfilment of this common duty is demanded alike by the aspect of the political horizon and by self-respect. The military organisation of Prussia, tested in war, and now adopted by the entire North German Confederacy, has been justly chosen as a model upon which to form our own. The speedy introduction into the Southern States of some similar arrangement will accelerate and facilitate our reunion with the North German Confederacy. A heavy charge, indeed, will be imposed upon the people to satisfy the military requisitions of the State, and, simultaneous with the duty of personal service, the taxes will have to be raised to defray the consequent expenditure. But your Royal Highness's faithful people will be the more ready to make any sacrifices, the more fully they are convinced that the development of their internal institutions, and the progress of domestic reform, is not imperilled by reunion with the Northern Confederacy,' &c.

The last passage is intended to protect the Liberal institutions of Baden against any encroachments possibly consequent upon the Grand Duchy joining the North with its more Conservative Government. I wish space permitted my communicating the debates which preceded the passing of the address. Never has a more statesmanlike discussion taken place in a South German Parliament. While owning to Liberal politics, and blaming the Conservative propensities of some of the Prussian ministers, the speakers were far from making their grievances a motive for advocating separation from Prussia. On the contrary, the conviction that the permanent interests of the nation compel reunion with that State which can alone

afford them safety against France was general. Germany once united, a more regular and steady progress in the matter of domestic reform would be sure to be secured. The establishment of a South German Confederacy was universally repudiated, being denounced as the surest means of paving the way to foreign aggression. Too weak to pursue an independent policy, it would become the football of foreign influences.

What indicates a healthy change in the popular sentiments, is that the Chamber also insisted that the national type of the South closely resembled that of the North, and was represented as something different only by foreign enemies, Ultramontanes, and other interested antagonists of unity. Up to a short time ago it was a cherished habit with some people on the other side of the Main to lay stress upon their slight dissimilarities from the Prussian race, rather than upon the many and more important points they have in common with it. Exactly as in Scotland before the Union.

WHY PRUSSIA EVACUATED LUXEMBURG.

Berlin, September 25, 1867.

In yesterday's debate in the Prussian House of Commons one of the speakers, observing that Luxemburg had been 'lost to Germany,' Count Bismarck replied as follows:

'We resigned the right to garrison Luxemburg, believing that right to have been rendered doubtful by the dissolution of the old German Confederacy; but in so doing we did not lose the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg to Germany. It remains a neutral and independent State, and has not been appropriated by any of our neighbours. This is the true state of affairs. In my opinion we ought to be grateful to his Majesty that he withstood the temptation to lead his armies to new victories, seeing the cause of war would have been a mere right of garrison contested by our neighbours, and no longer maintainable by ourselves. A Sovereign in the habit of himself leading his army to the

field, who has witnessed the fall of so many of his warriors, and seen their eyes glazed in death, does not lightly resolve upon war. Moreover, there is the European guarantee for Luxemburg, which fully makes up to us for the evacuation of the works.'

That evacuation has certainly been felt by the Germans to imply a concession to an enemy. But if war can be bought off at this price, they will none the less congratulate themselves upon having strained a point, and satisfied the greedy cravings of their neighbours. They do not fear war, but they abhor it.

ARE THE SOUTH GERMAN STATES TO BE ADMITTED TO THE NORTHERN CONFEDERACY ONLY AS A WHOLE?

Berlin, September 28, 1867.

COUNT BISMARCK'S speeches in the debate on the address having been incorrectly reported in the telegrams, I am under the necessity of reverting to the subject. In the first instance, Count Bismarck, in alluding to Luxemburg, asserted that the European guarantee of its neutrality was valid and effective, notwithstanding the 'petty and twisted interpretations' (*Deuteleien*) subsequently attempted. Secondly, the Count made a most interesting remark upon that sore point, reunion with the South, which was equally lost to the press. 'If,' he said, 'the totality of the Germans on either side of the Main were to insist upon the establishment of one national commonwealth, no German statesman would be courageous or rather cowardly enough to set himself against it.' In these few words we have an authentic clue to the Count's German policy since the close of the war. As the Northerners are pretty unanimous in wishing for re-construction, the condition on which it is made to depend by the Prussian Minister must refer chiefly to the South. Practically, then,

the South is not to be admitted to the Northern Confederacy until such admission be demanded by all its States. With this sentiment of the Count's his action perfectly agrees. Having had his attention drawn to a statement of a Hessian Minister, that Prussia did not wish for the separate adhesion of Hesse to the Confederacy, he contented himself with denying that he ever gave any one a right to think so. Nor have the unity overtures in the Baden speech from the throne been met in a reciprocal spirit in the address delivered on the opening of the Federal Parliament. On the contrary, the period when a formal proposal is hourly expected from Carlsruhe is thought the most opportune for dropping the hint, that it is only the totality of the South which can hope to effect an entrance into the precincts of the Berlin Bund.

It would be easy to augment these proofs of a cautious and conservative policy by facts bearing upon the relations between this Cabinet and the Bavarian Premier. From avowed leanings in favour of unity Prince Hohenlohe has, by the reserve of this Government, been obliged to assume a more distant and indefinite attitude. From all which it follows that Count Bismarck is a far more temperate politician than the French studiously profess to give him credit for. It is true, should Napoleon move to form the Southern States into an anti-Prussian coalition, patriotism as well as the most urgent necessities of self-defence would compel Count Bismarck to withstand the attempt, and vindicate the right of the Germans to settle their own business in their own way. But if Napoleon will but oblige him by leaving well alone, Count Bismarck indubitably prefers imitating his example, and putting off the day of settling Germany till it can be effected more safely and securely than now. That such is the case cannot be too often and too emphatically repeated. The more eager the French to attribute an insatiable desire for conquest to this Government, the more necessary it is to correct the erroneous

notions prevailing on this head. Count Bismarck having sketched out with a firm hand the outline of unity, can afford to put off filling-in the picture. At any rate, he has no wish to bear the responsibility of unchaining the dogs of war when farther progress can be perhaps secured by the natural development of the seed sown. His acts and utterances alike evidence this beyond the possibility of a doubt.

THE WÜRTEMBERG GOVERNMENT ON THE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE TREATY WITH PRUSSIA.

Berlin, September 30, 1867.

So anxious is the Austrian Government to spare the susceptibilities of France, that the statue of Prince Schwarzenberg, which was to have been unveiled on the 18th proximo, will be inaugurated at a later date, and without any attendant ceremony. However natural it would have been to revive the memory of the General who commanded in the battle of Leipsic, on the anniversary of that decisive contest, the relations between Austria and France have become too intimate to allow of a defeat of Napoleon I. being demonstratively commemorated in the reign of Napoleon III. Is it more than an accidental coincidence which causes the change in the inauguration programme to occur simultaneously with the insertion in the French Government papers of correspondence breathing a fierce warlike spirit against Prussia?

The South German Governments having by their vow of secrecy been prevented submitting the military treaties with Prussia to their Chambers in the last session, have now made up for the omission. Of the fate of the important compact in the Baden Chamber, friendly to Prussia almost to a man, it is unnecessary to speak. The case is

otherwise in Würtemberg and Bavaria. There the Catholic and Republican parties will unite to offer a strong, though it may be confidently anticipated unavailing, opposition to the iron link binding North and South. Their resistance will be rendered the more vehement by the candid avowal of Count Bismarck, that immediate reunion with the South may indeed be forced upon him by foreign intermeddlers, but that he will not accelerate it, if left to his own devices. 'What!' it is anticipated the Republicans will say, 'are we to add to the military resources of Prussia without being admitted to her councils? As a preliminary to political unity, we might have placed our armies under Prussian command; but if we are to be excluded from the North German Parliament for an indefinite time, we had better reserve to ourselves the right of deciding upon the use of our troops as circumstances may direct.' To meet this argument, the Würtemberg Cabinet have accompanied the treaty with an explanatory address, the more important passages of which I subjoin. After briefly relating the events of the preceding summer, and glancing at the situation created by the Prague Treaty of Peace, the ministerial commentary continues:

'The Würtemberg Government had the alternative placed before them of either regarding the German States as severed from each other, and taking up an independent European position, or of combining in some way to restore their ancient connection. Whether the former were feasible at the time the military treaties were concluded we need not dilate upon. You are sufficiently conversant with the circumstances of our then position, and need only look at what our immediate neighbours were obliged to do to form a correct estimate of our own necessities. Our neighbours concluded military treaties with Prussia, and we likewise thought it incompatible with the national interests, duties, and feelings of Würtemberg to hold back. The treaty now submitted to you, while not affecting us in time of peace, obliges the contracting parties to vindicate the integrity of each other's territories in time of war. Not one of you will hold that Würtemberg should have entered into an arrangement of this nature with another European power than Prussia. The only question, then, would seem to be, whether to conclude any treaty of this description was not superfluous; in

other words, whether we had a right to expect that if we were to forego our national duties towards Germany, our neutrality would be respected in the event of a war. This question must be absolutely negatived. In her peculiar geographical situation, Würtemberg would not be strong enough to enforce neutrality, even though combining for this purpose with the two other Southern States on her borders. An alliance being thus rendered indispensable, to place our troops under Prussian command was, after the latest changes in Germany, a matter of course. If we had not made the concession in a diplomatic instrument, the nature of things would have forced it upon us in the field. Again, if the alliance-treaties of the South German States with Prussia were to be as effective as they ought, there could be no doubt that the supreme command of our military forces must be placed in the hands of a single Power, and that that Power must be the strongest among the German States.'

After alluding to the secrecy so long enjoined upon him in regard to the treaty, Herr von Varnbüler, who signed the document, goes on to say:

'The question might be raised, whether, under the wording of the Würtemberg Constitution, the Government are obliged to ask for parliamentary sanction of a treaty which could not be acted upon except with your consent. Without caring to discuss this point, the Government have determined to ask for your positive approval of an instrument on which we may some day be summoned to stake our all.'

If the singular constitutional reservation in the above is intended to inform the Opposition that the treaty will be enforced with or without them, the precaution was scarcely called for. No doubt the nays will be numerous after what Count Bismarck allowed to escape him in his last oral and written utterances; but that the ayes will carry it nevertheless is universally assumed. In all probability, even the recusants, after vociferating against the vital instrument, will ultimately indorse it. They comprehend its political necessity, though they are too proud to acknowledge it. They cannot, moreover, afford to overlook the feelings of the military. In the whole South no section of the community is more favourable to the establishment of Prussian supremacy than the armies beaten by Prussia but a year ago. Far from resenting the defeat

inflicted upon them, the Würtemberg and Bavarian troops are longing to be placed under the command of those generals who know so well how to grasp victory by the forelock. Did they regard the Prussians as foreigners, they would yearn for revenge; but having in the very conflict realised that they are Germans like themselves, they prefer making common cause with them against outsiders, threatening both parties alike.

DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY, AND PARLIAMENTARY SCHEMES.

Berlin, October 3, 1867.

WHILE Napoleon is communing with himself at Biarritz, reviewing old connections and meditating new ones, time is being turned to account by the vigilant Minister at the head of this Government. Acting perhaps on the supposition that the Russian overtures in regard to the East may be ultimately received at Paris with a better grace than was the case a few months ago, Count Bismarck the other day ran over incognito to Dresden to pay a visit to Baron Beust, sojourning there. Since then the Count has taken flight again to Pomerania, as the papers say, or still farther east, as Rumour, that inquisitive busy-body, will have it. Whatever credence we may attach to this report, it is certain that, profiting by recent events in Italy, the Prussian Premier has endeavoured to place himself on a more cordial footing with M. Ratazzi, so long the stanch adherent of France. The opportunity for a *rapprochement* to the Florence Cabinet has been created by Louis Napoleon manifesting an inclination to protect the Pope against all comers.

Turning to another quarter, we find Russia reinforcing her troops in the south-western provinces of the empire

The move is accompanied by the *Moscow Gazette* varying its habitual vituperations of France by the occasional insertion of an article pointing out the advantages of a Russo-French alliance against Germany and the East. We know this design to have been long cherished by the National party in Russia, as well as by influential personages in and near the Tuileries. But as the Czar objects to an attack upon Prussia, and as the Emperor does not care for any other reward for Oriental concessions than permission to seize the Rhine, all these coquetting overtures are sure to come to nothing.

In the course of the past month the Turkish General Achmed Effendi has been travelling in Switzerland to enlist Polish refugees to serve in the foreign legions of his Sovereign. The Polish troops of the Sultan are to be employed against the Bulgarian and other insurgents, supposed to derive the better half of their courage from the hope of Russian support. Numerous exiles were sent to Constantinople viâ Geneva.

In Würtemberg the Prussian and anti-Prussian parties are holding mutually defiant meetings. The object of the agitation is to influence the decision of the local Parliament on the military and commercial treaties with this country. As I told you in my last, ratification may be regarded as certain. The Republicans are not numerous enough, and the Ultramontanes too much confined to the lower classes, to render any effective resistance in such an emergency as the present. Did the constitution of the North German Confederacy satisfy the Liberal party in the South, the opposition would be nowhere. But the constitutional grievances of the progressists, coupled with Prussia's hesitation to admit the Southern States to the Bund, have a tendency to encourage opposition. In Bavaria the Ultramontanes have been so emboldened by the reserved attitude of this Government as to present a petition to their King, entreating him to guard against being 'degraded to the station of

a Prussian prefect.' In Saxony, readily as her Ministers seem to subscribe to the words and acts of the Federal authorities, an anti-unity agitation is being openly and officially countenanced. No unity man has in the Saxon elections to the Federal Parliament been supported by Government influence. Saxon official papers are writing against Prussia, and Saxon troops, though wearing the Prussian uniform, are, in Saxon papers, stated to sing anti-Prussian songs with impunity. There is certainly no danger in this last lingering remnant of former opposition. It is the last spark of a fire about to go out for want of fuel. It is an innocuous excrescence of the national character, which always requires some time before turning over a new leaf. Yet as reform will be necessary before long, would it not be better to grant it at once, disarm opposition, and accelerate the process of unification in a way congenial to the race and the age?

A FRENCH THREAT.

Berlin, October 5, 1867.

GENERAL FLEURY, who recently arrived at Berlin, has confidentially informed this Cabinet on the part of his Sovereign, that the publication of any more Notes such as the last circular of Count Bismarck's would be calculated to kindle a warlike excitement in France, which the Government might find it difficult to appease. Rather good. Napoleon first indulges in a hostile demonstration against Germany, and then complains of Prussia accepting, somewhat sarcastically, it is true, his denial that he has done so.

Count Bismarck's circular has been answered by M. de Moustier inviting the principal representatives of France to take note of the expressed intention of the Prussian

Premier to allow the Southern States to keep aloof from the Confederacy. M. de Moustier quotes Count Bismarck rather inaccurately. The latter, in his circular, expressly made continuance in his present reserved policy dependent upon the non-intervention of France.

The French Cabinet has been sounding the Vienna and Munich Courts as to their willingness to undertake a joint guarantee for the independence of the Pope, in the event of a modification of the September Convention becoming necessary. Were the Munich Court to answer in the affirmative, it would be committing itself to an intimacy with France, which might have ulterior consequences. But Munich is sure to do no such thing.

SALZBURG DISCLOSURES. THE BAVARIAN PREMIER ON THE REUNION OF NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN GERMANY.

Berlin, October 12, 1867.

We are invited to believe that a change has supervened in the foreign policy of France. Though it may not be destined to endure for ever, it will, while it lasts, be important in its reaction on the entire state of the Continent.

The less ambitious course at last adopted towards this country by the Emperor Napoleon may be traced back to the days of the Salzburg interview. When Napoleon first appeared at Salzburg, he was, from the rose-coloured reports of his agents, under an impression that it would not prove a task of uncommon difficulty so to organise the four Southern States as to leave them an instrument in his hands. But the reception he had from the Southern people, as

well as the refusal of the Southern Sovereigns to meet him at the place appointed for the Conference, and, above all, the conversations he held with Baron Beust, speedily convinced his calm and calculating mind that he had been misinformed respecting essential facts of the case. Baron Beust, though telling him that he meditated recovering as much of Austria's former position in Germany as he could, had to confess the failure thus far of his endeavours to that end. The Emperor then passing on to what had been effected towards reorganising the internal resources of the empire he wished to befriend, was so much at a loss what to make of the answers returned, that Baron Beke, the Finance Minister, had to be telegraphed for from Vienna to enlighten him on the subject. A man of facts and figures, the latter replied distinctly to the searching questions put; and what he said did not encourage his inquisitive interlocutor to count upon the fighting capacities of the State under discussion. Still the Emperor was too discreet to betray his disappointment to the Austrian Ministers; and Baron Beust, at the very moment of his policy evaporating into thin air, actually caused it to be asserted, in his and his friends' papers, that he was about to conclude a comprehensive alliance with France.

The motives which induced Napoleon to withhold his impressions from the Austrian Minister were even more strongly at work as regards the world at large. Naturally he had no wish to advertise the frustration of his hopes. So Baron Beust was permitted to go on entertaining us about the perfect understanding effected on main points, and the ministerial conference to follow for the settlement of particulars. Elated by these flattering prospects, the Vienna *Debatte*, a semi-official paper, ventured to allude to the idea of an Austro-French war against Germany. Then, and not before, his Imperial questioner, long since safely housed at home, gave Count Beust a gentle reminder of the inadvisability of using language perhaps premature, and

certainly of a nature to frighten Prussia into the arms of Russia. Baron Beust, being a little put out at the unpalatable advice, in return gave his friend to understand, that if there was anything to prevent their entering into partnership, others—for instance, Russia and Prussia—would be happy to close with him, and even allow him territorial emolument in the East.

It was at this juncture that the Vienna telegraph-office, whose every despatch is revised before sending off, flashed the news to Paris that a coöperation of the three northern Powers in the East had been proposed to the Austrian Government by Herr von Ladenberg, acting as Prussian Chargé d'Affaires in the absence of Baron Werther. Too improbable to be credited, the news did not produce any visible impression upon the attitude of the French Cabinet. Nor did it result in any signs of ill-will towards the Austrian Chancellor: though prevented now, he might yet be able to serve them hereafter. Far from evincing any displeasure at his innuendos about Russia and the East, France kept her temper admirably, and is even likely to solicit Beust's appointment to the Austrian Embassy at Paris, in the event of his being obliged to retire before the clamours of the Episcopate and the animosity of the Czechs. We all know how strong was the impetus he gave to the war party in France by disseminating his own version of the Salzburg parley. Coupled with the armaments of Louis Napoleon, and the artful chafings of the French malcontents, the movement set a-going by this erroneous account was potent enough to attain the alarming height witnessed during the last few weeks. But exaggeration always produces its own cure. Things have reached a pitch which is beginning to force the Emperor out of his ambiguous reserve, and will confer upon Europe the blessing of more comforting anticipations as to the future of Germany and France.

Count Bismarck seems to be nettled by the rumour

representing him as returned from a secret trip to Russia, Italy, and the Continent generally. To-day's *Kreuz Zeitung* publishes a minute itinerary of his journey, showing him to have been no farther than Pomerania and Brandenburg. Yesterday all the Bismarck kith and kin assembled at Berlin to offer an ovation to the illustrious scion of their house. The festivities included a meeting attended by the whole Clan Bismarck, and a banquet, at which a magnificent silver goblet was presented to the hero of the day. An album containing photographs of all the Bismarcks was also given by his admiring relatives to *the* Bismarck.

The news semi-officially propagated from Vienna, that an arrangement modifying the September Convention was secretly arrived at between France and Italy a short time ago, is unfounded. Negotiations are still pending between the two Powers. Italy presses the matter. France is not in a hurry. M. Armand, the French representative at Rome, having repeatedly assured the Pope that he may count upon the support of his Sovereign, Italy apprehends that the spread of the insurrection to the immediate vicinity of the city may call forth unpleasant resolves at Paris.

Count Bismarck's disinclination to urge the adhesion of the South German States to the Northern Confederacy is a fact important enough to be watched under all its aspects. It has just received a remarkable confirmation in a speech Prince Hohenlohe, the Bavarian Premier, delivered in a sitting of the Munich Chamber:

'Prussia,' the Prince said, 'has declared to us, that she does not by any means insist upon forming a connection with the Southern States on the same basis as that with the Northern States. Prussia has added, that the only thing required is a tie giving a guarantee that the Southern States will not be drawn into a policy inimical to the North, and securing common institutions for the development of the commercial interests of Germany.'

Under these circumstances, what else could Prince

Hohenlohe do than indorse the Bismarck policy? He certainly cannot go farther in the direction of unity than the State which is to establish it. He accordingly assured the Chamber, that he was of the same opinion as his distinguished friend at Berlin, and thought the present relations between North and South would suffice. In answer to this declaration, the Berlin semi-official *Nord-Deutsche Zeitung* responsively observes, that no endeavours will be made on the part of the Prussian Government to induce the Prince to change his views.

Upon the Unity party in Bavaria these revelations have come like a wet blanket, chilling their hopes. The Bavarian Unity men are numerous and influential, and, were Hesse and Baden admitted to the Confederacy, might soon get the upper hand in their own principality. But after these explanations of their Premier they cannot but expect to lose ground. Nor are the Bavarian Secessionists satisfied. Wishing to join Austria, which Count Bismarck forbids them to do, they have as little reason to thank him as have the more liberal patriots, whom he refuses to assist in their efforts to effect a junction with Prussia. Both Bavarian parties are surprised at their Government contemplating an increase of the army when the policy pursued by it is equally obnoxious to either. Prince Hohenlohe has signified an intention to reorganise the Bavarian forces at a rate involving a doubling of the annual expenditure of the State. In the Bavarian estimates of 1865 the expenditure was fixed at 47,000,000 florins; in those for 1867 it is set down at 88,000,000 florins. Among the means adopted to cover the increase is the raising the direct taxes by 50 per cent, and a heavy addition to the excise upon malt. Besides this, the duty of military service will become proportionately onerous. Considerable self-command will be required for the Bavarian Chamber to vote an outlay, which the country is certainly rich enough to defray, but which deprives them of

the cheap government, so long a privilege of the minor States, and yet does not immediately secure the grand national object in view. Still, it is hoped they will perceive the necessity of arming in right earnest.

Councillor of Legation Bucher, an able diplomatist and confidential secretary of Count Bismarck, has been selected to carry on negotiations with Herr von Quaade, the Danish Envoy, respecting the cession of a portion of Northern Schleswig. I believe I am right in saying that, in the same measure as France relaxes her animosity against Prussia, the latter is likely to oblige Denmark.

The French Government have complained to the Luxemburg Envoy at Paris of the dilatoriness shown in razing the works of the evacuated fortress. It is thought France would not object to help Luxemburg in a task almost too heavy to be accomplished with the resources of the Grand Duchy alone.

THE PRUSSO-BAVARIAN ALLIANCE AND THE MUNICH PEERS.

Berlin, October 16, 1867.

THE disposition lately evinced by the Bavarian peers to reject the military treaties with Prussia has drawn attention to the views entertained by these Conservative noblemen. In the course of the researches made, an unpleasant fact has come to the surface. When the Luxemburg question was at its hottest, certain peers frequenting the Munich Court used every endeavour to prevent their King from supporting this Government in the event of a war. 'The treaty compelling him to side with Prussia,' they argued, 'had not yet received parliamentary sanction. This alone would account for the King's holding back; but even supposing him to be competent to carry it out, independently of parliament, there would yet be no actual necessity

for taking a step of such questionable wisdom. Under the Prussian treaty, Bavaria was indeed bound to succour the northern monarchy in war. But in the cautious language of diplomacy, this promise must be regarded as referring only to a war approved by the Bavarian Government. If the latter disapproved Prussian wars, or the policy that led to them, it need never turn out its troops, and might yet remain faithful to the pledge given. Were this reasoning correct, the world would have been mistaken in supposing a Prusso-Bavarian alliance to exist. Fortunately, however, the alliance is based upon a surer foundation than any treaty could supply. It is based upon the patriotism of the Bavarian Government and people. In the event of a great national war against France, no minor Government would be in a position to hold back. Whatever a few Ultramontane peers may think of the future, there are not many unprejudiced politicians in this country who doubt that Germany in such an emergency would rise like one man. At the same time, it is true that the deficiency of the constitutional arrangements of Germany is still great enough to keep the hope of possible interference alive in France.

GARIBALDI'S EXPEDITION. AUSTRIA'S OPINION ON THE TREATIES BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND SOUTHERN GERMANY. TURKEY AND GERMANY.

Berlin, October 19, 1867.

NEGOTIATIONS have been opened between Italy and France with a view to a joint occupation of the Papal territory.

The rumour that Prussia is menacing France in the

interest of Italy is entirely unfounded.* Much as the Berlin Cabinet sympathises with Italy, and earnestly as the present painful entanglement is regretted here, interference is out of the question. The benefit Prussia derives from her improving relations to France is too great for this Government to meddle with what, to all appearance, will be only a storm in a puddle. Interest, therefore, and a hopeful view of the imbroglio alike induce this Government to confine itself to friendly advice, which, at a subsequent stage, may perhaps be followed up by an offer of mediation. In the mean time it is a gratifying fact that Count Solms, the first secretary of the Prussian Embassy at Paris, was a fortnight ago dispatched to Baden-Baden to convey to King William the most unequivocal assurances concerning the pacific intentions of France.

The Bavarian revelations are getting more and more unpleasant. Yesterday's *Allgemeine Zeitung*, a Bavarian paper of universal circulation, is in a position to state that on the military treaties between Prussia and the Southern States being first communicated to the Austrian Cabinet, the latter, through its representatives at Munich and Stuttgart, declared that it regarded them as incompatible with the Prague Treaty of Peace. 'Austria,' her envoys were instructed to say, 'might think it advisable to ignore for a while the fact of these compacts being concluded. She might do so all the more readily, as to adopt a different line might be exposing Germany, in whose welfare she sympathised, to collisions not so easily settled as the Luxemburg affair. Yet silence was not approval, nor did it by any means prevent her reverting to the matter at a more opportune moment.' In plain English this means neither more nor less than that, in the event of any war affecting the Confederacy, Austria will protest

* This Letter refers to Garibaldi's march upon Rome. Connived at by Italy, and at first tolerated by France, it was ultimately crushed by the latter. On November 8, General de Failly defeated the Garibaldini at Mentana.

against, and if strong enough hinder, the Southern States from coöperating with the North. Looking upon it in the light of this new disclosure, Count Bismarck's policy, in not at once admitting to the Confederacy as many Southern States as he can get, betrays the most perfect contempt of the menace uttered.

It is certainly not for want of encouragement that he holds back. Once more Herr von Freydorf, the Baden Minister of Foreign Affairs, has declared in a public sitting of the Carlsruhe Chamber that Baden claims the right to join the new Bund, no matter what opinions may be held and what politics pursued by the other Southern States, especially by Bavaria. Naturally, no actual proposal to join can be made while things remain *in statu quo* at Berlin. Yesterday's official *Provincial Correspondenz* contains an article expressly approving the Bavarian policy of non-adhesion to the Confederacy.

As Lord Lyons will be accredited at Paris prior to the Kaiser's visit there, Baron Buest will not repair to England, but content himself with submitting his Oriental proposals to a statesman so intimately acquainted with the East as the late British Ambassador at Stambul. The questionable prospects of Turkey and the internal difficulties arising in Germany are curiously connected in a leader of the *Berlin Post:*

'Prussia has no direct interest in the settlement of the East. In whatever way the future of Turkey may be arranged, it is a matter of comparative indifference to us. Any State hostile to Prussia must, therefore, be prepared to find her among its adversaries, should a crisis supervene on the Lower Danube. Without swerving from our principles, we can in this affair afford to be mainly guided by the axiom, that a man is the natural ally of his enemy's enemy. No doubt Napoleon is acute enough to correctly estimate the advantages of our peculiar position. He cannot fail to perceive that, while continuing on equivocal terms with us, his strength is more fettered than ours. If he wishes to interfere in Turkey, he has to adjust his relations with us, who are not intent upon any extensive enterprise. In this we see a strong assurance of peace—a guarantee that Prussia will not be obliged to purchase the friendship of

France at a sacrifice. But it would be a sacrifice, were Prussia to refuse any longer to listen to the solicitations of Baden for admission to the Confederacy. We cannot possibly afford to wait till the mists of Bavarian policy have sufficiently cleared away to allow the Munich Cabinet to join Baden in her more sensible course. Prussian policy has of late understood how to select the right moment for action, and to achieve to-day what may not be deferred till to-morrow. Let us hope that the same circumspection will sway our councils in the present instance.'

Similar sentiments are nowadays frequently met with in Berlin, and, should the Eastern question become more immediately urgent, are likely to spread still farther.

GARIBALDI, RATTAZZI, AND NAPOLEON. GERMAN MILITARY AND ZOLLVEREIN TREATIES.

Berlin, October 23, 1867.

THE *Vienna Gazette* contradicts my account of the Salzburg Conference. Of course it does. Foolish escapades are not easily owned to by those who have to keep up a character for gravity. Still, would it not be better were the official organ, in a position to deny that its semi-official contemporaries deliberately menaced this country during and after that interview?

From Paris we learn that the fit of imperiousness which has somewhat unexpectedly seized the Emperor Napoleon, was partly occasioned by the moral impossibility of leaving the Pope to his fate at the moment of the Kaiser's visit to Paris. Remembrances of Maximilian and his melancholy abandonment would have inevitably obtruded themselves. In the Cabinet councils which preceded the summons* to

* After suffering the Garibaldian expedition to be prepared for months, France called upon Italy to stop it. Garibaldi, this time, was too slow for Louis Napoleon to ignore his proceedings. He did not like to oppose what at first threatened to turn out a prompt and successful *coup de main* applauded by all Italy; but he could not afford to overlook what eventually proved a struggling and ill-devised attempt.

Italy the name of Prussia was repeatedly mentioned by ministerial and imperial speakers. M. Rouher, strangely reversing his ordinary politics, demanded the assumption of a warlike attitude in the interests of peace.

'France,' he urged, 'had been so often charged of late with a want of energy, that were she to remain passive in the present instance, she would be obliged to make war at no distant period to appease the mortified feelings of her people. But to go to Rome was much cheaper than to engage in a continental war; and so far from shirking the responsibilities of an Italian entanglement, it ought, on the contrary, to be considered as a safe and convenient outlet for the pent-up ambition of the nation.'

A different view, arising from her habitual suspicion of Prussian policy, was taken by the Empress Eugenie. Rather than irritate Italy, and drive her into the arms of Prussia, her Majesty wished to effect a compromise with the Florence Cabinet. Neither to desert the Pope nor coerce Italy, so long as a less offensive course were open, was the advice tendered by the fair politician. To this M. Rouher judiciously replied, that, even supposing Italy to be frightened into an alliance with Prussia, the latter, pursuing a pacific policy, would still not become aggressive towards France. The result of the deliberations is known. Italy was summoned to protect the Pope. Soon after the decisive telegram reached Florence, King Victor Emmanuel began to doubt the wisdom of continuing the policy he had followed for the last few months. Rattazzi having announced a resolute programme, had to tender his resignation. Notwithstanding this apparent retreat of the Florence Cabinet, it is yet expected that the insurrection will continue, unless resisted by the application of main force.

Next to the probable solution of the difficulty, the question how it arose is warmly debated here. You have probably heard of the *Cracow Czas* asserting the existence of a secret understanding between Italy and France relative to the future of Rome. Without deciding whether

it is true or false, the statement is thought not to be altogether so incompatible with the misunderstanding, which has subsequently arisen, as would at first appear. If it exists, the treaty was certainly not concluded after the damper cast upon warlike aspirations at Salzburg. While nourishing hostile intentions against this Government, Napoleon may have endeavoured to secure the assistance of Italy, in return for permitting her to deal with the Pope. After giving up, or at any rate postponing, his plans, it is equally probable that, having no immediate occasion for Italy's assistance, he may not have wished to pay the Roman equivalent stipulated for it. In such a case he may have profited by Italy's offending against the sense or text of the compact to dissuade or stop her from acting upon it. Italy's interests, on the other hand, must have pointed in an opposite direction; and it would be quite intelligible that the less eager her ally to profit by the agreement, the more irrepressible her desire to execute it before it was altogether too late. However this may be, the conduct of this Government towards Italy, which had been hitherto regarded as no more than properly cautious, has been marked in the late crisis by a degree of coldness not easily accounted for by ordinary motives.

The recent interview between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria at Oos—the first since the war—was planned by the former. It was brief, and is said to have been cordial. The King appears to have been moved by a sincere desire to place himself on a better footing with a relative, the war against whom he has never ceased to consider as a melancholy event. The Kaiser did not object to shake hands with one who was an honest enemy, and now cordially wishes to be on friendly terms again.

The Prussian Government has formally notified to the Stuttgart and Munich Courts, that it will exclude them from the Zollverein, if the military treaties are not ratified by their respective Chambers. There is, however, little fear

of extreme measures becoming necessary. In Würtemberg a special committee of the Second Chamber has certainly declared against the completion of the offensive and defensive alliance with the Northern Confederacy; but the Chamber itself has not yet spoken; and whatever difficulties may be raised by it, its ultimate vote may be prognosticated from the fact that, of the eight Chambers of Commerce in the country, six have already asked for the maintenance of the Customs Union, whatever the political conditions attached.

FRANCE AND ITALY. BAVARIAN PEERS AND WURTEMBERG RADICALS OBJECTING TO THE PRUSSIAN TREATIES.

Berlin, October 30, 1867.

The Prussian Envoy at Florence has manifested a strange reserve in the present crisis. Yet the speech from the throne, just delivered by his Sovereign, emphasises 'the great interests which this country has in common with Italy.' There are two ways of accounting for this seeming contradiction. Either Prussia is desirous to prolong the quarrel between France and Italy indefinitely, so as to secure for herself the alliance of the latter in the event of a war with the former. This assumption would render it intelligible that Prussia should encourage the litigants alternately, but support neither to the extent of enabling his getting the upper hand. Or else Prussia is convinced of the accuracy of the report that Rattazzi, months ago, concluded an offensive alliance with France against Rome and Berlin, the execution of which was subsequently regarded as inexpedient at Paris, but not at Florence. In this case, it is only natural that on Rattazzi

undertaking to act without his fickle ally, this Government should have let him feel the consequences of his infidelity towards his former associate. That Italy was afterwards patted upon the back is on the one supposition as intelligible as on the other. For the present, the Prussian Government is certainly rather favourable to Italy, and there are signs indicating that it will continue so as long as Italy's needs are extreme.

To a confidential inquiry from France, whether Prussia would be inclined to take part in a new settlement of the Papal territorial question, a negative answer has been returned. A like reply, though from different motives, having been given by England, France will be left to face alone the evil created by her vacillating policy, unless indeed Austria can be prevailed upon to commit, as an earnest of friendship, the grievous mistake of signing a co-guarantee. In any case, it is expected Louis Napoleon will try to make matters up with Italy. But three weeks ago he agreed to negotiate with M. Nigra on the basis of a joint occupation of the Papal States: if he has since resolved to protect the Pope, he is, nevertheless, sure ultimately to attach more importance to the reëstablishing of passable relations with Italy than to the complete fulfilment of episcopal wishes. His bishops may be pacified on some future occasion, if only the Pope is not sent away; while Italy, were the attempt made to humble her irretrievably, would nurse her hatred, and might prove an unpleasant neighbour in any foreign entanglement. The danger of such a sequel is likely enough, even though the present crisis may be promptly terminated, and there is surely no call for Napoleon to aggravate matters in that quarter.

The Bavarian Peers have been committing themselves to a vote which they will be shortly required to rescind. As is well known, Prussia, at the end of last year's campaign, concluded treaties with the States of Southern

Germany, having for their object the renewal of the Zollverein, and of their old companionship in arms. As a necessary innovation demanded by the exigencies of unity, these treaties contain provisions according a predominant influence to the Government that represents Germany as a whole. Thus, in the event of war, the Southern troops are to be placed under Prussian command, while in the dispatch of Zollverein business, though each Government has a vote, yet Prussia has vested in her a right of veto against any alteration of the tariff, and other existing arrangements. Both treaties have now been laid before the Southern Chambers for ratification. In Hesse and Baden they were sanctioned as a matter of course—in the latter country, I believe, unanimously. Objections, however, were raised in Würtemberg and Bavaria, the two remaining States. At Munich it is the Upper, at Stuttgart the Lower, House that has a mind to oppose the policy approved by everybody else. The Bavarian Peers represent the nobility of a State, which the number and warlike qualities of its inhabitants have long enabled to aspire to the position of a Southern Prussia. In submitting to the supremacy of another State, they will therefore have to bury their hopes as to the coming greatness of their own particular race and kingdom. They will do it, no doubt, but reluctantly. They know full well that their idea of cutting Germany in twain is the reverse of unity, and that the national sentiment has become too great a power in every part of the country to render resistance of any avail. Still, being Germans and noblemen to boot, they would think themselves wanting in honour were they to give up their cherished convictions without making a stand for them. And so they did. Although the Second Chamber, their associate in the parliamentary field, ratified the objectionable treaty by a majority of 100 to 17; although their own Cabinet and King warned them against an antagonism that would prove unavailing; nay,

although they must be themselves aware that in entering the lists against a people of 40,000,000, they cannot possibly hope for victory, still they thought they owed it to their antecedents to utter a solemn Nay before committing themselves to an ultimate, but, alas, inevitable Aye. In a vote passed three days ago, they made the sanction of the commercial treaty dependent upon a condition which they knew Prussia could not accord. They asked for Bavaria the same veto which Prussia, the central and governing power of the Confederacy and the entire nation, legitimately possesses. Immediately after the ill-advised decision, Prince Hohenlohe, the Bavarian Premier, accompanied by Baron Thungen, a leading member of the noble assembly, left for Berlin to try to exact the required concession from this Government. They had not been many minutes closeted with Count Bismarck when the futility of their enterprise became apparent. To report progress, or rather failure, they consequently returned without farther delay to Munich. At that capital, deputations from nearly all the towns in the kingdom have in the mean time flocked together, to petition King and Chambers for the immediate and unconditional indorsement of a compact without which Bavarian commerce and industry would be ruined. It is expected that, despairing of success, the Peers will shortly bring themselves to reconsider the subject in a joint sitting with the Second Chamber. This expedient would have the advantage of their being out-voted by others, instead of themselves acknowledging defeat. However this may fall out, unless ratifications are exchanged by to-morrow at 11 A.M., the Prussian Envoy will give notice of the intention of this Government to exclude Bavaria from the Zollverein six months hence. This is in strict accordance with the text of the compact, prescribing ratification by October 31, or a six months' notice in default thereof. Under any circumstances, it may be confidently antici-

pated that the treaty will be completed, or, if necessary, renewed in time to prevent a dissolution of the Customs Union. Much as the French Envoy at Munich may endeavour to work an opposite result—and his doing so is a painful, though, from the hopelessness of the attempt, an almost unintelligible fact—no doubts are entertained as to the ultimate issue of the entire complication. Even if Bavaria bordered on France, and were independent of the action of Würtemberg and Baden, the two intermediate countries, all her production and consumption have been too long regulated by her connection with the Zollverein to allow her to strike out a new course, and be gulled by the impossible phantasmagoria of a tariff union with a foreign and dissimilar state.

The interest of the domestic drama now enacting is considerably heightened by the coincidence of a similar debate on the military treaty in Würtemberg. I should here remark, that as sanction by Parliament of a military alliance is not indispensable under the Bavarian charter, the Munich Peers to assert their politics had to be satisfied with an attack upon the comparatively harmless commercial compact. In Würtemberg, on the other hand, where both treaties have to be submitted, the Opposition cunningly singled out for its first onslaught that relating to military affairs. The commercial compact being clear gain, and nothing but gain, could not be inveighed against with any chance of success; but they had some hopes of securing votes against the military treaty, by representing that the burden of universal conscription will be imposed upon the country as a necessary sequel of entering into a warlike alliance with dread martial Prussia. Thus calculating, the Republican and Ultramontane elements in Würtemberg combined to retard the connection of their army with the Federal troops. Both fractions together are strong enough, not, indeed, to render the vote of the Second Chamber doubtful in the end, but

to occasion an animated debate, and perhaps a struggle that may last a month or two.

To accelerate the process, the ratification of the military treaty has been declared by Prussia a *sine quâ non* of the continuance of the Zollverein arrangements. The King, the Cabinet, the educated section of society, and the middle classes generally declare in favour of unity, and the agreements which secure its most indispensable rudiments to the nation. Meetings are held everywhere, deputations and addresses sent up by municipal and other corporations, and every effort employed to prevent delay taking place in the completion of a necessary step. That the Ultramontanes, principally elected by the peasantry in the northern and southern extremities of the kingdom, will not have it their own way may be inferred from a speech Herr Sick, the burgomaster of Stuttgart, has just delivered before a crowded meeting of his most respectable fellow-citizens. 'Are we,' he exclaimed, amid the applause of the assembly—'are we to be swayed by the decisions of a few dozen Bavarian aristocrats? Are we to decline adhesion now, merely that we may humbly sue for admission three months hence?' About as much the King of Würtemberg himself, the other day, intimated to a deputation from the local authorities of Friedrichshaven.

That Prussia will hold out, a certainty in itself, is rendered doubly so from a speech of Count Bismarck, delivered in one of the last sittings of the Federal Parliament. On the National Liberals moving that the Zollverein should be continued with the Southern States on condition only of their upholding the offensive and defensive alliance, the Count unreservedly approved this proviso. In the explicit and most remarkable address he made on this occasion, he said that—

'The lenient conditions of peace accorded the Southern States a year ago were only granted because of their offering to enter into military treaties. As to the Zollverein treaties, they, of course, would be

exploded by a rejection of the military treaties. The Zollverein treaties gave the Southern States a common tariff parliament, tariff government, and tariff finances with the North. Was it possible to have these institutions in common with States with whom war was not impossible? The Southern States had no better friend than the North, which, with its numerous and well-ordered army, was much more likely to protect the South than to be benefited by succour from the South, indifferently organised as its troops continued.'

The whole imbroglio can be correctly appreciated only by reference to the past. In this country of Germany the Federal as well as Zollverein institutions until lately were wont to confer upon each individual Government and each individual Chamber the right of veto against almost every vote passed by the central political and commercial authorities. From this anomalous division of power in the old Bund the minor Governments derived an undue feeling of importance. To understand the action of their Chambers on the present occasion, it is therefore necessary to remember that they have been but too long in the habit of attempting more than, under more sensible arrangements, they would have aspired to. But in the new era that has lately supervened the minor Governments have been taught their real position. The minor Chambers are, one after the other, likewise realising the fact, that the nation will be no longer kept in constitutional anarchy by a *liberum veto* vested in its several States. Of the sixty Chambers of the old days, ten have been abolished by annexation, and the remainder, with the exception of the two above-mentioned, have already become amenable to reason. There is no fear of the two recusants lagging long behind.

WHY RATTAZZI INVADED THE PAPAL TERRITORY.

COUNT BEUST'S PARIS DESPATCH.

Berlin, November 9, 1867.

SUSPECTING the joint occupation as well as the evacuation of the Papal territory to have been tacitly agreed upon, if not actually preconcerted, by Italy and France, the Prussian Government is naturally very cautious in its treatment of such an enigmatical affair. Hence, when Italy, a few days ago, solicited the good offices of Prussia with France, the petition was regarded only as an attempt to bring on the Conference this Government had all but declined on direct application from Paris. A refusal was consequently dealt out in this quarter also. Prussia, it is evident, has no wish to lighten the difficulties of two Governments, one of which has uniformly observed an ambiguous attitude towards her, while the other, lately represented by Rattazzi, her avowed enemy, is now headed by Menabrea, the adversary of her friends among his countrymen.

The better to understand the motives of this Cabinet, it may not be unnecessary to revert to a former remark, and state in so many words that on October 8 the Pope, through Prussian agency, was furnished with a copy of a treaty purporting to have been concluded about six months ago between M. Rattazzi and Napoleon. The object of that secret agreement, and the reason of its being carried out by one only of the contracting parties, have been repeatedly alluded to. Eager to secure allies against this Government at the end of the Seven Days' War, Napoleon conciliated Italy by promising her Rome; but he eventually cooled down, and regarding war as unprofitable, did not know whether he would have occasion for alliances. Rattazzi, on the other hand, fearing that the game was up, on his own responsibility hastened to reap the reward of

an assistance no longer demanded of him. He went to Rome, although he could no longer hope to render himself useful in Germany. On Napoleon objecting to this one-sided execution of the bargain, difficulties ensued, which, however, were speedily allayed by the wish, equally cherished on either side, to remain on tolerable terms. Under these circumstances, Prussia does not see her interest in mediating a compromise, which, while it would free both her opponents from the danger of their present entanglement, would yet leave the weaker dependent upon the stronger, and in a situation to be once more used against her, should an opportunity occur. Prussia will, therefore, not attend a Conference for a partial redivision of the Papal States. She will not promote a measure conferring some more Papal provinces upon the House of Savoy, and preserving the coveted city to the Pontiff, to be held out as a bait on some future occasion. Similar intentions are entertained by England and Russia. As to the Pope, so far from countenancing a compromise, he is unwilling to approve any arrangement that withholds from him an inch of his former domains. While, then, three of the great Powers, from a reluctance to benefit two others with no advantage to the European family as a whole, are averse from a Conference, the Pope's anger is likely to deter the smaller and Catholic States, who otherwise would have been ready to oblige France, and in doing so cut a figure in the world.

It is difficult to foresee what will come out of it all. Probably the matter will not be quickly arranged, but pass through a series of opposite phases, which will scarcely tend to keep the understanding between Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel so perfect as in the main it is thought to be. What is next expected at Berlin is, that the French, after a delay just long enough to make it appear a voluntary act, will march out of Rome, and, leaving a few thousand men at Civita Vecchia, set sail for home.

Herr von Beust is the same as ever. Imagining the task of a diplomatist to consist in the production of well-turned despatches, he has been unable to refrain from his usual employment on so excellent an occasion as his sojourn at Paris. He has done himself the pleasure of sending a circular to his principal Envoys, dated from the environs of the Tuileries. That the contents should be of a kind to irritate Prussia and compromise France, without any present possibility of benefiting the writer, seems to him to be a matter of secondary importance. But it is only fair to let him speak for himself. The following is an authentic abstract of his missive as contained in the *Dresden Journal*, formerly his own paper, and still his good friend:

'As the journey of Napoleon to Salzburg, so the visit of the Emperor of Austria to Paris, was only an act of courtesy designed to express the feelings of respect and affection both Monarchs entertain for each other. These interviews were arranged with no fixed purpose in view, nor will a new political situation arise from them. Far from being a legitimate cause of disquietude, they were only a fresh guarantee of peace. Austria was as desirous as ever to dispel every cloud as it appeared on the diplomatic horizon. Still it would be wrong to undervalue the importance of these meetings. The friendly reception given the Kaiser by his illustrious host and the people of Paris was in itself an event. His Austrian Majesty considered it such, and in his speech in the Hôtel de Ville wished the friendship of the two Sovereigns to be strengthened by the sympathies of their respective nations.

As the Sovereigns of Russia and Prussia had been accompanied to Paris by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, it was but natural that this example should be imitated by the Emperor of Austria. An exchange of opinion upon current events naturally followed, and it was a gratifying fact that, in the conversations he (Baron Beust) had with M. de Moustier, the two Governments were found to be perfectly at one upon all the most important questions pending in Europe. The firmness evinced by the French Government in putting down the Garibaldian bands has been gratefully recognised by Austria. The measures taken, especially the dispatch of troops for the protection of the Papacy, would restore quiet on the Peninsula, remind the Italian Government of the engagements undertaken by it, and remove the danger threatening both the safety of the Holy Father and the peace of Europe. Should the French Government wish to consult the Powers on the best means of

preventing similar events occurring in the future, Austria will not withhold her coöperation from this work of peace. Regarding Oriental affairs, the French Government had most unequivocally declared its intention of upholding the integrity of Turkey, without, however, deserting the Christian subjects of the Porte. It was true that France had joined Russia in a step at Constantinople which Austria found it impossible to subscribe to; but this step was only the termination of an old, not the beginning of a new diplomatic campaign. So far as France was concerned, the declaration transmitted to the Porte was no more than a means of closing a barren debate and recovering freedom of action. This incident disposed of, Austria and France would pursue the same policy in the East, and counteract collisions. As to Germany, both Powers agreed in avoiding all interference with the internal arrangements of that country. As far as possible they would abstain from taking any measures calculated to rouse legitimate susceptibilities. But this reserved policy was based upon the hope that it would be duly appreciated and reciprocated by the Northern Confederacy as well as the South German States.'

To give you an idea of the good done by this ambiguous string of diplomatic phraseology, I will subjoin how it is deciphered by the Prussian press:

'Though, to avoid unpleasant remonstrance, it is better to deny the political object of my presence in Paris, I yet cannot restrain myself from avowing it. I am hand in glove with France, and we mean to act in concert everywhere, but more especially in Germany. We will not interfere with the political reorganisation of that country so long as the South does not join the Northern Confederacy; but we will, if it does. In return for France's assisting us at Berlin, we shall do her business at Florence and Rome.'

As I have had occasion to observe before this, Count Bismarck is not inclined to accelerate the reunion of the Southern with the Northern States. But it would really not be surprising were he to change his mind, after what, in the eyes of his countrymen, amounts to an unprovoked challenge. To make bad worse, the publication of the above despatch has been seconded by the *Mémorial Diplomatique*, an Austrian organ at Paris, representing King

William as having humbly petitioned for the friendship of Francis Joseph in the interview at Oos. Nay, as though everything were conspiring to make the Prussians suspicious, the Emperor Francis Joseph on reëntering Vienna tells the burgomaster of his loyal capital, that he has struck out a new and constitutional path, with a view to recover his former position abroad. All which would be intelligible enough, were immediate action intended or possible. Neither being the case, it is really too anomalous to be accounted for on the supposition of ordinary diplomatic motives. Many reasons might be alleged, why the very liberties the Emperor Francis Joseph has conferred upon his subjects will prevent his recovering his 'former position.' During the Imperial trip to Paris, while Count Beust was caressing the Tuileries, Count Andrassy, the Hungarian Premier, bluntly informed the French Government of the utter disinclination of his colleagues and countrymen to go to war with Prussia. Remembering that it was defeat by Prussia which caused their ancient constitution to be restored to them, the Hungarians necessarily conclude that victory over Prussia would not be conducive to their interests.

While at Paris, the Emperor Francis Joseph presented the Polish Prince Sapieha to the Emperor Napoleon. Young Sapieha, the son of the Prince, a well-known agent of the Polish Revolutionary Government in 1863, is staying in the same city, and, according to the official *Warsaw Dziennik*, has been charged by the Polish exiles there to hand over an address to the Emperor Francis Joseph.

In the confidential exchange of opinion now going on between Denmark and Prussia, the latter has declared that if any portion of Northern Schleswig is to be restored to its former owner, the rights of its German inhabitants must be not only guaranteed by treaty, but embodied in a Danish law.

NAPOLEON PROPOSES AN ITALIAN CONFERENCE. PRUSSIAN TREATIES RATIFIED BY THE SOUTH GERMAN STATES.

Berlin, November 13, 1867.

NOTHING daunted by the unfavourable reception given to the plan when confidentially mooted, Napoleon has issued formal invitations to a Conference. It being, however, doubtful whether the Great Powers will help to free him from an embarrassment incurred by slighting their advice and interests, a host of minor States have been summoned to share the honours of the deliberations. It remains to be seen whether Denmark and other States of secondary rank, however dependent upon French support for the attainment of some cherished object, will be invested with sufficient authority to settle a matter which, if not left to Italy alone, ought to be decided by the civilised world at large. As to Prussia, she will abide by her former determination not to attend, unless invited by the Pope, and moreover assured by the Pope, Italy, and France conjointly, that they have a common programme to submit. That they would never have called in the assistance of others, could they have agreed among themselves, is scarcely enough to induce Prussian policy to swerve from its chosen path.

Harmony, indeed, between the three litigants is the more improbable, as France, the most authoritative of the angry trio, until a few days ago was herself undecided what course to pursue. According to our intelligence from Paris, General la Marmora has hitherto failed to extract from Napoleon or his Minister of Foreign Affairs any hints calculated to enlighten him on this interesting point. All that has been vouchsafed is the news that M. de Moustier has been charged by his Sovereign to propose some definite plan of action, and that the French troops

will have been withdrawn to Civita Vecchia by the 18th, the day of the opening of the Corps Législatif. It is, then, not even certain whether France will ultimately adhere to an idea suggested by herself in the diplomatic interchange of opinion of the last few weeks, viz. the modifying the September Convention to the prejudice of the Papacy.

The line adopted by the Berlin Government is in the main also held by the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg. England does not seem to favour the institution of formal debates while a portion of Italy is occupied by France; Russia, on the other hand, is hostile to the crowned priest who has just hurled another Bull against her Polish politics, nor is she at all disposed to oblige an Emperor, who hesitates to befriend her in the East. In this dilemma the German papers sarcastically recommend Napoleon to solve the difficulty by having recourse to that favourite and oft-applied expedient of his, *suffrage universel.*

This Government has chosen a rather unusual way of acquainting the world with the motives of its waiting policy in the Italian crisis. A week ago there appeared in a South German paper a document purporting to be a copy of instructions from Count Bismarck to the Prussian Envoy at Florence. Its authenticity was denied, which, however, did not prevent the semi-official papers of this capital from reprinting the curious composition, and ascribing it to a pen well up to what has been going on. Disencumbering the 'instructions' from their diplomatic shell, they simply direct the person addressed to use the utmost reserve, as there is no telling with whom the Italian Cabinet may be leaguing at the moment. Appearances might be deceptive, and the Ré Galantuomo, it is distantly hinted, might have a policy distinct from that of his Ministers, no matter whether they were Liberal, or the contrary.

One of your London contemporaries having said that

Baron Beust did not enter into any arrangements for a prospective alliance with France, the Austrian Premier deems it necessary to remark upon this in his Gazette. The London paper, he tells us, is wrong. I am bound to observe that the negatived statement is nothing but a repetition of what has been asserted in Baron Beust's last circular note. The busy Premier is apparently intent upon disguising the impossibility of active enterprise by an abundance of words, be they as contradictory as they may. The impression produced upon the German people by his courting France, then denying that he is courting her, and again vauntingly announcing that his courtship has been attended with success, is one appealing chiefly to their risible faculties. I am afraid, though, the Berlin Court views it more seriously. Coupled with what his illustrious master told the Mayor of Vienna, Baron Beust's circular has dispersed the hopes based upon the interview of Oos. The Austrian Note has called forth a calm, but sarcastic, Prussian reply.

On ratifying the military and commercial treaties with Prussia, the States of Southern Germany were obliged expressly to acknowledge that these compacts are indissolubly connected. Should Bavaria or Würtemberg ever refuse to succour the Confederacy in war, they will consequently be liable to be excluded from the Zollverein. I do not know whether this ought to be taken as a valuable guarantee of their fidelity. If they ever resolve to separate themselves from the largest and most powerful State of the nation, the risk will be so very great that the dissolution of the Zollverein would be insignificant in comparison. If beaten, they would lose more than the Zollverein; if victorious, they might count upon any terms, even the restoration of commercial unity being in such an event sure to be forced upon the vanquished. But it will never come to this.

The question whether Baden has applied for admission

to the Confederacy or not, is an idle one. The Grand Duke of Baden, being the son-in-law of King William, and on intimate terms with his royal relative, it is evident that he will not officially apply until confidentially assured of the favourable reception of his prayer. The fact of his not having as yet made an official application is sufficient proof of his being privately dissuaded from the step. You will remember that in his patriotic ardour he tried to compel admission by all but preferring a direct demand in a speech from the throne: thus far, however, it has been of no avail.

The year's conscription is going on in the entire Confederacy. To fill up the ranks of the four new *corps d'armée* created since last year's campaign no less than 100,000 men have been levied, instead of 90,000 or so, the ordinary quota of the year. With last year's levy of 112,000 men the new recruits will be sufficient to raise the new regiments to full war strength. The work of reorganisation completed, as it will be two months hence, the peace-footing of the Federal army in 1868 may be estimated at nearly 360,000. It is not surprising that the able and energetic general who, in addition to the valuable services rendered in the war, has carried through so difficult and comprehensive a task in less than a year, should feel fatigued and have applied for leave of absence. General von Roon, the Minister of War, will probably go to Egypt for the rest of the winter as soon as all is arranged. Speaking of military matters, professional readers may be interested to learn that the Prussian troops, who formerly marched only 100 paces in a minute, now have to make 120—the French standard, I believe.

'NAPOLEON III. AND EUROPE IN 1867.'

Paris, November 14, 1867.

SUBJOINED is a translation of the pamphlet bearing the above title, officially published at Paris on November 14, 1867.

I.

'It would be useless and even dangerous to desire to disguise from ourselves that Europe is at present passing through one of the most serious crises that have occurred since the commencement of this century.

There is hardly any country in Europe that has not its "question." There are the Polish question, the Eastern question, the question of dualism and federalism in Austria, the North Schleswig question, the question of Germany on this and the other side of the Main, the question of Fenianism in England, and the question of Rome, which, planted upon the banks of the Tiber, engrosses all Catholic peoples, and, indeed, all civilised countries in both hemispheres.

All these "questions," demand solutions. Some of them cannot be put off long without increasing the uneasiness which keeps Europe breathless, without causing the continent to pass, at more than one point, from the abstract sphere of ideas to the arena of tangible facts. The majority of these questions can only be settled by France, or at least with her effective coöperation.

Our patriotism does not mislead us to the point of believing that France is able or ought, singly, either by diplomacy or arms, to cut asunder all those formidable difficulties engendered by the struggle between a European order upon the point of disappearing, and a new order upon the point of arising. Far be from us the pretension of desiring alone to govern Europe, and to take upon ourselves the responsibility of her future destinies; but far be also from us all pusillanimity which would lead us to misconceive the important part Providence has assigned to us in the progressive march of universal history.

We believe that France is destined by Providence to pronounce at this moment one of those solemn words which put an end to uncertainty, fix the definitive value of the past, give its proper form to the present, and clear up the paths of the future.

This word, which the whole world expects of us—this word, which we alone are in a position to pronounce with complete efficacy—this word is "Peace."

But what peace, and upon what conditions?

II.

The only peace France can desire for herself and the world is a glorious peace, born of the legitimate aspirations of satisfied nations, as well as of the complete security of reassured governments. This peace rests upon a complete national and international political programme, and is supported by the following principles:

1. Frank, complete, and sympathetic acceptance of the facts accomplished or in the course of being accomplished in Germany in all that relates to its internal organisation.

2. Conscientious execution of the Italian Convention of September 15, or the acquisition of an equivalent guarantee.

3. Progressive development of the liberal ideas contained in the letter of the 19th of January 1867.

We shall show in detail, though very succinctly, the immense extent of this political programme, which reconciles the democratic aspirations of our age with the wisely conservative ideas of nearly the whole of our nation, and, we might add, of Europe. We shall demonstrate that this policy, at once liberal and conservative, pacific and generous, is equally suited to reassure Europe and to content France. We shall endeavour to set forth that this programme realises for many years an honourable peace, victory without combat, and the solution of the pending difficulties. Animated by a profound conviction, we hope to prove that this policy is a policy which patriotism advises, which responsibility necessitates to proclaim. We hope to prove this in such a manner that there may not remain in any impartial and serious mind the slightest doubt as to the intentions of France, and as to the approaching future she prepares for herself, for Europe, and for humanity.

III.

Germany is made. The Northern Confederation, the Customs' treaties and military conventions between Prussia and the South German States, the tendencies of the deliberative assemblies, the intentions of the Cabinet of Berlin, and the manifest aspirations of the immense majority of the German people—all these symptoms and facts compel every impartial mind to agree to the correctness of this affirmation—Germany is made.

The Main, already passed by the unity of commercial interests and military command, is nothing but an imaginary frontier. From the promontories of Schleswig to the mountains of the Tyrol, and possibly beyond, from the bridge of Kehl to the confines of the Grand Duchy of Posen, there exists a people with a common nationality, interests, forces, and language. Unity exists in its most decisive and most substantial shape. If we behold elsewhere the name without the fact, here we see

the fact without the name. The slightest aggression from without would suffice to create one of those floods which disappoint all calculations, and carry away all the barriers erected by conventionality, skill, might, and events. Yes, Germany is made, and the slightest breath may suffice to raise the wave which will place the sovereign crown of Germany upon the forehead of the chief of the House of Hohenzollern.

IV.

The narrow limits of this essay do not permit us to trace out the slow formation of the unity now accomplished, or in the course of being accomplished. We shall confine ourselves to pointing out that this unity, far from being the result of fortuitous events, which far-sighted skill might have frustrated, is, on the contrary, the necessary and inevitable development of causes that have been at work for centuries, and, let us not hesitate to aver, of noble and legitimate aspirations.

Superficial or systematically hostile observers see in the battle of Sadowa the sole cause of German unity; but to us who know the past of the German nation, the tendencies of its genius, the spirit of its schools, the dreams of its youth, the songs of its poets, the breath of its literature, and its practical requirements and material interests,—to us acquainted with all this, the battle of Sadowa was nothing but an event conceived long since in the mysterious womb of the past, and finally brought into the world, into the daylight of history, at the prophetic hour of its completed formation.

It is certain, or at least probable, that this formation might have been retarded; but it is also certain that it could not have been prevented. For if, upon the one hand, facts engender events, events, upon the other hand, predispose facts. Interference, which tries to delay what must be accomplished, serves only to produce a catastrophe where, in the natural course of things, a change might have been developed, if not entirely without a commotion, at least without one of those earthquakes which shake the bases of European order, and hold in suspense for an indefinite period the destinies of peoples and the fate of crowns.

V.

Germany is made, and the causes that have formed her are, we would willingly say, invincible, if we did not desire to hold aloof from every metaphor indicating strife or aggression.

But this Germany in process of formation, of unification upon our very frontier, is she a threat to us, or a danger?

Does there exist a duty, or indeed a right, that obliges or authorises us to interfere in this solemn drama of the formation of a great people upon our frontier?

Let us put plainly the double question contained in the problem whose solution weighs so anxiously upon the world. Ought France to prevent Germany from becoming united? Can France prevent Germany from becoming united?

To this twofold question thus plainly put, we reply without hesitation, "No." France ought not; France cannot. Let us hasten to add, that when we say France cannot oppose herself to the formation of the German nationality, we do not assuredly intend to speak of physical and material want of power. We wish to say that France cannot do so because she ought not. She cannot, because she must not be false to her democratic and liberal mission. She ought not and she cannot, lastly, because she must not make what is illogical and unjust the pivot of her policy.

VI.

France ought not to interfere in the internal affairs of Germany.

France—it is permitted to our patriotism to render her this testimony—France, and more especially the France of the last eighty years, is in Europe the highest expression of those two magical words to which belong in the future, and even already at present, the empire of the world—Democracy and Liberalism.

Democracy—*i.e.* the incessant effort to associate the greatest possible number of men in the enjoyment of intellectual and moral life, and, through it, in a wise participation in the management of public affairs.

Liberalism (liberty put in practice)—*i.e.* harmonious agreement between institutions and morals, an habitual tendency among all the depositaries of power to substitute persuasion for force, tolerance for coercion, goodwill for menacing proceedings—in short, a system that loudly proclaims in law and act the sovereignty of public opinion, and thereby renders constant and solemn homage to the truth, which is the basis of every democratic State and every free society—to the truth that Governments are created for and by the people, and not the people for the Government. These two political dogmas of modern society—democracy and liberty—have been proclaimed, propagated, protected, and developed by France. She has lastly given them a supreme and irrevocable consecration in one of the most prodigious of political facts—in that of a monarchy issuing from universal suffrage, and marching with it for fifteen years in daily closer alliance. But such a vocation imposes duties. Under penalty of proving untrue to what constitutes our power and greatness, we cannot repulse democracy by force and annihilate liberty by violence. Nothing certainly compels us to make ourselves their armed champions in every part of the world. But everything forbids our combating them when they are advocated by vigorous nations, and are likely to build up a splendid future upon the ruins of a condemned past. It suited us to lend the aid of our arms to their resurrection beyond the Alps,

and it would not be fitting for us beyond the Rhine to declare against the ideas we have caused to triumph on the other side of the mountains. Without directly desiring to do so, France has powerfully contributed to the unification of Germany. Beyond the Alps, as beyond the Rhine, she recognises, respects, and salutes with her most ardent sympathies, the word Nationality.

VII.

The philosophy of history shows with the clearest evidence that certain ideas prevail at certain epochs with a sort of inevitable fatality.

One of the ideas which has most inspirited, and still most inspirits, our age is the idea of association.

In the commercial sphere it has created credit societies, substituting collective for individual force. In the economical sphere it has created coöperative societies. In the more extended circle of international relations, this tendency to association has given birth to treaties of commerce, which, instead of severing two countries by opposing interests, unite them by the fertile principle of free and mutual competition.

Lastly, this magic breath which urges on to unity displays itself in its loftiest expression in political life, properly so called. There it tends to eliminate the breaking up into small States, and calls forth great realities. A future yet impossible to define is destined to see great agglomerations accomplished by the power of nationality, *i.e.* by the force of a certain homogeneousness resulting from a common language, from history, religious ties, and palpable practical interests.

The lamentable events in Poland were a supreme protest against force endeavouring to suppress this powerful breath of a nationality. The unification of Italy (a unification, we believe, durable if Italy, assisting our conciliatory policy, respects the temporal power of the Papacy) is born of the same breath. Roumania is its creation; dualism in Austria is its invincible vindication by the Hungarian people.

Lastly, the facts accomplished, or in course of accomplishment in Germany are its most powerful expression. And as they are produced in the latter country upon the largest scale, in the midst of one of the most civilised and patiently persevering people, and in a geographical and political position of the first importance, they authorise us to affirm that the accession to European public life of the German people constitutes one of the greatest facts, and, perhaps, the principal fact, of the second half of the nineteenth century.

VIII.

France must not, under penalty of proving false to the principles that constitute her greatness and her strength in the world, interfere in the internal affairs of Germany.

We add, that what she must not do, she cannot do either, because the violation of these principles would be at the same time a serious imprudence.

Yes, that which would be unjust would be, at the same time, signally maladroit. We are about to prove this.

IX.

France has a military past which authorises her in saying, without boast, that where her honour or her legitimate interest is engaged she has accustomed the world to expect of her but one policy—the policy of victory.

But when neither her honour nor her interest is at stake, the very greatness of her past, which to her is at the same time a splendid present, imposes upon her the duty of not disturbing the peace of the world upon questions of self-conceit, or, let us say the word, of vanity.

Farther, it is incumbent upon those who hold in their hands those most precious treasures, the gold and the blood of France, never to touch this twofold wealth of the country, neither to spend a sou, nor to shed a drop of the blood of France without conscientiously asking themselves if her honour and her interests are at stake, and without being able to testify before all the world that it is for a just cause, and with the well-founded hope of not causing blood to flow in vain, that the country is asked for its wealth and its children, of whom it must be the more careful the less it feels inclined to yield them up.

What, then, would be the probable and almost certain consequence of an interference of France in the internal affairs of Germany? We reply:

1. The whole of Germany from the Rhine to the Main, Inn, and Danube, Northern Germany, and Southern Germany up to the frontiers of Austria, and, perhaps, even beyond those frontiers, would rise up against us and defend her just cause. And, in the second rank, we should see Russia eager to profit by so favourable an opportunity for having the Treaty of 1856 torn up by Central Europe.

2. The abandonment of the temporal Papacy to the Garibaldian demagogues. For this price we should have to purchase the neutrality of a Government whose active support would be in any case of very slight use to us, but whose hostility might neutralise a portion of our forces.

Such would be the situation which an interference, alike unjust and imprudent, would create for France.

X.

Ardent spirits, more impatient than reflecting, might retort that France is not in the habit of counting her enemies. With all her habitual daring she has certainly so many victories in her military annals, as not to stand in need of farther great anniversaries.

Our reply to the impatient is this: Like you, we believe that even in the midst of the greatest dangers France would astonish the world, and succeed in conquering and triumphing where, perhaps, every other nation of Europe would succumb. But, to tell the truth, we dread a victory quite as much as a defeat. In a war undertaken to prevent the unification of Germany—a war which would be as sacred to our patient and tenacious neighbours as is the idea of unity itself—in such a war ten battles gained or lost would never bring about anything but truces, falsely called treaties of peace. The imprudent hand that should desire to prevent Germany from remaining or becoming a nation would kindle a war destined to ravage Europe for an incalculable period by periodical hecatombs. Let the arbiters of the destinies of Germany also reflect upon this. Many generations yet unborn would only appear upon this earth to be, when arrived at adolescence, mown down upon the plains of Belgium, the Palatinate, or Westphalia. What a harvest for Death would there be in these innumerable battalions in this gigantic shock of two entire nations in arms, making noble victims pay for the fatal error of a few!

XI.

But perhaps the French consider themselves hurt by what is going on in Germany, and will impose upon the Imperial Government a kind of moral obligation to satisfy their sensitive patriotism, even at the price of a political fault?

We deny this.

The immense majority of the nation will bless the Chief of France for giving to the country not only a peace which in no way offends our honour, but farther and above all the certainty of that peace.

France, though ready for war, as ever, has at this moment a sincere desire to preserve peace.

Everything in this world is affected by the varying tendencies of the human mind. The necessity the country has been frequently under of late of drawing the sword has given it a disgust for any commotion which does not arise from absolute duty, clearly marked out and universally recognised. There is no doubt that a long peace would create a contrary current. If circumstances obliged a young and brave Sovereign to appeal to a nation as eager for action as it is now for repose, the public mind after a long peace would be prepared for war in such a manner that nothing but reckless audacity could desire to force France to lay her hand upon the hilt of her sword.

There exists, we are aware, among us a small minority blaming the pacific tendencies of the Government. This minority is composed in part of turbulent and unreflecting spirits, who confound vanity with dignity, bravado with courage, the love of adventure with the wish of the country. The remainder is made up of those who blame and always will blame everything at all times.

It may be clever to affect wounded patriotism, in order to push into foolish enterprises a Government one would like to compromise, but which is well known to be too strong and too popular ever to be weakened or shaken by any other blows than those it might be maledroit enough to inflict upon itself.

But this Government, thrice confirmed by the largest popular acclamation ever witnessed, has neither to apprehend unskilful friends nor systematic adversaries. Supported by the entire nation, whose creation it is, it will lead the French people, amid a glorious peace, to a prosperity destined to become more flourishing than ever, because religious conscience will be reassured, and political liberty will animate the whole structure with its vivifying breath.

XII.

The German people, secure from our interference in its internal affairs, is destined to become our most faithful ally. Everything unites and nothing separates us.

Germany having to choose between two powerful neighbours will, once reassured, infallibly turn towards France, whose alliance is in all respects far more natural for her than that of Russia. Thus, a friendly understanding between France, Germany, and England is not only the indestructible peace of Europe, but secures the ascendancy of all the generous ideas of which these three great nations are incontestably, if not the only, at least the most illustrious and most powerful representatives in the universe.

XIII.

It is important to add, that this programme, capable of giving to Europe a long era of peace and prosperity, can only become a reality upon three conditions:

1. That the Convention of September 15, or the equivalent we endeavour to substitute for it, shall be rigorously respected, and that thus the Holy Father remain in that full independence indispensable to the exercise of his supreme pastoral charge.

2. That France, satisfied at home, does not aspire to relieve herself abroad from her internal disquietude.

3. Lastly, that Europe, desiring peace like ourselves, shall give an irresistible and absolute guarantee of the fact at a Congress by acquiescing in universal disarmament.

XIV.

France has just solemnly proved up to what point she intends to make her signature respected.

The energetic yet moderate attitude of the Imperial Government in the midst of the events which have caused bloodshed in the States of the

Holy Father must discourage the Garibaldian and cosmopolite demagogues, and reassure the Catholics and the Holy Father himself.

The definitive solution of the Roman question must be the work of all the Powers that do not wish to see criminal attempts periodically renewed, and preceded and followed by agitation as prejudicial to the peace of consciences as to the prosperous march of material interests.

The Convention of the 15th of September is not a last halting-place towards the complete absorption of the temporal Papacy by united Italy. It is an impassable barrier placed between the temporal Power and its assailants by the evident necessity of things, the logic of facts, and the energetic will of the Emperor Napoleon III.

We are aware that the passions which have just brought about bloodshed in Italy had promised themselves a complete triumph. The men who have so audaciously violated the laws of their country imagined that because the revolutionary flood, owing to events which it would be useless to recapitulate, has attained a certain height, it would be allowed to rise higher, to advance farther, and to cover and carry away all things.

But this flood has just encountered, and, if need be, will always encounter a strong bulwark raised by a hand which some call Chance, others Providence, but which is in reality the action of a wise policy carrying out—consciously or unconsciously—the eternal will of God.

XV.

France, reassured as to the fate of the Papacy, turns her glance back upon herself.

The country desires the liberal and complete execution of the Emperor's letter of the 19th of January. The reforms it announces will not deprive the Imperial Government of a single friend, yet give it numerous fresh adherents in the ranks of that young and ardent generation which is free from all ties towards the Governments which preceded the popular votes of 1852.

Napoleon III. does not disguise from himself that it is this generation which must one day aid Napoleon IV. to become a great Prince, reigning over a great nation.

The letter of January 19, 1867, is a considerable step towards a system which will find nothing to envy in any country of both hemispheres. Nothing hinders us from believing, and everything leads us to hope, that this step, which is not the first, will also not be the last. It is to the wisdom of the country, the moderation of the press, the gradual disappearance of hostile and anti-dynastic passions, and, lastly, to the loyal assistance of all honest minds, that we must now look for ripening the harvest which a patient, but sincere, will has sown in the field of the future. Yes, this harvest has all along germinated in the heart of a Prince who has been taught in the great school of adversity.

This harvest ripens daily. The desire of a father, who regards his son and France with the same affection, calls for its maturity. A powerful breath—wafting along the combined blessing of authority and liberty—prophesies complete success.

In the hour of this grand consummation will be sealed more indestructibly than ever the already invulnerable pact between the dynasty of the Napoleons and France,—between Imperial France and liberty throughout the world.

XVI.

Satisfied at home, sympathising with the development of the great German nation, an ever vigilant guardian of the Papacy, France may now give Europe a long era of peace.

But, in order that this peace should not be an armed peace more fatal than war, it is necessary for Europe to join the pacific views of France, and by a general disarmament to give the world a manifest pledge of universal concord.

Four years ago the Chief of the French nation made an appeal to the world to remove by a loyal discussion those causes of dissension which have since caused torrents of blood to be shed.

What sensible mind does not now admit that it would have been better for Europe if that appeal had been heard?

It is the property of a patient mind not to abandon a great design because circumstances were not favourable to its execution at first.

Perhaps in 1867 Europe, taught in the school of adversity, wearied by so much fruitless agitation, and eager for peace, may be happy to hear the same voice again say to her now,—"It is necessary that I should be listened to, for I speak in the name of France."'*

SPEECH OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

THE following is a remarkable passage from the speech with which Napoleon III. opened the session of his Chambers on November 18. 1867:

'Since you separated, vague disquietudes have arisen to affect the public mind in Europe, and to restrict the movements of industry and commercial transactions in all quarters. Notwithstanding the declara-

* Speech at the opening of the Session, November 1863.

tions of my Government, which has never varied in its pacific attitude, the belief has been spread that any modification in the internal system of Germany must become a cause of conflict. This state of uncertainty could not endure longer. It is necessary to accept frankly the changes that have taken place upon the other side of the Rhine; to proclaim that, so long as our interests and our dignity shall not be threatened, we will not interfere in the transformations effected by the wish of the populations. The disquiet that has been displayed is difficult of explanation at a period in which France has offered to the world the most imposing spectacle of conciliation and of peace.'

GERMANY AND THE FRENCH PROPOSAL OF A CONFERENCE.

Berlin, November 20, 1867.

PRESSED for a reply, Prussia has answered the French invitation to a Conference by declaring, that before making up her mind, she must be satisfied on three several points. First of all, it is necessary for her to know the basis on which the deliberations are to be carried on; next, she wishes to ascertain the likelihood of that basis being approved by Italy and the Pope; and, thirdly, the names of the Governments invited.

The first inquiry elicited a confidential intimation to the effect, that if Italy abandons the idea of making Rome her capital, there will perhaps be a chance of her annexing a portion of the Papal provinces.

As regards the second point, the Italian Government will be happy to entertain any proposal of the nature stated, provided it does not include a formal resignation of Rome. This does not augur favourably for a possible arrangement between the two parties principally concerned. Nor ought it to be lost sight of, that the Italian Parliament will be even less willing to compromise the matter than the Cabinet, which latter considers it a bad

legacy, and would like to be rid of it as soon as possible. It is this uncertainty about Parliamentary votes, and the consequences they may possibly have upon the destinies of the Peninsula, which caused the Emperor of the French to delay the withdrawal of his troops from Rome to Civita Vecchia. To increase the difficulties of the situation, the Pope has refused to discuss his rights at all, and will not appear at the Conference, unless for the purpose of reclaiming Bologna and the Marches.

With reference to the third item in the list of Prussian queries, it was easy enough to give the names of the invited guests, but not so easy to reconcile this Government to the company. France has invited some South German Governments, and even extended her summons to two States embodied with the Northern Confederacy. But by virtue of existing treaties none of these States are in a position to send a battalion to the field, except with the consent and coöperation of the Berlin Cabinet; and the Northern Courts are, under the Federal arrangements, even stripped of the right to accredit representatives to foreign Courts, unless on missions of form and courtesy. Of the two Northern States invited, one—Saxony—has shown itself sufficiently alive to the obligations constitutionally imposed upon it to hand the French missive to the King of Prussia, and leave it to be answered by him in his capacity of presiding member and sole representative of the North German Confederacy. Darmstadt, the other State referred to, relying probably on the circumstance that half her dominions only are united with the Bund, has hastened to respond to the polite attention shown her, and accepted unhesitatingly. The South German Governments waver. Between the bland advances of France and the allegiance they owe to unity and treaties they are in painful embarrassment. It would seem unnecessary to say in what light the conduct of France in treating confederate as independent States is viewed here;

but, if M. de Moustier is desirous to utilise the aid of this Government in his present delicate position, it is scarcely his most effective course to ignore the national reunion of Germany. The one excludes the other.

Circumstances, however, oblige Prussia to act with caution. Within the last few days a new actor, or rather an old actor in a new garb, has appeared on the stage. Profiting by the embarrassment of her old adversary, Russia has declined the invitation of France, at the same time evincing an unequivocal disposition to change her views about Italy on condition of securing support in the East. This is the third time in the course of the year that such a proposal is proffered to the powers that be at Paris. Twice rejected, will it meet with a better reception now? To Prussia this is a grave matter. No doubt Russia is anxious to sustain the power of this Government while counting upon it as a means of neutralising Austria, her own opponent in the East; but some of her diplomates might possibly have little to say against a slight remodelling of things in Germany, could they hope to paralyse Austrian antagonism on the Lower Danube by alliance with France. Ever since last year's campaign certain Russian diplomates have pretended to look upon a business connection with themselves as the only way left to France of recovering her prestige. With Russia, they intimate, France would soon assume a commanding position on the Rhine and acquire fresh glory in the Levant; without Russia, they regret to think, she can but descend from her ancient pedestal, and subside into the tame inactivity of a second-rate concern. Whispers to that effect have not been wanting for the last twelve months, and they are just now being repeated with additional emphasis.

The turn thus given to affairs seems to have taken our politicians by surprise. However intent upon keeping her Eastern irons in the fire, Russia was hardly credited

with the intention of bringing on a crisis before the completion of her railways to Turkey and Turkistan. Two years at least must elapse before this can be achieved. That she would endeavour in the mean time to make up for the want of rapid communication by foreign friendships had not entered into the calculations of many on this side of the Channel; but she is acting now as though she had hopes of being able to take the matter in hand. We are assured, on good authority, that preparations are making to mobilise the troops in the western provinces of the empire, and it is positive that the Polish fortresses are being strengthened, and the roads to Galicia, especially those to Brody and Lemberg, repaired. Taking farther into account that a Servian Note has been delivered at Constantinople, resembling in its diction if not in its demands an ultimatum, it almost seems as though they wished to make us think that the time was drawing near when the Cretan outbreak would be accompanied by similar events on the Continent. However, so far as we can see, all depends upon decisions in another quarter. If the Russian overtures are again denied a hearing—if Russia is plainly told that she will have resistance to encounter—the smouldering fire in those combustible regions will be scarcely fanned into a conflagration for some time to come. Neutrality, or want of decision, may have the opposite effect.

THE CONFERENCE BECOMES IMPROBABLE.

Berlin, November 23, 1867.

As there is little hope of the Conference ever assembling, or, were it to assemble, producing a favourable result, France's pressing the matter is here attributed to a wish to make the probable failure of her exertions a pretext for

prolonging the occupation, if not of Rome, at least of Civita Vecchia. To captivate the minor States, Munich has now been proposed as the place of meeting. Prussia's reserve will be probably augmented by unpleasant demonstrations proceeding from her Catholic subjects. Two thousand inhabitants of Cologne have petitioned the King to protect the independence of the Pope. Other addresses are in course of preparation in various provinces. Excepting the Ultramontane papers, which observe a cautious reticence, the German journals, of all shades of opinion, have declared against the Conference. Apart from other objections, which are neither few nor slight, the idea of France convening a diplomatic assembly purely at her own suggestion, selecting participants, and proposing the theme of debate, is considered as inadmissible.

The Danish press is highly satisfied with the sale of their West Indian Islands to America.* All political parties agree in wishing that the 2,000,000*l.* which are to pay for the tight little islands may be put by against the next war with Prussia. This one idea of war with Prussia still predominates at Copenhagen.

ITALY, TURKEY, AND POLAND.

Berlin, November 26, 1867.

THE unceasing efforts of France to realise the plan of a Conference have elicited the following remarks in the Berlin *National Zeitung:*

'The Pope, as well as Italy, having at length agreed to the Conference in principle, the Paris Cabinet are in hopes of bringing it to pass after all. Still, there remain grave obstacles in the way. Prussia, Russia, and England have made assent dependent, not on a mere willingness of

* The transaction was not ratified by the American Senate.

the chief litigants to attend, but on their previous approval of a basis likely to secure success. We earnestly wish to see this condition upheld. Otherwise there would be the risk of engaging in the empty semblance of a debate, of no good to anybody except to France. The latter, indeed, would have cause to congratulate herself on the mere fact of a Conference, even though barren of any ulterior result. If the meeting is held, France, independent of the turn the deliberations may take, will have again proved her self-assumed vocation to convene European Areopagi, select participants, and confer upon them the privilege of sharing in the arrangements resolved upon. As to the other Powers, all they have to expect is to assist at a display of unpleasant and unprofitable altercation. That they would be entrapped into signing a joint guarantee, is not to be thought of. To become security for the Pope would be contrary to their interest and principles.'

Doubtless a meeting of titled representatives round an oblong table covered with a green cloth does not insure the solving of an intricate difficulty. But the meeting itself is uncertain. Though several minor States have been won by the rare distinction conferred on them, the actual appearance of some, such as Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, will probably depend upon acceptance on the part of Prussia.

The conduct of the latter in the present stage of the business is not unlikely to be influenced by Russia, whose aims were adverted to in my last. At St. Petersburg most things are nowadays viewed by the light of the Eastern question. Not a few interests, otherwise dear and carefully guarded, would be sacrificed there to agreement with France on that one head. But the cherished object cannot be so easily compassed. A Constantinople correspondent in the *Moscow Gazette* thus represents the actual relations between the two great empires of the East and West:

'Not in the Cretan question alone does Turkey rely upon the dissension between Russia and France to prolong her resistance against foreign demands. The Porte is well aware that throughout the Ottoman East the political present and future of the Christian populations is viewed differently by the Paris and St. Petersburg Cabinets. Russia, the Turks have learnt to understand, supports the establishment of separate and

autonomic States; France, on the contrary, endeavours to assist the Turkish Government in effecting an impossible fusion between the Turkish and Christian tribes. As far back as the time of his embassy at Constantinople, M. de Moustier, now French Minister of Foreign Affairs, was enamoured with the latter plan, in which he entirely concurred with Fuad Pasha. To the Turks, then, Russia is a Power promoting a centrifugal movement in their realm; France, on the other hand, to them represents the centripetal principle. In Russia's Eastern policy they see destruction; in that of France, consolidation. There will come a day when this antagonism between the two Cabinets will assume a palpable form. Until that decisive moment arrives, Turkey, by relying upon either Court alternately, cleverly manages to further her own purposes, and, above all, gains time.

In this her whole policy has consisted since the Paris Treaty of Peace. Still, it would be erroneous to suppose her remiss in the matter of improved domestic arrangements. Thanks to the coöperation of Western allies and capitalists, railways are beginning to be constructed. In a short time they will cross the principal parts of European Turkey, facilitate the transport of troops to the Slavonic provinces, render insurrection more difficult, and be of good service in the event of an armed invasion on the part of Russia. Against this latter peril earnest preparations are being undertaken in more than one State department. Especial activity is being exhibited by the military authorities. Four battalions of the garrison of Constantinople have been armed with breechloaders, 50,000 Snider rifles have been bought, and orders issued to convert the old weapons into modern ones; so that by next spring 60,000 Turkish infantry will have been provided with arms of the most efficient make. Besides this, large quantities of corn are being purchased in the Danubian Principalities, the works of Erzeroum and Kars are being actively strengthened, and rifled artillery of large calibre sent from Constantinople to several places in the Levant. In a word, Turkey is keeping her military establishment on a permanent war footing.

Obviously the Power chiefly aimed at in all this is Russia. It therefore behoves us to accelerate the construction of our railways to the Turkish and Austrian frontiers, and equip our army in the best and most effective style. Possibly we shall at the very outset have to withstand a good many enemies single-handed. The Hon. Henry Elliot, the new British Ambassador, has just arrived here. They say that he is but a timid politician. If so, and if the policy of England remains unchanged, he will probably hold aloof, like Lord Lyons, his predecessor.'

The intentions so openly avowed by the *Moscow Gazette* are naturally noticed in more quarters than one. Not Turkey alone, but the Austrian Kaiser, too, deems it pru-

dent to be on his guard. Interesting intelligence about Austrian precautions is supplied in an article of the Lemberg *Gazetta Narodowa*, a Polish paper not unconnected with the Governor-General of Galicia:

'For many years past the three Powers which divided Poland between them did not fall out with each other, being alike interested in the tenure of the common spoils. But things have undergone a change of late. Austria is no longer apprehensive about her share, and accordingly finds the road open to Russian Poland whenever she likes. At the last Paris interview Austria treated the Polish question with the most unreserved frankness, and were Russia to declare war against Austria now, the immediate effect would be to cause this important topic to be revived. The same would be the result of Russia's setting to work in the East.'

The above statements are in the main correct. Baron Beust and M. de Moustier, when they last saw each other, concurred in the opinion that Constantinople would be best defended at Warsaw. The fact is apparent, but before it can be applied must be recognised by the Berlin Cabinet.

THE CONFERENCE STILL MORE IMPROBABLE.

Berlin, November 28, 1867.

THE Conference negotiations have entered upon a new but scarcely more hopeful phase. Finding all those endeavours to make others deliberate on what she had predetermined by the sword of no avail, France has so far realised the circumstances of the case as to offer a concession. At the instance of Italy she has declared her willingness to evacuate the Papal territory, if the Conference can be got together. But the withdrawal of her troops is made to depend upon agreement on some points calculated to advance the adjustment of the matter. Could France be prevailed upon to renounce all unpleasant conditions, the only immediate consequence of the Powers

accepting the invitation would be to give the French Government an opportunity for the withdrawal of its troops. As yet, however, neither Prussia nor Russia nor England has returned a favourable reply. On the contrary, they still insist upon the previous submission of a practical programme.

M. ROUHER'S 'JAMAIS.' HESSE-DARMSTADT AND THE CONFERENCE.

Berlin, December 7, 1867.

In the course of the diplomatic conversations respecting the practicability of a Conference, Russia the other day suggested, that if no programme could be concerted between Italy and France, the deficiency might perhaps be supplied by a preliminary meeting, to be attended by the great Powers only. Catching the hint, France invited the leading Cabinets to an introductory parley. Among these, however, there were some not particularly inclined to comply with the request. The Papal and Italian Governments, being diametrically opposed in their views, the Courts in question had too little confidence in themselves to suppose they could effect an agreement, whether at an introductory meeting or at the Conference itself; and as they had also their suspicions respecting the part that might be assumed by Russia in the prologue devised by herself, they were the less eager to return an answer in the affirmative. Their hesitation appears to have had an irritating effect upon Napoleon and his Cabinet. On no other assumption, at any rate, is it possible to account for M. Rouher going down to the Chamber and exclaiming, as it were in the face of the world, that no part of the Papal territory would ever be handed over to Italy. Again, it would be difficult to explain on any other supposition the estimable candour of M. de Moustier, in in-

forming the House and the family of nations at large, that as France has lost her influence over Italy, the other Powers are to be called in to restore to her that special advantage. Unless the hope of a Conference had been rapidly on the decline, it is not likely that manifestations so little calculated to promote it would have been made. And really it is perhaps better for all parties that there should be no such assembly. As the Pope is preparing a document, or rather an act of accusation against the Italian Government, to be laid before the diplomatic conclave, what, in the name of common sense, can there come of it? That document is now printing at Rome.

Count Bismarck, in an officially published note, blames the Hesse-Darmstadt Government for accepting the invitation to the Conference, unmindful of its connection with the North German Confederacy. The Count in this striking epistle says:

'To participate in the discussion of a European question is certainly not the same thing as signing a European treaty. Still, we beg to put it to the Grand Ducal Government, whether, if it accepts the invitation unconditionally, and alone of all German States enters into deliberations with non-German Powers, it considers such conduct entirely free from the risk of drawing it into a policy opposed to that of its allies.'

To this remonstrance reply was made in the official *Darmstadt Gazette.* Feeble in its argument, it is remarkable for the bluntness of its wording.

NORTH GERMAN AMBASSADORS. THE WALDECK ACCESSION TREATY.

Berlin, December 12, 1867.

In a recent sitting of the Prussian Parliament Count Bismarck informed the members that the Prussian Envoys to the principal Courts will be shortly recalled, to be immediately reaccredited in the name of the North German

Confederacy. Though in strict accordance with the Federal Charter, this step has been long postponed from a desire to spare the sensibilities of the minor Sovereigns included in the reformed Commonwealth. If now resorted to, it has been no doubt accelerated by the oversight of France in ignoring the existence of the Confederacy when sending out cards for the Conference. Should France hesitate to receive an Ambassador of the Northern Confederacy, she will only hasten its completion by the South —an eventuality otherwise more remote than one could wish.

As matters stand now, the Prussian Government has no wish to provoke France by completing the great work of reunion in a hurry; while the Bavarian and Würtemberg Courts, far from longing for embodiment, are, on the contrary, eagerly employed in retarding such a consummation. To characterise their bias by one example out of many, they have chosen this time of all others to remodel the trade laws and enact new rules of procedure in the courts of justice. Reform was certainly needed in both these departments of legislation; but, as sweeping measures of a like nature are impending in the Confederacy, it had been anticipated the Southerners would refrain from innovations of their own, and, putting off for a few months longer innovations delayed for but too many years, for unity's sake adopt the new statutes of the North. But the opposite conduct is pursued. Very naturally so, there being no need of legislative unity, if political separation is to be perpetuated, as we are candidly told it will be. The Würtemberg Premier has just declared in his Chamber that he will not on any account join the Confederacy, as it would only cost the country 5,000,000 florins a year, and deprive it of the post and telegraph revenues. Still, there is no sign that the Prussian Government will abandon the policy pretty plainly announced by Count Bismarck, of putting off unity until

demanded by the Southern Cabinets in a body. Between this cautious reserve of the Prussian Government and the dynastic claims of the Southern Potentates the unity movement has come to a standstill.

It is with very mixed feelings the German Liberals have to own to themselves that, for the moment, the only hope they have of compassing the reunion of all Fatherland lies in the possible refusal of France to recognise the consolidation of the Northern half. Were Napoleon openly to declare against the results of last year's campaign, the dread of future contingencies might compel the Berlin Cabinet, as well as the Southern Courts, to veer round, and sail for a different port from the one they are now bound for. To the people an opportunity of resuming the agitation will offer in January, when the Zollverein Parliament meets, and the debates, properly limited to tariff and excise affairs, might be extended to the other concerns of the nation. It is just possible that an attempt to leap over the Main *en masse* will be made by the Deputies, even should the Prussian and Southern Governments continue their reserve towards each other.

On the 9th the Waldeck treaty was the order of the day in the Prussian Lower House. By virtue of that curious instrument—the most extraordinary, perhaps, ever concluded between independent States—the Prince of Waldeck transfers the administration of his principality to the King of Prussia, reserving to himself a nominal right of indorsing the acts of his suzerain. The King of Prussia, on the other hand, in return for the political advantages accruing from this virtual annexation, engages to cover the deficit of the principality, amounting to 18,000*l.* a year. On the treaty being laid before the Prussian Parliament for ratification, the Liberals objected to paying for the Waldeckers while remaining Waldeckers. They ought to become Prussians, it was urged, supply an adequate share towards the common expenditure, and merge

their debt in that of this great monarchy. But the Waldeck case is one to which applies the old adage, *Ultra posse nemo obligatur*. Count Bismarck rose to reply, and in a lengthy and lucid speech conveying much useful information, proved that, whether embodied or no, the Waldeckers would be unable to make up their deficit, and always have to fall back upon the Prussians. He said:

'Waldeck—as indeed every one of the minor principalities, Brunswick alone excepted—was poorer than Prussia. Indirect taxation did not yield there what it yields here; while as to direct assessment, the pockets affected by it were neither numerous nor well-stocked. If the minor territories were to conform to the military requirements of the Federal Charter, they must be assisted. If annexed by Prussia, they would be just as little in a position to maintain their own quota of troops as if left independent. The Prussian Government, therefore, in declining to accede to the proposal of the Sovereign and people of Waldeck, who were both anxious for annexation, had not injured in any way the pecuniary interests of its subjects. In refusing to become owners of Waldeck, the Prussian Government had been actuated by a regard for the feelings of the other Sovereigns forming the Bund. If, after guaranteeing the sovereign rights of the princes entering into permanent alliance with her, Prussia had, no matter in what way, added the domains of one of them to her own, the rest would have imagined that the Federal arrangements were mainly designed to compel abdication. Not wishing to awaken this apprehension, Prussia met the proposition of Waldeck by a counter-proposal, and the result of the negotiations that ensued was the treaty now before the House. It had been ratified by the Waldeck Parliament, and he hoped would be by the Prussian.'

Which was accordingly done. The like benefit Prussia has been obliged to vouchsafe to a host of minor principalities all left in the possession of Federal independence. Together with the increased expenditure for her own army, these unavoidable contributions to the minor exchequers have had the result, that the Prussian budget, always above the mark in former years, shows a deficit of 2,000,000 thalers in the estimates for 1868.

AN OUTSPOKEN DIPLOMATIST.

Berlin, December 18, 1867.

A SPEECH delivered by the French Envoy at Dresden on the birthday of the King of Saxony creates some sensation. In proposing his Majesty's health at an official dinner, attended by all the ministers and dignitaries of state, Baron Forth-Rouen expressed a wish that the misfortunes which had befallen the King in 1866, and which had only served to raise him in the eyes of the world, would be counterbalanced by a long life of happiness and prosperity. Those misfortunes of the King being defeat by Prussia and embodiment with the Confederacy, the sentiment of the speaker amounts to an audacious reproach passed on this Government. It is the more irritating, inasmuch as the Saxon Cabinet, though allowing agitation to go on in the State under their immediate control, have yet officially done all in their power to fulfil their Federal duties in accordance with the letter of the pledges given.

The rumour alluded to by the *France*, that the negotiations between the Berlin and Copenhagen Governments having come to naught, a rupture will probably ensue, never existed but in the mouth of the Paris semi-official organ. Like the speech of Baron Forth-Rouen, that statement seems to be mainly intended to renew the guerilla war, suspended for some time, but now resumed at many different points at once against this Government. It is but harmless sport. After the abundant experience we have had of this sort of skirmishing, it would scarcely deserve mention, were it not that nervous people are somewhat disquieted by its reappearance.

A TURKISH MINISTER'S LETTER ON THE STATE OF HIS COUNTRY.

Berlin, December 28, 1867.

THAT a Turkish statesman should write to a Continental paper to explain the condition of his country, and urge the reforms he considers necessary, is an event in itself calculated to attract attention. How much more must this be the case at a time when the aspect of European politics is none of the most exhilarating, and when improvement is really required in more quarters than one to prevent matters from getting worse. I believe, therefore, it is not a work of supererogation to acquaint the reader with a letter on the state of Turkey, addressed to the editor of the *Dziennik Poznanski* by Ziya Bey, a well-known Turkish Liberal. Though a leader of the party styling itself 'Young Turkey,' the writer is advanced in years, having long held the highest offices under the Porte, and spent an active life in immediate attendance upon successive Sultans. Some time ago he and his party began to avow their heterodox leanings, and, emboldened by what they thought the necessities of the case, presumed to ask for liberal and even constitutional reform in the European sense of the term. But the season for such a change had not arrived, and the Cabinet looking black upon them, Ziya Bey and some of his political friends had to beat a hasty retreat to Paris. From that place he now writes on the subject nearest his heart, selecting for this purpose a Polish paper—probably because the Poles, being the enemies of Russia, are the friends of Turkey, and have been earnestly engaged of late in assisting the reorganisation of the country they consider their natural ally. Not to mention the Polish Legion employed in watching Bulgaria, and the Polish political police, expressly organised for the detection of supposed

Russian conspiracies among the Christian Rayahs, not a few of the Warsaw exiles have recently betaken themselves to Constantinople, to serve in military and administrative capacities at the seat of the Ottoman Government. Their countrymen being the only connections Ziya Bey has in the more civilised part of the world, it is to them he sends the missive which is so little in accordance with the ordinary practice and self-complacency of Oriental statesmanship. Concerning the soundness of his views I do not presume to offer an opinion. I should not wonder if his remarks were open to criticism, the subject being an intricate one, and the writer an exile temporarily shut out from the sight of his country, and the honours so long enjoyed there. Yet he is a man so intimately conversant with the question, and his mode of reasoning is in many respects so new, that the hearing he demands will be scarcely denied him. His letter runs as follows:

'*Paris, December* 18, 1867.

'Sir,—Events in the East are developing fast, and it is possible will produce a crisis in the ensuing spring detrimental to the peace of Europe. And yet it is only eleven years since a treaty purchased at the cost of so much blood and money was signed, and the integrity of the Ottoman empire solemnly guaranteed by the European Powers.

Is the preservation of that empire less important for the maintenance of the balance of power now than eleven years ago? No, it is not. But, in spite of this undeniable truth, it seems as though all the sacrifices made by Europe in 1856 were destined to remain unproductive, and as though the danger of seeing the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean in the hands of Russia were as imminent as ever. In raising my voice at such a critical time as the present I am actuated by a sense of duty, and by the conviction that, having held various high offices in my own country, I am in a position to portray matters as they really stand. The testimony I am about to offer is the fruit of twenty-five years' experience gained in the highest offices of the civil service — as Grand Vizier, Minister of Justice, High Chancellor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of the Privy Council, and private secretary to this Sultan and his predecessor. I flatter myself that I can supply Europe, deceived though she is by Russia and the Porte itself, with reliable intelligence respecting the principal cause of the evils now overwhelming the East and threatening to become incurable.

The origin of the mischief is in the peculiar form of Government, unlike any that exists in other despotic States. Unlimited as is the power of the Porte, it is not vested in the Sultan, but in a handful of dignitaries not at all concerned about the success and respectability of his rule. Those dignitaries form a set of statesmen who, for a period of twenty-five years, have alternately relieved each other in office. By persuading the Sultan he cannot do without them, they have succeeded in immuring him in his palace and cutting him off from the rest of the world. For many years past the Sultan has reigned, but the Cabinet ruled. The more completely to enjoy their omnipotence, those dignitaries have removed all talented persons from responsible situations, thus leading the foreign Ambassadors to believe that there are no able or intelligent men to be found in Turkey. Nay, more, they have imbued the Sultan himself with this conviction, and, notwithstanding his dislike to them, he cannot summon up courage enough to dismiss them. Europe, he thinks, has been so long accustomed to transact business with them, and might be dissatisfied were he to appoint others. It may be easily imagined that the parties interested in confirming him in this mistake do not scruple to derive advantage from it. These old dignitaries have no policy they can call their own, but are mainly guided by the representatives of the foreign Powers. Their very continuance in office depends upon ambassadorial caprice. A Grand Vizier is deposed for disobliging a foreign consul. In the provinces things are equally gloomy. Ignorant, unpopular, and corrupt men are appointed Governors, if they can only boast the protection of a Minister. Everywhere there is corruption and lavish expenditure; whoever has interest at Court need fear no punishment. The people are weighed down by taxes, and from time to time utterly cleared out by the imposition of extraordinary tributes. They are decimated by conscription, and brought to the verge of despair through the illegal practices of their rulers. The department of public finance, being entirely without supervision, is administered in such a way as to dry up the very sources of wealth; justice is but an empty name in the tribunals; and the most complete despotism and incapacity are rife in every branch of the civil service.

Led astray by her agents, and deceived by Russian intrigues, Europe believes it is the Christians alone who are oppressed. Nothing can be more erroneous than this. The Mussulman, being subject to the same bad government as the Christian, comes in for an equal share of tyranny, and, if the truth must be told, is even worse off than his neighbour, having no foreign Embassies and Consulates to take care of him. Notwithstanding the protection awarded to the Christians, the policy pursued by the great Powers towards Turkey has benefited none but Russia. By looking after the interests of the Christians alone, and leaving the Mussulmans to be preyed upon by arbitrary officials, they are sowing the seeds of discord, setting one portion of the population against the other, and preparing the

way for events equally disadvantageous to both. For this result Russia is waiting, having long undermined the country by her indirect and unlawful influence. Civil war once broken out, Russia will take the field, will meet the armies of the West on Turkish soil, and make all provinces of the Ottoman Empire the theatre of a terrible struggle, which may end in the fall of a State of 36,000,000 people. Unless speedily amended, such will be the consequence of the improvident policy adopted by the Western Cabinets.

Always true to her ambitious traditions, Russia follows up her scheme of aggrandisement with unremitting zeal. Daily she instils poison into the veins of our body politic. With her numerous agents, whose action is directed by her Ambassador at Constantinople, she avails herself of every opportunity to turn it to her own account. She makes both Europe and the Porte play into her hands. She stations troops on her frontiers, endeavours to beget revolution—openly at Crete and secretly in Bulgaria; and is now pitting Servia against us, supplying her with the means of creating a disturbance. She sides with Greece, is on the alert in Thessaly and Epirus, and gives us trouble in Chios, Samos, Montenegro, and the Danubian Principalities. I may here observe that Russia, by fostering revolution in the East, has forfeited all right to blame the Poles, and their exertions in the cause of right and justice. Not content with this, she is coquetting with Prussia and the United States, always keeping in view the events that may come to pass in the East. What does Europe expect to arise from such extreme tension? Europe stands by irresolute, does not know what to do, and apparently waits to be guided by circumstances and international jealousies. In the mean time Russia profits by it all, and with great strength and astuteness levels the way to aggrandisement and predominant power.

In this deplorable state of things the only salve to be applied is the one so anxiously desired by the population, and so often promised and never administered by the Government. It is a radical reform of the institutions of the State. Thus far the Porte, when pressed for political concessions, has always evaded the demand by inventing the pretext, that the Sultan does not see the necessity of change, and that Mahometan fanaticism would not put up with it; but every one in Turkey is aware that, whatever the Sultan may think of the expediency of taking the step, he is not in a position to oppose it. Whether his Ministers are acting wisely or unwisely, he cannot influence them. By virtue of certain *irades*, the Ministers are positively authorised, in case of necessity, to use the unlimited power vested in the Sultan without applying to him, and yet be exempt from all personal responsibility. As to the subterfuge of Mussulman fanaticism, it has no foundation whatever. Has the Mussulman population ever restrained the action of the Government in anything? Whatever that fanaticism may be, it never was, nor is now, an opposing element, as may be proved by reference to numerous facts.

Foreigners can scarcely comprehend what a chaos the East has become. Both the Christians and Mussulmans are sorely excited, complaining of the existing order of things. Yet both have evidently the same interests, and can only hope to promote their prosperity by making a common stand against the onslaught Russia is menacing. This is a truth more generally acknowledged than it seems. With the exception, perhaps, of a portion of the Greeks, all Christian subjects of the Porte, far from wishing the downfall of the State, are only desirous to achieve such an improvement as shall alleviate their woes. The Bulgarians are opposed to the insurrection in Crete; and if any *émeutes* have taken place among them, it was Russia who originated them. The Armenians, being immersed in commerce, are not at all belligerently inclined. The Greeks alone, encouraged by the independence of the kingdom bearing their name, and supported by Russia, dream of the resurrection of the Byzantine Empire. They have yet to learn that even were it possible to revive that ancient structure, they would be unable to rule so many different nationalities, all hostile to them.

To work for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and promote at the same time its dismemberment, is to stultify oneself. Yet such is the course now held by more than one of the Powers which signed the Treaty of 1856. Turkey to be saved needs sweeping reforms, which her present antiquated Ministers will be unable to carry out. That Cabinet which has no position in the country, nor can boast of influence or sympathy out of it, can only rely upon petty intrigues to maintain itself, and has far too much to do with the prolongation of its existence to consider the interests of the State and people. Fortunately there are enough practical and intelligent men in the country, known to the Sultan and enjoying public confidence, who would be able and willing to undertake the great work of revival. But to set this enterprise afoot we need either a direct intervention of the foreign Powers, or a domestic revolution, or the initiative of the Sultan, aided by the sympathies of Europe. The latter alternative would be by far the most beneficial, and might solve in a pacific way a question so complicated in itself, and which by reacting upon the European balance of power will ultimately engross the attention of the entire world.—Receive the assurance, &c.

ZIYA BEY.'

The Emperor of Russia has refused to receive the petition of the Livonian Parliament, asking for the continuance of the German idiom in schools and in official correspondence.

NEW-YEAR'S DAY AT THE BERLIN PALACE. WARLIKE SPECULATIONS.

Berlin, January 4, 1868.

In Prussia it is not the foreign diplomatists, but the King's own ministers and generals, who enjoy the privilege of offering their congratulations at the palace on New-Year's day. On the last repetition of this ceremony Field-Marshal Wrangel, as usual, acted as spokesman of the military portion of the assembly. Addressing the august personage, he said:

'To the King belongs the imperishable merit of uniting the once-discordant elements of Germany, and converting into allies and cordial well-wishers those who but a year ago stood in arms against us and the common country. By this memorable deed, conceived in the spirit of Christian conciliation, Germany is henceforth safe from the ambitious hankerings of the foreigner, and in a position to develop her liberties under the mighty panoply of her military institutions. He therefore implored God to reward the King for his arduous labours in the good cause, and begged to convey to him the thanks of the army—the people in arms.'

In reply, his Majesty acknowledged his obligation for the loyal feelings expressed, adding that the strength of the Federal forces was the best guarantee of peace. His Majesty's opinion on this head seems to be universally shared in this country. While the intentions of more than one neighbour are doubted, their capacity to work mischief is regarded as considerably inferior to their supposed malevolence. To show no fear, yet give no provocation, is, therefore, the maxim of the day.

The Government papers have been instructed to ignore the challenge implied in the recent military debate of the French Legislative Assembly, and the independent journals are cautious enough to imitate this prudent example. Though reprinting the flaming effusions of official and unofficial Chauvinistes, they scarcely offer a single word

of comment upon them. As to the public at large, the three several qualities of manliness, calmness, and scepticism, which form distinctive traits in the national character, combine to render them blind and deaf to the flash and din of French oratory. Looking on a French attack from a multiplicity of causes as improbable for the present, the bold avowals of M. Gressier, the pathetic appeals of M. Thiers, and even the professional ambition of Marshal Niel fail to shake them in their deliberate indifference to what is passing on the Seine. Were it necessary to strengthen their unconcern, the composition of the French army, as it will be under the new laws, would tend to heighten the feeling of confident expectation prevailing here. The notion that the Austrians have been conquered, not by the needle-gun, but by the superior intelligence and *morale* of the common soldier, is so firmly rooted in the Prussian mind that, should an emergency arise, they would cheerfully face any army which excludes educated men from its rank and file. The new Garde Nationale, they admit, is to include men of all ranks and occupations, very much like the Prussian line, reserve, and Landwehr. But if married Frenchmen, though drilled into discipline by the rigours of a military life, are, by their own confession, indifferent soldiers, they will prove even more so when embodied and led against an enemy at the spur of the moment. In military circles it is also observed that, numerically strong as the French army may appear in the ministerial bill, the levying 80,000 recruits more a year would involve an augmentation of the cadres by a quarter or a third, the whole entailing a cost which the country would be unable to bear all at once. Hence it is inferred that the new system will be carried out only gradually, and that the increase of the fighting force will be proportionately slow.

In the mean time no needful precaution is omitted on the German side. The permanent arrangements for the mobilisation of the army have been remodelled, and orders

issued according to which a force of above 400,000 will be ready to take the field at any time eleven days after the command is given. Bavaria and Würtemberg are also being urged to complete their army bills, and raise their troops to a level with their resources in money and men. It would be venturesome to foretell whether these minor States will succeed in forming an army proportionately as large as it ought to be; but it is satisfactory to learn that the disposition of the Bavarian officers has become so favourable to this Government—the only source and fountain head, as they regard it, of military renown in Germany—that, whatever available troops there may be, the patriotic leanings of the generals, as well as of the youngest ensigns, will be alone sufficient to check the secessionism of the Ultramontane party rampant at Munich.

Of course, all these fine things in the shape of infantry, cavalry, and artillery are not to be had for nothing; and it is the supposed impossibility of keeping the nation for a lengthened term in the expensive costume of a girded and buckled warrior, that will eventually exercise a more sensible influence upon the settlement of international questions than the impetuous aspirations of M. Thiers and his sect. The army having such an important task intrusted to it, and suffering much from the high price of provisions consequent upon the failure of the crops in many parts of the Continent, the King of Prussia has resolved no longer to defer the increase of pay, imperatively needed for some time past. Even with this additional grant the salary of lieutenants remains little more than nominal, varying from 25 to 30 thalers a month, and an allowance for board and lodging. Colonels will henceforth receive 2,600 thalers, with extras for horses; surgeons from 600 to 3,000 thalers, &c. No civilian of corresponding rank would be satisfied with this rate of remuneration; but, as the army includes many wealthy men, and as those not favoured by fortune are consoled by the high honour at-

taching to the profession, the gallant gentlemen are, on the whole, very well satisfied with their worldly position and prospects. The extra expenditure incurred by this increase of pay, and some other measures of a like tendency, is so great that the Federal Council has been memorialised by the War Office on the necessity of adding another 5,000,000 thalers a year to the military budget. Considering that the taxes in the minor States have had to be nearly doubled to sustain the present budget, and taking farther into account that, instead of the millions formerly saved every year by the Prussian Minister of Finance, there is a deficit of about 2,000,000 thalers in this year's estimates, it is easy to understand that public opinion is not particularly edified by the financial results of national consolidation.

The pacific intentions of Prussia are not limited to France, her self-constituted rival, but extend to Italy, her doubtful friend, and Russia, her temporary associate. Unmoved by the provoking language of French Ministers, envoys, and deputies, Prussia will not have recourse to the comparatively safe expedient of protecting herself by encouraging Russia and Italy in the pursuit of their favourite projects. Were she differently disposed, it is probable that General Menabrea, upon the hostile vote of the Chamber, would have been replaced by some more enterprising statesman; that Prince Gortschakoff would not now find himself constrained to manifest his Eastern politics merely in the composition of notes; and that Baron Beust, far from devoting himself to the pacific work of reform, would be dragged into the whirlpool of a combined Eastern and Western crisis. Thus early is fulfilled the prophecy of those who held that a united Germany, while strong enough to moderate the action of her neighbours, would herself be swayed by essentially pacific views. Indeed, the interests of a civilised and industrious people such as this would compel Count Bismarck to maintain a wise reserve,

even were he not himself pacifically inclined, and fully conscious of the fact that the geographical position of Germany in the centre of Europe renders her a sufferer from any war on any point of the continental circumference. The Count has therefore not assisted Italy to defy France, nor dissuaded his Sovereign from following the bent of his Conservative politics, and sending a letter expressive of personal sympathy to the Pope. Nor is siding with Russia to the extent of supporting her Oriental strategy avowed in his just-published memorandum, which advocates the establishment of some more semi-independent States on the pattern of Servia in the dominion of the Padishah. Nay, even though France has recently taken the important step of conveying a direct warning to Servia, Roumania, and Montenegro, not to continue their armaments, thereby rendering it rather difficult for Prussia to remain in a state of neutral expectancy, this Government has not lost its equanimity, and by preparing for war, while endeavouring to ward it off, not a little contributes to the prolongation of peace.

THE SEPTEMBER CONVENTION. FRENCH DIPLOMATIC EXPERIMENTS. RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA AT LOGGERHEADS.

Berlin, January 8, 1868.

WHILE the French Government wish us to believe that the Conference has not been given up after all, their hope of realising the precarious scheme has been sufficiently shaken to make them look out for a way of escape from the embarrassments of their awkward situation. Within the last few weeks they have repeatedly proposed to Italy the renewal of the September Convention,* though, in-

* Under this Convention France evacuated the Papal territory, while Italy engaged to protect the Pope.

deed, in a slightly altered form. In return for this concession—for as such France represented it—Italy was expected to lay aside all animosity, and conclude a defensive alliance with the foreign patron of her destinies. But disappointed and defeated as she is, Italy would not listen to these overtures, and continues as unwilling to renounce future liberty of action as she is prudently determined not to expose herself any more for the present. Speaking of Italy, I mean the Menabrea Cabinet, which it is hoped here will survive the dangers of the impending session. While thus vainly endeavouring to obliterate the remembrance of the past, and convert a discomfited adversary into a compulsory ally, France is attempting a move which, were it to succeed, would render submission on the part of Italy less humiliating and more lasting. With the harsh authority of an unavoidable protector, she urges the necessity of liberal reforms at Rome. But there, too, failure is certain. The Pope declines to receive any advice on the subject of his domestic politics, while shorn of the better part of his territorial possessions. Although his refusal does not discourage France from reverting to the subject again and again, the Papacy, it is to be feared, in worldly as in other matters, will undeviatingly adhere to the ecclesiastical theory of infallible resolve.

In addition to this restless and contradictory activity in the south, French diplomacy is also at work in this capital, breathing peace and amity more zealously than for some time past. It would appear, the neutrality Prussia observed in the Roman controversy, and the deliberate manner in which she abstained from encouraging the Oriental proclivities of her Eastern neighbour, have engendered the notion at the Tuileries that in the event of an Italian or Turkish crisis she might be persuaded, directly or indirectly, to befriend France. But the hope, if it exist, is utopian. At any rate, it is so while the aims and ends of French diplomacy are constantly changing, and while

its sole occupation seems to consist in experimentising, unfettered by political consistency or friendly leanings. To enable Prussia to dispense with Russian support, France ought to relinquish all idea of aggrandisement on her Eastern frontiers, confine any ambitious plans she may be disposed to entertain to less civilised countries, and in general adopt a course which shall contain an intrinsic guarantee that she will be true to herself and others. The Prussian Liberals never had any marked predilection for Russia, and now that their co-nationalists in Livonia, Esthonia, and Courland are being deprived of their ancient privileges respecting language and institutions, are less than ever inclined to look upon the Slavonic Empire as a permanent friend; yet, even if their foreign policy were not energetically opposed by the Conservatives, so long and so faithfully attached to their Russian connections, they would not at this moment dissolve any existing ties before entering upon new and promising relations with somebody else.

People at Berlin cannot close their eyes to the fact that, while making advances to them, France is in such a hurry to strengthen her Eastern fortresses, that the works are not suspended even in mid-winter. Nor is military activity interrupted here by the inclemency of the season. Orders have just been issued for a general inspection of railways and rolling stock, for the purpose of ascertaining what may be expected of them in time of war.

Though the Customs Parliament, according to the latest announcements, is not to meet before March, the electioneering business has already begun in the South. In Baden, Bavaria, and Hesse-Darmstadt, manifestoes have been issued by the moderate Liberals, explaining the nature of the new institution to the people, and admonishing them to use this opportunity for the return of enlightened and patriotic members. All these addresses

plainly indicate that an attempt will be made by a number of deputies to extend their authority beyond mere commercial business, and include political affairs in the jurisdiction of the Parliament. This is especially shown in the Baden Manifesto, where it is positively demanded that the Parliament shall at once aspire to legislation on all questions connected with the right of residence, colonisation, emigration, navigation, patents, railways, telegraphs, and the civil code generally. This being considerably more than has been allotted to the Zollverein Parliament in the Federal Constitution and the treaties with the South based upon it, the opponents of unity are by no means delighted with the prospects of the coming session. The Würtemberg Government has gone the length of protesting, in its *Official Gazette*, against the Baden Manifesto, which, having been signed by several Baden Ministers, must be considered as the programme of themselves and colleagues. I rather think that even the Prussian Cabinet, whose nearest interests the movement apparently promotes, is not proportionately elated. As has been repeatedly observed, Count Bismarck objects to immediate reunion with the South. He is not at all anxious to irritate France, and place Louis Napoleon in a position which might render it impracticable for the ruler of an ambitious and susceptible race to keep the peace.

The troops sent to the western provinces of the Russian Empire within the last twelve months are set down as above 200,000. Vast as this number is, their being dispersed over an enormous tract diminishes the military and political importance which would otherwise attach to the move. Beginning at Wilna, the échelon extends as far south as Volhynia and the Ukraine. The various corps employed on this service are provided with cast-steel guns on the Prussian pattern, 700 of which (450 four-pounders and 250 nine-pounders) have been manufactured at Krupp's for the Russian Government since

November 1866. The conscription in course of progress in the Russian Empire will add 240,000 men more to the Imperial forces, without a corresponding dismissal of veterans having as yet been ordered. This latter circumstance is calculated to confirm the belief that the extraordinary measures resorted to are intended to support the Eastern politics of the Imperial Cabinet, and give the idea of their being in earnest.

No doubt some pressure is exercised upon Austria, the most vulnerable of Russia's adversaries, by this military display; and the language of the St. Petersburg and Moscow press is certainly not of a kind to allay any misgivings roused at Vienna. The Vienna papers retort in the same strain, though in Austria hatred against Russia is confined to non-Slavonians only. The latest charge preferred relates to the dissemination of seditious manifestoes in each other's territory. A fortnight ago flying sheets were found in the streets of the Russian capital, summoning the people to assemble in front of the Winter Palace, and ask the Czar for sundry concessions of a democratic nature. Instantly the rumour arose that Austria was at the bottom of the intrigue. On the other hand, the Austrian diplomatists openly complain that pamphlets bidding the Russinian peasantry rise against their Polish masters are being smuggled over the Galician frontier from the kingdom of Poland. The Russinians certainly do not want much pressing. Their ecclesiastical authorities have just adopted the Russian literary language for official correspondence, and the country people of their race, though Roman Catholics as yet, begin to steal over the frontier to attend divine service in the Orthodox churches. This significant fact is admitted in a circular of the Lemberg Consistory to the clergymen of the diocese, in which the priests are commanded to put a stop to these heretical practices, and teach the people that a Catholic praying in an Orthodox church is condemned

both in this world and the next. From the ambiguous terms used in the circular, it would almost appear as though the heinous offence were not only committed by peasants of Russinian but also of Polish descent. And, indeed, this is more likely than might appear at first sight. All over Galicia the villagers have been long informed by pedlars and itinerants of doubtful callings, that, though but a very little land has been ceded to them by their own nobles, the same class, on the other side of the frontier, are being deliberately injured for the benefit of the peasant. The means employed by the advocates of Panslavonic agitation are many and manifold. To some they speak of land; to others of the Orthodox faith, the religion of the Russinians before their subjugation by the Poles; to the more educated classes the consanguinity of race and affinity of idioms are held up as motives for reunion. Appeals to the national pride and the religious devotion of entire tribes are varied with benefits conferred upon individuals. One Russinian professor and two Czechian civil officials, deposed by the Austrian Government for their Slavonian leanings, have been appointed to profitable situations in Russia. A committee is established at St. Petersburg for regulating the 'scientific' intercourse between the various tribes of Slave origin. A statement that M. Katkoff, the ardent and highly-talented editor of the *Moscow Gazette*, has memorialised the Czar on the duty of annexing all Slavonian countries, is allowed to remain uncontradicted. No wonder, then, that the hopes of the dissatisfied Czechians, Croatians, &c. are rising in proportion to the encouragement given.

In a recent issue of the *Humoristicke Listy*, the Prague *Punch*, there is a sketch representing a Hungarian and a German dancing with all their might for joy at having been selected as privileged nationalities in the latest rearrangement of Austria. But the ground on which the terpsichorean performance takes place is undermined. In

the cavity beneath are secreted casks, bearing the inscription, 'Panslavonian powder.' Close to them stands a Czechian peasant with lighted match, coolly asking himself, 'Shall I, or shall I not?'

COUNT BISMARCK AND THE CONSERVATIVES.

Berlin, January 11, 1868.

PEDANTIC friends are not always an acquisition to a clever and judicious statesman. A Conservative society in Pomerania has addressed a letter to the noble Count at the head of this Government, remonstrating with him for certain commissions and omissions noticeable in his recent policy. They do not quite understand, these strict and uncompromising people complain, how in some remarkable instances a man of such lofty principles could have been led away into a line of conduct savouring of the Liberal, or, what to them is the same, the wicked. Not, however, wishing to condemn him unheard, they beg to submit certain queries, which, in the interest of the Conservative party, they trust he will deign to answer. In the first place, how is it he has accorded liberty of speech to the Federal Parliament, and also allowed other statutes to be enacted at variance with the theory and practice of their denomination? Secondly, why did he have himself photographed on the same *carte de visite* with Madame Lucca, the noted *prima donna?* And thirdly, wherefore is he never seen in church?

To these searching interrogatories the Premier is related to have had the patience to give a meek, and, it is to be hoped, a satisfactory reply. As regards the first, he reminds his inquisitive friends that the exigencies of political life cannot be so well appreciated by outsiders as by those whirling round in the vortex of events. Will the

questioners be good enough to take his word for it, that there is a difference between an active statesman and the adherents of a conscientious but exclusive party? As to the Lucca photograph, it is an old affair, dating as far back as 1865. He was staying at Gastein with the King, engaged in concluding the famous treaty, the violation of which by Austria subsequently became the immediate occasion of war. Negotiations were long and tedious, and life at the sequestered spa uncommonly dull. In this predicament he met Frau Lucca on the promenade, and requested her to arrange a concert for a charitable purpose. Frau Lucca consented, on condition of his being photographed *tête-à-tête* with her. It appeared the harmless wish of a capricious artist, and he did not scruple to gratify her. The third reproach is a graver one. On this point, indeed, he would deserve censure, if it were not that his health prevented his exposing himself to the cold and draught to be encountered in the Berlin churches. But if, unfortunately, he was denied the satisfaction of joining in public devotion, he hoped he was not thereby excluded from the privileges of a Christian. He therefore begged them to continue their amicable feelings towards him, and availed himself of this opportunity to assure them of, &c.

Such is the story long afloat in the upper circles, and a few days ago committed to print by a Radical organ. Difficult of belief as it appears, that a minister of the rank and position held by the addressee should submit to be catechised in this wise, no disavowal having been offered, the correspondence must, I presume, be taken as a fact. If so, the inquiries have undoubtedly emanated from a small but highly respectable section of the Conservative party, to whom the maintenance of their principles is a matter they have really at heart. While the major part of the Conservatives consists of noblemen and officials, chiefly interested in political and social privilege, there is coöperating with them a fraction of stern rigorous

men, addicted to an honest and equitable absolutism on Biblical grounds, as well as on the precedents offered by Prussian history. That Count Bismarck does not satisfy these is very natural. They had expected him to annihilate parliamentarism, and find him creating new Parliaments instead. They had hoped he would treat the advocates of constitutional doctrines as sinners against religion and the King, and now discover with dismay that he takes the trouble to combat them by superior statesmanship, and a tedious process of tactics involving concessions on either side. It is the consciousness of disinterested motives that has made these political Puritans come forward on more than one occasion with a boldness, the propriety of which might otherwise be questionable; and it is probably owing to the respect they command from the bulk of their party, and indeed from every impartial critic, that a kind and explanatory answer has been vouchsafed their latest display. It is superfluous to remark that Madame Lucca, whose real name is Frau Baronin von Rhaden, is a married lady, whose reputation has ever been without the slightest blemish.

RUSSIA THE REGENERATOR OF THE EAST.

Berlin, January 18, 1868.

General Ignatieff, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, who has been recently called home to report progress, endeavours to convince his Sovereign of the expediency of adopting a more energetic course in the East. According to his opinion, the Slavonian subjects of the Sultan should be encouraged in their hopes of coming independence. But he has an influential antagonist. Prince Gortschakoff deems this procedure too venturesome. Ap-

prehending that, if matters are prematurely brought to a crisis, France and Austria will remodel Turkey after a pattern of their own, he recommends caution and patience. It is notorious, that the Slavonic Rayah are only waiting for an opportunity to enter into a connection with the Western Powers, which shall free them from their exclusive dependence upon Russia. Servia, more especially, has long adopted a reserved attitude towards her zealous patrons on the Neva, and although, by the force of the national movement, temporarily obliged to swim with the stream, would be happy to revert to her old tactics, and be on equally good terms with Bonaparte as with Romanoff. On these circumstances Prince Gortschakoff grounds his opinion, that the safest course for him will be, by diplomatic pressure, to exact one concession after the other, thus binding the Rayah to himself, yet giving other Powers no opportunity for active interference. Operating in this manner slowly but surely, Russia, he thinks, would be employing her time advantageously, until, in the turmoil of some great continental conflict, she might perhaps reap the fruits of her prudent and prolonged forbearance. In these views the Prince is supported by Baron Budberg, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, and the German and aristocratic fractions at Court. General Ignatieff, on the other hand, relies upon the assistance of M. Milutine, the clever Minister of War, and of the national party, whose influence has preponderated in the Government since the last subjugation of the Poles. The papers of this party, many of which are semi-official or inspired organs, assume a bolder front every day, and in so many words assert that—

'The day has come when all Slavonic tribes must be placed under the patronage of the Russian sceptre. Success would be certain, were the matter once taken in hand. Excepting the Poles, too feeble to be taken into account, all Slavonians are longing for connection with the great and victorious empire of their race. As to the Powers, they would think twice before offering resistance, seeing they would run the risk of kindling a general conflagration. The Sultan is a sick man tottering on the verge

of the grave. Austria will not for years recover from the defeat of Sadowa. Prussia has no interest in the matter, and will remain neutral. Italy's attention is diverted by her own domestic troubles; and France has been so very unhappy of late in her foreign undertakings, that she will scarcely expose herself to a renewal of the Crimean war. England is kept in check by America and the dread of Russian cruisers. Russia, then, ought not to tarry any longer, but set to work and fulfil her manifest destiny.'

That Russia is the only one capable of regenerating that part of the world, we are expressly assured by the *Moscow Viedomosti*, the leading organ of the national party:

'Only Russia is able to revive the East on a religious and national basis, and the liberty of Europe will not be the worse for it. Austria and the Western Powers being perfect strangers to the East, with which they have neither religious nor national community, have no call to mix themselves up with the Rayah. Were Austria or any other Power to arrogate to itself such a mission, Russia would not scruple to have recourse to any means, however extreme, for preventing them.'

Simultaneously with this candid avowal, the Slavonic subjects of the neighbouring countries are formally advised of what is impending. To mention one example, I will quote the following from the Russinian *Slovo*, publishing at Lemberg:

'The sky is clouded, but in a different quarter from what it was a year ago: Prussia and Count Bismarck, who for the last two years have swayed the destinies of half Europe, no longer excite interest nor even attention. The eyes of all are directed to Russia, who, in the opinion of many, now holds in her hand the key to the solution of nearly all European questions.'

This sentiment is complacently copied and approved by the official *Invalide*. As M. Milutine, the Minister of War, inclines to the *parti d'action*, it is only natural that, at a moment when the thoughts of his political friends are running in this direction, military preparations should be in progress. To infer from them that war is at hand, would be, however, even more erroneous than to identify the measures taken by General Niel with the policy of

the French Cabinet. Professional soldiers are always in advance of diplomates, and especially at a time when so many things are on the cards.

The attitude of Prussia at this juncture is remarkable. By observing the strictest neutrality she, on the one hand, contributes to the prolongation of peace, and, on the other, keeps those Powers whose amity towards herself is not, perhaps, permanently established, in a state of mutual opposition, which neutralises their strength. The correspondence between King William and the Emperor Napoleon, made so much of in *La France*, was confined to a simple exchange of complimentary notes on the opening of the new year. England has joined the diplomatic action of the French and Austrian Cabinets at Belgrade, and admonished the Prince of Servia to behave more quietly. Lord Stanley's note to the Prince's Government, dated December 26, was delivered only about a week ago.

To the above it may not be superfluous to append a few remarks of the *Kronstadt Wiestnik* on the state of the French and English fleets. On this head, the *Wiestnik*, the official organ of the Russian Admiralty, has received the following intelligence:

'Warlike preparations in France have latterly extended to the naval forces. The most marked activity is observable in the Government ship-yards. At this moment no less than 39 ships of different sizes are building for the Admiralty. Four of these are rams on the mixed principle, being half of wood and half of iron. One ram, the Ocean, is to carry eight guns of the heaviest calibre in battery, and four others in towers. On the same system four corvettes are being constructed to carry two guns on each side, and four others in as many immovable towers. These vessels will be comparatively small, and provided with powerful engines, so as to attain great speed in the water. The French men-of-war steamers number 348; add to these 116 sailing vessels and the 39 in course of construction, and we have a total of 503. According to the last accounts, the English fleet in the Mediterranean has received orders to take in provisions, and be ready to sail on a short notice. Many officers on furlough have been recalled, and all ships on foreign stations that can be spared ordered home. At Toulon, every arrangement has been made to embark an army of 40,000 men.'

Russian railways are rapidly on the increase. The Ryasan-Morschansk line, a portion of the Moscow-Volga line, has just been opened. It is 150 miles long, and has taken only a year and three months to construct. The Koslow-Woronesh railway, a link in the long line to be laid down between Moscow and the Sea of Azof, will be completed in a few weeks. The Moscow-Odessa railway is progressing so fast that it will perhaps be finished this year; the Poti-Tiflis line, which, after its contemplated extension to the Caspian harbour of Baku, will monopolise a considerable portion of the Persian trade, has just been commenced. For these extensive enterprises the funds are supplied by the Russian Treasury and the German and Dutch money-markets. The shares being guaranteed by the Government, and having the additional attraction of a low price, numerous capitalists are to be found who will invest in this lucrative sort of stock. On the average, ordinary shares may be had at 75, and preference at 85. The gentleman to whom Russia is indebted for the rapid development of her railway system, and whose name will not be forgotten in the annals of her might and culture, is Herr von Delvig, a Courland baron, Government director of the railway department.

At Orenburg, on the borders of Turkistan, a military school has been established for 200 pupils, 120 of whom are to be selected from the sons of Tartar and Kirghis chiefs. As Russians and Tartars generally manage to get on well together, the new school will probably confirm the good relations between the two nationalities in the border country.

RUSSIAN ARMY REFORM.

Berlin, January 20, 1868.

THE condition of the Russian army in the past year is made the subject of an interesting article in the *Invalide.* After an introduction to the effect that the Czar, though he has kept an unselfish watch over the peace of the Continent so long, will perhaps, by his nearest interests, be obliged to adopt a different policy in the future, the writer proceeds to ask himself whether the Russian forces will be competent to fulfil the task likely to devolve upon them. The question is answered in the affirmative; and the following account of the state of the army appended in proof thereof:

'Owing to the necessity of economising the public resources, the army had been reduced to 730,000 men by the beginning of 1867. In the course of that year it was farther reduced to 714,000, and subsequently to 700,000 men. Still, as the measures taken chiefly affect non-combatants, the military strength of the army was not diminished, but, on the contrary, increased, along with the reduction of the auxiliary branches. The reserve has been greatly augmented, and with the men on furlough reaches a figure more than sufficient to place the army on a war footing. By calling in veterans, our troops can be increased by as many as 64 per cent; a fact which is the best guarantee that no extraordinary conscriptions will be rendered necessary in the event of war, as formerly. In consequence of these innovations, the men under arms are of course much younger than hitherto. This is a circumstance having its peculiar advantages. Commissioned and non-commissioned officers, as they have chiefly to deal with young men, redouble their zeal; and the army being thus animated with fresh life, the training of the troops has made such rapid progress, that on the occasion of the late reviews they were found in excellent condition by the Emperor. With the addition of the men on furlough, these young and well-instructed cadres will make a uniform body so perfect in their tactics that nothing better need be wished for.

The good looks and intelligent behaviour of the soldiers prove that the new system of educating, clothing, and victualling has already begun to bear fruit. The recruits are made to learn reading and writing, and, what is equally important, really receive the rations provided for them

by the Crown. The year 1867 has confirmed the new mode of provisioning the troops. The colonels and other commanders, formerly intrusted with it, have had to transfer this portion of their duty to special commissioners, and receive an additional salary to make up for the emoluments they eschew. By this alteration, while the officers are placed in a more dignified position towards their inferiors, the interests of the army are more securely guaranteed. As to the regimentals, they too are no longer provided by the colonels, but made at extensive Government workshops at Moscow, Petersburg, Dunaburg, Brest, and Kiev. In each of these workshops complete regimentals for 25,000 men, and undress uniforms for 50,000 are turned out annually. The amount might be considerably increased by employing more workmen and sewing-machines. Thus, together with the numerical increase of the reserve, the means of supplying the army with all necessaries have been materially improved.

In the equipment of the army we have also made a considerable step in advance. The campaign of 1866 forced all Governments to adopt breech-loading rifles; a change which at first appeared very easy, but subsequently proved fraught with considerable difficulties. France, for instance, especially active in completing her military operations, hoped to provide a sufficient quantity of new rifles in the course of some four months, so that her army would be re-equipped by the spring of 1867. But the experiments made with different samples, the choice of the favoured one, and the necessary preparations in the factories, consumed so much time, that not even a third of the French infantry had been supplied with the chassepot by the end of that year. The expeditionary force to Rome, that it might be armed entirely with the new weapon, had to be composed of battalions taken from every part of France. With us the orders of the Government to public and private manufactories were so given as to insure the completion in the course of 1867 and 1868 of 800,000 new rifles. The adaptation was begun on the capsule system of Teri Norman, and continued on the needle-gun pattern of Karl. As in France, the cause of delay with us was the necessity of trying a good many new inventions, and of getting our factories into working order after making our choice. The final decision in favour of the Karl rifle was made in July 1867, and when the requisite machines were once put up, our factories began to work with the utmost dispatch, so that there is every hope of the measure being completed in good time. The Norman guns, repaired on the capsule system, are destined for the Siberian troops, while the Russian and Caucasus army will be exclusively provided with needle-guns. Together with the adaptation of the old rifles, new ones of a different system, with metallic cartridges, have been ordered in America. This rifle, too, is in future to be made in our own factories, for which purpose machines are being sent over.

The new equipment of our field artillery, on the peace footing, may be regarded as finished. The greater part of the batteries are already

provided with the new cannon, and the rest will be so in the course of the winter. Only seven batteries, stationed in different parts of the Empire, will have to wait till the end of the summer. In addition to this, the third batteries of the entire field artillery, now consisting of rifled, muzzle-loading four-pounders, will be likewise furnished with breech-loaders of the same calibre; an alteration to be effected, one half in the present and the other in the coming year. Fortress artillery was this year cast in our own foundries only. Guns of artillery metal to be employed on coast defences were cast at Petrozavodsk, and iron ones for the same purpose in Perm. The latter factory also turned out a quantity of steel guns, which, with those received from Krupp's, were distributed over the various fortresses. Yet there remains a great deal to be done to raise our artillery to the technical demands of the times; a remark which equally applies to the fortresses and the material of the army generally.'

The rest of the article is devoted to military schools and the new military courts of justice.

The *Czas* asserts that, according to private intelligence received from Warsaw, an army of 200,000 men is to be assembled in the kingdom of Poland as soon as the weather permits. The troops are to be chiefly stationed in the districts adjoining the Austrian frontier, and some of them will live in tents. Every owner of landed property in the kingdom possessing above ten acres will have to contribute two garnez of rye, oats, and barley for the maintenance of the troops. If this intelligence is correct, the national party at the Court of St. Petersburg must be assumed to be strong enough to exercise a certain pressure upon the resolves of the Austrian Government in Eastern affairs. Speaking of the Oriental question, it is a curious fact that, as we perceive from a published decree of the Council of the Empire, a secretary has been attached to the suite of Queen Olga of Greece, whose salary is paid by the Russian Foreign Office.

Several thousand Poles from Lithuania, Volhynia, and Podolia, transported after the last rebellion, have been allowed to return, if not to their old home, which is to be entirely Russified, at least to the kingdom of Poland proper. Being there without any means of support, they

were lodged in the barracks to prevent starvation in the streets. The Posen Poles are collecting charitable contributions for their suffering kindred.

A LULL AT PARIS.

Berlin, January 29, 1868.

FRENCH diplomacy having become more profuse in its protestations of amity towards this Cabinet, Count Bismarck has availed himself of this favourable opportunity to direct their attention to the fact, that the language of the departmental press, including that portion of it notoriously semi-official, is scarcely in unison with the assurances given. The French Government thinking it advisable to take the hint, through the instrumentality of the Minister of the Interior, have admonished the Préfets to enjoin a more pacific bearing to the press under their control. To reciprocate one courtesy by another, this decree has in turn given occasion for a confidential note from the Prussian Government to their principal representatives abroad, informing them of the friendly disposition evinced in the Tuileries.

Simultaneously with this another concession has been made by France on a point long pending between the two Cabinets. Before the formation of the North German Confederacy, Mecklenburg, not belonging to the Zollverein, and being a purely agricultural country, had scarcely any tariff at all. Among the few articles paying duty on its frontiers was wine; on which, under a special treaty with France, concluded in 1865, no more than eight francs per French tun was to be levied. But the days of Mecklenburg particularism were numbered, and, in the Federal treaties which superseded the old Bund, the two duchies bearing this name were obliged to join the Zollverein.

The Zollverein tariff stipulating a higher duty on wine could not, however, be fully introduced into Mecklenburg unless with the consent of France. In the interest of unity, Prussia earnestly strove to obtain this concession from the Tuileries. For one year and a half her endeavours were fruitless. France, being intent upon frustrating the political object Prussia had in view, turned a deaf ear to her solicitations. Even when Prussia offered to reduce the Zollverein duty on wine from sixteen francs to twelve francs per tun, provided Mecklenburg were released from its engagements, France, less anxious to promote her commercial interests than foil a political rival, declined. Thus matters stood until a few days ago, when, actuated by a desire to give a seeming pledge of good will, the Tuileries at length signified their intention to yield. By virtue of a compact just signed in Berlin, the French Mecklenburg treaty is annulled, and the Zollverein duty on wine reduced to ten francs per tun.

With all these demonstrations of neighbourly feeling, France has not as yet succeeded in dispersing the suspicions aroused by her former politics. Nor does our Paris intelligence entirely dissipate all doubts. According to the latest news received respecting the disposition of the French Court, or rather the one man who constitutes it in these singular days, there is as yet no positive guarantee for the duration of the lull which has supervened in the restless activity of Napoleon III. It is, on the contrary, thought that the present pause is mainly intended to favour the raising of a loan, and will usher in a new policy safer, though hardly more reassuring, than the one pursued so long. The nationality principle having turned against its originator, the Roman Catholic and Latin race doctrine, it is assumed, will be set up next, should an occasion offer. That such may not be the case, is what this Government are working for at Paris, St. Petersburg, and Constantinople.

Towards Russia, France and Austria continue as cool as ever. Russian official papers complain that the new lithograph correspondence *Nord-Est*, filled with articles hostile to their Government, is regularly transmitted to the provincial press by the Paris Home Office. Orders of the Russian and Servian War Offices have been declined by Vienna manufacturers. On the other hand, the extraordinary tribute of rye and oats imposed in the kingdom of Poland for the maintenance of troops to be sent there is confirmed. Are the Berlin papers right in holding that the measure is a mere stratagem devised to frighten adversaries, and that the announced consumers of the grain will never make their appearance?

In the late treaty of peace Denmark engaged to restore the Flensburg collection of Northern antiquities carried off on the outbreak of war. This promise not having been fulfilled, on the ground that the collection had mysteriously disappeared, Prussia stopped certain payments undertaken by her in the same agreement, and after a little while had the satisfaction of learning that the hidden treasure had been rediscovered in the cellars of a brewery at Kolding. The collection is one of the most important of those illustrating pre-historic times, and will be shortly conveyed to its former abode. I wish I could say the North Schleswig border question were as happily solved as this international controversy about jugs, spears, and boats of the bronze and iron ages.

The *Giornale di Roma* greatly exaggerates the German demonstrations in favour of the Papacy. Far from being general, they are limited to Aix-la-Chapelle, Cologne, Mayence, and a few other cities, where the lower classes have been made to sign addresses in support of the temporal power.

The *Kreuz Zeitung* says that the Hanoverian refugees—many of them disbanded soldiers deluded into desertion about a year ago—have suddenly left Switzerland and

repaired to Strasburg, where they are being formed into a new *légion des étrangers*. The same paper suspiciously adds, 'The future will explain the motive of the French Government in taking this step;' and the *National Zeitung*, a Liberal organ, savagely asks whether 'we are to continue paying the ex-King of Hanover for fomenting treason?' In my opinion, the poor fellows are more likely to be used up in Algeria than anywhere else.

THE COUNT OF PARIS ON THE STATE OF GERMANY.

Berlin, February 1, 1868.

THE *Leipzig Grenzboten* has been authorised to publish the following letter from the Count of Paris on the state of Germany. The notes are the translator's.

'*July* 20, 1867.

'Before starting for Germany I promised to communicate to you the impressions which I should bring thence. Merely to keep my word, I now take up my pen; for not only was my journey so hurried that my impressions were necessarily incomplete, but they were also of such a varied and almost contradictory nature, that I fear I shall be carried beyond the proper limits of a letter in explaining them. In fact, the German mind has not yet recovered from the bewildering confusion consequent upon last year's events. Ideas, principles—indeed, the whole aspect of things—were turned topsy-turvy, and, as yet, nobody exactly knows what to hope or fear from the new state of affairs.

One fact alone is accepted as irrevocable—the unity of Germany under the supremacy of Prussia. Willing or unwilling, everybody submits to it. Dualism and Trias* are reminiscences of the past, and have been gathered to the defunct traditions of the Holy Roman Empire. It is true, German unity is neither complete, nor has it even been definitively established; but there is nothing to prevent our assuming that the Southern States will return to the bosom of the German people, and perhaps the day is not far distant when even the German provinces of the

* Dualism—the division of Germany between Austria and Prussia. The Trias would have admitted Bavaria to a share in the spoils.

House of Austria will recover their proper amount of influence over the destinies of the nation. For the present resolve and initiative belong to Prussia alone. At Sadowa Prussia has slain that hundred-headed hydra which had become an object of ridicule as far back as the days of Lafontaine; unaided, yet victorious, she has attached to herself the whole body politic of the nation. Such a success has worked a spell upon all Germany. If the *éclat* of the triumph contributed much to this result, the combination of prudence and audacity in the policy of the Prussian statesmen and the tactics of the Prussian generals did even more. Comparing these rare qualities with the sluggishness, the blunders, the ruinous illusions of the Vienna Court, and the ridiculous impotence of the Federal Diet, the Germans, whose national pride had lately been so sensibly humbled, have with one voice exclaimed, "Here is our leader!"

People in France are apt to overlook the painful disappointments Germany of late has had to put up with. Until 1849 the Liberal movement, proceeding at first in a legal and subsequently in a revolutionary track, alike aimed at liberty and unity. When the aspirations to liberty were forcibly repressed, Germany became all the more anxious to secure for herself that foreign influence which despotic Governments are in the habit of promising to their oppressed subjects, and whenever any great European question was decided without their coöperation, the people looked upon the event as a personal insult offered to themselves. During the Crimean war, when the sympathies of Germany were on our side, her influence was neutralised by the antagonism between Austria and Prussia. Later, in 1859, Germany had a mind to interfere with our proceedings; but months were required to set the Federal machinery a-going, and when it was in working order at last, Austria—ever jealous of Prussia—hastened to deprive the latter of all plea for intervention. Since Herr von Bismarck has been at the head of affairs the Germans feel that there is such a thing as a German policy; hence his popularity. The Holstein question, till then enveloped in a cloud of law phraseology, by him was treated simply as an object of national ambition, and solved by main force, despite the protests of nearly all Europe. Indifferent to his strange procedure the Germans hailed the forcible decision obtained as a signal revenge for the treaties of 1856 and 1859.

From that time, then, a German policy had arisen; but who was to be its representative? Austria, as ambitious but less skilful than Prussia, claimed the privilege for herself. In order to prevent its being appropriated by her rival, she suspended fighting after the battle of Solferino, and at a later period made a grand attempt at Frankfort to place herself at the head of the unity movement. In 1864 Austria agreed with Prussia to set aside the Federal Diet, throwing it off like an old cloak too ragged to cover the two athletes who had so long wrestled under its folds. The moment had arrived when the inevitable duel was to be fought. From this day, when the two rivals fairly stood up against each other in single

combat, the fabric of the German Confederacy began to crumble under their blows, and the day of Sadowa definitively did away with the balance of power on which all German affairs had so long been founded. Since then Count Bismarck has been able to present the Germans with the primary object of their ambition—the satisfaction of being taken into account in Europe.* Prussian *hauteur*, intolerable to the Germans when they themselves have to endure it, flatters their pride when exercised against the foreigner. Formerly the inhabitant of Thuringia or the Reuss principalities felt small in the presence of a Frenchman or Russian; their country seemed so insignificant when compared with others. To-day, though preserving an indefinite and poetic attachment to his "more immediate country"† he is yet proud to contribute to the expenses of a federal Government influential in the councils of Europe. He respects himself more highly for his newly-acquired ability to exact respect and fear from others. Even those who lost most by the formation of the new Bund‡ share the feeling, and it sweetens the bitterest pill.

German unity, then, may be regarded as a reality. But will Prussia be merged in Germany, or is Germany to be merged in Prussia? This is the important question now at issue. By Prussia I here designate the Prussian Government. A Government with bureaucratic and absolutistic traditions, with an army recruited in a democratic manner, yet in the hands of an essentially aristocratic body of officers; a Government active and intelligent, but with a marked predilection for formality, despotism, and Cæsarism. As to the Prussian people, the first in Europe in point of intellectual culture, industrious, steady, and pervaded with the spirit of association, they are far from identifying themselves with a Government so little in harmony with their real instincts.

On the way the question now pending between Russia and Germany is solved depend our future relations to the most powerful neighbour of France. A Germany in which Prussia has been merged would be a nation placed in the centre of Europe, impelled by interest, habits, and ideas towards liberal institutions; a nation which, perhaps, will give us the example of liberal reform, and is sure to follow us on the path of political progress, should we be so happy as to precede it. It would be a body politic, possessing all social elements requisite for a free country, yet comprising too many and too various interests to become offensive; a nation more military, perhaps, yet less warlike than ourselves. The development of its internal prosperity, the recognition of its legitimate influence, can in process of time become a guarantee of peace. This, I believe, is a prospect which we ought to accept cordially, even though we may miss somewhat the old dismembered condition of Germany. At

* Up to the very outbreak of the war the Germans unanimously protested against the acquisition of power to the detriment of liberty.

† '*Engeres Vaterland*' the German calls his native State, in contradistinction to the united Fatherland. ‡ The minor Sovereigns.

any rate, we should prefer this combination to the division of Germany between Austria and Prussia. Such a division would have given us for neighbours two Powers ever ready to implicate us in their domestic quarrels, only to desert us in turn for fear of appearing un-German, and ultimately to make common cause against us.

But a Prussia in which Germany has been merged would be Cæsarism established in Central Europe. The natural tendencies of such a Government, its opposition to the real bent of the German mind, its indifference to the violation of numerous interests, the necessity of lulling Liberal aspirations by exaggerated concessions to national pride—all would combine to make it adopt a menacing attitude and pursue a policy of attack towards its neighbours. It would be at once a permanent danger to the peace of Europe and a severe blow inflicted on the Liberal cause.

In what wise will this question be solved? Without offering a premature reply, it is yet possible to resolve the problem into its constituent elements. The Prussian system has been strengthened by the prestige of success, by confidence in the future, and the overthrow of all parties opposed to it. Count Bismarck's triumph has broken up and disorganised all political sects not only in Prussia, but in all Germany. He began by undermining the basis on which his own party was founded. He who has restored universal suffrage, who has dared to hold out his hand to Italy, and who sometimes speaks of the rights of nations, is the declared chief of the feudal fractions and the *Junkers*. One can well understand the horror of Prussian legitimists at the policy of their leader; but, as obedience to the Crown is their supreme tenet, there remained nothing for them but to support the Count while kept in power by the King. Hostile to all they comprise under the generic term of "revolutionary," hostile to the kingdom of Italy, hostile even to the annexation practised by their own Government, as the thing must eventually diminish their influence, they found themselves doomed to impotence by the man they had elevated to power.

Herr von Bismarck next turned against the Liberal party, snatching from it the weapon with which it had contended against him so long. For three years he had withstood the Chamber of Deputies and its Liberal majority. Though its constitutional prerogative was trodden under foot by the Minister, the Chamber retorted only with a display of empty verbiage. Having thus proved to the world how weak the Liberals were in point of action, he, one fine morning, seized an opportunity to do more. Looking upon the Liberal ideas as a mania which infects and victimises the nineteenth century, he yet perceived the necessity of indulging the popular bent, and for this seeming concession selected the hour of triumph. Shortly after the day of Sadowa, when the country, still excited by the martial impressions of the war, withdrew its votes from the men who had been the most unyielding in the defence of its rights, he asked for a vote of indemnity at the hands of the Parliament. By thus according a tardy respect to their rights, the Prussian Minister converted old opponents into serviceable tools. The bill was voted, and a rich en-

dowment for the Minister to boot. His next step was a bold appeal to universal suffrage for the election of a *Constituante*. This blow completed the rout of the Liberals. Having, in their abstract and barren discussions, long ceased to distinguish the essence of political principles from their form, they had so much abused terms like German unity, universal suffrage, &c., that they did not even perceive the snare set them by the Prussian Minister.* The party claiming for itself the epithets of National and Liberal was now rendered almost completely subservient to his purposes. The National Association, with its many branch societies, became a blind but well-applied instrument in his hands. As to the petty Governments, he guaranteed their existence, but, in the very act, deprived them of the essential condition of their duration. He compromised their popularity by allotting them a full share of the military burden imposed upon the Prussians, thus trebling their expenditure. When the Duchy of Coburg-Gotha, for instance, concluded a military convention with Prussia a few years previously, the latter only asked eighty thalers, or 300 francs per man. The amount was fixed so low, to act as a bait, and also because in those days Austria was still in the field as a rival, and, unless outbidden, might have done it cheaper. At present Prussia exacts of the same Duchy 170 thalers, or 637 francs 50 cents per man. The contingent of the Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar in the days of the old Bund entailed an outlay of 240,000 thalers, or 900,000 francs; the military budget now forced on it will consume 800,000 thalers, or 3,000,000 francs.† The petty Governments had always endeavoured to oblige their subjects by exempting them from the oppressive taxation weighing down their more powerful neighbours. It was the first solicitude of Prussia to deprive them of this advantage, of this means of prolonging their existence.‡

In this unsettled state of things the Prussian system, whose strength has been tested, seems to be a sort of necessity for Germany. Still, she will be opposed by two different currents of popular feeling, which, very unlike to each other, are yet alike adverse to her final success. In the North there is the anti-centralisation movement; in the South there is the growing desire to adhere to the new Bund.

The anti-centralisation movement is easily accounted for. The position acquired by Germany satisfies the national pride. Once having attained to this position, people do not perceive the necessity of sacrificing all local traditions, institutions, and interests to complete uniformity

* The Radicals knew very well that the impending elections would go against them, were the franchise remodelled; but expecting the new law to become in a few years a powerful weapon in the hands of the masses, they deliberately voted for it. The moderate Liberals had not the moral stamina to withstand the pressure brought to bear upon them by the Government party and the Radicals; but they too foresaw the result.

† The Prussian military expenditure is proportionately even higher.

‡ Unless the national military expenditure was to be defrayed by the Prussian taxpayer alone, Count Bismarck could not have acted otherwise.

with the Prussian system.* Thus it is, that even those who were most anxious to bring about the *hegemony* of Prussia, now find it is time to come to a full stop. Annexation to Prussia numbers but few adherents in the petty States since they have been embodied, with or without their consent, with the Northern Confederacy. Their capitals are wide awake to the losses that would befall them on becoming the seats of Prussian *sous-préfets*. Even the universities, ever the centre of the unity movement, will not bow before Berlin. In the minor contingents one meets with jealousy and secret malice against the Prussian army.† The numerous bureaucracy know very well that annexation would send them to subordinate offices far from home, while all the higher posts will be filled with Prussians.‡ The masses waver; Prussia seems to be saying to them, "As you bear the burden of Prussian subjects, you had better become Prussians, and have all the contingent advantages." But the despotic tone of her civil service is dreaded,§ and the difficulties of all kinds which she encounters in the new provinces do not encourage the advocates of annexation in the neighbouring States.‖ Indeed, the petty States are as yet free from the complicated administrative machinery required for the purposes of a centralising despotism, and were it imposed upon them, it would not easily be acclimatised.¶

In the Southern States public feeling is running in the opposite direction. There the isolation resulting from the Prague treaty of peace is deeply felt. The line of the Main, which Count Bismarck was perfectly sincere in establishing, has never been accepted as a *bonâ-fide* frontier by the German people. It would have been possible only with Prussian sentinels on one, and Austrian picquets on the other bank of the river; but Austria having been expelled from Germany, the Prague proviso only amounts to a sort of penalty inflicted upon the Southern

* What people in the minor States really want is liberal reform. They think they require it quite as much as the Prussians themselves.

† No longer the case. On the contrary, the minor contingents are proud at being incorporated with a truly national and renowned force. This feeling extends even to the South. In Bavaria, for instance, the most steadfast adherents of Prussia are now the military officers.

‡ No such thing has taken place in the provinces lately annexed. With few exceptions, all officials in them, both superior and subordinate, retain their posts.

§ The tone of the Prussian civil service is often misunderstood by the easy-going inhabitants of Southern Germany. It is not harsher than is perfectly congenial with the national characteristics of the three old provinces.

‖ The Liberal members for the new provinces are among the most reliable supporters of Count Bismarck; much more so, at any rate, than the Liberal deputies from Prussia proper. The old Prussians insist upon liberal reform; the new Prussians likewise demand domestic improvement, but, if they cannot get it, will, for a time, be satisfied with the national advantages of unity.

¶ The reverse is the case. In most minor States the bureaucracy is more numerous and more generally addicted to the paternal government principle than in Prussia. But the forms are stricter and more rigorous in Prussia.

States, from which they must sooner or later be relieved. Would it have been possible for the Southerners to make a stand against Prussian military rule, if they had constituted themselves the champions of the Liberal cause, thus imitating the example of Belgium and Switzerland, which border upon more powerful neighbours, but make up for want of strength by the superiority of their institutions? It is very doubtful. To display a flag, even that of Liberty, a favourable wind is needed; but not a breath of air would have breathed, had the South unfurled it in opposition to Prussia. At any rate, their Governments did not for a moment contemplate the idea of so venturesome an experiment. Northern and Southern Germany are but one nation. Not even religion divides them. Just look at the valley of the Rhine and the adjoining provinces. In the South, Baden, Darmstadt, and Würtemberg are, to a considerable extent, Protestant; in the North, on the other hand, the Rhine Provinces and Westphalia are almost wholly Catholic. Southern Germany exists by its intimate connection with the North. Its artificial capitals, Carlsruhe, Stuttgart, Munich; its old imperial cities, Regensburg, Augsburg, even the industrious Nuremberg, and the scholarly Heidelberg, are insufficient to impart to it a life of its own. Commercially, the South is perfectly unable to dissever itself from the North, with its great prosperous emporiums, its industrial centres, and its access to the sea. Even more dependent upon the North is the South in its intellectual life. Everything, then, combines to cause the South to long for reunion with the North. The South is determined to have its will under any circumstances, and rather than remain in its present situation would prefer to accept Prussian supremacy without delay and at any sacrifice.*

The injudicious demand of a correction of the frontier, put by France to Prussia in 1866, has sufficed to prove to the Governments of the Southern States how very much they need the protection of the latter Power; and they have accordingly hastened to place the whole of their military force at its disposal. When left to choose between the reorganisation and the dissolution of the Zollverein, they have submitted to any terms—among others, to the clause entitling Prussia to prohibit, by her vote, any alteration of the tariff. This Customs Union is but a brief and transitory stage, paving the way to a real union. In the mean time Berlin enjoys the unique privilege of possessing three Parliaments, representing the three Fatherlands of the modern Prussian—Prussia, his more immediate country; the North German Confederacy, being the political commonwealth of which Prussia is but a constituent part; and Germany, temporarily disguised as Customs Union. So artificial a structure cannot last, and the North German Parliament will, at no very

* Neither Northerners nor Southerners are in a hurry to accomplish unity. Apart from other motives counselling delay, they prefer waiting for an opportunity when their wishes can be fulfilled without undergoing the ordeal of a sanguinary war with France.

distant time, include the representatives of all Germany among its members.

For the moment, Prussia, it is true, would like to put off the day of this supreme consummation. She has been in a hurry to get the Constitution of the Northern Confederacy duly voted, because she did not want to discuss it, except with the States admitted by herself. Other States that may join in future will have to accept it *in toto*. The Berlin Cabinet dares not openly oppose the movement drawing the South to the North, but is desirous to delay its taking effect till the time when it will have Prussified the North. They prefer eating the artichoke leaf by leaf. They are also well aware that the addition of Southern members to the Federal Council would strengthen the opposition which their proposals already meet with from the Northern Governments, and that, instead of making laws, they might then be placed in the position of having them made by others. For this reason we, judging from the French point of view, must wish for complete unity to be speedily accomplished. In all matters of European import unity has been already effected by treaties, and still more by the weight of *faits accomplis*. The Southern armies are henceforth the inevitable auxiliaries of Prussia in any war she may choose to undertake. By complete reunion with the South, Prussia will not gain a single soldier, but encumber herself with an opposition strong enough to counterbalance her predominance in German affairs.

For the German Opposition to be able to organise itself and make head against the absorption policy of Prussia it is necessary that no war should break out. Can we count upon the maintenance of peace? But a few months ago the Luxemburg case put the question very pointedly, causing all who then believed themselves on the eve of a terrible war to reflect seriously upon the possibilities of the future. A slip on the verge of an abyss teaches caution even to the rash. Similar reflections have been awakened in England and the United States when there was a possibility of war being occasioned by the Trent affair. Sometimes, it is true, a people, irritated by domestic pressure, feels a morbid longing to vent its anger on a neighbour. But such is not at all the case in the Germany of to-day. Though the last campaign has been wonderfully short, the sufferings occasioned by it could not be removed by a stroke of the pen. Bullets and cholera have demanded numerous victims in all classes of society; there was sorrow and mourning everywhere.* The calling out of all able-bodied men has caused depression in every branch of commerce and agriculture, the consequences of which are felt to this day. The prospect of a war is all the more odious to the Germans, as they have learnt by the last what evils it entails. Nor is the thirst for battle commonly assumed to animate all armies very generally to be found in the German soldier. The memory of the last campaign is still too fresh in those who then fought against the Prussians to make them

* The Prussian losses amounted to about 11,000 dead and wounded.

wish to serve under their command.* As regards the Prussian army, it takes less pride in the battle of Sadowa than it did in the capture of Düppel; and naturally enough, having, at the latter place, first re-asserted itself after a long period, during which it was undervalued by Europe. At Düppel it had the first opportunity of restoring its reputation, and the more meagre the laurels plucked in Denmark, the greater the desire to give them a gloss. But to-day, when the Prussian army has gained the most decisive battle since Waterloo, when it has become an object of admiration in the military circles of the whole world, and when, moreover, it has learnt how much in war depends on luck, it has somewhat altered its language. In a word, in all Germany those looking to war as a means of bettering themselves are very few. Those benefited by recent events wish to enjoy the fruits of victory in quiet; while those injured cherish peace as the best means of making up for losses.

But if the Germans are desirous to complete the work of reunion in peace, they are none the less jealous of foreign interference with their domestic affairs. The idea of recovering Alsace or Lorraine, or annexing Holland, the Germans have never regarded as anything more serious than a wild fancy hatched in the brain of some professor of history; but they too have their Monroe doctrine, "Germany for the Germans," and whoever would attempt to violate this axiom by the appropriation of a slip of that land whose entire soil forms their great Fatherland, or even by meddling with their internal concerns, might be assured that he would cause them all to unite and turn against him. This is a fact which it would be useless and absurd to conceal from oneself. Hence the national sensitiveness, which may be taken advantage of by the Prussian Government at any moment, should it wish for a rupture. When Count Bismarck—who, it is said, had approved of the sale of Luxemburg†—withdrew from the bargain, because public opinion would not let him stand by it, he was charged with having dishonestly called forth the excitement referred to as an excuse for his vacillation. But this time he was calumniated. The excitement was real, not artificial. It is, however, quite possible that Count Bismarck was not sincere when promising connivance; for he might have foreseen that public opinion in Germany would speak out energetically on this head, and, if the circumstances permitted, prevent his abiding by his word.

The Luxemburg question is settled. Few Germans regard the evacuation of the fortress as a disgrace. Still, the whole affair has served to confirm an idea rankling in the German mind, and which, from day to day, may become dangerous to the preservation of peace. It is, the conviction that the Emperor is determined to make war, and that he is only waiting for a favourable opportunity. Since 1859, when the

* Were the royal writer to visit Germany again, he could easily convince himself that things have changed.

† An assertion stoutly denied by the Count and for which no proof has been ever adduced by his adversaries.

originator of the Crimean war ceased to be regarded as the champion of the oppressed, and the ally of Germany against Russia, this idea has gone on engrossing all minds. The cautious bearing observed by the French Government in 1866 has not allayed this apprehension. People knew that the French Government was not ready for war, and their suspicions were speedily confirmed by the vain attempts successively made by the Tuileries to acquire Mayence, Landau, or Luxemburg. The Germans, having of late been so much occupied with their own concerns, know proportionately less of France. Of course, the admirable eloquence of M. Thiers has made a great impression on the other side of the Rhine; but the Germans notice only those passages in his speeches in which he declares most unconditionally against their unity movement. They do not consider that his words would doubtless have sounded very differently, had not that movement been assisted by the application of main force; and they make no allowance for the peculiar views of the great orator, or the tenour of the whole discussion his words were intended to illustrate. The Germans sought the views of the Government in the articles of the *Constitutionnel*, and imagined they found the unanimous opinion of all fractions of the Liberal party in the columns of some papers recently established in Paris. They believed, and indeed believe even now, that if the Emperor is bent upon war, he is instigated by the warlike hankerings of the French people,* and that therefore it would be better to have war at once than to purchase a short respite with concessions to a dishonest neighbour. Hence, though they have no wish to provoke war, they are by no means in a conciliatory mood, and will not eschew it. Though disclaiming it, they yet hold war to be a necessary evil under the circumstances, and, once in it, will carry it on with a will, so as to have done with it all the sooner. Germany does not incite Count Bismarck to war, and will even thank him for obviating it; but it will supply him with the means.

The peace of Europe, then, depends on the policy of Prussia. What is this policy? Count Bismarck will have us believe that all his influence has been employed to prevent a war on account of Luxemburg.† However this may be, the motives he had for wishing war on that occasion, as well as the reasons which must have dissuaded from a conflict, are easily to be discerned. The superiority of the Prussian forces, better armed and more numerous than our own, and buoyed up by the certainty of victory, and the wish to strengthen and condense unity in the fire of a foreign war, to him seemed so many reasons for accelerating the crisis.

* The Germans have since learnt to distinguish between the morbid but fickle hankerings of the French and the deliberate endeavours of some official and unofficial leaders to kindle a European conflagration.

† Which he certainly did. As the King, the Princes, and the Generals were unanimous in preferring war to the surrender or even the evacuation of the Duchy, Count Bismarck had much difficulty in proving the expediency of a compromise.

And yet, after a long period of irresolution, the Prussian Government at last decided in favour of peace.

The Prussian Government felt that it would be taxing Germany beyond her strength, were it to drag the country into another war after so short an interval of peace. Inflamed for a short time, public opinion rapidly recovered its balance, and was very calm at the moment when the conflict seemed nearest. The Southern States, which were in such a hurry to sign the treaties of alliance, showed less zeal in executing the stipulations contained therein. They had just disorganised their troops, but not yet reorganised them. No effective coöperation was to be expected of them. Hanover was worked upon by a far-spread conspiracy,* which to break out only awaited the arrival of the French flag at the mouth of the Elbe. No doubt the conspiracy would have been crushed by the national feeling turning against the invader; but it was an ugly symptom, and might have become the beginning of great difficulties. The avowed enemies of Prussia in Germany were the most eager advocates of war, as though anticipating the downfall of her rule from defeat on the Rhine.† War was evaded. The situation will be the same next year. Prussia will have to cope with the same difficulties, to solve the same problems. The Southern troops will no doubt be better organised, but the progress they will have made will not be equal to that of France.‡ Prussia then will have no greater interest in war than three months ago. Nay, she will have more reason to shun it. In a word, the German people are prepared for, but not inclined to war; the Government will perhaps be involved in it by an accidental combination of circumstances, but it is far from being resolved upon it. War, therefore, is possible, but not at all inevitable, nor even, I should say, probable.

Were war to break out, it would perhaps undermine the whole structure of Prussian power; but its first result would be to do away with all resistance against that power, and to effect the reunion of North and South, not to the advantage of Germany, but alone to that of Prussia, as the sole representative of the national military resources. But if, thanks to the preservation of peace, thanks to the speedy admission of the Southern States to the Northern Confederacy, Germany sufficiently

* The conspiracy was insignificant. It included some 600 disbanded soldiers of the late Hanover army, who had been assured by some ex-officers that the day was drawing near when the French would require their services. The poor fellows are now exiles at Strasburg. That the Prussian Government have no reason to distrust their Hanover regiments is shown by the fact that there is but a very slight admixture of old Prussians in them. The Hanover municipal corporation have just refused to reëlect their deputy-chairman, one of the few anti-Prussian agitators in the town.

† In France too the enemies of Napoleon were eager for war, and for the like reason.

‡ Their reorganisation has barely begun. In Würtemberg the new military law—a copy of the Prussian—was enacted but a few days ago; in Bavaria it is still under discussion.

recovers herself to be able to make a stand against the Prussian system, and to force Prussia to become German, instead of the opposite process, Prussia, in the main, and with the assistance of the Liberal ideas, may yet attain the same happy result.*

What was possible a year ago, what France might have wished for then, what to our neighbours might have been acceptable then, is to-day irremediably lost. German unity, having been long in course of preparation, has not only been established, but established by force of arms. Foreign complications or domestic events may accelerate or retard matters. A war may break out and sweep away all resistance still opposed to the Prussian system. A revolutionary hurricane may arise, and the King of Prussia, having successively turned all parties to account without inspiring any with confidence in him, may some day realise the fact that he will rise highest when restoring with his own hands the natural supports of his throne. But should a prolonged calm succeed the storm of Sadowa, it may be foreseen even now that Liberal ideas will revive during the process of internal reorganisation, that their old defenders will rally, attract others, and strive against the growing predominance of Cæsarism in Central Europe. If the *aura popularis* be favourable, Count Bismarck himself may some day be numbered among the most devoted champions of Liberal ideas.

However this may be, the events of an uncertain future cannot be foretold to-day; but we have never belonged to those blind admirers of success who only strive to foresee it in order to prostrate themselves before it. Should we not, in view of the grave revolution now going on in Germany, confine ourselves to an equitable judgment on present events, without losing time in anticipating future contingencies or regretting an irrevocable past? Perhaps we may hereafter be able to see where we should bestow our sympathies as Frenchmen, as Liberals, and, I should like to add, as sincere friends of Germany.'

The Liberal views expressed in this essay with no common talent have been much noticed by men of all parties in Germany. The fact, too, of their publication at the present moment has given rise to a good deal of speculation.

* The habit of regarding Prussia as Conservative and the minor States as Liberal arose some thirty years ago, when constitutional forms were introduced in Southern Germany, but repudiated in the North. If this difference ever constituted a distinction, it has long been obliterated by the extension of parliamentary institutions to the Berlin latitude.

THE HANOVER AND SCOTCH LEGIONS.

Berlin, February 6, 1868.

THE Prussian Government has inquired at Paris whether the Hanoverian legion now forming at Strasburg is to remain in Europe. The answer was, 'No; it will be sent to Algeria.' More disagreeable to this Cabinet than the enlistment of a handful of unfortunate refugees is the possibility that their example may be imitated. As we learn from Hanover, some more young men have run away within the last few weeks. Actuated by the dread of the new military regulations, and the hope of leading an easy life at the expense of the Guelphian interest abroad, these rural innocents suffer themselves to be enticed away to Holland, Switzerland, and France. Once arrived at their destination, the majority will be obliged to turn Napoleonic legionaries for a livelihood.

The official *Warsaw Dnevnik* contains the following:

'Prince Napoleon goes on asserting his old axiom, that Russia, not Prussia, is the enemy of France, and the Emperor begins to believe him. No doubt, his only option is between internal commotion and foreign war; and Prussia being too strong for him, the general opinion is that he will take the East in hand, and begin a regular campaign in the spring. We could only congratulate ourselves on such an event.'

In the mean time the Russian papers have suddenly changed their language in regard to Poland and the Poles. By a sudden metamorphosis yesterday's wrath has been converted into amiable and conciliatory sentiments to-day. Even the *Moscow Gazette*, long the implacable enemy of the doomed race, as though a new inspiration had suddenly dawned upon it, professes sincere sympathy with the sufferings of the subject nationality. It is noted in connection with this remarkable fact, that Counts Wielopolski, Zamoyski, and Ostrowski, Liberal but loyal Poles residing in Warsaw, have been telegraphed for from St.

Petersburg to advise the Government on some mysterious matter as yet hidden from the public ken.

The Russian Government has at length commanded that the veterans whose services, after the late conscription of some 80,000 recruits, are no longer required, shall be sent home on furlough. It is, however, impossible to ascertain how soon the imperial ukase will be carried out.

Orders have been issued by the Prussian Government to hasten the works of the Jahde military port. If all goes as it should, they will be completed in the course of this year. For the first time in her modern history, Germany will then possess a place of refuge for her vessels admitting of serious defence. The works at Kiel too are being pushed on vigorously. In the new dockyards near that city the construction of the first cuirassed frigate will, it is expected, be commenced early in 1869.

At the instance of Mr. Odo Russell, the 'Scotch Legion' forming at Rome under Papal auspices has been disbanded, and the men sent home. It appears that the supposed 'Scotch,' so eager to fight for the Pope, had in reality come from the Emerald Isle to learn the trade of arms, with a view to eventually displaying their skill nearer home.

THE KING OF HANOVER AND DUKE OF NASSAU ENDOWED.

Berlin, February 8, 1868.

We have lately had two remarkable debates on the subject of Hanover in the Prussian Lower House. The first was occasioned by Government proposing to pay King George the sum of 16,000,000 thalers as a compensation for the losses incidental to his dethronement. The matter has long been discussed in the country, and public

opinion strongly pronouncing against a pension held to be excessive, the Opposition attempted a combined attack on the Minister identified with the measure. It was urged in debate, that were the sum proposed handed over to him, King George would not only be richer than the means of the country warranted, but actually be better off than when he was a reigning sovereign. On being deprived of his crown, he remained in possession of landed property estimated at 20,000,000 thalers, of a capital of 6,000,000 thalers, and plate and jewels worth 2,000,000 thalers. Adding to this the 10,000,000 or 15,000,000 thalers constituting the fortune of the Brunswick family, which, in the course of things, must shortly devolve upon the House of Hanover, the Chamber did not think themselves justified in according him 16,000,000 thalers more. By the annexation of Hanover he had certainly forfeited an annual revenue of 800,000 thalers; but as a considerable portion of this had to be spent in maintaining the dignity of the Crown, he would be a richer man now than he was, were he, after his release from the cares and solicitudes of government, to receive a capital corresponding to his former income. What, it was asked by the indignant deputies, has become of the traditional economy of the Prussian Cabinet, in proposing to indemnify the late Sovereign by the payment of a capital the interest on which is twice as large as that portion of his former civil list which, after the necessary deductions for court expenses, was left for his personal use? And how, it was added, are we to regard the action of the Government in bestowing this excessive endowment upon a prince who declines to abdicate, and continues in a state of open warfare with us; who subsidises anti-Prussian papers in Hanover, Paris, and London; whose friends have but lately lured several hundreds of young men from their homes and whose supporters in France and Switzerland avowedly conspire against the *de facto* Government of his for

mer dominion? Of all the Ministers, Count Bismarck alone met the attack. But his eloquence was sufficient to parry the onslaught. He said:

'An ex-sovereign who accepts an indemnity larger than his former income has by this very act abdicated his throne. He has sold his rights, and there was consequently an end of them, though he might not admit it in so many words. But, even if he continued to play the part of a pretender, a wealthy pretender was less dangerous than a poor one. It was, moreover, the will of the King of Prussia that the Sovereigns whom, out of regard for the national interests, he had been unfortunately compelled to depose, should be left in the unrestricted enjoyment of their former revenues; and the Cabinet, knowing that some foreign Courts, jealous of Prussia's success, would be conciliated by this generosity, could not but concur in the royal decree. The Cabinet must be supposed to understand these things a little better than those who had first raised an outcry against the war, and were now desirous to mar its results. Should the House be of a different opinion, nothing would remain for him but to resign, and see whether others could do better than he.'

In reply, the leading members of the Liberal party hoped the Count was not in earnest in speaking of his possible resignation. Yet, on the question being put to the vote, the pension was granted by a large majority. Rather than disoblige the King, and create difficulties for his trusty Premier, the House strained a point, and complied with the ministerial demand. In the same sitting an indemnity of 8,500,000 thalers was granted to the Duke of Nassau on the like grounds.

RUSSIA ADJOURNS THE REMODELLING OF THE EAST.

Berlin, February 8, 1868.

PRUSSIA not evincing any particular readiness to second an energetic course of Eastern politics, Prince Gortschakoff and his moderate tactics have carried it over the more impetuous designs of General Ignatieff. So the probability of an armed insurrection in continental Turkey has been

temporarily lessened, and the new year promises well. I ought not, however, to leave unmentioned, that, though matters are viewed in the right light here, there is an odd inclination noticeable on the part of the French to censure the St. Petersburg Government, the less occasion there is for complaint. The accusations recently preferred at Paris against the Roumanian Government are likewise considered as groundless. Prince Charles and his Liberal advisers, while Slavonic agitation was at its height, may have been obliged, by a regard for their own immediate interests, to tolerate a movement which it was not in their power to stay. But it is a notorious fact, that of the three semi-independent Sovereigns under the supremacy of the Porte, he of Hohenzollern descent is the least inclined to favour a warlike settlement of the Turkish question. Though embarked on the boisterous sea of Eastern politics, the Bucharest dynasty is steadily guided by the compass of Western prudence and moderation. To ascribe to it other plans than can be safely carried through, is to take an erroneous estimate of its entire policy.

THE POLES, RUSSIANS, AND RAYAHS.

Berlin, February 13, 1868

THE Polish deputies in the Lower House have of late voted with Ministers. Their change of tactics is ascribed to the reserved attitude assumed by Prussia in Eastern matters. Having anticipated this Government would second Russia as a matter of course, they are agreeably disappointed in their expectations, and gratefully acknowledge their error. The papers of the Polish refugees at Paris have likewise altered their tone towards this Government.

Friendly to Prussia for the moment, the Poles are more actively opposed to Russia than they have been for several years past. All able-bodied refugees have flocked to Turkey or Galicia, where they hope they will have an early opportunity of serving against the Czar. Their clergy aiding in the agitation as usual, Archbishop Wierzchleyski, of Lemberg, has issued a pastoral letter, in which he charges Russia with intending to exterminate the Polish race and faith. But the Poles may be deceived in their hopes. Taught caution by former experience, Russia is not likely to oblige them by rash proceedings in the East. Far from encouraging the Rayahs, as they did until a few weeks ago, the Russian papers, as well as those Slavonic journals coöperating with them, have begun distinctly to perceive the necessity of postponing the great South-eastern revival. France not wishing to assist the Russians on the terms they offer, and Prussia being altogether too pacific to engage in fresh adventures, there remains nothing but to temporise. But the East is the *corpus vile* of European politicians. The moment one State ceases experimenting upon it another begins. Strange to say, now that their own passions have subsided, the Russian papers retort the accusations so long preferred against them by the French and Austrian press. To condense the import of their long and excited articles in a few words, they assert France and Austria have determined to bring on the crisis their own Government is too temperate to provoke.

It is too early to form an opinion upon the matter. One tangible fact deserves, however, to be mentioned. I have before me a copy of the *Belgrade Svetovid*, in which it is stated that a number of Austrian officers, with an escort, are scouring Albania to inspect the passes and other natural defences of the country. They are accompanied by Turkish Pashas; and there was a rumour at Perserin—the capital of the northern portion of the province—that Albania would be handed over to the Kaiser, the better to

enable the Sultan to defend the rest of his possessions. This rumour is easily recognised as a fabrication intended to excite the public mind against the Vienna Government; but the fact of Austrian military and civil agents abounding in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Turkish Servia is confirmed by private letters.

France has again purchased a large number of horses in Hungary. If my intelligence is correct, no less than 25,000 will be successively dispatched from Pesth to Strasburg.

THE HANOVER LEGION PROVIDED WITH AUSTRIAN PASSPORTS.

Berlin, February 15, 1868.

THE Hanover emigrant affair has either led to explanations with the Austrian Government, or is sure to do so before long. The Austrian passports which the emigrants had with them on arriving in France from Switzerland were dated from Hitzing, a place near Vienna, where King George resides, but which few, if any, of the men have ever seen in their lives. By this device the men, who in the eye of the law are nearly all Prussian military deserters, were placed under the protection of the Austrian Ambassador in France, although most of them have never set foot on Austrian soil. Add to this that the men get two francs a day from the King of Hanover, and that the leaders of the 'Legion' were telegraphically informed by M. Pinard, the Minister of the Interior, that they would enjoy his special protection; and you have the facts as they are represented by this Government. In our official circles the matter has given rise to the bitterest animosity against Baron Beust. While friendly feelings towards this country are ascribed to the Hungarian as well as the cis-Leithan Cabinets, the worst intentions are again imputed to Baron Beust by the semi-official press.

THE SOUTH GERMAN ARMIES.

Berlin, February 17, 1868.

Baron Beust has answered the remonstrances of this Government, assuring them that he was entirely ignorant of Austrian passports having been supplied to the Hanover refugees. He lays all the blame upon some subordinate police officials, won over by gentlemen in attendance upon King George at Hitzing. The excuse is perhaps more plausible than it appears. Although Baron Beust has been authorised by his Sovereign to strike out a new policy, the powers formerly dominant at Vienna are far from being entirely put down. There would be nothing to surprise us in the passports having been given behind his back. I believe his apology will be accepted on condition that similar occurrences are effectually prevented for the future.

Of the three independent States on the other side of the Main, Baden, having once embraced the cause of unity, is determined on promoting it as much as in her lies. The new army organisation voted by her Legislative body is mainly a copy of the Prussian: a peace footing of one per cent of the population, till the end of 1871; a war footing of two per cent; and a time of service which, though practically it will prove a little shorter than the Prussian, is yet long enough to admit of the battalions being augmented to the full war strength. With her 1,400,000 souls, Baden will possess an army of eighteen battalions of infantry, fifteen squadrons of cavalry, ten field batteries, and the usual auxiliary branches in due proportion. This force will number in peace 14,828; in war it will be raised to 24,000, inclusive of non-combatants, but exclusive of 8,900 dépôt troops, to fill up losses. In addition to this there is a reserve force of 8,000 Landwehr; the whole

forming a total of 926 officers, 38,547 rank and file, 4,194 non-combatants, with 7,517 horses.

In Bavaria, where a new army bill was likewise passed a few days ago, no such ardour is evinced. The most indispensable steps are, however, being taken. Count Bismarck having on a recent occasion significantly observed, that those neglecting their duty towards the common Fatherland would run the risk of forfeiting independence in a future commotion, the Munich Cabinet could not put off reform any longer, however expensive and disagreeable in many other respects. But if, after a year's delay, they at length yielded to the pressure brought to bear on them, their desire to oblige their own immediate subjects so much predominated over their anxiety to defend, and eventually extend, the common institutions of the nation, that the military burden will fall comparatively lightly on the Bavarian people. As is the case in Prussia and Baden, conscription, indeed, is to become general. The peace footing too, till the close of 1871, is to amount to one per cent of the population, the war footing to two. Of these two latter provisions, however, the former is rendered nugatory by the military supplies voted being barely sufficient to keep 35,000 men under arms, instead of the 45,000 enjoined by the law; while the other clause is practically negatived by the duration of service being confined to two years in the line, three years in the reserve, and one year in the Landwehr, instead of the corresponding figures of three, four, and five, as enforced in the North German Confederacy. The sharp edge of the law being blunted in this wise, the battalions can have no more than 350 men in peace, and perhaps 800 in war, 1,002 being the number prescribed by Northern regulations. The army is to consist of forty-eight battalions of infantry (formed into sixteen regiments), twelve rifle battalions, fifty squadrons of cavalry, four regiments of artillery, five fortress-artillery companies, &c. Its peace footing is to amount to 22,932

infantry, 7,220 cavalry, 4,692 artillery, and 1,008 engineers—making a total of 36,000. According to law, this is to be increased in war to 86,000; but it will not practically admit of an augmentation beyond 75,000—a small force in these perilous times for a population of nearly 5,000,000. An additional force of thirty-two Landwehr battalions seems to have a less warlike character than the Prussian troops of the same name, and will probably be only employed on garrison duty. Comparatively lenient as this measure is, it adds 4,000,000 florins to the military expenditure of the kingdom, which is thus swelled to 12,000,000 florins annually. In Prussia the amount required for the same number of troops would be much higher, the sum spent for each man in this country being 225 thalers, against 191 thalers in Bavaria. The difference is accounted for by the Bavarians meaning to grant liberal furloughs, and refraining moreover from the costly, but, alas, unavoidable, luxury of building and rebuilding fortresses. From the debate which preceded the passing of the bill in the Upper House, it may not be superfluous to quote a few words of Prince Hohenlohe, the Minister President. Regretting that it was his painful duty to involve the country in a fresh outlay, he said :

'The excessive growth of armies now going on in Europe, the epidemic of military preparations which has infected the family of States, cannot be endured much longer. Exhaustion of the exchequers and impoverishment of the nations would be the inevitable consequences, were we to go on in this way for any length of time. It cannot be otherwise than that a change for the better will speedily set in. Let us hope that public opinion will soon raise its powerful voice, and pronounce against the accursed hatred now setting one people against another. Let us trust that the day is not so very distant when the thought of universal disarmament will not be utopian.'

Pending this desirable consummation, Prince Hohenlohe recommended the House to pass the bill. His wish was gratified, though only after strong opposition. The Ultramontanes, being the sworn friends of Austria, thought it

incumbent upon them to make every effort to insure the rejection of a statute which, under existing treaties may hereafter benefit the hated North. Happily the Government majority was strong enough to prevent so extreme a step.

In the Würtemberg Parliament the army debate has not yet come to an end. Radicalism having long been a power in that little kingdom, a strong opposition has arisen there against the Berlin Government, and the military law destined to enforce its supremacy. The Stuttgart Cabinet, whose submission to the new order of things never went an inch beyond the absolute demands of necessity, did not scruple to profit by the convenient antipathies rife among their people. Though they could not help laying before the Chamber a bill similar to the one framed in Bavaria, they let the Opposition attack the measure without answering their criticisms, and, by their apathetic reserve, made the country believe that they did not object to its being thrown out. For a time it was only General Wagner, the Minister of War, and Colonel Suckow, one of his secretaries, who stood up for the bill on behalf of the Government. Like all Southern officers, they favour adhesion to Prussia since the instructive experience of 1866. But despite the striking inactivity of their colleagues, it became pretty certain at an early stage of the debate that the majority of the Chamber would not dare to shirk their share in the task of national defence. The members certainly raved against the particular institutions with which the Bismarck mode of unification is accompanied, vying with each other in confounding the acts of some secondary representative of official Prussia with the manifest destiny of the Prussian State; but they had not the courage to separate themselves from the nation and the largest of its kingdoms, at the risk of being outlawed by public opinion now, and absorbed by main force hereafter. It was only on discovering this mood of the Assembly that Herr von

Varnbüler, the Premier, came forward to defend the bill. His arguments did not make up in patriotism what they wanted in timeliness. Not a word of duty towards Fatherland, not a syllable about the obligation of conforming to the treaties with Prussia. Instead of all this, the mere prudential reason that, unless they passed the bill, Würtemberg at some near contingency might be annexed by some State better armed than herself. The lukewarmness and ambiguity of this behaviour were animadverted upon by the small but firm and active national minority in the Chamber. Of the details of the bill I will only mention that conscription has been generalised, the peace footing being fixed at one per cent, and service in the line at two years. By the like stratagem as in Bavaria, the supplies granted will, however, only suffice to keep recruits one year and nine months under arms. Similarly, 14,000 has been enacted as a peace footing, though the arithmetical proportion of the rate adopted would make it 16,000.

THE HANOVER LEGION AND THE SWISS GOVERNMENT.

Berlin, February 19, 1868.

On reaching French soil with his men, Lieutenant von Tschirschnitz, a leader of the Hanover military refugees, sent a letter to a Berlin paper, in which he declared that the machinations of the Prussian Government had forced him and his followers to leave Switzerland. The Prussian Envoy at Bern had been so unceasing in his remonstrances, that, to avoid serious inconvenience, the Swiss authorities had at length consented to send the poor persecuted Hanoverians away. This charge, not very probable in itself, has been positively contradicted. In a *communiqué* officially

inserted in the *Bern Bund*, the Swiss Government deny that Prussia ever addressed them on the subject.

'It was true the Hanoverians, spending their days idly, had found little sympathy in Switzerland. Still, they had been accorded a hospitable reception. They had not been driven away; their sudden and simultaneous departure had, on the contrary, occasioned much surprise. The Federal Government itself had been entirely ignorant of the cause which prompted their leaving. A few days before starting they had provided themselves with Austrian passports.'

If, then, the Prussian Government had nothing to do with the exodus, who had? In Berlin the answer to this question is, 'King George.' His Hanoverian Majesty notoriously maintained the 'Legion' when in Switzerland, and its leaders are proved to have telegraphed to him from Bâle for money. It is, therefore, assumed that the King directed his partisans to betake themselves to France, being aware that their presence in that country would be particularly obnoxious to this Government, and give rise to fresh hopes among his few remaining adherents in Hanover.

Considering that the money for these doings is being supplied by Prussia herself, who has just indemnified the King so liberally, it is not unnatural that the Berlin people should be sorely disappointed with the return made. I am afraid that, unless a more conciliatory disposition is evinced at Hitzing, reprisals will not be wanting. Indeed, they have been already announced. In yesterday's sitting of the Upper House, Baron Heydt, the Minister of Finance, said, in so many words, that if the ex-King persisted in his intrigues, his property would be sequestered. It is considered no trifling aggravation of these offences that about 2000 people at Hanover have just been provided with the means to go to Vienna to attend the silver wedding of their former Sovereign. The majority of the travellers belonging to a class not usually flush enough of money for a trip of 500 miles, the King is charged with defraying their expenses.

The Würtemberg army bill has been passed at length. Had it been modelled on the North German pattern of keeping one per cent of the population under arms in peace, and raising it to two per cent in war, the standing army must have amounted to 17,500 men, and admitted of augmentation to 34,000. Instead of this, a slightly modified system has been introduced, which will give 14,300 men, and about 30,000 when the reserves are called in. To judge from the extreme resistance the law met with in the Chamber, the people, unaccustomed to military service as they are, will submit to the burden with great impatience. But for the stringent communications addressed to Stuttgart from Berlin in the eleventh hour, the law, which passed with only a trifling majority, would have been thrown out.

AMERICAN TREATY FOR THE PROTECTION OF ADOPTED CITIZENS.

Berlin, February 24, 1868.

Mr. Bancroft, the American Envoy here, has exacted a concession from this Government highly acceptable no doubt to many adopted citizens among his countrymen. In accordance with a treaty signed two days ago, North German subjects emigrating to America at any time of their lives, the period of military service excepted, will, after an absence of five years, be free to return, and exempt from farther duties of the kind. A man therefore will be permitted to leave at any time before the age of nineteen, the period which renders him liable to the conscription laws; but if once summoned to enter the army, he will be obliged to acquit himself of his entire military duties, and remain twelve years longer, though he may be on furlough three-quarters or eleven-twelfths of the time. Considering the military propensities of the Government which

concedes them, and the inexorable character of the service they refer to, these stipulations are unusually liberal. Not, however, to make them act as an incentive to mere temporary expatriation, it is provided that emigrants who have gone away before fulfilling their military duty, and subsequently returned, shall lose the privileges appertaining to American citizenship two years after again taking up their abode in the old country. The principal result of the agreement will be to enable young men to emigrate just on the verge of manhood, when they could not legally have got away under the old legislation, and to permit them to return at any future time, if not for a prolonged residence, at any rate for a short stay. After the ratification of this treaty, we shall be spared the distressing spectacle we have witnessed repeatedly of the arrest and forcible enlistment of some German-American tourist, who, having made money on the other side of the water, returned to spend it here, fondly fancying he had ceased to be a Teuton twenty years ago. But for the intimate relations existing between the Berlin and Washington Cabinets, and which now seem to be closer than ever, the constant recurrence of cases of this kind would have long resulted in a serious difference.

Though the Prussian Government has ascertained the fact that the migration of the Hanover Legion to France was approved beforehand by the French Government, it is probable that no farther communication on the matter will be sent to Paris. The correspondence with Austria, too, would have been closed ere this, had not King George considered it right to announce at his silver wedding, in the presence of some 1,200 Prussian subjects, his speedy return to the throne. I do not think the Prussian Government goes so far as to hold Baron Beust responsible for the utterances of an unfortunate Prince; but they did expect that a desire to atone for the omission owned to in the passport affair would have made the Austrian Premier

exert himself more earnestly now. This, it is asserted, has not been done. So the Legion grievance is likely to be raked up again, and, together with the wedding speech, will be probably wrought into a regular remonstrance.

AUSTRIA CHARGED BY RUSSIA WITH HARBOURING SINISTER DESIGNS IN REGARD TO TURKEY.

Berlin, February 29, 1868.

THE Russian view of what is going on in one of the most interesting provinces of Turkey is contained in the following correspondence from Zara, in Dalmatia, which appears in the St. Petersburg official paper, *Invalide:*

'The journey of General Philippovitch, the Austrian Governor of Dalmatia, to Montenegro shows better than anything what the Slavonians of Turkey have to expect from Austria. Much as the Vienna papers may try to prove that the political importance of the Slavonian race is nothing but a dream conceived in the brains of some linguistic enthusiast, Austrian statesmen know better, and have begun to look upon south-eastern events with a vigilant eye, not unaccompanied by apprehension. The details which I am in a position to communicate respecting the visit of General Philippovitch to Prince Nicholas of Montenegro are sufficient evidence of this. What renders them the more interesting is, that they prove the coöperation of Austria and France in Eastern affairs.

General Philippovitch started on his journey with a numerous suite of both civil and military officers. When passing through Cattaro he declared to a deputation of municipal and rural officials who came out to welcome him, that his journey was a matter of courtesy; Prince Nicholas having lately called upon him on his way to Venice, he (Philippovitch) could not but return the compliment, and visit him in his own capital at Cettinye. At Cattaro General Philippovitch was met by a detachment of the Montenegrine body-guard, who escorted him to the residence of their Prince. Immediately after him M. Viette, the French consul at Scutari, arrived at the capital of the little principality. A conference was then held in the palace, at which Prince Nicholas, his father-in-law, and the two new arrivals were present. The French and Austrian representatives insisted that Montenegro should not interfere in the differences existing between Servia and Turkey. Austria and France, they declared,

were perfectly agreed on the matter, and would not suffer Montenegro to join in the struggle that might possibly break out between the Porte and its refractory vassal. To this positive demand the Prince replied that Montenegro would be happy to keep quiet, provided she was allowed the extension of territory so indispensable in her embarrassed situation. The Prince said, "Give us a port and enlarge our frontiers towards the North, and I will guarantee the neutrality of Montenegro. We cannot remain in our present position, which but too closely resembles that of a prisoner. Consider my proposal, and bear in mind that you possess a means of keeping my warriors out of the fray." The territory alluded to by the Prince is Nikshitsh, Sablyak, and Spuj, with the port of Spitch on the Adriatic; but Austria is opposed to any addition to his dominions; and General Philippovitch told the Prince in the plainest terms that the Vienna and Paris Governments would never allow Turkey to cede a harbour to Montenegro. M. Viette seconded the general, adding, however, that the two Powers would endeavour to obtain Nikshitsh and Sablyak for the Prince, if he would engage in writing to remain neutral in the event of a war between Servia and Turkey, or an insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Prince at length gave a verbal promise to that effect, General Philippovitch not thinking a written instrument indispensable.

But in resisting Montenegrine ambition Austria has no desire to constitute herself the protector of Turkish integrity. The proceedings of her representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly manifest the equivocal policy she has of late pursued towards the Porte. Conservative in all that relates to Montenegrine aggrandisement, she is not at all so in regard to those provinces upon which she herself has an eye. A glance at the Herzegovina will leave no doubt on this head. Her agent in that country is Vice-Consul Vasitch, an Austrian subject of South Slavonian origin. Warmly devoted to Baron Beust and his policy, it is perhaps from his love of the political dualism now prevailing at Vienna that his proceedings are so very ambiguous. As Baron Beust endeavours to satisfy both the cis-Leithanians and the trans-Leithanians, so Vasitch seeks to make himself agreeable to the cis-Naretvians (the Turks), as well as the trans-Naretvians (the Christians). Not to raise suspicion in the Turk, Vasitch has been instructed to support the Pashas in everything, and take their side in case of any complaints of the inhabitants being brought to his official cognisance. At the same time he is suffered to betray the deepest sympathy in the position of the Christians, and indeed permits no opportunity to pass without giving them to understand how happy they might be under the sceptre of the great Austrian Kaiser.

His doings are zealously seconded by M. Moravski, the French Vice-Consul there. This gentleman, a Pole, and formerly a Russian subject, now a refugee, on entering French service change his name from Moravski to Moreau, and in his politics is like the rest of his countrymen inundating Western Europe and especially France. Inveterately hostile to

Russia and everything Russian, M. Moreau-Moravski takes delight in coöperating with his valued friend M. Vasitch. Fearing that the Herzegovinese, were they ever to become independent, would be friendly to Russia, all his energies are directed to the one object of keeping them under foreign control. Among the various means resorted to for this purpose not the most insignificant is the propagation of Catholicism, the bitter and implacable enemy of a Slavonic revival.

While thus acting in concert and lending their official countenance to the Turkish authorities, MM. Vasitch and Moreau-Moravski are indefatigable in assuring their other colleagues, as also the few European travellers whom chance leads to those out-of-the-way districts, that the country is in excellent condition, that the Christians are very well off under Turkish rule, that their complaints are unfounded, and so on. In a word, when officially engaged or conversing with strangers, MM. Vasitch and Moreau are as sincere well-wishers to Turkey as she could desire; but in their confidential interviews with the inhabitants, especially with those of the mercantile class having dealings with Vienna, Trieste, and other Austrian towns, Vasitch and Moreau appear in a totally different character. They then hold forth on the selfish designs of Russia in wishing to possess herself of Turkey, and the sufferings such a change would entail upon the Christian Sclaves, whose treatment would be similar to that of the Poles. With this dark picture they contrast the magnificent future the South Slavonian countries might enjoy under Austrian rule. The whispers of the Consuls are repeated by the Catholic priests, whose secret intrigues never cease. The intentions of Austria are as clear as day. Since the return of General Philippovitch from Cettinye persons of high standing in the official world of Dalmatia no longer care to conceal their views, but openly avow that, in the event of a war between Servia and Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina will be forthwith occupied by the Austrians.'

The journey of General Philippovitch was undertaken eight weeks ago, and the state of the East has since become more satisfactory; but the intelligence contained in his letter retains its importance. Unable as I am to verify the charges preferred, I may yet offer a supplementary remark, derived from good authority. However innocent Austria may have been of awakening such a supposition, the Bosnians and Herzegovinese really believe her to cast a longing eye on their hills and dales. The idea, it is thought, originated with the Hungarian Cabinet, who are said to have secured the services of M. Karageorgevitch for the realisation of their plans. M. Karageorgevitch,

the exiled Prince of Servia, is an enemy to the present dynasty of his country, which, it is well known, has long looked upon Bosnia as the natural complement to its dominion. Having recently removed from Pesth to Agram, he is at all events near the scene of action. One circumstance which proves Hungary to be implicated is, that the spurious intelligence circulated by the French semi-official press, respecting the state of the East, is backed by the Belgrade Bureau de Correspondance, a concern countenanced by the Pesth authorities. That there is little if any ground for these gloomy anticipations of coming danger has been observed in my previous letters. In reality, Russia has put off action, while Roumania was never in earnest since the accession of the present Prince, and Servia has no wish to become the cat's-paw for foreign, though sympathetic Cabinets. This remarkable fact of Russia's backing out of the matter, noticed in my correspondence some little time ago, is confirmed by the Munich semi-official *Presse* stating that all Russian agents in the East have been instructed to use their utmost endeavours to prevent an outbreak. As it is difficult to assume that the French, Hungarian, and Austrian Cabinets should, for several weeks, have deceived themselves on the actual state of things, a suspicion has been aroused that the alarm given had an ulterior object, which remains to be explained.

It is suspected that the French Cabinet are meditating some move in the East, and that the journey of Prince Napoleon to this country has something to do with the matter. If so, he will find that Prussia, being satisfied with her present position, is little inclined to make common cause with Governments bent upon adventures.

THE HANOVER ENDOWMENT SEQUESTRATED.

Berlin, March 4, 1868.

THE sequestration of the indemnity recently allowed the King of Hanover is accounted for in the following report from the Council of Ministers to the King:

'When requesting your Majesty's sanction for the agreement concluded on September 29, 1867, with King George V., the Council of Ministers was fully aware that it did not imply a definitive recognition on the part of King George of the peace of Prague, and the state of things created by recent events in Germany. If they, notwithstanding, asked for your Majesty's sanction, the Council of Ministers did so because, by the very nature of the agreement, the continuation of hostilities between the two contracting parties was excluded. Unless a state of peace was assumed to have been virtually established by the entire transaction, the munificent proposals of your Majesty could neither have been made nor accepted. To look upon the agreement in any other light is impossible; and it was on account of this that Germany and Europe hailed its conclusion as a guarantee of peace, that the Prussian Parliament approved it, and that your Majesty sanctioned the law passed by the two Houses of the Landtag. King George V., by his signature, recognised in the face of all Europe the conditions and suppositions on which the treaty was necessarily based, as well as the consequences which would inevitably accrue from it.

To-day the Council of Ministers finds itself compelled to take note of the fact, that those conditions have not been fulfilled by one of the two contracting parties. Notwithstanding that the treaty had been completed and its execution actually begun by this Government, King George has continued hostilities against us. He has, through his agents, enlisted some subjects of your Majesty, and caused others to desert; he has formed them into military bodies, organised with the avowed intention of employing them on the next favourable opportunity in acts hostile to Prussia, having for their object the seizure of one of her provinces. He has provided them with officers and non-commissioned officers, and on foreign soil drilled them for military service against their own country. It has been officially ascertained that the correspondence between these military bodies and the attendants of King George was carried on in the ordinary military forms of command and obedience, and that money was sent from Hitzing to be given as pay to the troops. King George himself, in public and notorious utterances, has avowed his participation in these hostile acts of his immediate attendants, has invited others to persevere in them, and attempted to shake the fidelity of Prussian subjects.

The hope that King George would lend a willing ear to the advice and remonstrance of friendly Courts, and, duly appreciating the obligations imposed upon him by the above treaty, suspend hostilities and dismiss the troops enlisted by him, has not been realised.

Under these circumstances there is nothing left for your Majesty's Government but to adopt such means as are at their disposal for acquitting themselves of the duty of protecting the security of the State and the quiet of its inhabitants.

A judicial inquiry has been set on foot against the persons ascertained to have been in regular and authoritative correspondence with the leaders of the troops organised against this Government. The High Court of State has arraigned these persons on the charges preferred against them by the Crown.

The law of the land permits these judicial proceedings to be extended to King George, who might be charged with acts having for their object the seizure and appropriation of a province of the Prussian monarchy. The immediate consequence of such a step would be the sequestration of his entire property. The Council of Ministers believe themselves to be acting out your Majesty's generous intentions if, out of regard to the former position of King George, they refrain from recommending this course to your Majesty.

But in renouncing legal proceedings, it becomes incumbent upon them by some other means to protect this monarchy against King George's applying to our detriment the abundant resources vouchsafed him by ourselves. The measures to be taken must be maintained until such time as King George gives the guarantees rendered indispensable by his present behaviour.

King George having, by his acts, plainly indicated his wish to be regarded as on a war footing with your Majesty, it is impossible for Prussia to furnish him with the means to carry on war against Prussia.

The Council of Ministers therefore deem it their duty to humbly propose to your Majesty, by an act of legislation, to sequestrate the entire property of King George, and hold it as a pledge to insure the country against the attacks meditated; and if the consequences of the treasonable (*staats-gefährlich*) undertakings involve the Prussian monarchy in any costs, a corresponding portion of the property sequestrated ought to be forfeited. The right of the ducal family of Brunswick to the estate entailed on King George, being independent of that of its temporary owner, is not to be prejudiced by this measure.

The step proposed to your Majesty by the Council of Ministers is rendered necessary, not only by our duty towards our country, but also by the unavoidable consideration that hostile undertakings against any individual State are dangerous to the peace of Germany, and in their ultimate consequences may become so to all Europe.

Circumstances not having allowed of our laying this subject before

Parliament in the session just closed, the Council of Ministers respectfully request your Majesty to proclaim the decree appended, and order it to be submitted to Parliament for approval next session.'

Concerning the decree it will suffice to say that it affects not only the 16,000,000 thalers accorded to the King under the treaty above mentioned, but also his real estate, palaces, and property of all kinds remaining to him in Hanover. The interest on the money and the revenues derived from the estates are to be collected by royal commissioners, and added to the principal, pending the restoration of the whole either to King George or to his heirs. But there is an exception made. Though not especially said in the decree, it is hinted in the report preceding it, that should King George ever make common cause with an enemy of this country, and should a war arise out of such a combination, his entire fortune will be seized to defray the costs of defence.

Much as this implied reservation menaces the property of the King, it so happens that for the present the decree can be but partially carried out. The King, indeed, will have nothing from his Hanover estates,—a sensible loss, as his real property there is valued at 20,000,000 thalers; but, as no interest on the 16,000,000 thalers awarded him will be due until eighteen months hence, he cannot at present be mulcted in what otherwise would form no inconsiderable portion of his income. Under the treaty with this Government, those 16,000,000 thalers remain in the Prussian treasury which pays the interest; the first 2,000,000 thalers interest being, however, deducted for public moneys taken away by the King on leaving the country. It having been likewise stipulated that the money provisions of the treaty shall be regarded as having come into operation on July 1, 1866, about the date of the King's departure from Hanover, the first instalment on the interest, which is reckoned at 4½ per cent for 11,000,000 thalers, and at 3 per cent

for the rest, would have been payable in a year and a half.

Despite the decree, the King remains in affluent circumstances. Though the restriction of his income will, perhaps, induce him to curtail the outlay for the maintenance of the 'Legion,' the journeys of sympathisers, and the subsidising of newspapers hostile to Prussia, there will be no necessity to reduce the pomp and circumstance of his court. Besides the 2,000,000 thalers of public money appropriated, he has 600,000*l.* placed in the English funds by his royal father; and, if it be permitted to allude to such a thing, plate worth 2,000,000 thalers at the very lowest estimate. In addition to this, it is said, though not positively known, that the King had a couple of millions ready money with him on leaving his capital.

The blow dealt has been contemplated for some time past. It was proposed when, on the eve of what threatened to turn out a Luxemburg war, the King's agents persuaded several hundreds of the disbanded soldiers of the late Hanover army to leave the country by stealth, and form a 'legion.' Had not King William generously insisted upon a lenient treatment of his cousin, he, instead of having an additional allowance made him, would even then have lost the rents of his estates. But the subsequent dispatch of the Legion to France, and its favourable reception there, on the strength of Austrian passports, were provocations too serious to be overlooked. Though the King would fain have abstained from harsh measures, the Cabinet became more and more importunate in their demand for reprisals. Through the mediation of some Courts—the Austrian and French, if I am not mistaken—the royal exile was called upon for the last time to renounce all hostile proceedings against this monarchy. An unsatisfactory answer having been received, sequestration ensued. There can be no doubt that, a fraction of the Hanover people excepted, the measure will be ap-

proved by all political parties alike. For no act has the Prussian Cabinet been so universally blamed in the last few years by the Prussian people as for the endowment of the unyielding King of Hanover. The theory propounded by the Ministers, that no one planning war against this country should be suffered to derive any income from within its borders, is generally recognised. In fact, it had been vindicated in the papers long before its adoption by the Cabinet.

Reprisals are not limited to the King personally. Count Platen, with another gentleman of the royal suite concerned in the 'legion' business, has been arraigned on the charge of treason before the High Court of State. The very arraignment involves the sequestration of property; and as the accused will probably be found guilty, confiscation is almost sure to follow. All attendants of King George being by the law of the land Prussian subjects, the same procedure may be repeated in the case of every one of them.

PRINCE NAPOLEON AT BERLIN.

Berlin, March 7, 1868.

THE journey of Prince Napoleon was preluded by the French journalistic orchestra in the most winning of melodies. The intentions of Prussia were represented as pacific. The accusations preferred against the Oriental policy of Russia, designedly exaggerated as they had been the day before, suddenly appeared in a less culpable light to the semi-official chorus. Peace and goodwill reigned 'along the whole line.'

On the evening of the 4th the Prince was received at the Berlin terminus by the Ambassador of his Imperial relative. Had any Prussian dignitaries been present on

the platform, their bearing probably would have reflected the auspicious aspect of the international horizon. However, the Prince being supposed to travel incognito, official Prussia could not be represented, except by a detachment of police. The same courtly fiction prevented his driving to one of the royal palaces, and sent him to an ordinary hotel, where at noon the following day he received a visit from the Crown Prince. His Royal highness remained with his Imperial highness half an hour, after which his Imperial highness repaired to the palace. His call on their Majesties occupied three-quarters of an hour. It was no sooner at an end than the King gave an audience to Count Bismarck, and, after a short conference with his Premier, returned the visit of the Imperial guest. When his Majesty left the Prince at the hotel it was past 3 o'clock. Two hours later the Prince again made his appearance in the palace, to be present at a state dinner of thirty-six covers, given in his honour. With the members of the royal family, the Prince, the French Ambassador, and the most eminent personages of the Court, among them Count Bismarck and General Moltke, were entertained at the royal table. After coffee the Prince went to the French Embassy, where he stayed with M. Benedetti till 1 A.M. The morning of the 6th the Prince spent in his apartments. In the afternoon he called upon three Princes of the royal family and Prince Augustus of Würtemberg, and immediately after had the pleasure of seeing these same personages in succession at his hotel. Count Bismarck was the next visitor; and, as the duration of his audience may appear a matter of some significance, I shall be pardoned for noting it to have lasted forty minutes. The Prince then went over the museums, the splendour and scientific completeness of which seemed to interest him greatly. A diplomatic dinner at the French Embassy filled up the rest of the afternoon, the evening being devoted to an exquisite concert at the palace.

The sojourn of the Prince will be shorter than had been anticipated. From Berlin his highness proceeds to Dresden, and in all probability will include Vienna and Munich in his trip. There is also some talk of an excursion to Posen; a plan which, were it carried out, would justify the inference that any communications the Prince may have had to impart have not been altogether acceptable. Public opinion here is not in the least affected by the arrival of the royal guest. It is regarded as a curious incident, and nothing more. At the Vienna Exchange the journey actually caused a forty-eight hours' panic, which was only allayed by the impassive attitude of the Berlin financial world. Nervous as the Vienna bankers are, they this time worked themselves up to the belief that the Prince had crossed the Rhine with something like a declaration of war in his pocket. I hope he does not feel flattered at the supposition.

HANOVER, BRUNSWICK, AND PRUSSIA.

Berlin, March 7, 1868.

In the royal decree sequestering the property of King George there occurs a clause to the effect that the Crown shall be entitled to annul the measure at any time, and restore his fortune to the exiled Prince. Against this proviso a strong opposition has arisen in the press. It seems to be pretty generally demanded that the decree shall not be sanctioned by Parliament unless Government consents to its repeal being made dependent upon a preliminary vote of the Houses. No doubt this view will be shared by many of the members. It was with extreme reluctance that Parliament granted the ex-King a pecuniary indemnity at all. Neither the wish of an honoured

King, nor the urgent appeal of a Minister whose parliamentary influence is unparalleled in the annals of this country, would have prevailed upon the members, had there not existed a belief, that a munificent grant would put a stop to the hostile tactics of the Hanover Court. The fact of a pretender fomenting rebellion was so painfully disagreeable to the public mind, that, although his intrigues were anything but formidable, it seemed to be worth the outlay to do away with the thing. This object not having been realised, Prussia, in the opinion of the leading papers, has no occasion to buy the ex-King off at all.

The animosity which induces this reasoning daily receives fresh fuel from the doings of King George. As has just come to light, a petition to the Emperor Napoleon has been got up in some parts of Hanover, entreating him to liberate that country from the Prussian yoke. Anybody conversant with the state of things in the new province might have conjectured that such an address could only be the work of paid agents; for though some opposition does exist in the city of Hanover and in a portion of the north-eastern counties, the idea of soliciting foreign interference is happily as repugnant to the Hanoverians as to all other Germans. But no conjecture is needed to decide upon the origin of the address. It having been taken to Paris by Herr Meding, late director of the Hanover Government press, and now one of the most active agents of the dethroned Prince, there can be no doubt as to the identity of its prompters. As a matter of course, the Emperor Napoleon refused to receive a paper of such questionable authenticity. Another Power, which, one would imagine, stood in closer relationship to King George than France, has been requested by him to abstain from meddling with his affairs. I mean England. In consequence of this angry demand, the British Cabinet, which some time ago advised the King to yield, was unable to

comply with the Prussian request of another mediation, addressed to it before the seizure of the royal property. If King George consults his interest, he will settle with this Government before the matter is again submitted to Parliament.

The King and Crown Prince of Hanover are not the only members of the royal House of Guelph bold enough to place themselves in opposition to Hohenzollern. The Duke of Brunswick, too, is bent upon vindicating the inalienable rights of his family. Being the last of his line, the question arises upon whom is to devolve his small but valuable patrimony after his death. The Hanover family, nearly related to him, have always considered themselves his heirs, and continue to do so even now, though deprived of their own possessions. The Hohenzollerns, on the other hand, being likewise of that kith and kin, for some time past have been supposed to intend to dispute the claim, and after recent events are not likely to abandon their alleged rights. Had the King and Crown Prince of Hanover chosen to adopt a different course in the last few months, Prussia might have perhaps agreed to indemnify them with Brunswick on the ducal line becoming extinct. As things are, this is no longer likely to be the case. Foreseeing this, and wishing to do all in his power to prevent the future annexation of Brunswick, the Duke has recently completed two instruments, the one bequeathing his land, and the other his private fortune, to the chief of the House of Hanover. But will his testament be uncontested? The country of course cannot be willed away. It will fall to him who has the law of inheritance and the sympathies of the inhabitants on his side. To touch only upon the latter requisite, the Brunswickers pretty unanimously prefer being merged in a great national commonwealth to continuing existence in a petty State, the accidental product of mediæval marriages. If they could expect a liberal Government from a son of King George,

their feelings perhaps might undergo a change. But ever since its reinstitution by the Duke of Cumberland, the Hanover Court has been among the most reactionary in Germany. Nor is it so certain that the private property of the Duke of Brunswick will be handed over to King George and his descendants. Public opinion is sure to insist upon its being included in the sequestration, should Hitzing persevere in its resistance to the reconstruction of Germany.

If the Prussian Government do not go the length demanded by the citizens, they may yet be tempted to raise objections with reference to one, and this the most valuable portion of the legacy. What makes the Duke of Brunswick so exceedingly rich is, not the domains he owns in his duchy, but the possession of a whole county in the Prussian province of Silesia. The county of Oels was inherited by his grandfather in the year 1792, and with its 700 square miles of fertile acres and far-stretching woods, is one of the most lordly estates in all Germany. Like many a larger property, it comes, however, under the provisions of the feudal law, and cannot accordingly change hands except with the sanction of the Crown. Let King George persist in keeping up his army of a few hundred homeless refugees against the hundreds of thousands of Northern Germany, and there is no telling where Oels may go to.

PRINCE NAPOLEON'S ERRAND. THE DANES. THE FLEMINGS.

Berlin, March 11, 1868.

PRINCE NAPOLEON is 'doing' Berlin in the most approved tourist style. Palaces, barracks, libraries, and public institutions of every description are being duly inspected by this indefatigable traveller. His chief predilections, though, are in the military line. He has been to sundry infantry and artillery barracks, has attended at regimental drill, and even been at the pains of following the manœuvres of a sham fight. His hospitable entertainers do not seem to have the least objection to initiating him into the mysteries connected with the needle-gun, and have also taken him to the model foundry of the Ordnance Department, whence issued the new cannon of the Prussian and Russian forces. While his mornings are employed in this useful way, his evenings are devoted to visits, dinners, and routs. Besides the usual festivities in the royal palaces, the Prince has been entertained by the French and English Ambassadors, and Count Redern, the Grand Chamberlain of the Court. On some of these occasions, it has been remarked, the Russian Ambassador was not present.

Respecting the question whether the Prince is instructed with a political mission or not, I have reason to believe it must be answered in the affirmative. What the exact nature of his message is we cannot of course expect to learn as yet. Enough, however, has transpired to enable us to see that the Emperor Napoleon meditates, or says he meditates, a move in the East, and that he is desirous to ascertain what would be the views of this Government, were he to attempt to carry out his designs. Prince Napoleon has no particular proposals to make, but only to announce a general intention, and request a reply in

the same abstract and indefinite strain. But what his communications lack in perspicuity they gain in force, by his giving people to understand that, according to the answer vouchsafed, he may be instructed to continue his journey either to Vienna or St. Petersburg. It is but natural that the broad and ambiguous character of his errand should have given rise to an infinity of rumours, which, while each has some truth in it, alike fail in that they pretend to give a distinct preponderance to one of the many alternatives on the cards. To allude to one only of these manifold reports, the Prince by some Berlin papers is represented as having mentioned the reëstablishment of Poland as an infallible means of compelling the acquiescence of Russia in any Eastern changes, should she betray an intention of holding back. I need not say that, in the present stage of the negotiations, nothing so pointed can have been suggested as we are naïvely required to believe in this exaggerated account. Indeed, the very supposition that the thing has been delicately touched upon is rejected by those most likely, one would imagine, to credit such an *on-dit*. The Polish papers of Posen and Cracow warn their countrymen against believing in the seductive but ever deceptive *fata morgana* of French assistance.

The sequestration of the property of King George is being proceeded with, his palaces at Hanover and Herrenhausen having been placed under the seal of the royal commissaries. In the case of Count Platen, no sequestration has been possible, it having been ascertained that the hereditary estates of his family are as yet exclusively claimed by his father and elder brother. But the Count is in some personal danger. His extradition may be demanded from Austria, under an agreement for the giving up of political offenders. Singular changes wrought by time! That agreement was concluded some thirty years ago by statesmen of the legitimist school to prevent Prus-

sian demagogues taking shelter in Austria, and *vice versâ*. It is now likely to be applied against an eminent advocate of the permanent-sovereignty doctrine.

Owing to recent discoveries, the bitter feeling against the King of Hanover is on the increase here. The Swiss Federal Government have ascertained that one of the leaders of the Legion before leaving Zurich telegraphed to Count Platen at Hitzing for100,000 francs. A telegraphic reply was returned from Vienna, signed Schwartz, expressing surprise that the money had not yet arrived. In addition to this, another irritating circumstance has come to light. Herr von Strobach, the director of the Vienna police, has been decorated with a Hanoverian Order for supplying passports to the Legion, and has received the permission of his Sovereign to accept and wear the foreign badge. This permission was given in November last. It seems, however, to have been retracted, or rather temporarily withdrawn, on Prussia's complaining of the irregularity of the whole proceeding.

A few days ago the navy estimates were being discussed in the Danish Lower House, when all the speakers based their arguments on the hopes of carrying on a war of retaliation against Germany some future day. The fact is sure to be alleged by this Government as a reason for not ceding a portion of Schleswig, as stipulated at Prague, except on conditions which shall guarantee the adoption of a more pacific policy by Denmark.

As a remarkable concession to the Germanic element in Belgium, it deserves to be noted that the instruction given to soldiers of Flemish descent will be henceforth imparted in the Flemish language, instead of in the French as hitherto. As the Flemings, whose dialect is all but identical with that of the country people of Northern Germany, are nearly twice as numerous in Belgium as the Gauls—or, as they are called there, Walloons—their language and nationality, if adequately regarded by the

Government, would serve to diminish the attraction exercised over the little kingdom by *la grande nation*. The present is the first tangible result of the Flemish movement going on for some time in Belgium.

FRENCH OVERTURES TO PRUSSIA CONCERNING THE EAST.

Berlin, March 14, 1868.

THE intentions of France have become more clearly apparent the last few days. France not only wishes to make a move in the East, but professes a desire to do so, if possible, in concert with Russia and Prussia. As was communicated in this Correspondence in its proper place, Russia, in the course of the last eighteen months, twice made the same proposal to France, without, however, being able to arrive at any definite conclusion. The first time France, after entertaining the idea for a short space, dismissed it for unexplained reasons. Prince Gortschakoff, in his recent diplomatic publications, mentions what he considers the faithlessness of France, but himself hardly seems to know what reason to assign for her change of mind. In Berlin it is believed that the then attitude of England caused France to withdraw; an assumption the correctness of which can be better tested in London than here. Despite this failure, Russia a little later made another attempt at a *rapprochement*, and this time through Prince Gortschakoff himself. Having prepared the ground by supporting France in preference to Prussia in the Luxemburg affair, the Prince went to Paris to look at the Exhibition, and moot again his favourite project of joint action in the East. Napoleon did not absolutely decline, but, while seemingly in favour of the plan, had some counter-proposals to make. If he obliged Russia on the Danube,

he, in return, required her to exact such concessions from Prussia on the Rhine, that the Czar, fearing a rupture with his royal uncle, signified his unwillingness to press the matter farther. The Czar, indeed, would have been willing enough to continue the course he took in the Luxemburg affair, and leave Prussia to settle any future controversies with France alone; but he was not prepared to turn against an old ally, who happens to be a revered relative, and to renounce his old connections, while the serviceableness of the new confederate remained problematical. So the thing dropped again. It has now been brought forward for the third time, with this difference, however, that in the present instance it issues not from Russia, but from France, and is proposed not directly, but through the medium of another Power. France, it seems, has been afraid that, were she to apply to Russia direct, the latter, remembering former suggestions, might suspect the seductive overtures to be again made with a view to the victimising of Prussia. In such a case failure would have been inevitable, the motives which actuated the Emperor Alexander at Paris continuing in full force. But, whatever reason France may have had for acting as she did, certain it is that the plan of a Russo-French partnership in the East has now been submitted not to St. Petersburg, but to Berlin. Or, more correctly, that the first cautious and introductory steps for reviving it have not been made in Russia, but in Prussia.

The position of the Berlin Cabinet under these circumstances has become rather difficult. It is true, no German territory is demanded, nor are German interests to be directly violated, as heretofore. All that is asked of Prussia at present is a friendly neutrality, which, moreover, may be requited by some secondary advantage or other. But, whether the proposition be accepted or declined, a number of unpleasant contingencies are hidden under this specious outside. Supposing Prussia to accept,

Austria will be unable to offer any resistance, and obliged to accede. She is evidently making ready for it. From all we learn about the doings of her agents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria, under the auspices of France, is even now preparing to have her share in a readjustment, should it ensue. By such a combination Russia might be enabled to promote her Eastern designs to an extent that would allow her to dispense with Prussian support, if not for ever, at least for a while. But the ally she no longer needed she would have no farther reason to assist. In other words, if satisfied, or even temporarily allowed to have her own way in the East, the motive she now has to second Prussia, in the event of a French or Austro-French attack, would either vanish altogether or be considerably weakened. It is therefore thought to be hazardous for this Government to indulge Russia in the East, unless indeed they can contrive to consolidate their own power at the same time, and elevate this monarchy to a pitch rendering a future attack on the part of its Southern and Western neighbours all but impossible. The most natural way of obtaining such a secure position would be by receiving the South German States into the Northern Confederacy; but this is a consummation which neither Russia, nor Austria, nor France will permit to take place while they can prevent it, and which moreover does not seem to enter into the immediate objects of Count Bismarck's policy. On the other hand, if the Berlin Cabinet reject the French proposal, they will likewise diminish the interest Russia has in contributing to maintain their greatness against foreign and domestic competition. Such a refusal the National party at the Court of St. Petersburg would regard as an act of direct hostility. By it Prussia would run the risk of isolating herself even more rapidly than were she to accept what comes to her under the guise of an alliance, but may prove the beginning of an estrangement from her new as well as

her old friends. In this dilemma, the Berlin Cabinet have every reason to defer giving a definite reply while no direct questions are put.

There are certain symptoms that the Russian Government has been aware of the French proposals before they were submitted here. Those proposals include some concessions to Poland. Russia has no objection to make to this demand, provided France is content to see the new favours limited to the kingdom of Poland proper, to the exclusion of its ancient colonies and outlying provinces. To indicate her intentions, some loyal but liberal Poles were called to St. Petersburg about a month ago, and hopes held out to them of a change for the better in their unfortunate country. In the semi-Polish province of Lithuania, on the other hand, the lenient and generous Count Baranoff has just been replaced by the Cossack General Potapoff, an advocate of energetic measures.

After undergoing many more dinners, suppers, and routs, Prince Napoleon left this morning for Dresden. Probably he will return to Paris without any farther *détour* to Vienna and St. Petersburg. His journey has been attended by innumerable rumours, some devised to deceive as to its object, others to prepare for its eventual announcement. During his sojourn here, Sir Andrew Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, arrived at this city, conferred with Lord Augustus Loftus, and immediately returned to his post.

A work of considerable interest to politicians is a collection of official and semi-official utterances of the Prussian Government during the two eventful years 1866, 1867. It is compiled by Privy Councillor Dr. Hahn, the author of not a few of the compositions contained therein.

FRENCH OVERTURES. THE AUSTRIAN NATIONAL DEBT.

Berlin, March 19, 1868.

THE fact of Prince Napoleon having been commissioned to sound this Government on sundry matters of importance is indirectly admitted by the *Provinzial Correspondenz* stating him to have come here without any 'definite political purpose.' Up to yesterday he was represented as having had no political purpose whatsoever.

The Frankfort Chamber of Commerce has addressed the Austrian Minister of Finance to protest against the contemplated additional reduction of the interest on the National Debt. The Frankfort Exchange has for the last fifty years been doing a very large business in Austrian stock, and with the Berlin, Vienna, and Amsterdam Exchanges forms the principal market for *métalliques.*

An authorised German version of the *Queen's Journal* is about to be published by Perthes, at Gotha.

Under a law just promulgated, the gambling-houses at Wiesbaden, Homburg, and Ems are to be closed by the 31st of December 1872 at the latest. The Crown is at the same time empowered to abolish these fashionable enormities at any time before the date mentioned, should it see good reason for so doing. This proviso is intended to make the *concessionnaires* purchase at a round sum the continuance of their privilege to the latest date allowed. If they take the hint, the money got out of them is to be handed over to the towns so long graced by their presence, to serve as a fund for the defraying certain local expenses hitherto borne by the opulent 'bankers.' Rather a questionable transaction, I should say. The leases granted by the extinct Governments of Nassau and Hesse-Homburg are cancelled, and in the same breath a temporary prolongation is offered in return for an extra *douceur.* If bankholders are regarded as a class with whom to break old

contracts is no sin, it should not have been considered right to enter into new, however short-lived, arrangements with them. The enraged *croupiers*, who are all French, mean to complain to their Government.

AUSTRIA COMPLAINS OF PRUSSIA'S COLDNESS.

Berlin, March 21, 1868.

In a recent sitting of the Hungarian Delegation, Councillor Falke, in the name of the Austrian Government, stated that, however conciliatory the sentiments of his Sovereign might be, Prussia had not lately given any signs of courting intimate relations with him. In answer to this remark, the Prussian semi-official papers and correspondents have been directed to point to the published despatch of Baron Beust to his representative at Munich, in which, at the time of the Luxemburg affair, he offered his alliance, were he allowed 'an equal position with Prussia in a new Pan-Germanic Confederacy.' Since then Prussia has ceased to make advances. A circumstance which came to light a fortnight ago will probably confirm her in this reserve. It was discovered from the curious papers left by M. de la Varenne on his decease, that the famous pamphlet, entitled *Gare aux Barbares*, published in 1867, was a product of his pen, and that it was composed by order of Prince Metternich, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris. The *barbares* are the Prussians, who, in this not over-temperate essay, are coupled with the Russians, called thieves, and represented in the unenviable light of enemies to civilisation and the human race generally. For this happy *œuvre* M. de la Varenne acknowledges the receipt of the sum of 2,000 francs from Prince Metternich,—a statement made public by the *Pays*, and not contradicted by the

party referred to. In the face of this fact, likewise officially noticed in our press, Prussian politicians are not likely to cease watching Austria with a feeling more nearly akin to suspicion than amity.

A large number of Berlin schoolmasters have addressed the gentlemen of the press, soliciting their coöperation in the good work of raising the moral tone of metropolitan society. The request refers to the scandalous pieces which the second-class theatres are representing in a city but a short time ago a stranger to such unblushing license. The police having the last few years strangely relaxed in their supervision of this branch of public performances, the guides of youth apply to the representatives of public opinion to enlist their services in combating the novel abomination. There is certainly great need of interference from some quarter or other. We have not only had all Offenbach's plays on the Berlin stage, but have imitated and even surpassed them by local productions of an unprecedented type. That the thing has become possible is owing to the many moral, religious, and even political shortcomings of the times, which will not be removed by opposing one of the various symptoms of the public disease; but much may be certainly done by the papers discussing the subject, and representing certain things as too disreputable to be looked at by 'ladies' and 'gentlemen.' That the old German notions on public improprieties are not wholly extinct, but may be revived by the journalists, if setting about the task in right earnest, is satisfactorily proved by the present scholastic petition.

KING WILLIAM'S BIRTHDAY.

Berlin, March 25, 1868.

CERTAINLY this King rejoices in a happy old age. Last Sunday he celebrated the seventy-second anniversary of his birthday, and was present at the christening of his fourth grandson. A whole galaxy of princely luminaries had congregated to do honour to the aged King and the infant scion of his House. The Grand Duke Czarevitch of Russia, the Crown Prince of Saxony, the Grand Duke of Saxony, the Duke of Saxe-Altenburg, the two Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg, the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, Prince Reuss, Prince Hohenzollern, and others graced the Court with their presence on that auspicious day.

When, after the festivities of the morning, the King took a walk with his guests in the promenade known as Unter den Linden, the public, sympathising with his happiness and pleased to see him so surrounded, expressed their joy by continuous cheers. The day after, the King, accompanied by the Princes of his House and his illustrious visitors, went to open the second session of the North German Parliament. The Queen, the Crown Princess, the Princesses, and many of the fair consorts of the guests, attended the ceremony. There was also a grand muster of the *corps diplomatique* and of civil and military dignitaries of every rank and degree. Nothing was wanting to render the day a brilliant success. The royal speech contained only the ordinary communications on the state of public affairs. Nothing was said in it concerning reunion with the South.

Count Bismarck has been appointed hereditary member of the Prussian House of Lords; a body to which years ago he belonged as a representative elected by the

landed nobility. This, depriving him of his seat in the Lower House, frees him from the inconvenience of becoming a candidate at future elections. I ought to observe that Prussian Ministers are, under the constitution, entitled to speak in either House without being members. So the Count's advancement to the Lords does not entail any of the disadvantages it would have for an English Secretary of State.

Polish papers connected with the Austrian Cabinet, such as the Lemberg *Gazeta Narodowa* and others, warn the inhabitants of the kingdom of Poland against believing in any likelihood of reform, as held out by the Russian Government. As the Austrian Cabinet is, no doubt, aware what the mission of Prince Napoleon was, this language of its Polish organs must be taken as a first symptom of its disapproval of the propositions made by Paris to St. Petersburg. Did Austria favour an agreement between Russia and France, she would endeavour to strengthen the new ligue by gaining for it the goodwill of Poland.

POLAND PATRONISED BY FRANCE.

Berlin, March 30, 1868.

The Russian Government has done away with the last remnant of separate Boards at the head of the administration in Poland. These boards were originally established as so many departments of state, and intended to mark the existence of a separate and independent kingdom of Poland, which was to have nothing in common with Russia except the person of the Sovereign. Their abolition is a measure of no practical importance. Long before the appearance of the last sweeping ukase the greater part of the Boards were successively dissolved, and the small

remnant reduced to a nominal existence, scarcely recognised by the omnipotent military authorities. Especially since 1864, when the last rebellion was crushed by fire and sword, the 'kingdom,' for all practical purposes, has been ruled by the St. Petersburg Cabinet direct, not by any intermediate authorities of Polish nationality. Notwithstanding, however, the comparative insignificance of the present step, France has thought fit to make it the occasion for diplomatic proceedings of a marked character. Assuming that the foreign Consuls-General at Warsaw, hitherto empowered to transact political business at the *chancellerie diplomatique* of the Governor, will be treated as mere commercial agents, now that the independent position of Poland has been entirely annihilated, France has inquired of Austria what she will do in such a contingency. Austria's reply was guarded. Baron Beust probably reflected that, although this premature inquisitiveness of France might indicate the failure of her recent overtures to Russia and Russia's allies, it might be equally intended to conceal success, or hide the continuance of ulterior negotiations on that interesting head. Nor could the Austrian Premier be particularly reassured by Prussia's issuing a circular note to deny that Prince Napoleon came hither without any political mission at all. Prussia's assertion is, no doubt, in accordance with the facts, as viewed from a diplomatic point of view. Bringing no credentials, the Prince cannot, in Ministerial language, be said to have had a mission. Consequently he did not negotiate, but only talked. Still, it is but too likely that the Prussian circular proves nothing beyond a natural and, no doubt, very sincere desire to back out of the matter, and have nothing to do with projects calculated to imperil the safety of this country, no less than the peace of the Continent at large. There are other symptoms to be noted besides the Prussian circular. The Russian papers continue rather cool towards France, as though there were nothing in the wind;

but a State which in such a matter cannot be supposed to act without the countenance of some one more powerful than itself has suddenly taken up the cudgels against the probable victim of a Russo-French agreement, were it ever to be concluded,—Turkey. As we learn from the Belgrade semi-official *Vidovdah*, Servia, after keeping quiet for a couple of months, has revived the Rustchuk grievance, and in a most energetic note demanded satisfaction for the arrest and massacre of one of her subjects on board an Austrian steamer off that city. The announcement of this step is accompanied with threatening remarks touching the 30,000 Turkish troops alleged to have been assembled on the borders of the principality. While such is the latest intelligence from the Lower Danube, General Ignatieff, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, is staying here on his way back to the Bosphorus, and has already had two long audiences of the King. The General is reputed to be one of the prime agitators of the Eastern question in Russia. In the improbable event of an agreement being effected between Prussia, Russia, and France, or even between the two latter only, it would imply some concessions to Poland, and thus pave the way to a reconciliation between the Czar and the Pope. Cardinal Bonaparte, it is related in diplomatic circles, would then have a chance of being sent to St. Petersburg in the capacity of papal Nuncio.

As cannon in Prussia, according to the proud inscription on every piece, is *ultima ratio regis*, so it shall be the last subject I will touch on to-day. Hitherto the heaviest breech-loading ordnance of the service was a gun projecting balls 200 pounds in weight. It has now been surpassed by the construction and adoption of a superior monster gun, whose balls weigh 300lb., and which is said to be as handy and manageable as pieces of much smaller calibre. Another novelty in the same line is the production of massive iron plates to be used as a protection for field artillery,

in lieu of earthworks and batteries. Experiments have proved them to be capable of rendering good service. Not content with home inventions in this murderous line, the Government have just bought a mitrailleuse from the firm of Christophe and Montigny at Brussels. This terrible instrument has 37 barrels, and fires 370 rounds in a minute.

DENMARK SUPPORTED BY FRANCE AND AUSTRIA.

Berlin, April 8, 1868.

THE old game of starting disquieting rumours and contradicting them in the same breath is again rife at Paris. No sooner have the Dano-Prussian negotiations come to a standstill than Copenhagen telegrams announce the departure of the Danish Minister of War for Paris as imminent, and Paris telegrams in responsive echo state his arrival as certain. After all that has come and gone during the last two years, the double report not unnaturally affects the more timorous among the stock-holding community on the Continent; but before the impression that something is amiss has gained ground, other telegrams are set a-going to assure us that their predecessors conveyed no more than the news of the holiday trip of a man as yet unknown out of his country. Not, however, to let the soothing effect of this anodyne work unchecked, the official *Berlingske Tidende* is immediately after made to deny a statement, alleged to have been put forward by the *Weser Zeitung*, that Denmark has offered to join the North German Confederacy, in return for the restoration of all Schleswig. It is a pity that such a statement should never have appeared in the paper in question. The passage referred to by the *Berlingske* could not be so grossly misinterpreted as it is unless with some ulterior design. Any one

acquainted with Count Bismarck's foreign and domestic policy need scarcely be told that, even if such a proposition had emanated from Denmark, he would not have granted it. If he would not include Luxemburg in the German Confederacy, because ruled by a non-German Sovereign, is it likely he will admit an entire foreign State? And how would it be possible to dovetail the democratic institutions of Denmark with the moderate constitutionalism of Germany? Facts so patent as these must be as well known in Denmark and France as in this country. If ignored notwithstanding, they justify the inference placed, however unwillingly, at the head of this paragraph.

Regarding Austria's attitude in the Schleswig affair, a significant fact remains to be mentioned. When the Luxemburg dispute was at its hottest, Count Beust sent a despatch to Berlin, reminding this Government that, unless the Schleswig affair were settled without farther delay, foreign Powers might perhaps interfere. This warning, given at such a time, was very unfavourably received, and, although modified by the remark that Austria had no wish to constitute herself the advocate of Danish interests against Germany, not a little contributed to place the relations of the Berlin and Vienna Courts on their present footing. Since then the matter has, I believe, been only orally alluded to in the intercourse of the two Powers.

On the 3d of April died, at Gotha, Baron von Gruben, Lord Chamberlain of the Saxe-Coburg Court; a nobleman well known at the Courts of England, Belgium, and Portugal. He accompanied Prince Albert on his first journey to England, and after the Prince's marriage was the guest of the Queen for some time. He was repeatedly employed on errands of a delicate nature by King Leopold of Belgium, and, with Baron Stockmar, ranked first among the confidential advisers of the House of Coburg.

According to the report of the Board of Control, the Russian deficit in 1866 amounted to nearly 100,000,000

roubles. In the estimates there had appeared no deficit at all. The miscalculation was partly owing to too favourable presumptions respecting the revenue, partly to large military and railway expenditure unaccounted for. Considering that the estimates did not exceed 350,000,000 roubles, the mistake and the deficit are equally great.

Russian papers gladly notice the fact that the Czarevitch, on his recent visit to Berlin, was present at a sitting of the Federal Parliament. It is said to be the first time that a Russian Prince has condescended to confer such an honour upon a modern parliamentary assembly.

SCHLESWIG. ATTEMPTS TO SOW DISAFFECTION IN THE NEW PROVINCES.

Berlin, April 11, 1868.

As yet the Danish Cabinet have made no direct appeal to the Powers in its controversy with this Government. All they have done is to supply the leading Courts with copies of a despatch, sent to their representative at Berlin about three weeks ago, declining the Prussian proposals. In reply to an inquiry from this Government they have denied that General Raaslöff, the Minister of War, had any political object in going to Paris, as ascribed to him by the Danish press. From what I learn about the opinions prevalent in the upper spheres, there is not much likelihood of this Government accepting the mediation of any third Power, were it to be offered. The Prussian people too, were France to interfere in behalf of Denmark, would be hardened by the new antagonist into an obstinacy which the matter of itself has been unable to produce. The war-cry latterly raised in the Paris semi-official press has already had its influence in exciting the public mind, not so much against France, who has too often indulged in the

like to be much regarded, as against Denmark, who, justly or unjustly, is suspected of being the moving cause this time.

In any continental capital frequented by Polish refugees you may hear the sanguine wanderers assert that, his recent overtures having been rejected by Russia and Prussia, Napoleon has struck into an opposite path, and is now negotiating with the Pope for the restoration of Poland. Wild as this design would appear to be, it is too early to give any opinion on the probability of its being entertained. That the French Emperor was not particularly successful here is certain enough; but there are probably very few in a position to say what his relations with St. Petersburg really are, and how they affect his general politics. The view obtaining in political circles is, that when offering his assistance in the East, he asked more extensive concessions for the Poles than Russia was willing to concede. As to the news that he has now turned to the Pope, it is credited by some and doubted by others; but even those who regard such a step as not improbable look upon it less as a sign of goodwill towards Poland than as an artifice employed to compel Russia to give in.

The day before yesterday seven gentlemen, formerly officers in the Hanover army, and now attached to the Legion which has already given so much trouble and promises to give more, were found guilty of treason by the High Court of State, and sentenced to ten years' house of correction. The punishment will not fall very heavily upon them. None have obeyed the summons of the Court; and France, where they reside, has no extradition treaty with this Government affecting political criminals. In the course of the trial, which, in the absence of the accused, was solely occupied with the hearing of witnesses, it was proved from intercepted letters that the gentlemen in question had persuaded soldiers on furlough to desert and join a military body, whose purpose it was to fight this

Government. They had been engaged in these unlawful proceedings chiefly at the time of the Luxemburg difficulty, when there was a chance of having France to back them. Their operations were directed by gentlemen in the suite of King George at Hitzing, some of whom also took an active part in organising the Legion after the men had been got together. The activity of the Hitzing Court was not confined to Hanover. Not satisfied with attending to what comparatively may be called its own affairs, it also endeavoured to raise a rebellion in Hesse. As was hinted at the trial, and is confirmed by semi-official correspondents, Herr Frabert, the Cassel editor prosecuted for circulating seditious pamphlets, was a paid agent of King George. It would be superfluous to say that the loyalty of the Hessians was not affected by a naïve proclamation calling upon them to rebel and recover those elevating constitutional rights they possessed in the days of the late Elector. That Hanover is likewise well disposed towards the new Government may be seen from the fact that, of the officials appointed there in the last two years, scarcely any came from the old provinces of the kingdom. Even the Hanover regiments have but a very slight Prussian admixture, and are so organised that, three years hence, they will consist of Hanoverians exclusively. The circulation of the pro-Prussian papers of the city of Hanover is about twenty times as large as that of the Guelphian press.

PRUSSIA DECLINES THE FRENCH OVERTURES.

Berlin, April 15, 1868.

To a question raised and commented upon in one of my last, I am to-day in a position to give a more definite reply. Resolute as ever, Count Bismarck has declined the Napoleonic proposals respecting a Russo-Prusso-French

coöperation in the East. He has likewise refused to renounce the idea of a nearer connection with Southern Germany, in return for an unequivocal recognition of the new arrangements in the North. While assuring France that he has for the present no intention to cross the Main, and extend the Federal institutions to its southern bank, he has yet given her to understand that this is a purely internal question, on which no engagement can be entered into with foreign Powers. To this intimation he either has, or at any rate might have, added that, little inclined as he is to precipitate the consummation of the German destinies, it is just possible that, were France to embroil herself in some other quarter, his countrymen would force him to profit by this opportunity for realising the unity ideal of the race. Thus denied admittance at the first door at which he knocked, Napoleon has deemed it too venturesome to continue his round and strike a bargain with Russia independently of Prussia. Acting differently, he would have run the risk of seeing Germany united while he was deep in the intricacies of the Eastern question. It is very evident that to prevent this unpalatable result was one of the principal reasons which induced him to make an offer of so-called coöperation at Berlin.

As to Russia, she seems somewhat sulky at Prussia's defeating a scheme so nearly affecting her interests. The more enterprising among her statesmen talk as if they need only stretch out the hand to effect an agreement with France irrespective of this Government—a hint which General Ignatieff took special care to convey during his late sojourn here. Prince Gortschakoff and the more temperate among his colleagues do not, however, approve such a step. They would not have objected to Prussia's requiring some concessions in Southern Germany as a reward for connivance in the East; nor would they have prevented France from likewise indemnifying herself on the same much-disputed soil: yet, while dividing thus impartially

their favours between their two possible allies, they wish to keep up a more intimate connection with the one nearer to them locally and politically. Uncertain how far France is prepared to go with them, or even how long her present Government will exist, they do not like giving up their friendly relations to the old-established House at Berlin to throw themselves into the arms of the enterprising but rather speculative concern at Paris. *Au reste*, Prince Gortschakoff agrees with General Ignatieff in anticipating that the desire of this Government to maintain the *status quo* both in Germany and the East will not always be so easy of fulfilment as it is now. In other words, if Prussia will not consent to accept the French programme concerning the rearrangement of Germany, and thereby give France more freedom to act elsewhere, the Russians anticipate that France will single out Prussia as the first point of attack, and thus enable themselves to do as they please in the East. Had General Ignatieff been installed in the Foreign Office, he would not, perhaps, have waited for the realisation of these expectations, but have attempted to settle with France directly without delay. But the improbability that France, having no guarantee as to Prussia's conduct, would join Russia in a common venture greatly contributed to keep Prince Gortschakoff in office, and with it the Continent in a state of comparative tranquillity. For this satisfactory result Europe is mainly indebted to the manly and sagacious diplomatist who directs the destinies of this monarchy.

In addition to the points of difference above mentioned, Russia and France, it seems, could not quite agree on some items of minor importance. France appears to have asked more extensive concessions in behalf of Poland than Russia might have been inclined to concede, had things gone far enough to compel a decision. Russia, too, was averse from granting Austria certain advantages advocated by France, and which seem to have had reference chiefly

to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, there is reason to believe that this would not have prevented an arrangement, had other matters been in equally good train.

The war-shout sounded once more by the Paris press has attracted but little notice here. The fact is duly registered, but by scarcely any paper thought worthy of editorial notice. Of the more important journals I have seen, the *National Zeitung* alone bestows a few lines on an incident which, by constant recurrence, has ceased to produce impression. Even this paper contents itself with the remark that the French journalists are again behaving like women in hysterics. That the Danish editors follow this example, and represent the journey of General Raasløff as a sign of coming war, obtains somewhat more attention. It was probably to dispel the impression created by the arrival at Paris of the Danish Minister, that the Marquis de Moustier, at his reception on the 9th, assured some German diplomatists that his august Sovereign harboured no intentions prejudicial to the peace of the world. Prussian politicians entirely admit the veracity of this statement; only they would have preferred saying no immediate intentions. It is well known here, that Marshal Niel, for strategical reasons which it would be premature to enlarge upon, would wish a German campaign to be commenced in the autumn, were his Imperial master ever to resolve upon one. This paragraph may perhaps be appropriately concluded by the news that General Moltke is just back from Trèves, where he has been looking for an eligible locality for a fortified camp to make up for the loss of Luxemburg. Louis Napoleon is about to copy from Prussia the use of iron plates as a cover for field-guns; and, if Danish papers can be credited, has ordered 100,000 Remington rifles in America, the chassepot being no longer considered *merveilleux*.

The Grand Duke of Darmstadt has been made to feel the consequences of his continued opposition to this Go-

vernment. It appears his royal highness had a mind to organise the troops of his Southern provinces in a way different from the one adopted in his Northern possessions. Though the Northern provinces only are embodied with the Confederacy, he, under his military treaty with this Government, had no right to do this. Accordingly Prussia remonstrated. But the Austrian Minister at Darmstadt encouraging the Grand Duke to persevere, her warning was in vain. Nor had it any influence upon the courageous monarch, that Prince Ludwig, the heir presumptive and husband of Princess Alice, resigned his post as Commander-in-chief; rather than become instrumental in carrying through a measure directed against a dynasty with which he is nearly related and on the most amicable terms. At length two Prussian officers had to be sent to Darmstadt to announce coercive measures, in the event of the objectionable system being proceeded with. This proved effectual. Prince Ludwig resumed his command, and General von Grolman, the Minister of War, who is identified with the unjustifiable innovation, went out of office. The Prussian General Von Bonin has been stationed at Darmstadt to see that all things are arranged as they ought to be.

The Polish members of the Federal Parliament have resolved to absent themselves from the sittings, when, by the addition of the Southern members, it becomes the Customs Parliament. The latter assembly representing the nation as a whole, the Poles deem it unbecoming their position in the German Commonwealth, of which they are but unwilling members, to participate in the debates.

The protest against illegal succession to the throne of his ancestors, recently promulgated by Duke Charles of Brunswick in the advertisement sheet of the *Times*, has been occasioned by the intention of his brother to bequeath the duchy to the Crown Prince of Hanover. I am afraid that neither the ex-Duke nor his much-hated relative will

have the bestowal of the coronet under dispute. In Brunswick the large majority of the inhabitants are in favour of Prussia, *the* State they conceive to be the nucleus of a great national commonwealth of their race. Even the poor Hanover legionaries are being infected with this notion. The other day some of them applied to the Prussian Ambassador at Paris for means to return home. They were kindly received, supplied with the needful, and will no doubt be pardoned.

RUSSIAN MOTIVES FOR ADJOURNING THE REORGANISATION OF THE EAST.

Berlin, April 18, 1868.

SUBJOINED is a *communiqué* on the Eastern question, which has appeared in the St. Petersburg *Birjeviya Vedomosti*, and apparently is from a well-informed and authentic source:

'An opinion has lately arisen in Russian society that the present is a most favourable moment for solving the Eastern question in a way advantageous to ourselves. "Now or never" is the watch-word that may be frequently heard. This confident belief is based on the consideration that Austria is too weak to offer any serious resistance, while Prussia is supposed to be little interested in the Eastern question, and ready to allow us full play in Turkey, if only we do not prevent her unifying Germany. Of Napoleon it is assumed that, however eager to interfere in the East, his hands are tied by the German and Roman difficulties. Let him, it is said, meddle with Turkey, and Prussia will cross the Main, while Italy will no longer respect the Roman frontier. Thus compelled to divide his strength and operate on three points at once, Napoleon would run the risk of being defeated on all. As he will probably think this too venturesome and keep away from Turkey altogether, England, it is farther argued, will not take upon herself to interfere single-handed. Why, our sanguine friends wind up, why not set to work without delay? Would it not be unpardonable to allow such an opportunity to slip by unimproved?

But is this reasoning well grounded? Is it true, for instance, that Prussia has no interest in the East? that she will not, directly or in-

directly, interfere, but adopt a strict and impartial neutrality? We doubt it. We doubt whether there is any Power wholly unaffected by the state of Eastern affairs, and prepared to submit to Turkish re-arrangements with perfect indifference. Europe has too little life left in her to be able to dispense with the new country of the Balkan. Prussia now represents all Northern Germany, and is endeavouring to devour Southern Germany also. Is it so very probable that she will permit the mouth of the Danube, that South German Volga, to fall into foreign hands? Such a policy, at any rate, would not contribute to make her a favourite with the South Germans. The eagerness with which she placed Prince Charles on the Roumanian throne proves very clearly that the question, who is to rule on the Danube, is one she has thought of. Her neutrality would be a sham. If by keeping aloof she unties the hands of Russia, she equally frees those of Napoleon. For her to abstain from action while war is rife in Turkey means two things—either not to hinder Russia on the Danube, nor to restrain herself on the Main; or by remaining inactive in the latter direction to permit Napoleon to dispatch his forces to the south-east. Would this be neutrality towards ourselves? As to the Roman question, Austria alone will be strong enough to hold Italy in check. It needs not France for that. The thing was most likely discussed as far back as the Salzburg interview, since which Italy has begun to strengthen the Quadrilateral. The inference to be drawn from all this is, that we ought to take up the Eastern question, not from any confidence in the weakness or disunion of our antagonists, but only because we feel strong enough to encounter the many difficulties in our way. If we feel so, then, and only then, is our time.

There is no denying that, as soon as we approach this unfortunate affair again, Europe will once more be united against us. But, it is urged, even if Bismarck promise not to cross the Main while Napoleon is engaged in the East, Napoleon will not believe him. All we can say in reply is, that in our opinion he would be safe, were he to believe him. The unification of Germany is a mere question of time, and will be completed, if not now, on some future occasion. Bismarck can afford to regard the date of this inevitable event as a matter of comparative indifference. It would certainly not be much retarded, were France to weaken herself by bloodshed in the East. But is it so very certain that France will oppose German unity? Is it certain that France objects to the aggrandisement of Prussia, if she is offered an indemnity? Prussia and Italy having been elevated into considerable Powers, nothing is more natural than that France should demand a corresponding increase of land and men. We may depend upon it, that Napoleon will be rewarded—not, indeed, with the "left bank," but with Belgium, Piedmont, and a portion of Switzerland. Such will be the consequences of Prussian neutrality.'

With the exception of the last paragraph, containing

idle speculations concerning the future, the above will be found to agree with my last intelligence on the subject. Napoleon does believe that Bismarck will make hay while the sun shines, and has not yet brought himself to look upon the embodiment of the southern with the northern half of Germany as an event he would be justified in permitting while he can prevent it. If this has kept him from reviving the Eastern question on his own account, it is all the more likely to influence his conduct, were it resuscitated by somebody else. Besides, were Russia to cross the Pruth, she would have to reckon with more than one Power. This truth has been too fully realised some years ago to induce her to enter the field again unaided.

THE FIRST CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT OF GERMANY.

Berlin, April 28, 1868.

LEAVING out of account the Frankfort Parliament of 1848, which like a meteor shot across the political horizon of the country, only to make the succeeding darkness the more sensibly felt, the Assembly yesterday opened is the first representative body of the entire nation convened since the downfall of the Germanic Empire. Sober and resigned as the character of the times has become, the members during the opening ceremony were yet visibly impressed with the solemn import of the moment. The hall was crowded as it never has been before. It needed not much discrimination to read in the faces of those present that they felt they were assisting in a great historical act. Nor did the royal speech weaken the feelings aroused by the event. While stating in modest and unpretending terms that the Customs Parliament has to deal with fin-

ancial interests alone, the speech hopefully represented the growth of the Zollverein as typical of a future progress towards political unity. Then, proceeding to specify the task awaiting the Assembly, the King alluded to the commercial treaty with Austria, and, with considerate regard for Southern idiosyncrasies, admitted that empire to be bound to Germany by ties of common nationality and common material interests. In conclusion his Majesty hoped that trade and industry would be farther developed by the continuance of that peace 'which the German States had allied themselves to maintain, and in vindicating which they might always count upon the united strength of the entire nation.' This apposite allusion to the military treaties between the North and South elicited much applause. When, half an hour later, the House was taking the first introductory steps towards the opening of the debates, Herr von Frankenstein, the most aged member, and President *pro tem.*, reëchoed the royal words, and, with sanguine amplification of their meaning, boldly announced that the object of the House was 'to unite Germany.'

But realities will soon begin to show themselves from beneath the festive cloak thrown over them for the occasion. Unless very extraordinary circumstances should supervene, it will be impracticable to attain, and even useless to aspire to, the establishment of complete unity in the impending session. You have been repeatedly informed how it came to pass that the unity movement, which seemed to carry everything before it after the war, has lately come to a dead stand. Not wishing to provoke French interference, Count Bismarck declined to admit Baden to the Confederacy, and so little encouraged the friendly propensities of the Bavarian Cabinet as to induce it to modify its original programme. The disappointment occasioned by this policy was equally great in the North and South. In either half of the country it threw a wet

blanket upon the action of the Unionists, and revived the waning hopes of their adversaries. Step by step the former retreated from the ground they had so confidently taken up a short twelvemonth ago; eagerly and passionately the Secessionists pressed after them, occupying the deserted posts and gaining strength in proportion as their antagonists lost it. When the laws and treaties providing a Customs Parliament for all Germany were first promulgated, the conviction was universal that, no sooner would the new Assembly meet, than it would burst through the limits set to its authority, and improve upon commercial union by supplying the desirable supplement of political alliance. By the time the elections to the Customs Parliament drew near, this flattering anticipation had been so far toned down by events, that the unity party, finding it useless to go in for their entire programme, only asked for the jurisdiction of the new Assembly to be extended from tariff to commercial affairs generally. But even there the retrogressive movement was not arrested. The Southern Unionists sustaining a signal defeat in the elections, they have since had to abandon all immediate hope of making way in the direction of their wishes, and are now merely striving to keep the Customs Parliament in working order, and to secure the faithful execution of the military treaties. That the Northern Liberals cannot ask them to do more, when their own Government does not second the demand, is a matter of course.

Yet there is nothing in the victory of the Southern Secessionists to seriously mar the prospects of unity. All the united Radicals and Ultramontanes have effected by their triumph is to dispatch a certain number of men to the banks of the Spree with instructions to vote against any extension of the authority vested in the Customs Parliament. Seeing such an extension to be for the moment discountenanced by the leading Government itself, the tactics of the Southern Secessionists are comparatively innocuous.

When the day dawns for the Liberal party to resume the work of unification conjointly with the Prussian Government, they will not appeal in vain for the support of the people of the South. Until then, should an emergency arise, it is morally certain that, no matter whether united by the bonds of a common constitution or not, the nation will present a common front to foreign foes. In case of danger, the power of the Prussian Crown, the patriotism of the dynasties and the people, and the sense of national honour pervading the armies, will force recusants to remain true to the pledge given, and to espouse the right side.

Of the eighty-six Southern members, whose addition to the 297 members of the Federal Assembly converts the latter body into the Customs Parliament, about forty are the representatives of Ultramontane or Republican creeds. These dissimilar allies are averse from unity unless established under Austrian or else ultra democratic auspices, and would repeal the Zollverein and cancel the military treaties, were their power commensurate to their ill-will. Nearly twenty-five are unity men, ready to accept the Federal Charter as it stands, though desirous, if they could, of amending it in a Liberal sense. About as many hold an intermediate position, being equally opposed to the complete absorption of the South by the North as to their total separation. Strictly adhering to the Military and Customs League, this section yet professes no wish to join the Confederacy. Its members are in the habit of supporting the Bavarian Government, and had the latter been in a position to abide by the more advanced principles at one time entertained by them, they would doubtless now vote with the partisans of unity. But if the eighty-six new-comers are divided into three several sections on the question of unity, they are so far agreed on most other subjects as to offer a common opposition to Conservatism in the administration of domestic affairs.

They will have little occasion to manifest their home politics in a Parliament whose allotted task confines them to the discussion of tariff and excise.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF GERMANY.

Berlin, May 3, 1868.

BEFORE a Continental Parliament can get into working order, it has to go through a number of introductory formalities, which afford opposing parties the first opportunity to measure their strength. The Speaker and his deputies have to be elected. Standing committees have to be appointed for verifying elections and reporting upon technical bills requiring special consideration. Last, not least, there is the question whether the royal speech is to be answered, and if so, in what way—a matter apt to give rise to a good deal of serious debate in these unsettled times. The choice of Speaker in the present instance went off smoothly enough, all parties deciding for the President of the Federal Parliament—a gentleman equally eligible on account of his superior ability as for his having directed the debates of the Germanic Representative Assembly in 1848. Accordingly, Dr. Simson, the parliamentary veteran, was all but unanimously reinstated in presidential honours. As first Vice-President, the Prussian Conservatives and Liberals, out of courtesy to the Southern members, returned a Southerner of eminent position and moderate politics. Prince Hohenlohe, the man of their choice, is Bavarian Premier, and in accepting a seat in the Customs Parliament was actuated by a desire to vindicate his programme of strict adherence to the defensive and offensive treaties with this Government. Tame as his politics are to the Northern Unity men, they were yet

powerless to win him favour with the Secessionists from the South. Nearly one-half of these being opposed to the military treaties, voted against him.

There was another and even more interesting division of parties in the election of the second Vice-President. For this post the Prussian moderate Liberals had fixed upon Herr von Roggenbach, the late Baden Premier, a noted and well-deserving friend of unity. Of the small number of Prussian advanced Liberals in the House, some approved the choice; others, ridiculing the idea that unity can be established by a Conservative Bismarck, voted against the man guilty of entertaining the opposite belief. Nor were any of the other fractions more partial to Herr von Roggenbach. The Prussian Government party, in their two shades of Conservatives and Free Conservatives—the former Tories, the latter Whigs—rejected him to a man; as to the Southerners, Ultramontanes and Republicans were on this occasion joined by the friends of the Bavarian Premier, professing almost as great a dislike to complete unity as they do themselves. Herr von Roggenbach having thus been disposed of, the two Prussian Conservative fractions, aided by the Southerners, elected the Duke of Ujest, a Prussian Tory of temperate and independent opinions. Thus one of the few Southern Unionists of mark who have succeeded in making their way to the House was by the united resistance of the Prussian Government adherents and his more immediate countrymen prevented from assuming a prominent position, such as the leaders of influential parties are wont to consider their due.

But, however averse the Prussian Government and its supporters may be from precipitate reunion, the King does not seem to see the use of pushing this policy so far as entirely to discourage the Southern friends of his State and dynasty. On the day following the election there was a grand dinner at the palace. All Deputies had been in-

vited, and, excepting the Würtemberg Republicans and the very blackest among the Bavarian Ultramontanes, all did themselves the honour of attending. After the banquet, the King freely conversed with his guests. It was on this occasion that, approaching Count Bethusy, the leader of the Free Conservatives, his Majesty was heard to ask him with some asperity of tone why he had not taken Roggenbach's part the day before. I believe the Count was in a position to answer that *he* had, though most of his party had not. Another interesting utterance was elicited from the King by a plain-spoken member from the South. Continuing his after-dinner tour through the hall, the King likewise accosted Herr Kugeler, a wealthy manufacturer from Offenbach, complimenting him upon the industrial fame and prosperity of his town. 'We are well off enough,' was the reply; 'all we want is reunion with the North.' His Majesty had lighted upon one of the few Southern Unionists present, and had a request personally addressed him which in his exalted position he could not feel otherwise than reluctant to answer any way, either in the negative or the affirmative. He, however, extricated himself cleverly from the embarrassment. Without showing any signs of surprise, he evaded a direct answer by quoting a well-known line from Schiller, the implied negative in which is toned down and almost obliterated by its frequent and jocular application to trifles. '*Du sprichst ein grosses Wort gelassen aus*,' his Majesty said—a dictum which, divested of its poetic garb, may be rendered in blunt vernacular, 'Rather cool.' At this the undiplomatic Offenbach manufacturer—a portfolio maker, though evidently no portfolio holder—had no reply to make; and the King passed on, greeting an acquaintance here, and offering a friendly remark there. Advanced Liberals from the minor States, however friendly to Prussia, the King did not condescend to notice.

Two days later the skirmish thus opened with courtly

weapons in the palace was resumed with more trenchant arms in the parliamentary arena. The subject in hand was one connected with the elections. The Würtemberg moderate Liberals, having been defeated at the poll, have sent up a petition complaining of certain alterations in the franchise arbitrarily adopted by the Government of their principality. Their complaint being a matter of secondary importance, I will not enter upon it farther than by remarking that its justice was eventually acknowledged by the House calling upon the Federal Government to prevent a recurrence of the alleged irregularities. All the more interesting was the debate which preceded the vote. The petition of the aggrieved Würtembergers had been placed in the hands of Dr. Braun, from Nassau, a moderate Liberal and unity man *quand même*. This eminent speaker availed himself of the opportunity of reading a lecture to the Würtemberg Government. He said:

'The Würtemberg Ministers had not only tampered with the franchise, but allied themselves with the Republican and Ultramontane parties, on all other points violently opposed to them, to prevent the return of pro-Prussian members. They had employed the bureaucracy as electioneering agents, and had lent a hand in the circulation of addresses representing the Prussian Government as morally debased and the Prussian people as no better. Such had been the conduct of that Herr von Varnbühler (the Würtemberg Premier), who, before the war of 1866, in a public sitting of his Chamber, threatened to treat Prussia according to the Roman maxim, *Væ victis*,—who, after the overthrow of his Vienna friends, was the first to solicit a Prussian alliance,—and who now, reverting to his old practices, openly sided with people who recommended the rupture of the treaties concluded by him.'

Among the audience treated to this cutting harangue were two Würtemberg Ministers, the identical Herr von Varnbühler, and his colleague Herr von Mitnacht, the Minister of Justice. The latter was the first to reply, and, it must be owned, made the best of a bad bargain. Being unable to deny the charges preferred, he ignored them altogether, confining himself to the assertion that if the pro-Prussian party in Würtemberg had been defeated,

this was owing to their bad strategy in withstanding the undivided current of public opinion, and abusing their countrymen to boot for differing from them. After that came Herr von Varnbüler, who, referring to the reproach cast upon his former politics, begged the House to let bygones be bygones. He was now the ally of Prussia, and would faithfully carry out the duties imposed on him. So would the party who had been victorious in the Würtemberg elections. They would likewise remain true to the treaties instituting the Zollverein Parliament; but they thought the establishment of political unity by means of that Parliament prohibited by those very treaties. Their opinion was so manifestly in unison with the letter and spirit of the compacts entered into, that the Würtemberg electors could not be blamed for making a corresponding course obligatory upon their representatives. This was a Parliament not for discussing high politics, but for revising the tariff, and talking about cotton, paper, and tobacco. To this undisguised avowal of anti-unity sentiments, a telling rejoinder was made by Herr Lasker, a Prussian Liberal, saying that:

'A fourth of all Würtemberg electors, and among them nearly every man of education or property in the country, had voted for tightening the ties with the North German Confederacy. The Customs Parliament, therefore, was not one for the exclusive discussion of cotton and tobacco, but would pave the way to the consummation of the national destinies.'

This ended the debate. On the House dividing, the Government were asked by a large majority to attend to the Würtemberg petition, if not now, hereafter. Nays were confined to the Conservatives and the South Germans, the few moderate Liberals among them excepted.

Emboldened by this success, the Prussian moderate Liberals resolved to yield to the eager solicitations of a few Southern friends, and move for a reply to the speech from the throne, to be conceived in a spirit of unity. Before carrying out their intention, they thought it as well to

take the opinion of the other parties on the draught they meant to introduce. The Conservatives at once declared against it, being partly averse from unity, partly unwilling to thwart the Cabinet in a matter concerning which its wishes could not be doubtful. The Free Conservatives at first likewise opposed the idea. There is, indeed, much to be said against it. It is certain that the Government will not act upon the advice of impatient Liberals, but choose their own time for proceeding on the path entered upon in the memorable summer of 1866; and it is likewise easy to foresee, that of the Southerners in the present House, three-fourths will vote against any address of the kind proposed. If, then, the address is sure to have no practical consequences, is the advantage of passing a mere demonstrative vote great enough to weigh against the drawback of giving prominence to the fact that unity, in its present aspect, is discarded by the majority of the Southern members? For these reasons the Free Conservatives at first resolved to discourage the plan of the moderate Liberals. All of a sudden, however, they have changed their mind, and, it seems, carried a number of Conservative Ultras with them. Their conversion is ascribed to a hint from a high, though not exactly ministerial quarter.

The total number of soldiers sent on furlough by the Commander-in-chief of the North German Federal Army amounts to 12,000. The practicability of taking some such step had, at the instance of Austria, been confidentially mentioned by the Marquis de Moustier to the Prussian Ambassador at Paris. Little did he probably think that this Government would act upon a suggestion which looks like a diplomatic feint, and set him the example of pacific intentions and fearless composure.

The Commission appointed by the Italian Government for examining into the comparative merits of the different breech-loading rifles known have decided in favour of the needle-gun. This is the only instance of its having been

approved by a non-German State, all other countries having endeavoured to construct a more perfect weapon. More general recognition has been bestowed upon the Prussian breech-loading cannon. Having some time ago been adopted by Russia, Belgium, and, for fortress and naval artillery, by Austria also, it is now about to be introduced into the Italian service.

A new invention has been semi-officially announced. After many experiments, we are given to understand the Prussian military chemists have succeeded in precipitating the explosive liquid known as nitro-glycerine, and reducing it to a solid. By this transformation its combustibility is diminished, while its force remains unimpaired. The terrific substance, so long unavailable for any purposes other than where the utmost caution could be observed, is thus rendered more manageable and fitted for military use. If all we hear about it be true, the novelty will indeed be a great hit. Grenades filled with it and shot from guns of moderate calibre are said to have smashed the strongest cuirass that ever covered the sides of iron-cased ships. Supposing this to be confirmed, what, we may well ask, will the new monster guns be capable of doing?*

* Even in this mitigated form the dangerous stuff was ultimately voted too inflammable for application in the field.

AUSTRIA AND THE ZOLLVEREIN: THE CIS-LEITHAN CABINET.

Berlin, May 13, 1868.

WHEN, sixteen years ago, Prussia was defeated by Austria in the much-trodden field of German politics, the victor, among other concessions, exacted a treaty of commerce intended to pave the way for his admission at a future period to the Zollverein. Under this agreement the Customs were considerably reduced by both parties, the benefit of such reduction being confined to the two contracting States exclusively. Foreign competition was shut out by high tariffs. The treaty expired in 1865, when Prussia, having recovered from her political discomfiture, in the name of the Zollverein entered into another and more liberal compact with France. Austria, believing herself unable to advance in the direction of free trade, opposed the idea of this Government taking a step which would separate her commercially from the Germany she so ardently wished to rule. Failing to intimidate Prussia, she used every exertion to get the States of Southern Germany to repeal the new treaty with France, leave the Zollverein, and join her in a protectionist league. These efforts proved inefficacious. The Southern States, finding it impossible to exist apart from the Zollverein, sanctioned the objectionable treaty with France, and the struggle resulted in a commercial Sadowa for the imperial Cabinet, as decisive as the military and political rout that was to follow. Prussia is indebted for this first victory to Count Bernstoff, then Minister of Foreign Affairs. Foiled in her attempt to effect a commercial reunion with Germany, supplementary to the political connection existing in those days, Austria now went off on the opposite tack, and, angrily withdrawing herself, raised her tariff to an extraordinary height.

But the financial interests of the Austrian Empire suf-

fered too severely from the return to an antiquated and injurious system to admit of its being maintained for any considerable time. In the rest of Europe, by a whole network of international treaties, a wholesome competition was created in every branch of manufacture; the Austrian princes of the mill, the forge, and the dyeing house were alone in a position to sell inferior goods at exorbitant prices. By this arrangement, while the industrial resources of the country remained comparatively undeveloped, a tribute was exacted from the million in favour of a few capitalists, and the Government, whose revenue from the Customs was exceedingly small, deprived of what otherwise might have been a plentiful source of income. To go on in this way was plainly suicidal. The twofold necessity of improving the condition of the public finances, and keeping the industrial skill of the Austrians on a level with the rest of the manufacturing world, enjoined a change of system after a three years' trial of its predecessor. In the beginning of 1868, Baron Beust consented to a new treaty with the Zollverein, which though it certainly does not make every concession which could be desired, yet, by a reduction of the most important counts in the tariff, lays claim to being called a step in the right direction. Two days ago this treaty was read for the first time in the Customs Parliament, the majority in favour of its unaltered indorsement being 246 to 17. The nays came entirely from Southerners, whose inveterate protectionism in many cases even preponderates over the Austrian sympathies.

As far as the lowering of the Zollverein duties is concerned, the Austrian treaty under former compacts equally applies to England, Belgium, Italy, and France. So does the stipulation that, from the 1st of January 1869, the subjects of either country shall be at liberty to carry on trade in the other with the like privileges as its own subjects. Both parties are free to dissolve the treaty by the 1st of January 1877.

The expense incurred in sending the Hanover Legionaries home—not a few have applied for a *viaticum* at the Prussian Embassy at Paris—is charged on the sequestered income of King George. Yet the King does not relent. That part of the legion stationed at Nancy has been made acquainted with an order of the day emanating from the King, in which they are promised a speedy invasion of Germany by the side of the French. Toasts to the same enterprise have been likewise drunk at a carousal King George, a fortnight ago, gave at Hitzing to a number of legionaries back from their travels.

The admission of Hessian troops to Mayence is erroneously represented by French papers as implying a timid concession on the part of this Government. By the treaty which gave her the right of garrisoning the fortress, Prussia is obliged to admit a small number of Hessians. The Hessians are moreover to all intents and purposes Prussian troops, belonging, as they do, to the North German army, and being placed under Federal command.

Up to this moment the Dutch Government have omitted to demolish the fortifications of Luxemburg, as undertaken in the late international settlement. The widening of a single gate excepted, the matter has not been so much as taken in hand. A new paper, entitled *L'Avenir*, has been established at Luxemburg, to prepare the public mind for annexation by France. Such is the undisguised plainness of its language, that in a recent sitting of the Luxemburg Chamber, Herr Brasser, a deputy, thought it necessary to ask the Government, whether they meant to suffer that journal to circulate treasonable appeals. Herr Brasser also alleging that the paper was in connection with the French diplomatic agent in the Grand Duchy, requested the Government to complain of this gentleman's conduct to the Paris Cabinet. The Government, in reply, promised to enforce the law against all political agitators.

German, Austrian, and Polish papers notoriously in-

spired by the Vienna Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have lately so far agreed with certain Paris organs as to anticipate the approach of war. This being remarked and commented upon, two German politicians of note applied to members of the cis-Leithan Cabinet, expressing their regret at the unintelligible phenomenon. The Ministers thus confidentially interrogated are political friends of the gentlemen in question, and since the days of the Germanic Parliament of 1848, when they all sat together on the benches of St. Paul's at Frankfort, seem to have kept up some intercourse with their old colleagues. The reply given by them was, that the cis-Leithan Cabinet had no sincerer wish than to maintain amicable relations with Prussia. We learn this from the querists themselves, one of whom, Dr. Löwe, has just told the Customs Parliament so, while the other, Herr Biedermann, avails himself of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, of which he is the editor, to announce this satisfactory result of his inquiry.

The recall of Baron Budberg, the Russian Ambassador, from Paris, coincides with the failure of France to effect an agreement with the St. Petersburg Cabinet respecting the affairs of Germany and the East. Baron Budberg is believed to have long advocated a French alliance. But the plan seems to have been found impracticable for the time being. Russia cannot make up her mind to throw Prussia overboard, and France has found it impossible to induce Prussia to become a party to an arrangement. Count Stackelberg, who replaces Baron Budberg, will have no immediate successor at Vienna. Austria has been so long represented at St. Petersburg by a Chargé d'Affaires, that the Russian Government deem the same mode of representation sufficient at Vienna.

POLITICAL BANQUET AT BERLIN.

Berlin, May 23, 1868.

PLEASURE, not business, occupied the Customs Parliament during the last three days of its brief existence. On Thursday the deputies were entertained by a number of eminent members of the mercantile community; Friday was the day chosen by a Liberal club to dine with their Southern friends, and show the world that the feeling of patriotism and boon-companionship rises above party differences; and to-night as many of the members as accept the invitation of a Berlin bankers' committee will leave in an extra train for Kiel, to view the North German squadron —a novelty and a thing of infinite interest to the land-locked Southerner. The Thursday festivity was a decided success from a culinary, no less than an oratorical and even political, point of view. About 300 guests, pleasantly associated with 140 hosts, partook of a *déjeûner à la fourchette* in the splendid marble hall of the Exchange. That the gastronomic part of the ceremony must have possessed peculiar charms may be inferred from a bill of 1,000*l.* being run up by the convivialists in less than two hours. Not that this interfered with the speechifying. On the contrary, wine is all-powerful to untie the tongue; and the genial liquid grown on the verdant banks of the Rhine incites to confidence even more effectively than Port or Bordeaux. So hearts soon warmed towards each other, and tongues were loosened. There were loyal toasts and jovial toasts, sentiments felicitously put and sorry blunders. Of the many speeches delivered, I will only mention a few, to which political importance attaches. Herr Siemens, of the famous engineering firm of Siemens and Halske, having saluted the guests on behalf of the committee, Dr. Simson, the speaker of the Customs Parliament, returned thanks in set terms. Count Bismarck,

who had been invited with the other members of the Federal Council, then delighted the assembly with the following address:

'The Speaker of the Customs Parliament, my honoured colleague, has cunningly endeavoured to captivate our mercantile hosts, and induce them to pass a favourable verdict upon the parliamentary labours now drawing to a close. We shall all derive some benefit from his appeal to the jury that has to judge the work intrusted to our particular body politic. As regards myself, permit me to bid our South German brethren farewell. The short time of our being associated has vanished like a spring day; may it bear fruit like the blossoms of spring! (*Cheers.*) I believe that our South German brethren, having worked with us for the common good, will carry home with them the conviction that they leave friends and well-affected relations in these Northern regions ready and willing to stand by them in any emergency. (*Cheers.*) I hope that each repetition of our sittings will strengthen the feeling of intimate connection existing between the different parts of Germany. (*Cheers.*) Let us cultivate these mutual relations; let us abide by them. Animated by these feelings, I wish we may all soon meet again.'

The enthusiastic applause which followed this speech having at last subsided, Prince Hohenlohe, the Bavarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and among those present second in importance to Count Bismarck only, returned thanks in the name of the Southerners:

'Gentlemen,—In expressing my gratitude for the words uttered by the Chancellor of the Confederacy, and the reception accorded them by the Northerners among us, I beg to take note of the fact that the Southern members present have been equally gratified and elated by them. North and South are in a fair way of strengthening the bonds which unite them. For this happy result we are indebted to the Customs Parliament, which has brought us together in a friendly gathering, and will pave the way for the fulfilment of our national hopes, and of our intellectual mission, which is a higher, nobler, and more glorious mission than that of any other nation in the world. It is the common appreciation of the exalted task before us that draws us together; and therefore, gentlemen, I venture to hope you will heartily respond when I propose "The unity of Germany."'

Cheers drowned the last words of the distinguished speaker, many members rising to thank him personally for the patriotic wishes expressed. It is true, it was the Deputy that had uttered the gratifying sentiment, not the

Minister; but his words held out the hope that, under more favourable circumstances, the Minister would some day be ready to carry out what the Deputy had foreshadowed.

The business of eating and speaking over, coffee was brought in. Cigars were lighted, and the whole party, rising and promenading in the open courts, mingled in easy and friendly converse. Count Bismarck was in the happiest of moods. Judge Waldeck, his old democratic opponent, he was 'delighted to meet on neutral ground;' and an eminent banker, who seems to demur to the dilatory politics lately pursued by the Premier, was greeted by the remark that 'no horseman could afford to be always on the gallop.' Characteristic for Berlin it was that among the 140 entertainers of Parliament there were about 90 Jews. The ancient faith is not only as industrious and pecuniarily successful here as elsewhere, but culture and intellectual attainments have created for its professors a social position denied them in many other parts of the world.

This year's emigration promises to be one of the largest on record. It is expected to reach something like 250,000. Its remarkable feature is the prevalence of the Northern element, chiefly Protestants, and men with a small capital in their pockets. Ten years ago the bulk of emigrants was contributed by Southerners — Catholics and paupers, just able to pay their passage; nowadays it is, and indeed has been for several years past, the reverse. The reason for this is twofold. The centres of the Southern population have, by the long drain on them, freed themselves of their superfluous elements; the North, on the other hand, in which the increase of the population, however rapid, was never felt, now sends out those of its field hands who in the last fifteen prosperous years have managed to lay-by some little sum. Without some thalers to start him in the new country, the provident Northerner will rarely embark in such an enterprise. Should the

emigration retain this new character for some time to come, it will begin to tell upon the position of the Germans in the United States.

A NAPOLEONIC PAMPHLET ADVOCATING WAR.

On May 26, 1868, a pamphlet entitled *La Paix par la Guerre* was semi-officially published at Paris. The following summary of this remarkable production is taken from the Paris correspondence of the *Times:*

'In the writer's opinion, the only way to restore public confidence would be sharp, short, but decisive war with Prussia. He begins by remarking on the singular fact that, in spite of all the pacific declarations of the Emperor Napoleon; in spite of his resistance to those who advised him, the very day after the battle of Sadowa, to send an army to the Rhine and take Prussia by surprise; and in spite of his ready acquiescence in the decision of the London Conference on Luxemburg, there still exists a general apprehension that France does not really mean to be at peace, notwithstanding her great forbearance and Prussia's opposition to carrying out the fifth article of the Treaty of Prague. No one can be surprised if France now resolve to interfere diplomatically in that matter; for if she was not a contracting party to the treaty, it was she who had the clause relative to Northern Schleswig inserted in it, as M. Bismarck himself has recently admitted. If she has not hitherto interfered, it is entirely owing to her love of peace. At any other time, so manifest a proof of moderation would have sufficed to tranquillise Europe.

The causes of this persistent uneasiness are of older date than Sadowa. They were pointed out in the Emperor's speech on opening the Chambers in November 1863—viz. the keeping up of mutual mistrust by excessive armaments, and continuing in a situation which was neither peace with its security, nor war with its happy chances; and he added that there were only two ways open—the one to progress by conciliation and peace, the other, which must inevitably lead to war. The moment, however, is now approaching—for the Treaty of Prague is not observed, and the limit of the Main is passed—when the imperial Government will be forced to call upon Prussia to respect treaties, and to demand from her the guarantees which her policy for the last two years has made indispensable. What are these guarantees? There is but one calculated to soothe the just susceptibilities of France, and that is, disarming—not a mock disarming, but a real one. The day that question will be put to Prussia;

the day when she is called upon to make her choice between disarming and war, between the fulfilment of the Treaty of Prague and a new struggle destined to definitely settle the fate of Germany, will the answer of Prussia be pacific? The writer fears it will not. Every time that France has asked for any slight concessions from the Berlin Cabinet since 1866 she has been refused, on the ground of the resistance of the national feeling of Germany, or more strictly speaking, of Prussia herself.

Well then, if war be decided upon, will it be long or short? It will be short, for long wars are not possible in our times. Will it be successful for France? No one can say so with certainty; for the state of Europe is such that no Power has an alliance on which it can count absolutely. With all this, however, it is most probable that Prussia would have the support of Russia. The alliance of Russia may cost her dear, but she will have it; and this is why it is desirable that events should be hastened, for Russia is less prepared at this moment than she would be a year or two hence. Her railways are not completed, and the transformation of her armaments is hardly begun. England of course will remain neutral. Austria will be with France, if Russia join Prussia. The same may be said of Denmark, for Denmark has not forgotten the past; and of Holland, for Holland fears for the future—and both desire to see the ambition of Prussia arrested. Italy will—and one can hardly blame her for it—be for the Power she most stands in need of. That Power is France, for it is France that can most serve or most injure her; and on France it depends to have her for an ally. But the best allies of France will be found in Germany. In this respect, too, the present circumstances are favourable, and the moment is propitious. Germany is not what she was on the morrow of Sadowa; and she is not what she will be if Prussian domination be established there definitively. After Sadowa, a great many Germans cherished illusions as to the nature of Prussian ambition, and the part this Power aspired to play. Those illusions are now dissipated; they would not again appear; but the Prussian domination would be completed, all resistance crushed, and it would be then too late to deliver Germany. Now the liberation of Germany would be the real object of the war, and the true result of France's triumph. Prussia, moreover, has against her the Catholics and the Democrats; the former alarmed by the preponderance of Prussian Protestantism, the latter enlightened as to the pretended liberalism of Prussia. But, above all, Prussia has against her the very genius of the German people, who are opposed, not to national unity in its large and elevated sense, but to the narrow and oppressive centralisation sought to be imposed upon them under the name of unity.

If France, indeed, contemplated a war of conquest, all Germany would be with Prussia; but there is nothing of the kind to fear. The heir of Napoleon I. has never in this respect followed the example of the head of the imperial family; and as he respected Italian independence, so

will be respect that of Germany. The war once over, it will be for Germany to reconstitute herself. All that France would do would be to protect the manifestation of the popular will by universal suffrage. Bavaria of course will keep her dynasty. The reigning house of Baden associated to Prussia will be rejected by liberated Germany, and the whole of Suabia will form but one State under the house of Würtemberg. Lower Saxony will take back her national dynasty, which she has never renounced—the dynasty of the Guelphs, one of the most ancient of Europe, which, from the Middle Ages downwards, struggled against despotism and centralisation, then represented by the Hohenstauffen, as they now are by the Hohenzollern, with a population of eight millions, will be in the north what Bavaria is in the south. To constitute that kingdom, which will hold so excellent a place in the equilibrium of Germany, it will be sufficient to restore Hanover to her legitimate Sovereigns, and to join to it Westphalia as far as the Rhine and the Duchy of Oldenberg. The Duchy of Brunswick will be united to it some day by the extinction of the ducal branch of the Guelphs. The Duchies of Saxony will, of themselves, demand to be united to royal Saxony. Prussia will be driven back beyond the Elbe.

The writer of the pamphlet ventures to hope that her conquerors will not abuse their victory as after Jena, for "it is never good to drive a courageous people to despair." Prussia must remain a compact and well-defined kingdom. She must have Magdeburg to enable her to defend the Elbe. She must be left all the territory on the left bank of that river, including the Duchies of Mecklenburg, which nature seems to have made to be absorbed by her, and which will complete her line of coast on the Baltic. Frankfort will recover her republican Government, to which she owed her prosperity. The new Confederation would have a defensive instead of the aggressive character which Prussia has given to the Northern Confederation. With such an organisation Germany would enjoy all the benefits of national unity, without the disadvantages of centralisation, and she would be safe from all attack from abroad, without becoming a danger to the other States of Europe. The writer concludes thus:

"We do not pretend that this plan, once adopted and carried out, would make all future wars impossible. It would be too much to hope from human nature. But we think we may affirm that an organisation of Europe conformable to the wishes of the people, and the principle of nationalities understood in its true sense—an organisation that would reëstablish Poland, drive back Russia, give to Austria the mouths of the Danube, protect Turkey against the dangers which for the last half century menace her, reconstitute Germany in a manner conformable to her tendencies and the genius of her people—would keep off for a long time the principal causes of war which at this moment agitate public opinion and keep Europe in alarm. If the war had such results, it should not be regretted. Let people reflect on the present situation. Let them

call to mind how the Emperor has described it. 'It is not either peace with its security, nor war with its favourable chances.' The state of things which we have just sketched would be, on the contrary, after war with its happy chances, peace with all its security."'

There is a striking contrast between this and the pamphlet likewise officially published November 14, 1867. In the autumn of 1867 the action of Prussia in unifying Germany was represented as perfectly legitimate and conducive to the welfare of the world; in the summer of 1868 it appeared the reverse. After what has been stated in preceding letters, it is unnecessary to observe that the French endeavours to utilise Prussia were foiled in the interval between these two dates.

PRUSSIA'S RESERVED ATTITUDE. SOMETHING IS BREWING IN GALICIA.

Berlin, May 28, 1868.

THE cautious and forbearing spirit in which the affairs of Germany are conducted by this Government has received a signal illustration in the last speech from the throne. In it the King, to remove every pretext for foreign interference, solemnly repeats the assurance, so often given before, that as far as he is concerned the present political arrangements of the country shall be conscientiously maintained. He indeed hints that were he so minded, he might be strong enough to extend his direct influence over the States south of the Main; but, coupling this with the promise that the relations between the two halves of the country shall be regulated not by might but by right, the King in the same breath expressly guarantees existing treaties, until superseded by others of a more effective and popular nature. It can have been no such easy task for his Majesty to bring himself to repeat this on an occasion which gives peculiar weight to his

words. He has said, and by his entire policy confirmed it so often in the course of the last two years, that even his adversaries, who for purposes of their own pretend to impute different intentions to him, cannot in their heart of hearts but be convinced of his sincerity. If nevertheless he has not thought it beneath his dignity to avow again and again sentiments so continuously proved by deeds, his moderation would deserve acknowledgment, even did he not think his opponents were meditating something just now. But it seems that a suspicion of growing antagonism on the part of some foreign Powers, far from making him assume a proud reserve, has caused him to protest his love of peace all the more energetically.

The Munich *South German Press* has been the first to recognise the discretion of King William's conduct. Gratefully accepting the assurances given by the King, the Bavarian ministerial paper tells us:

'If Prussia will exercise no violence to merge the South in the North, Bavaria is equally determined not to allow the military and commercial treaties between North and South to be infringed upon. Bavaria admits that Prussia had no alternative but to take up arms two years ago, and create a new era by the application of main force; but she is the more indebted to Prussia for abandoning forcible measures as soon as possible, and returning to a pacific course directly the most indispensable wants of Germany were satisfied.'

A better recognition of the equitable bearing of Prussia than the one voluntarily vouchsafed it by the organ of a Southern Cabinet could hardly be conceived. From another impartial quarter a similar token has emanated. The Ultramontane and Radical members of the Customs Parliament from the South have drawn up a report to their constituents, in which the plan of a separate Southern Confederacy has dwindled down to the pale image of its former self. When coming to Berlin a few weeks back, they dreamt of a Southern Confederacy as the means the best adapted to injure this Government; before leaving, their wrath had been so far allayed, and their self-suffi-

ciency so far humbled by the strength and moderation of the people with whom they came in contact, as to make them refer to the old object of their political dreams only for appearance' sake, and without the faintest hope of realisation. Their Report neither hopes for a Southern Confederacy, nor does it attempt to charge Prussia with the guilt of contemplating the embodiment of the South with the North. Many of these sectarians actually have allowed themselves to be mollified to the extent of taking part in the parliamentary trip to Kiel, Hamburg, and Altona, and dining six times in the course of three days in honour, if not of united, at least of confederate Germany. The speeches delivered on these joyous occasions have awakened a ready echo in every corner of the land. They really are a symptom of progressive fraternisation between the various political creeds and geographical sections of Fatherland. At the Kiel *terra firma* dinner — for there was a marine dinner too—a Prussian Opposition member proposed the health of General Moltke, who modestly transferred any merit attributed to him to the King. A South German Ultramontane celebrated in glowing terms the Prussian Admiral Jackmann, commander of the German navy. The member for the Baden Government in the Federal Council extolled Count Bismarck; and a Würtemberg Minister proposed three cheers to 'Concord between his more immediate countrymen and the Prussians.' Improving upon this sentiment, Baron Rhein, the President of the Bavarian Chamber of Peers, spoke of complete unity as a mere question of time, thereby encouraging Liberal deputies from his State to promise the assembly that on returning home they would become so many active missionaries of a creed avowed even by a man who at Munich has ever been regarded as a Secessionist. When, on the day following this universal manifestation of peace and goodwill, the leading Generals of the late war, who in their capacity of members were of the party, showed

themselves at the Hamburg Exchange, they were warmly saluted by the pacific princes of the tea and tobacco chests.

The news from the Galician frontier, however startling to the public, has scarcely taken the Prussian Government by surprise. For some time past no Polish refugee who had a mind to pitch his tent in Galicia applied for an Austrian passport to the land of his hopes without obtaining it. This concentration of unruly elements in close vicinity to the Russian military lines, coupled with the fiery language of the Galician press, had a natural tendency to inspire venturesome plans. As a first practical consequence, the formation of armed bands on the Russo-Polish frontier has been announced to the Prussian by the Russian Government. I regret to be obliged to add, that the Austrian authorities are charged by Russia with aiding and abetting the movement. Whether it will increase, or pass away without result, is more than can be foreseen. At any rate, Prince Napoleon will no longer deem it fitting to extend his journey to Galicia. It is too late for him to gather ovations such as the Lemberg papers have recently called upon their countrymen to greet him with.

The signal for the Galicians to begin seems to have been given at the very city of Warsaw. A few days back, the news of the birth of an heir presumptive to the Russian throne came to the Polish capital. The telegram which brought the tidings arriving in the evening, General Berg, the Governor of the kingdom, took it to the theatre, and had it read from the stage. The orchestra played the national anthem, the public rising, as is usual on such occasions. Only three ladies of the highest Polish aristocracy, Countess Kosakowska, Countess Plater, and Madame de Laska *née* Countess Ilinska, kept their seats; so did also the French Consul, with whom they were conversing. The Governor, noticing this, sent his adjutant to bid them rise, which the ladies did, but only to resume their seats immediately. Thereupon the chief Superin-

tendent of Police was applied to, who entered the box, and commanded them to withdraw. To this injunction no resistance was offered; but the incident appeared serious enough to be conveyed to St. Petersburg by a special messenger. It was indeed not unnatural for the authorities to regard it as quite an event. In Russian Poland every spark of resistance has been trodden out for some years past, and it is hardly imaginable that three ladies should suddenly brave the Government, and deliver themselves over to the tender mercies of the police, unless ambitious of being petrels to a coming storm.

A refusal to accept the general pardon of this Government, alleged to have been signed by some 700 privates of the Hanover Legion, and couched in the most insulting language, has been published by the Paris *France*, one of the avowed organs of the French Cabinet. Anything so striking as this is hardly weakened in effect by other Paris papers of lesser authority asking those legionaries to refrain from vituperative attacks upon Prussia and her institutions. One cannot but wonder whether the Emperor Napoleon believes he is promoting the chances of peace by permitting the more martially inclined among his advisers to indulge in such practical jokes as these. Little as is said here about it all, and determined as this Government undoubtedly is to ignore mere verbal attacks, the energy with which these have been recently made begins to awaken a doubt whether M. Rouher, after all, will carry the day over Marshal Niel. Nor is our Danish intelligence particularly calculated to set our misgivings at rest. The Copenhagen press is pretty unanimous in anticipating war between France and Germany, and already beholds the Danish army descending upon Schleswig.

The *Coburg Zeitung* denies on authority the rumour that negotiations have been entered into between Duke Ernest and Queen Victoria with a view to the cession of Coburg-Gotha to Prussia.

GENERAL DUCROT SURVEYS THE BANKS OF THE RHINE.

Berlin, June 3, 1868.

COULD provocation be given by slight things, Germany would have sustained one on the part of a servant of the French Government. Three weeks ago General Ducrot, who commands at Strasburg, rode in demonstrative fashion over the bridge uniting the French to the German bank of the Rhine. Surrounded by his staff, he galloped across the planks that have a peculiar political importance attached to them, and was so over-anxious to reach German soil, that he very nearly rode down the first Baden sentinel he met. Then, stationing himself with his companions in front of the small *tête de pont* that defends the bridge, he discussed the strength of the fort in such a manner as to attract the attention and wound the feelings of the passers-by. However characteristic, the incident was scarcely alluded to at the time in the German press, and therefore not noticed by your correspondent. A few days ago, however, it had a sequel, which I believe justifies my reverting to it. The same general, embarking with a number of officers in several boats, inspected the German bank of the Rhine for a considerable distance below Hüningen. There were telescopes on board, and a show was made of taking observations and consulting maps. Thus engaged, the party slowly floated down the border stream. The expedition cannot have been got up for the purpose of a military survey, the German maps of the river being too accurate to admit of correction in a parade trip.

Without caring to inquire into its purpose, one cannot help wondering what the language of the French papers would be, nay what the international relations of the two countries would become, were a German general to imitate the example set him by his French brother-in-arms. For-

tunately for the preservation of peace, the Germans are not so easily irritated. The German press looks upon the boating excursion as a matter to be mentioned, though hardly serious enough to excite anger. As to Count Bismarck, he faithfully adheres to his discreet politics, and, indifferent to all this petty manœuvring, has just obliged the French Government by his good offices in the Tunis imbroglio.

PRINCE NAPOLEON AT VIENNA.

Berlin, June 13, 1868.

THE most pleasant hours of Prince Napoleon's journey to Vienna were spent in the company of those whose policy least agrees with his own. The Grand Duke of Baden, ardently attached as he is to unity principles, gave the distinguished foreigner a polite reception, a state dinner, and all the rest of it. Regard for King William's son-in-law made him accept the invitation of a political adversary. The Würtemberg Court, from warmer feelings than mere courtesy inspires, would have been but too happy to imitate the example set by their neighbours of Carlsruhe. But the traveller would not be fêted at Stuttgart. Würtemberg not seconding the German politics of France with the zeal expected of her, the omission had to be resented by corresponding frigidity. The Prince's anger did not, however, extend to Herr von Varnbüler, the versatile Premier, with whom he had a two hours' conversation on current events. Its purport, the anti-Prussian papers of Stuttgart with shameless significance assert, will be known when Germany, assassinated at Sadowa, rises from the dead. When the Prince came to Munich, he found the Court out of town, and no arrangements made for either feast or politics. King Ludwig, taking him at

his word, and manifesting the most implicit belief in the alleged sight-seeing character of his trip, so strictly respected the princely incognito as not even to come to town from the neighbouring château of Berg. Under these circumstances, what else could the Prince do than leave? To have called on Prince Hohenlohe, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or to have signified a wish to be called upon by him, would have been love's labour lost. Though not in a hurry to effect complete reunion, Prince Hohenlohe is the most patriotic of Germans. The only visit, consequently, his Imperial Highness received while in the Bavarian capital was from the French Minister. As regards his sojourn at Vienna, and the political intercourse he is indulging in under cover of the Hofburg, you will, perhaps, permit me to communicate a letter from a North German gentleman there, in a position to see what is going on when the curtain is drawn up, and also when down. Among other things he says:

'The radical difference between Vienna and Berlin has been again brought out by Prince Napoleon's journey. While the Prince was so completely ignored by Berlin society as to make him complain that, go where he would, none but official faces, and these always the same, met his bored gaze, politicians of all shades may be found waiting in his antechamber at Vienna. His travelling companions, and above all M. Scheffer, the clever Alsatian who is supposed to know all about the East, and will act as his interpreter down the Danube, are being applied to from all sides to admit them to the presence. There are the Poles, eager to pour out their sufferings to the professional friend of the oppressed. Two, MM. Ragowski and Rogalski, have been already received, to hear Russia called the image with the feet of clay, which may reveal its crumbling propensities before long. As ready an access is accorded to the sons of Hungary who have contributed to cure Austria's malady upon the Napoleonic prescription. With them he laughs at the notion of Roumanian independence, and the rat-catching community of Slovackia, Russia's van in her menacing advance upon the Austrian Empire.

Politicians here may be broadly divided into two parties. Some, retaining the traditional policy of the State to which they belong, would not scruple to go to war with Germany the very day they could make sure of French assistance. The advocates of such a course are to be found chiefly in military and clerical circles. You should see them nodding

and beckoning to the cousin of their cherished patron, in hopes that he will understand the pantomimic language of their yearning hearts. It is needless to say that the Hanover Court is constantly attending upon him. The other section of Vienna politicians are too German to indulge in allusions of such an explosive nature. But even these cannot deny themselves the piquant delight of accosting the foreign luminary, whose easy manners are in such interesting contrast to the reserve of their own royalties, and will glibly discuss with him, in the space of a gossiping half-hour, the affairs of this and neighbouring planets. The task is all the more grateful as the Prince is in the habit of speaking rather than listening on these voyages of discovery, and withal possesses the extreme politeness of modifying his views to suit his audience *pro tem.* So the Germans in calling upon him need not be afraid of having their feelings wounded by an excess of Hungarian or Polish sympathies. What he tells his Teutonic friends, with an air of genial communicativeness, is that the sort of unity established by their Northern countrymen two years ago will of itself fall to pieces at no distant period. In his opinion, it needs no Napoleonic attack to effect a catastrophe certain to come off in the unaided course of events.

"A Napoleonic invasion of Germany," he says, "besides being unnecessary to secure this end, would be also inadvisable. Austria particularly would suffer from it. Were France to engage Prussia, the first shot fired on the banks of the Rhine would be the signal for Russia to seize Galicia and the Danubian Principalities. France at such a juncture would be unable to come to the rescue, while England—*teste* Jerome Napoleon—would be scarcely strong enough to prevent the East from going to rack and ruin. The one thing to be done was to restrain Russia, and this would not be so very difficult of accomplishment either. In protecting Turkey one could not, however, conceal from oneself that the Ottoman Empire scarcely deserves being defended against all comers, if it will contribute nothing towards its own consolidation. That the Turks would mend their ways was more than could be expected. It was apparently contrary to their nature to accommodate themselves to the requirements of European civilisation. At their best they would make an effort and proclaim pathetically and with a parade of sententious language, grand principles, while practically leaving everything as muddled as ever. It was the pregnant task of the present age to remodel Ottoman affairs."

These suggestions the Prince ordinarily intersperses with humoristic references to the attempt of the Czechians to assist Russia in her antagonism to Sultan and Kaiser. I daresay that, until he gets to Prague and Bucharest, his opinions on the claims of the Slave and Wallachian races to influence the course of events will have been sufficiently toned down to enable him to turn his conversational talent to as good account there as here. If any colour may be said to predominate in the polychromatic hues of his political creed, it is hatred of Russia and con-

tempt of Turkey. The Prince speaks as though he wished to create an impression that something might be undertaken against them both. Although it would be going too far to identify his words with his politics, or his politics with those of the Emperor, there is nothing to preclude the assumption that the loquacious cousin has by the reticent one been sent flying about the world as a *ballon d'essai*.

Should certain schemes—long hatching, but never as yet considered ready to break the shell—be earnestly taken in hand, recent events in Servia would tend to render them more advantageous to Austria than they could have been before. The murdered Prince leaves no heir, but a pretender behind him. The latter, M. Karageorgevitch, has already sat on the Servian throne, but ten years ago was deposed and forcibly expelled his country for his marked leanings towards Austria. Of late the progress of party dissension among his countrymen seems to have inspired him with the hope of recovering what was formerly his own. He left Pesth, where he had long resided, for Agram, and I believe has been at the pains of informing the three Austrian Cabinets that, should he succeed in resuming the sceptre, he would not forget to promote on Turkish soil the interests of those who had lent him a helping hand. The many and prolonged interviews of Prince Napoleon with the Austrian Ministers, especially with Baron Beust and Count Andrassy, are, as a matter of course, hidden from public cognisance. It is only drawing an inference, when I say that they have partly turned on the question whether the Empire has really gained in strength from the new political arrangements. In conclusion, let me observe that, fully as interesting as anything the Prince confides to his unofficial friends is the silence he observes towards them respecting the probable bearing of Germany, should his schemes ever approach realisation.'

GENERAL DUCROT'S SURVEY. GENERAL VON MOLTKE ON THE ARMY AND NAVY ESTIMATES.

Berlin, June 18, 1868.

THE Paris semi-official *Constitutionnel* ridicules the idea of General Ducrot's boating excursion having been undertaken for military purposes. Just so. As the German maps of the Rhine are so very exact, it would have been impossible to improve them with strategical intent by leisurely floating down the river, and looking every now and

then through a telescope. But in this unmethodical manner it must have been still more impracticable to take observations—as we are invited to believe he did—which could be of any use in regulating the course of that mighty and capricious stream. Moreover, it would be hardly in keeping with the division of labour ordinarily practised in the civilised world, that a General of Division, besides attending to his own branch, should be utilised as civil engineer. The affirmative portion in the statement of the *Constitutionnel*, then, does not seem to be quite as acceptable as the negative one, and the less so as it is a little behindhand. Why were these explanations not vouchsafed when the news of the aquatic promenade first got into the German press? Why only when it was copied into the *Times?* As the Germans consider themselves deliberately provoked, it would have been conducive to the improvement of international relations to enlighten their ignorance at once, and state the supposed offence to have been, not a bravado, but a hydraulic survey.

The same day Prince Napoleon dined at the King of Hanover's at Hitzing, an agent of the King was arrested at Landeck, a well-known watering-place in Silesia. The prisoner's pocket-book is officially stated to have contained some very interesting letters. These bear a recent date, are written by Count Platen, the late Minister and present attendant of George V., and mainly turn upon the means of keeping up an agitation in his former kingdom. To characterise them, one sample will suffice. In a sort of programme Count Platen says:

'Prussia is the common enemy of all countries. An alliance of all minor States with France, for the purpose of shaking the power of Prussia, and thrusting it to the other side of the Elbe, after the example of Napoleon I., is demanded by the law of self-preservation. It is still time to fulfil this duty. Prussia, not having as yet assimilated to herself the newly-acquired provinces, meets with energetic resistance everywhere, especially in Hanover. The dismemberment of the State of the Hohenzollern is the allotted task not only of France, but also of all those less

powerful principalities who see in France their natural protector, and who look with terror at the rise of the Prussian military monarchy.'

Count Platen, then, does not scruple to agitate for the invasion of his country by the troops of a foreign and not always disinterested race. After this discovery, the last doubt as to why the Hanover Legion was removed to France is solved.

The North German Federal Parliament has voted a naval loan of 25,000,000 thalers. With a view to recommend it to the Liberals, who at first opposed the measure on economical grounds, General Baron von Moltke, who is a member, offered some interesting remarks:

'Is there any sensible man who would not wish the enormous military expenditure to be applied to peaceful purposes? But ardently as we may long for such a consummation, the time is distant when war will be replaced by international arbitrement. Whatever may be effected by the progress of civilisation, for the present there is, in my opinion, but one way to prevent war in this quarter of the globe. A Power must rise in the centre of Europe, itself unambitious of conquest, yet strong enough to restrain its neighbours. If such a blessing ever be conferred upon humanity, it will be through Germany—that is, through Germany when united. In arming, then, we do it not for ourselves alone. Part of the money demanded by Government is to be expended in costly experiments. To wait for these experiments to be made by other nations would be unpractical. In mechanical science it is not the invention alone which is of moment, but the way it is employed also. It took us twenty years to make our needle-gun the excellent weapon it is, and manufacture a supply of millions of them. If an honourable gentleman has given it as his opinion that all iron-clad ships will be ultimately smashed by cannon, I can only say that I think a couple more wars will be necessary to settle the question. Gentlemen, our neighbours—including those who pretend to be ignorant of the fact—are well aware that we will not attack them. But they must likewise be made aware that we will not be attacked either, and this is why the present loan has become a necessity.'

In reply to another member, the General at a later stage of the debate expressed himself as follows:

'I have not said that Germany must be united to secure us a large army and navy; but, on the contrary, that we require a large army and navy to establish unity. That aim once reached, the military budget, I sincerely hope, will admit of considerable reduction.'

As appears from the above, General Moltke holds that Germany *is* not yet, but *must be* united. This is an utterance remarkable in itself, considering the man it comes from, and doubly so when comparing it with the tenets of his Conservative friends. The latter, regarding reunion with the South as the surest way to create a Liberal majority in Parliament, would like to see the South mending its politics, before admitting it to a close connection with the North; the General, on the other hand, arguing more as a military man than as a politician, seems to have arrived at the conclusion, that while the attitude of France remains what it is, Germany can find safety only in complete union.

There is no truth in the report that Prince Charles of Roumania is among the candidates for the Servian throne. The Prince is far too sensible to render his position still more uncertain by a wish to combine incompatible dignities.

RUSSIA'S ACTION IN TURKEY AND TURKISTAN.

Berlin, June 6, 1868.

THE following from the *Berlin Post* touches upon a matter which, in connection with Russian progress in central Asia, has been frequently discussed in our political circles of late:

'Russia's victories in Turkistan will probably rouse England to action in Turkey, and thus exercise a direct influence upon our own politics and those of Europe generally. We trust England will at length perceive the necessity of doing something in a field where the *laissez aller* principle, so long maintained, has certainly not availed her. By a reorganisation of Turkey, England can profit more than Russia; by merely preserving the *status quo*, and leaving everything alone, Russia, the protector of the oppressed Rayah, is the sole gainer. Supposing a number of independent or semi-independent States to be created on the Balkan peninsula, and to be placed under effective patronage, their inhabitants will be most happy

to evade annexation by the Czar, now menacing them as the ultimate, though not very pleasant, consequence of Russian protection. Of course, to embark in such an enterprise would be impossible while Austria, the other neighbour of those aspiring Slavonians, is not strong enough to afford them any notable assistance; and that she will never be while leaguing with France against Germany, and thereby forcing us to befriend Russia. But if Austria were to join us unreservedly, we might dispense with other allies, assist her to much better purpose than France ever can, and, among other valuable services, enable her, both by our power and our hosts of emigrants, to become the representative of civilisation in Servia and Bulgaria. To induce Austria to adopt this sensible course we take to be in the interests of English Oriental policy. That Austria should give up her rankling opposition towards Prussia, and her predilection for the line of the Main, is the preliminary condition necessary to secure a variety of things, and among them the solution of the Eastern question, to the prejudice of Russia, and for the good of England.'

GERMANY, HOLLAND, AND BELGIUM.

Berlin, August 26, 1868.

SATISFACTORY as it is to see a portion of the French Government papers striking off into a more pacific track, the nomination of M. de la Gueronnière to the Brussels Embassy is a proof that no final determination on the question of peace or war has as yet been arrived at in the Tuileries. Up to a few years ago, M. de la Gueronnière was one of the most industrious contributors to the Paris *France;* a ministerial paper habitually opposed to this Government. He is also the man with whom the plan of a military and commercial league between France and the neighbouring States of secondary rank originated a short time ago. Though not officially communicated to any Cabinet, this project has nevertheless been zealously discussed in the diplomatic world; and, indeed, attracted sufficient notice to cause it to be disavowed by the Belgian, Swiss, and Dutch Governments in succession. Switzerland and

Belgium, in circular notes addressed to their representatives abroad, left no doubt that they are conscious of the security they find in neutrality, and in neutrality alone. The Dutch Cabinet expressed themselves more reservedly. The apprehensions entertained by their countrymen with regard to Prussia did not permit them to repudiate the idea of a nearer connection with France in the future. Public opinion in Holland is in a strange state of excitement. The papers and the statesmen of the Netherlands profess to be convinced that, should a war break out between the two great neighbouring empires and neutrality be impossible, the more prudent course for them will be to side with France rather than Prussia. Having long been accustomed to look upon Germany as an impotent body, they were so much surprised by the events of 1866 as to fall into the opposite extreme, and, without any reasonable cause, denounce this Government as bent upon conquering them, and anything else that conveniently comes to hand. Though, in sober reality, the Prussian Government is not half ambitious enough to suit the tastes of the German Liberals, who cannot even include the German South in the Northern Confederacy, the Dutch insist upon looking on all States contiguous to this monarchy, whether Teutonic or not, as probable victims of the inordinate Berlin appetite. Of late this feeling of mingled ill-will and dread has increased, on account of Austria thinking defeat in the field a fair reason for reducing the interest upon her national debt. Large quantities of her stock being in Dutch hands, this repudiation has not a little contributed to render the name of Prussia, who illnaturedly discomfited Austria, ungrateful to the Netherlander's ear. Deceived by their ominous forebodings, and irritated by pecuniary losses, the Dutch believe they are consulting their interests by leaving open a way to alliance with France, should a commotion occur. As they foresee mischief to themselves from a Prussian victory, they are

naturally disposed to forestall this unfortunate issue by preparing to side with the other party, whose power to injure them, being geographically more remote, they consider as proportionately less dangerous.

Opposite views are necessarily entertained in Belgium, as it borders upon France. It was therefore scarcely a considerate act on the part of the French Government to accredit M. de la Gueronnière to the very Court which plays so unenviable a part in his little device. A close alliance with Belgium, which shall be so very close as to be difficult to distinguish from annexation, has long been M. de la Gueronnière's favourite idea.

The publication by General la Marmora of the Prussian plan of war, officially communicated to him in June 1866, would have excited little surprise, did it not occur at the time of a signal concession from the Italian to the French Government. As to General la Marmora's privately printing an official document, this is thought to be in perfect harmony with his habitual feelings towards this country, and the wonderful strategy displayed by him in the late campaign; but the engagement entered into by the Italian Cabinet, to resume payment of interest on the Papal debt without the French garrison being withdrawn from Rome, implies extreme deference to France, and is taken as a sign that the step of La Marmora will not be very severely censured by his Court. The two things together are regarded as a proof that Napoleon has succeeded in convincing Victor Emmanuel that, come what may, he has little chance of extricating himself from his grasp, and therefore had better merit the indulgence of one whose power he cannot hope to elude. By what potent spell Napoleon has achieved this triumph it would be difficult to say. That Spain has promised, in the event of war, to assist France in protecting Rome, can have scarcely compelled such a concession. The Pope, although refusing to be a party to any agreement with Italy, even though

it may lighten his pecuniary obligations, is so charmed with what France has effected in his behalf as to have spoken of admitting her to the Œcumenic Council to be held next year. This is more than has yet been accorded to any other Power. Napoleon is likewise not a little satisfied with his success, and, as a reward, has raised Count Sartiges, his Minister in Rome, to the long-promised dignity of a senator.

LA MARMORA'S POLICY IN 1866.

Berlin, August 29, 1868.

THE indiscretion of General la Marmora in attacking this Government has not failed to produce consequences. A Paris correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette*, whose information is derived from a diplomatic source, has been enabled to give the following account of the General's conduct before and during the war:

'Political circles have long been aware that the war of 1866 was not only permitted, but promoted, by the Emperor Napoleon, because it might possibly lead to the aggrandisement of France on the Rhine. Prussia had certainly refused to promise him that aggrandisement before the war; but what she would not concede of her own accord and in advance, he hoped to be able to exact against her will a little later. The diplomatic world thought it extremely probable that Prussia, in the event of a defeat, would not object to being succoured by France, and requiting the good service rendered by the cession of the Rhine. As to Austria, it was assumed she would be satisfied with Silesia, in return for which she was expected to relinquish Venice. The less doubt was entertained on this last head, as the cession of this province had been talked about even before the beginning of hostilities, the equivalent offered being money. When the war did commence, therefore, General la Marmora had good reason for saying that he was "crossing the Mincio with Venice in his pocket"—an assertion which the French Foreign Office, speaking by the mouth of M. Valfrey, has but lately caused to be confirmed in the most unmistakable manner in the *Mémorial Diplomatique*.

Napoleon III. knew and fully approved the treaty concluded between Prussia and Italy on April 8, 1866. He had the less hesitation in expressing himself satisfied with the agreement, as Prussia otherwise might have desisted from war at the eleventh hour, in which event the chance of Rhenish acquisitions would have been lost to the Emperor. La Marmora, as Italian Premier, on this as on every other occasion, had not moved an inch without first inquiring the pleasure of the Paris authorities. Difficult as it was for Prussia to manage an ally whose decisions were swayed by orders from abroad, still, if she wished to profit at all by the coöperation of Italy, she must accommodate herself to circumstances.

Considering what La Marmora's proceedings were before the war, and remembering subsequent events, there can be no doubt that Austria, with the General's knowledge, formally promised to France to respect Lombardy and the line of the Mincio, even were she victorious in the Quadrilateral. The equivalent demanded for this concession by Austria it is not so easy to ascertain; but what else can it have been, if not the engagement of France to prevent Italy from crossing the Isonzo, should she succeed in overcoming her enemy? To localise the war in Italy was the evident desire of France.

In its reaction upon Prussia this clearly amounted to the conclusion of an armistice between Austria and Italy even before the first shot had been fired. Nay, if Austria had made up her mind to cede Venice, she would with this instrument in her hands have been in a position to turn her whole force against Prussia, without employing a single man against Italy.

As soon as Prussia got wind of what was going on, she exerted herself to the utmost to cause Italy to adopt a more effective plan of war. Except by La Marmora and his adherents, her representations were favourably received by the military and political leaders of Italy. Yet all her endeavours in this direction were fruitless. Notwithstanding what had occurred at the military *pourparlers* at Berlin and Florence, and the Conference held on June 6th between La Marmora, Count Usedom, and Colonel Bernhardi, it soon became evident, that a localised war, to be carried on within the precincts of the Quadrilateral, had been determined upon by the Italian Premier. The march on Vienna, as proposed by the Prussian negotiators, was rejected as a wild fantasy, the whole conduct of Italy going far to render the only effective alliance at the disposal of the Berlin Government useless.

In the middle of June hostilities commenced in Germany. Italy too was preparing for the contest. But how? The main force, 120,000 strong, under the King and La Marmora, approached the Mincio to divert the attention of the enemy. Cialdini, who, with 70,000 men, was to open the campaign in earnest, had been ordered to march due north from Ferrara, and attack the 80,000 under the command of Archduke Albrecht. As to Garibaldi and his volunteers at Bari, they were sent to the hills

and precipices of the Tyrol, instead of Dalmatia. La Marmora's plan was preferred definitively to the one urged by the Berlin Government.

In this crisis Count Usedom determined to have recourse to a last means of saving Italy a defeat, and preserving to Prussia the effective support of her ally. He wrote the note of the 17th of June, and by giving it a strictly official form made it incumbent upon the Italian Government to return as official and binding a reply. In a word, he essayed to take the matter out of the hands of individuals, and make it a Cabinet business. On the reception of such a communication as this note, it would be the duty of General la Marmora, in his capacity of Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, to submit it to the King, the Council of Ministers, and the Council of War, and to frame the answer according to their decision. Were the Prussian proposition approved by them, he would have no alternative but to carry it out; in the opposite event, Prussia, at any rate, knew what she had to expect, and could act accordingly. This was an ugly dilemma for La Marmora. It was plainly on the cards that Prussia would regard his not crossing the Isonzo as tantamount to a breach of treaty, and in her own negotiations with Austria leave Italy to shift for herself. In this predicament La Marmora hit upon an expedient which, it is true, had not entered into Count Usedom's calculations. He suppressed the note, the original of which remains in his possession to this day. Thus he was saved the painful choice between a decided "yes" or "no."

But it soon became General la Marmora's turn to be surprised. The disposition of his troops, and the loose and scattered order in which they were to enter the Quadrilateral, had been betrayed to the enemy. A Tuscan, who was related to an Italian staff-officer, had gone to Trieste, and reported all the necessary details to the Austrian commanders there. From the latter he received a considerable sum, which, it is said, was subsequently still farther increased by the liberality of Archduke Albrecht. In consequence of these disclosures, the Archduke recalled General Marcovich and his 35,000 men from the Adige, and, having thus concentrated his entire forces at Verona, marched forward to meet the Italian army at Custozza.

In the mean time La Marmora had been all but perfectly idle. He fondly imagined he should find the Austrians on the other side of the Adige—say somewhere near Vicenza; and to this opinion he adhered in spite of all that should have taught him the contrary. Patriotic countrymen, who, at the risk of their lives, came to impart intelligence from the interior of the Quadrilateral, he scornfully sent away, vilifying them as rascals and scoundrels. The Venetian National Committee sent him written information of the approach of the Austrians: he contemptuously refused to be guided by it. Exactly the same behaviour was displayed by the commander of another corps, who received the same news from the National Committee at Verona. With equal obstinacy the General declined

to make any change in the scattered disposition of his troops, much as he was warned against continuing in a loose and straggling order of march. On the morning of the battle, reconnoitring and other military precautions were suspended by the General's own order, so that the troops were actually cooking their dinner at the moment the Austrian cavalry was bearing down upon them. Each of the attacked divisions had to fight as best it could. None knew what had become of the others, nor were they provided with any instructions for such an emergency. It was "confusion worse confounded."

It is easy to say that in such a case the retreat ought to have been sounded, and the troops withdrawn to be concentrated in the rear, preparatory to a fresh attack. But it requires particularly well-disciplined troops to carry out such a movement without its leading to flight, even when the distances between the various corps are not so great as they were in the present instance. Orders, moreover, for this movement must have been devised and written down on horseback—a task which the General, unsupported by his staff, which had been left in Gerlungo, a long way off, was altogether unequal to. Instead of taking his stand on one particular spot, as is the duty of a commander-in-chief, he hurried from one division to the other, placing one of them, I am told, with its back to the enemy. The precipitation with which he took his measures, and the desire to attend to every detail himself, caused him to neglect the supervision of the whole. Adjutants and orderlies were galloping over miles and miles of country to make reports or to ask for orders and succours without meeting with the General. Those that did chance to fall in with him found it impracticable to extract anything definite from the Commander-in-chief.

Towards noon the General left the battle-field for Gaito. But where is Gaito? Was it a rendezvous a quarter of an hour to the rear, the usual distance in such cases? Nothing of the kind. Gaito is the well-known place on the Mincio, which one of his corps had passed but the day before. From the battle-field the place is full twenty-two kilometres distant. What could be the meaning of this impromptu ride? In his report the General says that he intended to secure Gaito in the event of a retreat. But, at twenty-two kilometres in the rear of the Italian army, the passage of the river could not be possibly manaced by the enemy. Thanks, moreover, to the wide tract of land over which the troops were spread, Gaito was not left without a force sufficient to repulse attack. But perhaps the General went there to fetch reinforcements? If so, these could not reach Custozza before nightfall, and an ordinary officer would for such a purpose have done as well. And why did not the General return to the battle-field after a lapse of time sufficient for his self-imposed task? Why did he leave the army five long hours without orders from and any substitute for the Commander-in-chief? Why did he tarry at Gaito, listening to the distant cannonade in despair, and

proving himself utterly unequal to the emergency, however brave and respectable he may be? It is certain that it could not have been the bullets of the enemy, nor the defeat nor flight of his troops—for things did not reach such a pass—that drove the General from the battle-field. What scared him away was the hailstorm of reports, entreaties, and queries to which he had no answers to give.

As to whose fault it was that the army remained a fortnight quietly encamped on the Po and the Oglio is a question still being discussed in the pamphlet war which has broken out between Cialdini and La Marmora. We shall not be far wrong in ascribing the inactivity of the Italian forces to the confusion then prevailing among the general officers in the camp.'

To these painful revelations I may add, from my own knowledge, that the Prussian plan of war had been no sooner communicated at Florence than it found its way to Paris. Immediately afterwards its acceptance by Italy was vetoed by Napoleon,—a move at once suspected, but not fully known here before the refusal of General la Marmora to answer Count Usedom's note. In such an emergency all Count Bismarck's determination was required to pass the Rubicon, and attack his enemies unsupported by any reliable allies. But Sadowa defeated them all — open enemies, hidden enemies, and questionable friends.

GERMANY NOT DISQUIETED BY THE CONTINUAL RECURRENCE OF WARLIKE SYMPTOMS.

Berlin, September 2, 1868.

While *la milliarde* continues to be idle in the cellars of the Paris Bank, and the French mercantile community will not credit the pacific assurances of their own Government, people in Germany are comparatively at their ease as regards the future. Not as though any one in this country were in a hurry to believe a man or a journal

connected with the French Government holding forth on the slippery subject of foreign affairs. The events of the last few years, and the studied ambiguity affected till very recently indeed by French official gentlemen and papers when alluding to this interesting topic, have made people sceptical. But what the laboured protestations of an entire class fail to produce is easily effected by the persuasive eloquence of *la situation* itself. The Germans have become sufficiently acquainted with the peculiarities of the French Empire not to be prematurely disquieted by any attitude it may choose to assume. They know by experience that to Napoleon III. foreign politics are a means of strengthening his personal position at home, and that words and deeds apparently aimed at other nations are in reality only intended to amuse the French. There is, indeed, a lamentable uniformity of belief on this side of the Rhine, that if Napoleon had a chance of exhilarating his restless countrymen by a victory over Germany, he would not hesitate to treat them to this brilliant spectacle, and procure for himself the applause on which the hero of a tragedy graced with so many deaths may reasonably count. But, though admitting thus much, people derive comfort from imagining that a man in the Emperor's place will a hundred times hint at these dramatic contingencies before once contemplating their realisation in earnest. According to German prognostics, he will not venture on an attack without safe allies. But is he likely to have them? Should Austria join him, Prussia may reckon upon the support of Russia, Austria's rival in the East. In the still more improbable event of Russia herself making common cause with the Napoleonic interest, things, it is true, would look ominous for Germany. But this arrangement presupposes a readiness on the part of Russia to go shares with Austria in the East, or to acquiesce in her aggrandisement in Germany. The former alternative, being at variance with Panslavonic principles, has always

been held in abhorrence at St. Petersburg; the latter could not be entertained unless Russia is prepared to render Austria, if not at once, at least in the future, the champion of culture and emigration in the East, thereby giving her indisputable superiority in those parts. This being the light in which matters are viewed here, there is a disposition to regard the state of international relations as more tranquillising than first appearances would seem to warrant.

In the mean time the variable symptoms on the French political horizon are being observed with the vigilant attention of a philosopher rather than with the eagerness and anxiety of men about to suffer invasion. Without displaying any particular excitement at the fact, it is confessed that in the last few weeks the phenomena have not been very satisfactory. The amiable phraseology adopted by some of the semi-official journals is counterbalanced by bellicose language in others. The conversion of the *Constitutionnel* to tenets of international love and charity appears but a passing sentiment when M. de Cassaignac jun. is decorated for advocating opposite doctrines. The cool reserve of the *Moniteur* does not signify much, as long as the Government by toleration bestows an indirect approval upon M. Girardin lashing his countrymen into the fury of war. Passing on to avowedly official spheres, we find one Minister vaunting his readiness to go to war at a moment's notice, though another announces a manufacturing millennium to be at hand. And, as though martial boasts were at once to be confirmed by deeds, we hear of French officers having been arrested in Germany in the act of making sketches and taking notes of strategical import. The five gentlemen stopped in this questionable pursuit were employed on the high roads between Frankfort and Eisenach, and between Darmstadt and Würzburg, lines that would be taken by an army penetrating east. On being brought before the magistrates, they produced pass-

ports describing them as French officers, but failed to explain why, in the hotels, they had given their names as artists, engineers, &c. They were at once set at liberty on condition of discontinuing their journey; and so anxious is the Prussian Government to remove every cause of discord with France, that the official journalists of Berlin had to represent the matter as utterly insignificant. Of course the public were not deceived by these smooth representations, but are satisfied that if five were arrested, at least fifty were sent out. Fortunately they are as firmly convinced that war need not be impending because of some generals, who wish to plunge their Sovereign into it, completing preparations.

More feeling has been excited by another incident. On the 1st of August the *Austrian Military Gazette* published an article on the Usedom note,* in which Prussia was attacked in the most opprobrious language. By order of the Austrian military authorities, 10,000 copies of this article have been distributed among the officers of the army. I will not trouble you with the remarks this little event has elicited in the Prussian press. There is such a whirlpool of political currents at Vienna, that to foretell which will prevail in the decisive moment, should such a one appear, baffles conjecture. Pending the issue, the peace-loving citizens of the Confederacy have their misgivings somewhat allayed by Hungary objecting to future entanglements with Germany. At any rate she is believed to object, and would be only consulting her interests, were she to do so. People here cannot help remembering an incident of the last war. A few days after the battle of Königgrätz the Kaiser, in the military cloak which he usually substitutes for a dressing-gown, cigar in hand, received M. Deak. Having requested the Hungarian leader likewise to light the pipe of peace, he asked of him whether,

* Vide the preceding letter.

were he to continue the war, he might hope for voluntary contributions of men and money on the part of the Magyars. Deak answered in the negative. Before anticipating, he said, any spontaneous exertions from his compatriots, the Emperor had better restore them to the independent government they claimed as their ancient right. The Emperor has since accorded all to Hungary she wanted. Yet he seems to have failed to produce the expected result. The more privileges have been granted her, the less inclined has she grown to aid in recovering for Austria that influence over Germany whose loss formed the basis of her independence. There has been no lack of symptoms indicative of her resolutions on this head. In the interest of a friendly intercourse between the two neighbouring monarchies, it is much to be regretted that Prussian politicians are made to indulge in reflections such as these.

Quite unmistakable is the behaviour of the Polish exiles with regard to the question of peace and war. A short time ago the Czartoryski party established two papers, to keep the plan of a French-Austrian alliance against Russia and Prussia before the public. One of these, the *North-Eastern Correspondence*, appears at Paris in French, and every now and then is forwarded to the departmental press by the Government; the other, *Der Osten*, a German paper, is published at Vienna. By spreading alleged diplomatic intelligence prejudicial to Germany, and representing her as an easy prey to every comer, both papers endeavour to promote the object they have in view—a campaign on the Rhine and Vistula, with contingent restoration of Poland. The means employed for this purpose are clever enough, though perhaps not always in accordance with what Aristides would have considered a strict code of morality. One example will suffice to illustrate this interesting by-play in the political comedy of the day. About a fortnight ago the *North-Eastern Correspondence* put forth that the Emperor Alexander, at his interview with

King William at Schwalbach, insisted upon the necessity of a close Russo-Prussian alliance. While this intelligence was being propagated by a paper destined for circulation among the French, the Lemberg *Gazeta Naradowa*—an organ of the same party, but in Polish—inserted a Paris letter which confided the very reverse to the countrymen of the writer. According to the Polish journal Russia was endeavouring to play the polite to Austria and France, and turn a cold shoulder on Prussia. The latter version is the correct one. The real state of the case, then, is communicated to the Poles in a paper accessible to them only; but an opposite version, meant to irritate Europe against the *bête noire* of Berlin, is propagated in French for the benefit of the European press. The Poles are initiated into the latest state of diplomatic affairs, to enable them to adapt their attitude to the exigencies of the moment; the French, on the other hand, are hounded against the Prussians, no matter whether the Prussians are giving offence or not. I do not mean to imply that both articles have been written by the same man, but they proceed from the same political faction.

The official Warsaw *Dziennik* asserts that the inauguration of the Rapperswyl monument* has been marked by a formal treaty between Polish, Turkish, and Hungarian agitators. Prince Czartoryski, Count Plater, and MM. Skotnicki, Duchinski, Mikoszewski are stated to have signed the instrument in the Polish interest.

* An obelisk erected at Rapperswyl, in Switzerland, in memory of the Polish Rebellion.

GERMANY DISGUSTED AT THE PROVOKING ATTITUDE OF FRANCE.

Berlin, September 5, 1868.

THE royal order postponing the enlistment of recruits for three months may be regarded as another proof that Prussia entertains pacific intentions. It does not, however, necessarily indicate on her part a corresponding confidence in the sentiments of France. On the contrary, I am afraid I shall not be far wrong in drawing the opposite inference from it. The novel tactics of the French Government, to make their press blow hot and cold at the same time, to cram the *Constitutionnel* with protestations of love and amity, and suffer the *Pays* to reëcho the unmusical growlings of Marshal Niel, have excited more suspicion than the attacks formerly indulged in by all journals alike. People cannot help reflecting that, were the French Government earnestly bent upon removing public anxiety, it would have the power, with a single stroke of the pen, to cause the whole host of journalists connected with it to strike the same chord. It would moreover cost it as little trouble to influence the language of the independent organs also, and leave no member of the profession unconvinced that to preach war is to compromise the Government and damage the interests of the people. All this might be done without even acknowledging the peace of Prague, or formally declaring that if France would not let Austria interfere in the affairs of Italy, she cannot logically claim to prevent Germany disposing of herself. But if none of these efficacious means of tranquillising public opinion are to be adopted, the question arises, what motives have the Paris authorities for playing the double game they are now doing? It may be nothing but an attempt to revive trade, without entirely forfeiting the advantages imagined to be derived from the war-cry. But may it not be practising

the policy pursued before the Italian war and the avowal of the Luxemburg design? In both cases the announcement of the Emperor's intentions was preceded by an epoch of comparative repose in the inspired portion of the press.

With this uncanny experience haunting their minds, France must really excuse the politicians of this country if they have some misgivings about the future. The mass of the German people indeed continue indifferent to the varying aspect of the Napoleonic game. Nor do those whose business or favourite pursuit it is to attend to politics absolutely construe the friendly promises that are being given as a symptom of a coming storm. Still I find that in influential quarters the latest attitude of the Paris press is supposed to imply the possibility of the war party having acquired additional *aplomb* at the Tuileries. At any rate, it is thought as well to guard against contingencies. It is considered no superfluous precaution to deprive France of the power of saying, in the event of war, that she was more pacifically inclined than Prussia before its outbreak. Knowing the sort of strategy resorted to by her possible adversary on former occasions, Prussia seems determined to guard in time against being placed in the wrong. To leave the French Cabinet without the slightest shadow of a pretext for the assumption of a menacing attitude, as well as to give a fresh and most conclusive guarantee of their own peaceable leanings, this Government have taken the step which more than any other testifies to the real tendency of their politics. They have postponed the conscription. They have put off for three months adding to the army its usual quota of 80,000 men. The question now is, what answer France will return to the invitation to go and do likewise, tacitly implied in this conciliatory step. Should an ungracious, or, what would be quite as unsatisfactory, an ambiguous reply be given, it would be only natural were diplomacy again to make room for military precaution.

As to the tone of the masses, I can only repeat, they are not disquieted, though thoroughly disgusted, with what is going on in France. Thanks to the incessant schooling given them by their press, the Germans distinguish pretty accurately between the French people and the journalistic tools employed in vilifying a foreign nation while they seduce their own. They pity the French for being by the imperial police denied all genuine intellectual intercourse with the peoples around them, and make allowance for a nation who find it more difficult to get a sight of foreign papers than the Russians in the days of the old *régime*. They do not overlook that, ambitious as the French are, and labouring under political disabilities as they do, not a few of them have been carried away into repeating the sophistical nonsense they are taught about Germany. How would it be possible for the Germans to ignore that thoughts of aggression unworthy of a civilised and self-respecting race, are rampant in France nowadays? Yet the anger felt is principally directed against the journalists and those scheming dignitaries who direct the pens of the literary tribe. To the Germans no punishment would seem severe enough for that handful of mischievous persons who, for egotistic purposes, do not scruple to incite two wealthy and cultivated nations against each other. What, after two years' provocation, people in these parts have at last come to feel about the class they regard as their principal enemy in France is anything but flattering. As a sample, take the following from to-day's leader of the Berlin *National Zeitung*, the most influential and the most moderate of the Liberal organs:

'Were we only to judge from appearances, we should say that France has been converted into a desert inhabited by bloodthirsty animals. The only sounds penetrating to us from the other side of the frontier are like the tiger's roar and the jackal's howl, eager for the prey. Blood, blood! is the echo incessantly wafted towards us from those dens of ferocity. And why all this noise? why this cruel and malicious yearning for war, razzia, and destruction? Why this apparent obtuseness to the pri-

mary teachings of morality and reason? Because the German nation has chosen to alter its Constitution. Because it declares that now, as at the time of its former institutions, it desires to live in peace and amity with its Western neighbours. Because it is slow to take offence, and declines to be irritated by the absurd accusation of contemplating the ruin of France. The behaviour of the French writers is unprecedented among civilised nations, and we are tempted to ask whether by some magical spell we have not been transported back a thousand years. Since Christianity existed, such a scandal has not occurred among Christians. While the Germans are perhaps the only people in the world who would submit to it, there are certainly none but Frenchmen who would offer such insolent provocation. To what wrath would the English and Spaniards be roused, were a portion of their territory every now and then claimed by the swaggering and impudent journalists of France! As it is, we must trust to the sensible and respectable among our volatile neighbours, gagged though they be, to modify the effect produced by the infamous braggadocios in their midst. Our mutual relations depend on the success of their endeavours.'

Prince Napoleon has steamed back from Hamburg to his native shores. The only institution of the North German Confederacy he has inspected this trip is the roulette at Lübeck, where they were inhospitable enough to mulct him in some Napoleon-d'ors. His late tour to Bucharest has been speedily followed by the establishment there of a paper in the French language, destined to advocate the common interests of Austria and France in those parts. The same purpose in the same city has been served for some time past by a Bulgarian journal. In Wallachian latitudes none of those papers can be self-supporting.

DELICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA.

Berlin, September 9, 1868.

To a great extent it depends on the mutual relations between Russia and Prussia whether the French war party will have it in their power to carry out their sanguinary

designs. While Russia covers Prussia's rear against Austria, her rival in the East, any war between France and Prussia must be a fair stand-up fight, the terrible chances of which Napoleon will not be in a hurry to court. But will Russia abide by her present policy? At Berlin, as I have said in a previous Letter, people are inclined to answer this question in the affirmative. Russia, it is true, takes umbrage at the refusal of this Government to support her designs in the East. What is even more galling, she has little prospect of altering Prussia's policy on this head. Why should Prussia meddle with Turkey? Why give France a pretext for attack, and on a non-German question too, in which the Southern States have no stake? But though Prussia will never in the present aspect of politics do anything of the kind, it would be unwise were Russia to try to obtain in a way hostile to this Cabinet what she has failed to secure with its consent. To arrange the matter with Austria alone would be impossible. Austria is not now capable of adding to the strength of Russia to the degree required for such an enterprise. The only Power, then, to which Russia might apply for succour is France. She has indeed done so repeatedly in the last few years; but, proposing to confine operations exclusively to Turkey, leave Prussia unattacked, and Austria unbenefited, she did not succeed in convincing France of the expediency of an alliance for such a purpose. France, as I had occasion to state at the time of Prince Napoleon's trip to Berlin, might have accepted the Russian overtures, could she have exacted a promise from Prussia not to profit by an Eastern hubbub to tighten her hold on the States south of the Main. But Prussia would not give any such promise. Though she has no particular wish to cross the Main, she thinks it dangerous to concede to France a right to interfere with German affairs at some future period. Balked in this, the principal aim of her policy, France thought it a bad bargain to embark in an Eastern venture, and leave

Prussia to do as she pleased in the mean time. The Czar, on the other hand, from personal affection for his aged relative as well as motives of policy, could not bring himself to enter into an arrangement to the prejudice of his Berlin uncle. So the matter came to nothing.

Since then an influential party has been formed at the Russian Court, urging that France should be allowed to try her worst against Prussia, on condition of letting Russia have her swing against Austria and the Turks. It is, however, not to be anticipated that the Russian Government will commit itself to such a plan, or that if it did do so, France would accept it. Such a league, were it ever to be realised, must result in a counter alliance of the three Powers attacked, which compelling France to fight Prussia single handed, and placing Russia *vis-à-vis* the Austro-Turkish arms, would quite as seriously jeopardise the assailants as the assailed.

But there is another alternative. What if Russia should determine to allow Austria a share in Eastern spoils? Such a step might not be impossible, were it not that by taking it, Russia would run the risk of forfeiting superior advantages in the future to secure inferior ones now. There is no doubt Austria would endeavour to turn the alliance to account, and recover influence not only in the East, but in Germany likewise. If successful, Austria would be set on her legs again, and, with a portion of Germany at her back, be powerful enough to prevent Russia from any future acquisitions in the coveted quarter. On these grounds we are justified in regarding the contingency of a bargain being struck between Russia and France as a remote one. Russia, to spite her disobliging friends at Berlin, may exchange meaning glances with the beaux of Paris; but she will hardly find it conducive to her interests to go farther. Little as her national party loves Prussia, it admires Austria still less.

Though the relations between the Russian and Prussian

Cabinets are likely to remain tolerably good, a serious estrangement has arisen between the two nations. As giving strength to the war party at more than one neighbouring Court, the fact is worthy of notice. On the causes of this growing coldness we had better hear the Germans themselves. An article in a Berlin journal gives them at full length:

'For the last two years the Russian papers have been pleased to rail against this country. They have been steadily going on from bad to worse, notwithstanding the little notice that has been taken of their criticisms. Their censure began when they did not find us sufficiently hot against the Poles. To this crime we soon added another. We did not recall from Russia those industrious countrymen of ours established in all Russian towns worthy of the name. After the last subjugation of Poland, the national pride of our neighbours rose to such a pitch, that the presence of the Germans in their country—who had brought them science, handicrafts, and the rudiments at least of a Government—became intolerable to the perpetrators of the Warsaw and Wilna exploits. Having become vain, if not civilised, they had no wish to be, by the sight of foreign teachers, reminded that the little culture they possessed was not of home growth. They positively wished the German immigrants to quit the country, announcing at the same time an intention to Russify the population of their German provinces, because it was too numerous to be expelled. At this juncture a third grievance was palmed upon us. We, the Germans of Germany, committed the unpardonable offence of sympathising with our oppressed co-nationalists in the Baltic provinces. Not being blind, we could not but see that everything originally Russian is as yet, to say the least, very primitive, and that, as far as Russian society is civilised, it either speaks, writes, and even thinks in German or French, or else imitates in its own language foreign modes of thought. We therefore deemed it as absurd as it was unjust on the part of the Russians to force their own language, which they themselves have scarcely begun to use for civilised purposes, on the Germans among them. We insisted that for these Germans to have Russian officials, schools, and priests thrust upon them, was to lower their culture, expose them to all manner of lawlessness, and contaminate their religious faith. We did not, indeed, very often allude to the matter, it being too painful a one; but even the little we did say brought down a storm of invective upon us.

But the principal offence was yet to come. We took the liberty of amending our own institutions in such a way as should protect the individual States of Germany from ever again becoming tools in the hands of

Russia. This was too much. Russia, whose whole political organisation only aims at providing the requisite number of bayonets for the use of her foreign policy, was disgusted at finding her bookish neighbour leave his writing-desk and attend for the nonce to the affairs of this sublunary sphere. It was a severe blow to her plans of territorial aggrandisement; an upsetting of her designs, which Germany for so many years past had been too badly organised to interfere with.

The Russian Government, it is true, being, from its Oriental policy, on bad terms with Austria, could not afford to give too loud expression to the displeasure it experienced at our rise in the world; but Russian society, which almost exclusively consists of officials, gave all the more passionate vent to their feelings through the press. It became fashionable at St. Petersburg to inveigh against Prussia, just as they had formerly cast opprobrium on the Germans indiscriminately. The habit extended to very high quarters indeed, and eventually enabled the *parti d'action*, which has influential representatives in the Government, to cause the Foreign Office to make certain overtures to France, preparatory to throwing us on one side. We were too pacific to satisfy Russian idiosyncrasies with regard to the East. What our Muscovite friends gave France to understand on this occasion may be seen from a very candid leader which has just appeared in the *Moscow Gazette*. In this remarkable effusion we meet with the following passage: "Russia has no interest whatever in promoting the enlargement of Prussia. More than once we have pointed out the danger to us from the development of the Pan-Germanic idea—a danger already imminent in our Baltic provinces. Alexander II. as little wishes to injure France as did Alexander I. Hitherto France has been the blind instrument of a policy prejudicial to herself no less than to us. If it be true that Napoleon has resolved to square accounts with Prussia, whatever may come of it, he will have no difficulty in understanding the conditions on which our neutrality may be assured. Let him guarantee our interests without expecting us to trust to his honour. It would be beneath our dignity to allow ourselves to be circumvented." To be sure, the difficulty lies in the mutual distrust entertained of each other. And how would Prussia view such a plot? And England? And Austria? And Poland?

It is only natural that the menaces of the Russian press to sell Prussia to France should irritate our public. That nothing will come of them, is regarded here as equally certain as at Paris. The French war party never seriously thought of Russia as their possible ally. On the contrary, they insist upon treating Russia and Prussia as one, and this not only for defensive purposes, which as-

sumption would be correct, but also for offensive ones, where nothing of the kind is the case. The latest blow they have aimed at this country is the propagating a rumour of a contemplated cession of the western provinces of Poland to Prussia. The story is expressly devised to represent the Berlin and St. Petersburg Governments as so closely leagued that to fight the one is the same as fighting the other. There is system in this. Prussia is to be held responsible for Russian shortcomings. I need scarcely say that this rumour, which simultaneously appeared in a St. Petersburg correspondence of the Paris *Union* and a Warsaw letter of the Posen *Dziennik*, is utterly unfounded.

NAPOLEON'S AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE IN ADDRESSING HIS TROOPS. HEAVINGS IN THE EAST.

Berlin, September 15, 1868.

THOUGH the troops at Châlons have repeatedly saluted him with shouts of *Au Rhin!* and *Vive la Guerre!* the Emperor of the French, on parting with his impetuous legions, has had no more quieting assurance to give us than may be inferred from silence. He would make them no farewell speech, his Majesty intimated at the parting audience he gave the generals, since whatever he said would be sure to be interpreted by the public press in a warlike sense. It is to be regretted that his Majesty should so inopportunely have erred concerning the relative advantages of silence and speech. Though in the Proverbs we are told that the one is gold, and the other silver, there are some occasions when this authoritative apothegm were better reversed. For how do matters stand now that his Majesty has omitted to speak out? Some of his Minis-

ters, and nearly all his papers, have been menacing Germany for the last two years. The Luxemburg affair, the immense military preparations, and the entire attitude of his Government have not served to blunt the edge of those menaces. Now that the armaments approach completion, the soldiers, with the instincts of their profession, have greeted the Cæsar with ardent cries. The officers during his presence in the camp have regarded war as the most legitimate topic of conversation. The generals, who are in daily intercourse with the Emperor, have not checked the zeal of their subordinates, but are supposed to be discussing the chances of the campaign in their ornamental tents. The whole atmosphere of the camp is full of strife and *gloire*. In this state of anxious suspense the friends of peace expect that the Emperor will utter a few tranquillising sentences, or, if he prefers silence, that he will not at any rate seek to attach an ominous importance to it. At length he speaks, but speaks only to account for not speaking to the point. He will not allude, he says, to the one question agitating all minds, because he would not be credited. This is to leave everybody in the dark. Whatever may have come and gone, an avowal of pacific sentiments, couched in unambiguous language and borne out by deeds, could have only tended to allay the apprehensions felt. Nothing need have prevented the Emperor impressing this character on his words and acts, had he thought it expedient to disperse the rumour of an impending catastrophe. But he wraps himself up in silence, alleging a reason of such exaggerated modesty for his strange reserve, that his warmest friends are tempted to look for a hidden motive. How if they refuse to believe that the Emperor thinks so little of the power of his words as he pretends? How if, rather than attribute to him such extraordinary diffidence, they assume his silence to arise from a wish to prolong the present state of uncertainty? Would their supposition be altogether unjusti-

fiable? Could they not support it by the fact, that the visible, the plainly perceptible symptoms of French policy have been anything but conciliatory during the last few days? Have not the peaceful melodies in the Paris press died out as suddenly as they arose? Is it not true that the official *Moniteur de l'Armée* has just published a grossly insulting article against the Prussian army, in which the soldiers of this country are represented as contemptible slaves, kicked by their officers, and stripped of all prospect of advancement by the rigour of a despotic system? Does not the semi-official *Constitutionnel* ascribe the postponement of the conscription in Northern Germany to economical motives only, not to a wish to give a pledge of peaceful intentions? Have not papers notoriously connected with the French Government forged a Prussian note on the subject of postponed conscription, and made their forgery the vehicle for getting up a dangerous controversy respecting the state of military preparations in the two countries? Is not the Luxemburg *Avenir*—the journal with whose editorship the French Consul was charged in the Luxemburg Chamber—just now being converted into a daily paper? Last, not least, are not strange things reported from the East? In a word, how can the Emperor expect his friends to look upon his silence as implying peace, as long as the language of his tools, with a brief interlude now and then, points to the reverse?

And if it is difficult for his friends to repress their misgivings, what, then, must be the apprehensions of his possible victims? The Germans are certainly aware that, for a Sovereign who enjoys the privilege of ruling the French, it is one thing to rattle the sword in the scabbard, and another to unsheathe it. But, however hardened the German nation have become to French menaces, their statesmen cannot help watching the game that is being played. They begin to view it as involving possible danger to themselves.

In connection with these Western phenomena much importance is attached to the latest aspect of Eastern affairs. According to direct intelligence from Bucharest, the Bulgarian bands are being chiefly organised by emissaries of the French war party. Nor is any particular care taken to conceal the fact. The *Narodnost*, a Bucharest paper in the Bulgarian language, which is in the habit of representing Austria and France as the guardian angels of oppressed nationalities, is the *Moniteur* of the rebellion. The Russian organs of St. Petersburg, Bucharest, and Belgrade, on the other hand, dare not openly oppose a movement which they have so long and so strenuously aided in preparing; yet, as the Czar has no ally for offensive purposes, and cannot wish to irritate France while she is looking out for employment, his journalistic auxiliaries make a virtue of necessity, and throw cold water upon the whole thing as far as their avowed politics will permit. The *Romanul*, a semi-official organ of the Roumanian Government, likewise dissuades the Bulgarians from raising a commotion, when they will be only used to serve somebody else's interest. More than this neither the paper nor the Government it serves has the courage to say. Bucharest cannot afford to come to loggerheads with influential gentlemen at Paris. As yet this unique rebellion is represented by a few insignificant bands skulking about in the hills and woods, and occasionally attacking a Turkish village or a couple of Moslem travellers. Most of the men were enlisted in the Wallachian Principalities, no objection being made to Servians, Roumanians, gipsies, &c. as long as they would accept the bounty money. The real Bulgarians are perfectly quiet, some mountain villages excepted, which seem to have recently joined the "cause." This is the truth about an insurrection which the French Government press insist on attributing to Russia, and regard as a most serious affair.

What is the meaning of it all? Is a case to be made

out against Russia? Is Prussia to have the alternative placed before her, of either supporting the only Power she may perhaps count upon as an ally, or of leaving that Power to be defeated preparatory to a possible attack on herself? The gravity of this question is increased by what is brewing in Galicia, the country whence—as the Poles expect—will issue the restoration of Poland. Were the Galician Poles to be let loose against Russia to-morrow, the attitude of the Austrian Government towards them could not be more encouraging than it is.

KING WILLIAM ON THE QUESTION OF THE DAY.

Berlin, September 16, 1868.

After patiently submitting to French criticisms for a couple of years, the King of Prussia has at last said a few words in public, which admit of being interpreted as a reply to the umbrage given. His Majesty is now travelling in Holstein, where his dignified demeanour, manly frankness, and evident good nature produce the same favourable impression upon his new subjects which he is sure to elicit wherever he shows himself. When replying to a speech from Dr. Lüdeman, the rector of Kiel University, who had greeted him at the head of his learned colleagues, the King inserted the following, among other less political remarks:

'I fully concur in your wish for the maintenance of peace. It is a responsible moment for a Sovereign when he deems himself called upon to proclaim war. Yet there are circumstances which render this duty imperative. At present I see nothing in Europe to lead to war. I say this expressly in order to tranquillise any apprehension that may be felt. But what will inspire you with even greater confidence than my words is a

glance at the representatives of the army and navy now before you. They are the strength of the country, and have proved on another occasion that they are ready and willing to accept challenges forced upon them.'

Words such as these the King would have scarcely uttered, had he not thought it necessary to notice what occurred at Châlons. No one can keep his temper better than the King.

The number of French officers scouring the Grand Duchy of Baden intent on military studies seems to have increased of late. At any rate, the Baden Government has issued orders enjoining the immediate arrest of all people found sketching in the fields. Ladies frequenting Heidelburg Castle, sketching-book in hand, will do well to note the restrictions necessitated by the pictorial propensities which have suddenly come over the French army.

The Bucharest Government has at length summoned up courage to arrest the editor of the Bulgarian paper, *Narodnost*, published in their city, for inciting the subjects of Turkey to rebellion. The paper is hostile to Russia, but friendly to Austria and France.

KING WILLIAM'S SPEECH.

Berlin, September 19, 1868.

My last having been dispatched so soon after the delivery of the King's speech at Kiel, could not report upon its reception generally. In the days which have since elapsed, the public mind, disturbed at first by the administration of so acrid an alkali, has had time to settle and precipitate a sediment of opinion. The King's speech is taken as an appropriate animadversion on the Emperor's

silence at Châlons. His Majesty, it is said, could not ignore the fact of another Sovereign complacently standing by and suffering his troops to clamour for war against him. In the opinion of his subjects, the dignity of the crown and the safety of the country alike would have been compromised, had the King allowed such unprecedented conduct on the part of a neighbouring and professedly friendly potentate to go unnoticed. In passing over the language of the papers, and of some of the Ministers of Napoleon III., the King is thought to have given sufficient proof of his patience and self-control: to feign ignorance of the Châlons incident, when Napoleon himself played such an important part in it, might have seemed timid, and would have certainly been unwise. It might have encouraged Napoleon in his hazardous course; it might have caused him to drift from provocation to provocation, and brought on the very war which the King and his subjects are so anxious to avoid. That the King's words could be construed into a threat, when they are only intended to stem the tide of foreign menace, no one here seems for a moment to apprehend. The fact of the Prussian Government and people wishing for nothing so ardently as to be let alone is supposed to be indisputable, except by the professional sophists at Paris. Even those unscrupulous casuists find it impossible to allege any hostile acts committed by this Government, and are driven to impute objectionable intentions as the only way of accounting for their sanguinary designs. They threaten war because 'Prussia is in league with Russia.' They vow revenge, because Germany takes the liberty of reserving the rearrangement of her affairs to herself. They are furious, because they suppose that Prussia is going to receive the Southern States into the Northern Confederacy. Now, it is certainly the opinion of the Germans that, even if Prussia did harbour this latter intention, this would not justify France in announcing an interference than

which nothing can be more offensive to the becoming pride and independence of this great and famous realm. But, apart from this ready-made consideration, the merest glance at the history of the last two years must convince every one that, whatever the Prussian Government may be driven to do in the future, it is not at all inclined to take the unpalatable step just now. It prefers quiet to commotion, having gained more than remains to be gained. It prefers digesting what it has swallowed, dreading the effect the acquisition of more might have upon the constitution of the body politic. Above all things it is desirous to avoid war with France, which would probably entail a number of successive campaigns, and, even if crowned by victory in the end, produce incalculable changes at home and abroad. All this is amply proved by Prussia's conciliatory bearing in the Luxemburg affair, when, instead of evacuating forts garrisoned by Germany for a thousand years, she might have pounced upon unarmed France. It is likewise evidenced by the extreme reserve with which the advances of Baden and Bavaria have been received by this Court. It is farther shown by Count Bismarck systematically discouraging the 'Immediate Unity party' in the Federal Parliament. Such being the case, it is confidently assumed in our political circles, that the frivolity of French innuendoes must be manifest to every one, and that the King's words cannot be justly interpreted as pointing to more than a determination to ward off aggression. This is also the reading given to the speech on 'Change. What threw the Vienna bankers into a panic had but a very transient effect upon those of Berlin.

But while the public are well satisfied with the royal utterance, they are less so with the way it has been construed in France. It is observed, that the French Government papers insist upon regarding the speech as referring solely to the events of 1866. It is also noticed, that, acting upon this pretended ignorance of the real aim and

object of the royal words, the Ministers as well as the papers of Napoleon III. continue to offer the same hostile innuendoes as before. Simulating unconsciousness of the provocation given by them and resented by somebody else, they go on in the same crooked and slippery track. The *Constitutionnel* cannot imagine that the hint dropped by King William refers to anything of more recent interest than the conquest of Alsen or the victory of Sadowa; and the *Moniteur*, seemingly reassured by this assertion of its honoured *confrère*, continues to speak of 'questions in examining which the various Powers endeavour to make the principle of moderation prevail.' As though there existed any questions but those wantonly raised or injudiciously fostered in the Paris press! As though there were any special need for the Powers to endeavour to make the principle of moderation prevail!

FRESH PROVOCATIONS.

Berlin, September 20, 1868.

OBVIOUSLY the King's warning has failed to take effect. The *Moniteur* is at it again. Its soothing assurances are so peculiarly worded as to induce the belief that the reverse is meant. To me this appears a circumstance of ominous import. The game played by the French official and semi-official press, as well as by the French Ministers, has been publicly denounced by the King: yet it is continued. This may lead to a grave result. It may gradually awaken an echo in the same key here.

Accompanying this war of words, and unpleasantly illustrative of it, there are again some striking facts to report. In Nassau and Hesse gentlemen have been noticed travelling about, endeavouring to irritate the people of

the new provinces against the Berlin Government. Their whispers being diversified with hints as to the probability of French 'assistance,' they are, not unnaturally, after the late arrest of certain officers, set down as French agents. Next, there is a painful disclosure respecting the Hanover legion and its sojourn in France. As you may remember, the legion some six months ago suddenly transferred itself from Switzerland to France. However hospitably received by the provincial authorities, the leaders of the legion stoutly denied having been invited to come and rest their weary limbs on Gallic soil. As a matter of course, their asseveration was backed by the language and entire attitude of the Paris Government. The legion having been avowedly organised for the purpose of invading this country at the next favourable opportunity, no Government could have owned to according them more than the ordinary hospitality conceded to political exiles. To admit that they had been invited over the frontier, and permitted to keep up their organisation, with an eye to future contingencies, would have been coming it rather too strong even for a Napoleonic Cabinet. But truth and oxygen cannot well be corked down. The canton of Basle city annually publishes a sort of blue-book, called the *Administrative Report*, and, lo, in its last issue occurs a passage to the effect that Captain von Hartwig, of the Hanover legion, on a certain day informed the Swiss authorities of the impending departure of his men, 'in consequence of an offer made them by the French Government.' *Sapienti sat.* Some of the officers of the legion, in letters from Paris, are stated to be quartered at the bureaux of the extinct *Situation*, the paper which had been established to pave the way for the restoration of the Hanover dynasty, but had not life enough in it to wait for the event.

It is not, however, in distant lands alone that such phenomena arise. Warmed by the rays of a foreign sun, indigenous weeds likewise spring up again. The ex-

Elector of Cassel (now residing in a Bohemian village) has printed a paper showing why he should be reinstated in his former dignity. What he demands, his servants are naturally anxious to secure for him, no matter how. It was probably while acting out this principle that Herr Preser, the Elector's private secretary, became implicated in an intrigue which has just caused him to be convicted of high treason at Berlin.

As a consequence of the intelligence conveyed in this sorry account, preparations are being made to organise thirteen new batteries. In accordance with the *ordre de bataille* published a year and a half ago, they were not to be formed before 1874.

AUSTRIA AND FRANCE ENDEAVOURING TO UTILISE THE EAST.

September 23, 1868.

Politicians in this country have recently begun to turn their eyes to the Lower Danube, rather than the Rhine; and no wonder. The news of the Bulgarian bands being organised by French agents has been confirmed. This is something to set people thinking. Before adverting to the reflections thereby awakened, I shall enumerate a series of interesting circumstances which would have thrown light on the Bulgarian movement, even had not its originators been at last discovered on the spot.

Looking at the South Slavonic press, we find that papers habitually representing the interests of France and Austria in the East as identical are the warmest friends of the insurrection. The Bucharest Bulgarian *Narodnost*

and French *L'Etoile de l'Orient* have been the organs of the rebellion from the very outset. The *Narodnost* first gave publicity to the so-called petition of the Bulgarian provisional Government to the Ambassadors of the Powers at Constantinople, as also to the address, from the same nominal source, to the Bulgarian people. To this paper we are also indebted for most of the sensational news, such as alleged encounters, pronunciamientos, &c. which have subsequently found their way into the European press. Both the *Narodnost* and the *L'Etoile* speak of the movement as occasioned by the terrible wrongs of the noble nationality they have undertaken to defend; both represent it as gaining ground; both continue to describe Austria and France as the friends of the oppressed, contrasting them with Russia, the foe, or at best selfish protector, of the weak.

An opposite attitude is observed by that portion of the South Slavonic papers which sides with Russia. These papers have, indeed, too long and too unremittingly fostered the notion of Bulgarian mutiny to be able absolutely to oppose it under any circumstances; but the shy reserve with which they touch upon the delicate subject at this particular juncture plainly betrays that the movement now going on is viewed as a spurious article by their Northern friends. The Braila *Dunavska Zarya*, a journal vindicating Russian interests in the Bulgarian tongue, follows the insurrection with frigid indifference. It receives little, if any, original intelligence 'from the Balkan,' tardily reprints the news contained in the *Narodnost*, and has seemingly no reason to encourage the Bulgarians to support the insurrectionary bands. The same line of conduct is held by the *Svetovid*, the Servian champion of Russia at Belgrade. This journal almost treats the Bulgarian rising as if it were not. Of the fictitious reports of fights which have never occurred, but are sedulously blazoned abroad by the agents of the other party, it reprints but few; to

the so-called declaration of independence it has alluded only in a couple of lines. Instead of inserting leaders teeming with praise of Panslavonic liberty and hatred of the infidel Turk, as is its wont at ordinary times, it deems this the proper moment to initiate its readers into the intricacies of European civilisation, printing long-winded essays on—book-keeping by double-entry.

Now, let us turn from these local representatives of contending interests to periodicals less exclusively devoted to the discussion of Eastern affairs. To begin with Austria. Nearly all Polish papers in Galicia, Prussia, and France, have recently sided with the Vienna Government, regarding it as friendly to the anticipated revival of their race. They now agree in pronouncing the Bulgarian rebellion as a serious and pregnant event. The most untiring in this endeavour to make a bubble appear a solid globe is the Lemberg *Gazetta Narodowa*, the reputed organ of Count Goluchowski, Governor-general of Galicia. It is equally remarkable, that the *Narodowa* and its many contemporaries pretend to view the alleged conspiracy as the result of Russian intrigue. That it is not at all favoured by the Russophil papers published in those parts, but, on the contrary, encouraged by those supporting Austria and France, the *Narodowa* considers unnecessary to note. Exactly in the same spirit the rebellion is commented upon by the *Correspondance du Nord-Est*, the Paris organ of the Czartoryski party. The Vienna papers express themselves in a similar strain, though more reservedly; and the Semline telegraphic agency, a concern notoriously influenced by the Austro-Hungarian authorities, allows itself to be made the vehicle for the propagation, by electric wire, of the alarming intelligence systematically supplied by imaginative contributors to the Bucharest *Narodnost*. As to the Paris semi-official press, it lends a helping hand in the game with its usual skill, now reporting Bulgarian battles that have never been fought, now nega-

tiving alleged intelligence that has never appeared in print. Its latest manœuvre is to deny the news started by *L'Etoile*, that the Turks are going to occupy Roumania to stop the formation of insurrectionary bands. Why take the trouble to contradict the unknown *Etoile?* Why, if not to invest the other intelligence propagated by this ephemeral publication with an importance which it has not?

Passing over to Russia, we find the Moscow and St. Petersburg papers displaying as marked an indifference to the movement as the representatives of the Russian interests at Bucharest and Belgrade. It is true the *Invalide*, *Golos*, and *Moscow Gazette* are not in a position to disown any Bulgarian rising, however unprofitable to them. They have been too long engaged in inflaming the Bulgarian mind to adopt more moderate principles now that their trade, with all its ingenious artifices, is being imitated by a rival. But, though prevented by their own antecedents from declaring against any sedition directed against the Sultan, they content themselves with drily registering the inventions of the other party, without titivating them with fancies of their own. An even less ambiguous insight into the state of Russian feeling we receive from a paper too staid and respectable to be made use of for purposes of agitation, and therefore free to animadvert on what is going on. The *Severnaya Potschta*, the official organ of the Home Office, frankly owns that the movement has not been originated by patriots,—a term which in its columns means those devoted to the Russian cause. The reason why Russia has suspended operations in those parts is, as we all know, that Prussia cannot be utilised for offensive purposes, while Austria and France being on very good terms of late, the two would be sure to put a stop to any suspicious moves.* This fact too, long stifled in the Russian

* At one time the National party in Russia were in good hopes that, to complete the unification of Germany, Prussia would ally herself to them, and thus enable them to make progress in the East. Great was their disappoint-

press, is at length admitted. The *Golos* relates that when Prince Napoleon was at Constantinople he asked the Sultan whether, in the event of a French war with Prussia, he thought he was strong enough to keep Russia employed. The Sultan is stated to have replied in the affirmative. Whether he said so or not, the insertion of this story in a Russian paper implies the admission that the Russians expect Austria to act in concert with him. Without this pre-supposition, the very idea of such a reply would be absurd.

Having thus mustered the organs of the Powers more immediately concerned in the business, we will cast a glance at the papers of two States of less weight. I mean Servia and Roumania, whose geographical situation, more than their strength, entitles them to play a notable part in every Oriental entanglement. Officially Servia keeps aloof from the Bulgarian sham fight; semi-officially it evinces a disposition to make common cause with it. The *Vidov Dan*, the officious organ of the Belgrade Government, has repeatedly published correspondence from the Lower Danube describing the insurgents as numerous, well armed, and acting upon a strategical plan. In its leaders this paper likewise announces a continental war as imminent. It ridicules the reduction of the Prussian army, which it conceives is only intended to make France appear in the wrong, but which, it says, will not serve its purpose. Supposing any enterprising schemes to be afloat at Constantinople, this language of the Servian Government paper ought to exercise a sobering influence over the minds of men there. The Servian and the Turkish Go-

---

ment at Prussia's declaring herself perfectly satisfied with the result of Sadowa, and free from any ulterior designs on Southern Germany. Since then the National party, now potent in the wide dominion of the Czar, have been steadily trying to conclude an anti-Prussian and anti-Turkish alliance with France. For farther particulars the reader is referred to the preceding Letters, as well as those that follow.

vernments cannot both be gainers by a Russian war. One must deceive itself as to the chances, or be deceived by somebody else.

As to Roumania, being situate between two antagonistic empires, it must have the worst of it in the event of a collision. Naturally, therefore, it is all in favour of peace. Too impotent to disperse insurrectionary bands formed under French auspices, it has yet kept an eye on the Polish refugees in the country, and prevented some, if not all of them, from taking an active part in the plot. It has likewise closed its frontiers against some Poles, and sent away others; and it has, though long permitting the *Narodnost* to print treasonable matter against the Sultan, the suzerain of the State, at last so far emancipated itself from fear of France as to arrest its editor. How little it has countenanced the rebellion from the beginning appears from the language of its papers, which have never ceased to warn the Bulgarians against allowing themselves to be seduced by foreign hirelings. As a sample, I will quote the following from the Bucharest semi-official *Romanul:*

'The Bulgarians know that the Turkish Government has promised to introduce effective reforms, and that France is disposed to enforce the fulfilment of these promises. Why, then, do they not apply to France, Germany, and Italy to obtain redress of their grievances? Will the great Powers, among whom we must also include Russia, be deaf to their complaints? And what other course remains open to them? Are they sufficiently armed and organised to go to war with the Turkish Empire? We affirm that they are not, and that even if they were, they would have no chance of victory while fighting single-handed. Servia, Montenegro, and Greece are neither ready nor in the humour to begin hostilities; while as regards the Powers, do the Bulgarians expect them to remain neutral in such a contest? None but the enemies of Bulgaria would attempt to put arms in their hands at this moment.'

When such are the words and deeds of the Roumanian Government, it seems incomprehensible that it should have been charged by the Polish, French, and Austrian press, not only with conniving at the formation of insur-

reactionary bands, but with doing this in the interest of—Russia. Yet this is the fact—is the fact in the teeth of facts. The papers with French leanings at Bucharest favour the rebellion; the French papers at Paris denounce it, and hold Roumania responsible for it. The journals siding with France at Bucharest palpably exaggerate the exploits of their petted heroes; the Napoleonic organs at Paris, entirely disapproving their doings, are yet in a hurry to believe every fabrication about events which they pretend to regret. How to account for this seeming contradiction? How to solve this journalistic riddle? At Bucharest people believe they have divined the *mot* of the enigma. At any rate the Roumanian Government have just communicated with some of the leading Courts, and charge France with urging Turkey to occupy the Wallachian Principalities, in order to bring on a war between the Czar and the Sultan. As the pretext for the occupation is to be supplied by the alleged dereliction of the Roumanian Government in allowing Turkey to be invaded by bands formed in its territory, the reason why that invasion was promoted by the French press in Wallachia seems, in the eyes of people at Bucharest, to be quite clear. That the Czar might view the occupation of Wallachia by Turkey as a personal provocation is possible enough, though, under the circumstances, not inevitable.

In reviewing the sundry phenomena here recounted, Berlin politicians evince a marked disposition to couple them with recent Galician events. They cannot understand why the Kaiser is so particularly condescending to his Polono-Galician subjects at a moment when they are clamouring for all but Hungarian independence. They find it impossible to give a reason for his apparent readiness to comply with the Galician demand, which, were it conceded, would have an evident tendency to contribute to the decomposition of the Empire. To them the only way of reconciling these incongruities is by assuming that

the Poles, after all, have not boasted in vain of Austrian support so long, and that a policy is to be inaugurated in Galicia which, should circumstances prove favourable, shall qualify that province to be used as a weapon against Russia. It has been, moreover, ascertained that the Hungarian Ministry, however opposed to the idea of a Prussian war, are not equally averse to damaging Russia, whose Panslavonic propensities they have reason to fear within and beyond their frontiers. There can be no doubt, that the Hungarian Cabinet, in opposition to their cis-Leithan colleagues, advised the Emperor to undertake the trip to Galicia, which is so hopefully regarded by the Poles. Putting all these many and curious things together, and remembering that this is a time when improbabilities are made more probable than usually is the case, we need not be surprised at suspicious people in this latitude fancying that they are spectators of preparations for a combined move to be possibly undertaken against the Northern Colossus. With this suspicion hanging over them, can they forget that if Russia be attacked by those whom Prussia is unfortunately forced to consider her own enemies,* the latter will have thereby the alternative placed before her of choosing between immediate war or future isolation.†

But I must guard against Berlin opinions being misunderstood. Our politicians are by no means sure of war, but, on the contrary, are convinced that the Emperor of France has not yet made up his mind to stake his throne on the issue of a battle or two. Yet, as he has permitted the more warlike among his political friends, at home and

* The Paris *Moniteur* has not condescended to print the speech the King of Prussia delivered at Kiel, and the Vienna official *Abendpost* deems it incumbent upon it to charge, at such a moment as the present, not the Paris, but the Berlin papers, with precipitating war.

† In December 1868 the danger alluded to in the above was commented upon by Count Bismarck, in a sitting of a special committee of the Prussian Parliament.

abroad, to take steps which may probably bring on such a result, they think they are justified in watching his activity at various points, and keeping contingencies in view. They have an inventive antagonist, and try to meet his ingenuity with adequate vigilance. But all this refers to the initiated few only. The masses remain stoically indifferent to the disquieting facts and rumours penetrating to us from France.

AUSTRIA UTILISING POLAND.

Berlin, September 26, 1868.

THE news we receive from Vienna is not of a kind to divert public attention from the East. From that quarter people now, as a week ago, await the decision as to war or peace. I have already alluded to the construction put upon the proposed visit of the Emperor of Austria to his Polish provinces. Our politicians seem to be persuaded that the journey would never have been contemplated at this juncture except for purposes of international bearing. They are the more inclined to think themselves right, inasmuch as their opinion is notoriously shared by the Galician Poles, and seems not to be altogether rejected even by the cis-Leithan Ministers of his Apostolic Majesty. The Emperor was aware that the Galician local Parliament, immediately before his arrival, were going to demand an all but Hungarian independence for themselves. Yet he consented to visit their province, and accepted sundry invitations from noblemen and municipal authorities, which would have converted his trip into a royal circuit attended with special pomp and circumstance. What wonder then, that, encouraged by the entire aspect of international affairs, the sanguine temper of the Poles saw

in his journey the first step towards the reëstablishment of an independent realm of their own, and that the cis-Leithan Ministers, though less prone to jump at conclusions, yet supposed a certain disposition to have sprung up in their master's mind to accede—at least partially——to the Galician demands? Alike unwilling to allow a farther rent to be made in the Austrian charter, already torn by the champions of Hungary, and to embark in a course which may possibly embroil them with Russia, the cis-Leithan Cabinet opposed his Majesty's intention, when at a late hour they were informed of it. At the last moment, they have succeeded in getting the journey postponed. Not satisfied with this concession, their President, Prince Auersperg, has declined to continue one of a body which is not exempt from the possibility of similar surprises. Having already for several weeks abstained from the exercise of official power, he has now demanded and received his *congé*.

What induced the Emperor in the eleventh hour to desist from his purpose we do not yet know. Probably foreign suggestions cautioning him against a Russian entanglement, and pointing to the precarious nature of the support he would have to expect from France, had something to do with his change of resolve. That the opposition of the cis-Leithan Cabinet alone cannot have brought about this satisfactory result may be inferred from their having warned him for weeks, and warned him in vain. The Emperor, knowing his policy to be approved by his Hungarian Ministers, until within the last twenty-four hours believed himself in a position to dispense with the assent of his German advisers. What object the Hungarian Cabinet had in promoting the Galician journey it is not for me to discuss; but the designs their countrymen attribute to them are betrayed in every Hungarian paper. General Klapka's *Szazadunk* ('Our Century'), for instance, has the following on this interesting head:

'It is no less in the interest of Hungary than of Poland that Galicia, instead of being an impediment to Austrian policy, should become a weapon in the hands of Hungary. This it may easily be made, by developing the germ which we have in Galicia of a future independent Polish commonwealth. We ought not to forget that the existing constitution of the empire has given Galicia no real strength, but only inspired her with revolutionary purposes, which, as they cannot have a free and natural outlet, must lure on to venturesome expedients. By making no distinction between Galicia and the western provinces of the realm, the present policy of the Government has forced her into an opposition prejudicial alike to the empire and the Polish cause. Galicia feeling herself called upon to act in the interest of all Poland, this aspiration may be attended with the most pernicious consequences, unless speedily utilised and directed into the proper channel. Hungary is in some sort obliged to make up for Austria's share in the guilty division of Poland, for it was on the plea of Hungarian pretensions that Galicia was occupied.* In taking Galician affairs into her own hands, Hungary will profit by the importance which Galicia has recently acquired in the Polish question, and also free the German half of the monarchy from so incongruous an element as Galicia must necessarily prove, if remaining bound up with the cis-Leithan provinces. Were the demand preferred, the Hungarian Cabinet might easily obtain the direction of Galician affairs, and need not doubt the acquiescence of Galicia herself in the arrangement. To obliterate in the Austrian portion of Poland all traces of its partition, to reserve the rights of a future legislative body of all Poland, to allow the other Polish provinces to exercise a direct influence on the remodelling of Galicia and on its relations to Hungary and Austria—these are the main features of the programme, which will remove the difficulties that may be in the way of a mutual agreement.'

An enterprising time is ours, in which such comprehensive designs are coolly conceived in the midst of a nation which but the other day acquired a half-independence. Hungary, two years ago at the mercy of any general appointed to hold command over her, to-day produces statesmen that do not shrink from challenging Russia. Most Hungarian papers of any standing are well satisfied with this independent plan. Only *Naplo* (Diary), the organ

* Five hundred years ago, a Hungarian king bought up the votes of the Polish Parliament, which accordingly elected him their sovereign. Though the reunion of the two kingdoms lasted but twelve years, it, in accordance with the notions of the eighteenth century, was alleged by Maria Theresa as a reason for mixing herself up in the partition of Poland.

of M. Deak, dissents. But even this journal does not venture to assert that the intentions commonly attributed to the Cabinet, and borne out to a certain extent by their action, are erroneously imputed to them. It says:

'A provincial paper, which receives its intelligence from the office of M. Giskra (cis-Leithan Minister of Internal Affairs), is spreading the rumour that the Emperor's proposed visit to Galicia has been advised by Count Andrassy (Hungarian Premier). We do not know whether this intelligence is correct or not, but we must protest against the arbitrary construction put upon it. If Count Andrassy has really something to do with the Emperor's resolve to go to Lemberg, he has certainly not been actuated by the motives ascribed to him. This is apparent from Prince Auersperg (cis-Leithan Premier) accompanying the Emperor on his journey.'

The cis-Leithan Premier has not accompanied his Majesty, but, on the contrary, left the Cabinet; and the Galician Magnates, until within a few hours, have most assuredly been of opinion that the trans-Leithan or Hungarian Cabinet had made up their minds to try their hand in international politics, and see whether the Austrian Poles could be used as a battering-engine against Russia. Has the design been relinquished, or only put off? *Vederemo.*

The plan to give Russia something to do in the East, and thus expose Prussia to attack from the South and West, which some people here think they can trace in all this, is also discovered in Turkey's behaviour towards Roumania. You are aware of the menacing posture recently assumed by the Turkish Government towards the Wallachian Principalities. Were it to result in their occupation by the Sultan's troops, this would certainly have a tendency to draw Russia's attention to the Lower Danube. The Roumanian Government does not seem to underrate the danger hanging over them. They believe it to be on the cards that Turkey will resort to harsh measures, and that she is in concert with Austria and France. Referring

to the rumour propagated by French papers, that Turkey is about to occupy Roumania, the Bucharest semi-official *Romanul* has the following:

'We have long realised the fact of an Austro-Turkish agreement to the prejudice of this country, and also pointed out the feverish excitement characterising the relations just now between the East and West. Yet we persist in hoping that the news of an imminent occupation of Roumania will not be confirmed. We persist in hoping that Turkey will perceive the danger to which she would expose herself, were she to take such a step; and that the great Powers will not suffer any one to play with fire in the immediate vicinity of the great powder-magazine denominated the Oriental question.'

The apprehensions of the *Romanul* are justified by the language of *La Turquie*, the semi-official organ of the Constantinople Government, which holds the Bucharest authorities responsible for the formation of the Bulgarian bands, and denounces its negligence in suffering them to be organised as 'a serious violation of the international position accorded to Roumania, which has not failed to attract the attention of the Powers.' Should there be some so suspicious as to attribute an ominous meaning to this, they would be borne out by intelligence contained in the Belgrade *Vidov Dan*, the journal of the Servian Regency. The Sublime Porte, this paper says, contemplates sending an army to the Roumanian frontier, and is already engaged in storing up provisions at Rustchuk. Austria, it adds, has proposed to the Powers to institute an international inquiry into the Bulgarian bands' affair and the complicity of the Roumanian authorities.

While this is going on in the far East, war on the Rhine is represented by the Polish papers as impending. The Lemberg *Gazetta Narodova*, an Austrian semi-official organ, cheers up its countrymen by the intelligence that France has sent an insulting note to Prussia, which cannot fail to be followed up by a speedy appeal to arms; while the *Posen Dziennik*, providing for coming exigencies, already supplies the list of the French generals who are to

lead on their civilisatory hosts to carnage. On Galicia and Posen such glorious intelligence, however visionary, is never thrown away. This time it excites people uncommonly, and makes them anxiously expectant of the events their fancy paints as near. I may also notice, *en passant*, that the Transylvanian local papers speak of troops being concentrated in their province, and that there is a rumour, as yet unsubstantiated, of Finnish and Esthonian regiments having been dispatched to swell the already overflowing garrisons of Poland. All which serves to keep our people on the alert, notwithstanding that the anticipated course of events has suddenly come to a standstill in Galicia.

Iskender Khan, the commander of the Afghan troops in Russian pay, who took part in the battle near Samarcand, has arrived at Orenburg, and probably gone on to St. Petersburg. It is the practice of the Russian Government to introduce the more eminent of its Asiatic friends to the astounding wonders of their capital.

Scarcely has the Moscow-Kursk railway been opened, when that between the latter city and Witepsk approaches completion. In a few days it will be ready for traffic as far as Roslavl, about three-fourths of the entire distance. The two lines, together with the Moscow-Woronesch and the Moscow-Morschansk railways, complete for some time, link Central Russia to Europe. In less than a year Southern Russia will likewise have been added to the accessible parts of the Continent by the extension of the Kursk line to Kiew. From the latter place to Balta the works have begun; from Balta to Odessa in one direction, and to Jelisavetgrad in another, the locomotive already runs.

POSTPONEMENT OF THE KAISER'S POLISH JOURNEY.

Berlin, September 30, 1868.

THE postponement of the Kaiser's journey to Galicia, and with it of the entire scheme related in my recent Letters, originated in Paris rather than in Vienna. Not the Emperor Francis Joseph but the Emperor Napoleon in the eleventh hour began to doubt the expediency of the course they had embarked on. Accordingly telegrams were dispatched from the Tuileries to the Hofburg, dissuading from the journey at a moment when the Czar was sojourning in the midst of his own dissatisfied Poles, and when the contrast between his reception at Warsaw and that of the Kaiser at Cracow might have been too great not to be immediately resented by Russia. Originally, this coincidence had nothing in it distasteful to the Paris and Vienna Courts. On the contrary, at a period when it was generally known that the Czar would go to Warsaw on such and such a day, the programme of the Kaiser's trip to Galicia had been so devised as to make the two visits clash. That this was no mere accident appears from an article in the semi-official *Gazetta Národova*, communicated in the *Times* of the 15th of September, comparing the probable effect of the two journeys. Yet, in spite of the well-laid and long-matured plan, when the moment for action arrived, and the ball was to receive the impetus which might have sent it heaven knows where, unlooked-for misgivings arose, resulting in the eventual adjournment of the whole affair. Thus the last, and certainly not the least uninteresting, of the many projects lately hatched in the Tuileries was interrupted. The Kaiser remained in Vienna. The Archduke Albrecht, who had already hastened to Cracow to receive his august cousin at the head of fifty Sarmatian noblemen in national costume, returned to the capital from his bootless errand. The

triumphal arches erected in so-and-so many Galician towns had to be pulled down, the festal garments to be put off, and the large outlay incurred by the various corporations in order to receive their Sovereign suitably to the occasion was expended in vain.

The fact of diplomatic influences having ultimately kept his Majesty away from his Polish provinces is admitted by the Cracow *Czas*, the independent organ of the nobility, as also by the Lemberg *Gazetta Narodova*, the moderate paper so long connected with the Governor of the province. The *Czas* expressly remarks that its intelligence is derived from a reliable source; the *Narodova*, immediately after the announcement of his Majesty's altered intentions, judiciously observed, that unless the Galician Parliament were dissolved, it might be safely assumed that no displeasure of his Majesty at its demonstrative address, but reasons of international import alone, could have prompted his final decision. You are aware that the Parliament in question has not only not been dissolved, but that a resolution to prolong its existence has been expressly adopted by the Council of Ministers.

In spite of these Polish admissions, the German writers of the Vienna Cabinet are endeavouring to represent the change in his Majesty's mind as occasioned by the Galician address, clamouring for a sort of Hungarian independence. It is easy to prove that this cannot be the case. Although the language of the Galician Parliament was certainly less guarded than the leading statesmen in Vienna, in the present introductory stage of the affair, approved, yet, as every Polish paper spoke of it, they must for the last four weeks have pretty well known what would be demanded at Lemberg. Still the preparations for the Emperor's journey went on. The fact is, they not only foresaw what was about to happen, but were in some degree agreeable to it. In the article above quoted, the semi-official *Narodova* actually declared that there would be nothing in the ad-

dress to frighten the Emperor away, but that, on the contrary, his object in coming to Galicia was to acquaint himself personally with the wishes and requirements of the population.

In the like spirit Count Goluchowski, the Governor-General of the province, expressed himself in the debate which preceded the passing of the address. He indeed warned the Parliament against asking for too much at a time; but he owned in the same breath and in unambiguous language, which drew down bursts of applause from the gallery, that Galicia ought to aspire to a position which would enable it to restore Poland with the assistance of Austria. 'We Poles,' he added, 'have displayed too little perseverance in our previous risings; let us be more consistent this time to secure the continuance of Austria's favour.' From the mouth of a royal imperial Governor-General words such as these require no comment. If Count Goluchowski has just resigned, this is only because he did not wish to continue in office after the policy he served had received such an untoward rebuff. Were it otherwise, worse consequences than mere dismissal would have befallen the chief of an imperial province talking of the future defection of the country he governs. *Au reste*, though it has been adjourned, the plan need not have been abandoned. It is a design at once too serious and comprehensive to be relinquished in a hurry.

I may notice, *en passant*, that the death of Count Walewski is deeply regretted by the Polish press. As the son of Napoleon I. and a Polish Countess, they thought him destined to play a prominent part among them some future day.

Having traced the action of France in the South-east, let us now turn to the North, and note the footsteps of her wary politicians there. Within the last fortnight communications from Paris have been addressed to the Swedish and Danish Governments, seemingly intended to prepare

them for the possibility of having to choose between siding with France or Germany. There is little doubt that Sweden prefers neutrality. Her people are prudently averse from entangling themselves, and, moreover, scarcely in a position to forget the dangerous vicinity of Russia. It is different with Denmark, whose Government, if I am correctly informed, as an earnest of its adhesion, has promised to mention the North Schleswig affair in the speech from the throne which King Christian will deliver in a few days. If the Danish people welcome the notion of war with Germany, the Germans, and, above all, those in Schleswig, are equally bent upon holding their own. *Dagbladet*, a Copenhagen paper all against Germany, the other day was obliged to acknowledge as much. Referring to the reception of King William at Flensburg, one of its correspondents had the following: 'I was deeply grieved to see the joy of the Flensburgers at all these festivities. I felt a great deal must happen before the black-white flags will disappear at Flensburg. More than ever did it become apparent to me that we have to deal with a Power which will strain every nerve to keep what it has got.' Which, however, would have scarcely prevented a restoration of Northern Schleswig to the Danes, had they not insisted on having Düppel given to them. That place—the only strategical position of importance in the Duchies—having been twice conquered at a considerable loss of blood and treasure, and being, moreover, situated in a district where the two nationalities are mingled, the Germans thought they would be damaging both honour and interest, were they to cede it. It is not so much the unwillingness of the Germans to give up a portion of Northern Schleswig, as the Danish demand for a slice considered rather too big, which prevents this particular clause of the Prague treaty being carried out.

The Paris official *Moniteur de l'Armée* continues its attentions towards the Prussian army. Having lately

described the Prussian soldier as the pitiable slave of a despotic Government, it now ridicules the intelligence and skill of the officers. The plan of campaign in 1866, according to this impartial critic, was the most miserable that can be conceived. 'If,' the paper actually permits itself to say, 'General Benedek was nevertheless beaten, this only proves him to be an even worse ignoramus than the Prussians, his adversaries. A single spark of the Napoleonic spirit would have gained him the battle of Sadowa, not once, but ten times.' Simultaneous with the appearance of this bravado in the War Office organ, the courtly *France* is busy proving to its readers that Prussia in the event of a war will be isolated. I do not perceive that these articles excite much feeling here. Only the question is raised now and then, whether the French Government papers have been instructed to encourage their countrymen to bell the German cat.

It is said that, to prevent the chance of a Montpensier ascending the throne of Spain, the Emperor Napoleon is trying to persuade the King of Portugal to offer himself as a candidate. The King, however, is not particularly inclined to meddle with his unruly neighbours, and by his refusal has already incurred the displeasure of his would-be patron.

On the 11th of September Ali Pasha addressed a letter to Prince Carl of Roumania, requesting to be informed of the result of the inquiry into the formation of Bulgarian bands on Wallachian soil. The Turkish Minister also uttered a hope that the most stringent measures would be resorted to to prevent the recurrence of similar irregularities. Apropos to Danubian affairs, the Servian Regency contemplate the establishment of *bonâ-fide* constitutional arrangements in their principality. Hitherto the Servian Parliament has existed only in name. It was the dissatisfaction felt at this state of things by the educated among the people which fostered the conspiracy against Prince Michael.

There is joy in the artillery department at Berlin. After having so long yielded the palm to Armstrong, Krupp, it is asserted, has at length defeated his rival. You will remember that early this summer a competitive trial of the two guns was held in the artillery-ground at Tegel, near Berlin, when the native product came off second best. Since then an improvement, the nature of which has not transpired, has been introduced, and, it seems, most successfully. At the trial, which has just come off, Krupp's 72-pounder smashed the nine-inch plates—said to be the strongest in use—at each round. What, then, must his guns of more formidable calibre accomplish, if remodelled on the new pattern?

According to the latest intelligence from Russia, it is expected that the railway between Moscow and Odessa will be completed by May next.* This is a fact of great political importance.

POLISH ADMISSIONS AND SERVIAN COMPLAINTS CONCERNING THE AUSTRO-FRENCH DOINGS IN THE EAST.

Berlin, October 3, 1868.

A SUPPLEMENT to my last will be acceptable from the interest attaching to the subject. The motive of the Emperor Francis Joseph for putting off his Galician trip is thus commented upon in the Cracow *Czas:*

'The trip was proposed at a time when war between Prussia and France appeared probable, and when a certain connection seemed to exist between a campaign on the Rhine and the Eastern question. It was postponed when, the Spanish insurrection becoming more serious, France had her hands tied, and peace was secured, at any rate for the coming year. From what has been said, it will be easy to draw conclusions as to the rest.'

This will be found to confirm my previous intelligence. According to the plan concocted by the war party in the

* It was only completed in December 1869.

French Cabinet, Prussia was to be engaged in the West, and Russia to be kept employed in the East. The testimony of the *Czas*, the leading organ of the Czartoryski faction, which played such a significant part in the comprehensive scheme now postponed, is indisputable. Nor is it difficult to account for the frankness with which the scheme is unveiled, now that its execution has been unavoidably retarded.

The Poles had been given to understand, that in the event of war they would be used to keep Russia in check. The Galician Poles more especially had become familiarised to the idea that theirs would be the duty of setting Russian Poland on fire. Constitutionally sanguine, they were excited by the report, semi-officially spread, that this time, at any rate, the reëstablishment of Poland formed an integral part of a wide project framed by several Powers, and consequently sure to succeed. In the midst of the enthusiasm awakened by these intimations, they were rudely surprised by unpalatable realities. The check was bitterly felt, and, unless plausibly explained and represented as unavoidable and merely temporary, would have grievously shaken their confidence in the skill of their native leaders, and in the honesty of the foreign statesmen with whom the idea of making Poland a tool for the attainment of ulterior objects originated. To prevent disturbances and keep their enthusiasm warm, the people had to be told the truth about the events of the last few weeks. That the said leaders, under the altered circumstances of the moment, are most anxious to console the Polish public, and to keep them in cheerful expectancy of a good time coming, may be gathered from the language of the Lemberg *Gazetta Narodova*, hitherto the mouthpiece of the Galician Governor-General. Alluding to the resignation of its patron, who so long favoured the scheme, and retired when he saw that the game wa up, this paper expresses itself as follows :

'Count Goluchowski is on the best terms with the Kaiser. His Majesty told him that he perfectly appreciates the motives which prompted him to resign. As a mark of his kindly feeling towards the Count and our province, the Emperor has sanctioned the law passed by the Galician Parliament on the (exclusive) use of the Polish language by the judicial and administrative authorities. Some of the cis-Leithan Ministers meant to dissolve the Galician Parliament (for passing the address demanding semi-independence for the province, preparatory to the reëstablishment of Poland); but the Emperor would listen to no such thing.'

In another place the same paper speaks as confidently:

'No change has occurred in his Majesty's feelings towards Galicia. It was by no means the address, or the resolutions accompanying it, which caused the Emperor to desist from his purpose of visiting us; nor would a modification of the address have led him hither. We are satisfied that the journey would have been delayed, even had no address at all been voted. Count Goluchowski's reasons for resigning were of a personal nature. The cis-Leithan Cabinet, indeed, endeavoured to attribute the postponement of the imperial journey to the passing of an inopportune address; but if, as we are told, the Count's first instructions were not opposed to what subsequently appeared so objectionable, the Governor has not compromised himself, but the Ministry have compromised the Governor.'

So much for the Austro-Polish share in the business. Once more to notice the participation of France where it was most openly manifested we must migrate farther east. As you will remember, the Rouman Government assert that, by feigning a Rayah rising, an attempt was to be made to marshal the Sultan against the Czar. It was certainly the pseudo-Bulgarian but in reality French paper *Narodnost* which sought to persuade mankind that there was such a thing as a Bulgarian rebellion, while the pseudo-Servian but really Russian *Svetovid*,* with other papers of the same colour, made a point of ignoring the alleged insurrection. Such being the *rôles* respectively played by these two journals, it was but natural that the *Narodnost*

* *Anglicè* 'St. Vitus.' On St. Vitus's day, June 15th, 1389, Servia lost the decisive battle which completed her subjugation by Turkey. The fatal day and the Saint who presides over it have ever since been held in melancholy remembrance by the people. Latterly the Saint's name has become the watchword of revenge and the title of a Russophil journal.

should blame any one who did not seem to evince sufficient interest in the rising, while on the *Svetovid* as necessarily devolved the task of constituting itself defender of any such heartless contemners of sham patriotism. The fact of the *Narodnost* for the moment being on the revolutionary, and the *Svetovid* on the Conservative and pacific side is, after what has lately transpired about Gallic designs, of such universal interest, that it will perhaps not be superfluous to evidence it by a quotation. It so happens that the *Narodnost*, which, Austria and France excepted, is blaming all the world for lukewarmness towards Bulgaria, has recently extended its reproaches to the Servians. Up jumps the *Svetovid*, and defends the accused nationality:

'The Bulgarian journal *Narodnost*, publishing at Bucharest, inserts a letter from a Bulgarian patriot, containing stuff and nonsense about the Servians. Were the Bulgarian people, were those Bulgarians more especially who are desirous of promoting amicable relations between their countrymen and the cognate race of Servia, of the same mind with the writer of this letter, it would be a poor look-out for the liberty and independence of our peninsula, just now striving for the recovery of national independence. We are accustomed to attacks from our enemies, which at present are also the enemies of Bulgaria; but to find among the Bulgarians any one silly enough to be made an instrument in our enemy's hands is certainly not what we expected. We have often asked ourselves what may be the cause of those charges so often preferred against us. Has Servia or its Government ever stood in the way of Bulgarian aspirations—aspirations identical with our own? We cannot discover a single circumstance which would justify such an assumption, having always evinced our sympathy for the liberty of the Bulgarian people. Or are the Bulgarians angry with us for not sending our battalions across the frontier, and rendering them substantial assistance? But the Bulgarians are said to be even now afraid of our conquering propensities. What would they say if our troops were marched into their villages, if they had actually conquered and occupied the country? If, as is certainly the case, we have hitherto committed no offence against them, we may well ask our detractors to bring forward facts in support of the language they hold. But it seems to us that they themselves do not know their own minds; or, rather, that these fiery gentlemen are anything but friends to Bulgaria. It is not so very long since the Bulgarians awakened to the consciousness that it behoved them to cultivate friendly relations to the Servians. We met them in the same spirit, without

any wish to acquire supremacy. We too wish to render ourselves independent, and have no inclination to oppress others. It would, moreover, be altogether impossible for us to do anything of the kind, needing as we do all our resources to liberate ourselves.'

Skilfully as it is hidden under the pretext of respecting the Bulgarians too much to interfere, indifference to the rising is yet none the less plainly expressed in the above. As I told you before, Russophil papers, having so long tampered with Rayah insurrections, are not in a position absolutely to declare against them, even at a juncture when interest dissuades from promoting the sanguinary game.

Proceeding still farther east, one is astonished at seeing the Bucharest official *Monitorul* repeat the apprehensions lately expressed by the semi-official *Romanul* respecting the hostile intentions of Turkey towards Roumania. And can the Paris *Correspondance du Nord-Est* be correct in speaking of a ministerial crisis at Constantinople, said to have been occasioned by the warlike designs of the Sultan? Improbable as is the story, it accords but too well with the goings-on we have noticed in other quarters. Whether true or not, its credibility is not increased by its being circulated by the *Correspondance*, a Polish organ eager to represent as near that general commotion which, among other things, was to help Poland. But the disposition of the Sultan has become a matter of indifference. We have every reason to believe that the *Czas*, in the passage cited in the first few lines of this Letter, is in the right, and that the untoward event at Madrid has changed resolutions at what may be styled the head-quarters of whatever combined move may have been intended in the East and West. All I have said therefore refers to a past happily disposed of. As a curious episode, however, and one which perhaps has in it a lesson for the future, the thing deserved to be sifted to the bottom.

Count Bismarck is not yet well enough to visit an

English watering-place. Since his fall from his horse, he has been obliged to pass the greater part of the day in a recumbent position. The irritability of the nerves is said to have brought on permanent pain in the muscles.

The improvement in the Krupp cannon, productive of such formidable results, consists in the enlarging the chamber in which the cartridge is lodged. The charge is to be double what it was, while the ball remains at its former weight of 200lb. When tried side by side with the 9-inch Armstrong, having a ball of 227lb., the Prussian gun proved greatly the superior.

The Russian frigate Alexander Newsky, in which Archduke Alexis was wrecked a few days ago on the Jutland coast, is hopelessly imbedded in the sand. The Prussian man-of-war Medusa, dispatched to her rescue, has come back without effecting anything. The crew of the lost vessel is shortly expected here *en route* for Cronstadt.

BULGARIAN ADDRESS TO NAPOLEON. REACTION OF THE SPANISH CATASTROPHE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

Berlin, October 7, 1808,

FRANCE's design of setting the East on fire, to create an opportunity of attacking Germany, has been plainly set forth in this Correspondence, and proved by the action of the various Governments engaged in the scheme, as well as by the attitude of the polyglot papers in their employ. Though interrupted by what has occurred in Spain, the plan is of so serious and comprehensive a nature that, were it only to guard against its revival in the future, it cannot be too fully elucidated now. I have said that the Bulgarian bands formed in the Danubian Principalities, with a view to set Turkey at loggerheads with Russia, were or-

ganised by agents connected with the war party in the French Cabinet. Besides basing my assertion on the present experience of reliable witnesses, I have corroborated it by reference to the language of the official Roumanian papers, and the French and Russian journals published in countries both near and remote. To these proofs, strengthened as they are by the harmony between them and the other features in this complicated case, I can to-day add another testimony equally conclusive. The Belgrade semi-official *Vidov Dan* says that, when Prince Napoleon visited Bucharest in the beginning of this year, the Bulgarians residing in that city presented him an address petitioning for French assistance against Turkey. The principal passages of the address are these:

'Your Highness's presence among us is witnessed with intense delight by all the Eastern tribes professing Christianity. The Bulgarians more especially, being the most numerous of the various races inhabiting this peninsula, and having so long suffered the most cruel wrongs, have been animated with fresh hopes on seeing your Highness inquiring into the state of our affairs. We cannot but be gratified by your kindly acquainting yourself with the condition of our country, governed as it is by brute force, which forbids us to complain to anybody, lest help should be forthcoming. We, the undersigned, being Bulgarian freemen residing in free Roumania, beg to express to your Highness the universal conviction entertained by our countrymen, that no reform will heal the wounds which Turkey has inflicted. Mahometanism and fanaticism have ever prevented an equality of rights from being established between the Turkish and Christian inhabitants of the Ottoman empire. Any striving to attain this impossible object must be futile. In the consciousness of their rights as men, the Bulgarians demand self-government and a national administration. The concession of this demand is the only means of maintaining peace and order within the Turkish empire. We hope the great Powers will second our irrepressible aspirations. Above all, France, who has liberated so many oppressed nationalities, will not oppose our desires. Fully persuaded of this, we beg your Highness to lay our wishes before his Majesty the Emperor of the French. *Vive la France! Vive l'Empereur Napoléon! Vive* your Imperial Highness!'

The slightest acquaintance with the East will satisfy the reader that, in a country where the arts of reading and writing, and the still more difficult accomplishment of

drawing up petitions, are not very extensively known, such a document as the above is never presented unless it has been asked for. In the present instance the contents of the petition and accompanying circumstances combine to render assurance doubly sure. Not only was the presentation of the address enveloped in the greatest secrecy, and has only now been divulged by an ally of doubtful sincerity, but the demand preferred in the petition is in perfect keeping with the so-called declaration of independence recently promulgated by the Franco-Bulgarian and Franco-Roumanian papers of the far East. Did a doubt remain after this, it would be removed by the passage referring to the inquiry kindly instituted by the princely sympathiser into the sufferings of his foreign friends. Turkey, they say, forbids them to complain; but he has come to look after them, and they cannot but respond to his friendly overtures in the same confiding spirit.

Another point repeatedly alluded to in my late communications is the postponement of the entire scheme, occasioned by the break-up in Spain. In the event of war, Queen Isabella, by garrisoning Rome, was to have kept Italy in order. She is a fugitive now, and Italy, were hostilities to break out, would be, comparatively speaking, at liberty to 'gang her ain gait.' Besides, there is the danger to the Emperor Napoleon of some one's ascending the vacated throne more nearly connected with other dynasties, and, perhaps, establishing constitutional government on the confines of his military despotism. It is only natural that so considerable a change in his position should have induced him to defer, if not entirely abandon, bellicose designs. In addition to other undoubted evidence, we have the word of the Cracow *Czas*, the leading organ of the Czartoryski faction, which was to have played such a prominent part in the matter, for the existence of the design. Yesterday's issue of that paper contains fresh admissions on this interesting head :

'At the first news of the Spanish revolution, we pointed to the influence it was likely to have on the political situation of all Europe, and more particularly on France's relations to other Powers. We now perceive that, in consequence of the events which have occurred, peace, so long menaced, becomes more probable. Neither the articles in the French or Prussian semi-official papers, nor the speeches of King William, would have caused public confidence to revive, had it not been for the intelligence coming from the southern coast of Spain. People understand that this movement paralyses France, and from its very nature will be detrimental to her interests. Preventing war as it does, the Spanish rebellion cannot but be applauded by England and Prussia; a circumstance which has led to the belief that they were instrumental in promoting it. They may or they may not have done so. There was certainly fuel enough to kindle of itself a revolutionary flame in the peninsula, the more so as the present rebellion is only the continuation of a previous one, which ended in smoke. The pacific influence of this revolution proves that the continuation of peace was menaced by France, not by Prussia. Were it otherwise, war would be more likely than ever, now that France is paralysed, and Prussia relieved from a heavy weight on her shoulders.'

I wonder whether the Poles, by having her former warlike propensities proved to them, will be consoled for the present 'paralysation' of France? Perhaps they will derive comfort from the thought that 'paralysation' is too strong a word to use—a supposition in which they would not be far wrong.

DISARMAMENT. FRESH POLISH DISCLOSURES.

Berlin, October 12, 1868.

PARIS telegrams ascribe to the Emperor Napoleon the intention of proposing a partial disarmament of the military Powers. There seems to be some foundation for this piece of intelligence. Finding his more enterprising projects seen through by Germany and marred by Spain, the Emperor contemplates an opposite course, and is anxious to prove to a relieved world the singleness of his de-

signs. Should the proposal, which is said to include a sort of Congress *ad hoc*, be really made, this Government will no doubt be happy to entertain and carry it out to the utmost compatible with the military system of the country. Beyond this they will probably not go. They will scarcely have any objection to increasing furloughs and putting off conscription, even more extensively than has been done; but they will keep up the *cadres* requisite to provide military training for most of the able-bodied men, and continue to educate the full complement of officers demanded by a war footing. They may reduce the line by shortening the term of service in peace, but they will jealously maintain the reserve at its full figure, so that they may face any emergency with undiminished strength. To do more, and modify the military organisation so as to render it less prolific in trained men, will in the eyes of this Government appear impossible. France's attitude during the last two years prevents any sweeping reductions in the army department. On this head the Prussian Government and people, much as the latter may groan under the military burden, are, I believe, agreed.

To hear the Prussians, their opinions on this interesting topic are a natural result of circumstances:

'France,' they say, 'and the Governments initiated into her scheme, may have suddenly assumed a more conciliatory bearing. But France only a few days ago was bent upon a mischievous course; if her schemes have of necessity been adjourned, this does not prove that they have been abandoned. The Poles, who in her German-Oriental plot were to play the ally, have in no way renounced their hopes.'

Views such as these are certainly supported by the attitude of the Polish press. The Lemberg and Cracow papers are as confident of war as ever. Just look at the language of the *Przeglad Polski*, the only Polish review extant, and the most cautious and solid of Polish periodicals:

'For the present, war is adjourned in consequence of Spanish events diverting France from German affairs. We have no sympathy with the

Government which has just been discomfited at Madrid, yet we cannot but look with fear and anxiety upon its successor, which, as it will be friendly to Prussia rather than France, enters into the composition of that political interest it behoves us to combat. War may be deferred for a while, but hardly for long. When it actually comes on, victory to France must be our most ardent desire; till then, to strengthen Austria is our most imperative duty. We are sure that our Deputies in the Vienna Parliament will be guided by these considerations, especially in all that regards the reorganisation of the army.'

The opinions enunciated by the Polish press are notoriously shared by the Polish public. At the dinner the Galician Deputies the other day gave to Count Goluchowski, the late Governor-General of their province, all were agreed as to the nearness of a French-Austrian attack of Russia and Prussia. To advert only to some of the speeches delivered on this occasion: Count Wodzicki insisted that to restore Poland was the mission providentially imposed upon Austria. War was imminent, when all Poles, whoever their actual masters, would side with the Kaiser. This sentiment M. de Grocholski improved upon, by observing that a strong Poland was as necessary to Austria as a strong Austria would be to Poland. He hoped that the day was not far distant, &c. Count Potocki described the Empress of Austria as the guardian angel of Poland. Her Majesty had been the sympathetic mediator between Galicia and her husband. She had contributed to collect the fuel, which some day would be kindled by an electric spark. With the assistance of Austria and her valiant allies, the Poles might hope to achieve an easy victory; without her they would have to wade through a sea of blood. M. de Skozynski then celebrated Count Goluchowski, the late Governor, who, though dismissed, was made so much of by the Kaiser, as the ablest champion of their national cause. Count Goluchowski himself, in a lengthy reply, while regretting that he had not been able to do more, exhorted his countrymen to continue in the path they had chosen, and pursue it with perseverance and wariness.

This will suffice. In estimating the value of such utterances, it may well be said that Poles will catch at a straw and build an aerial structure of any number of stories upon a hint, however ambiguous. Still it cannot be denied that in the present instance some solid foundation had been vouchsafed them, and that they are not so unreasonable in believing that a matter of this gravity, if once mooted, is not easily set aside for good and all.

The South German Governments are holding a military conference at Munich, to consult upon common arrangements to be adopted in their respective armies. This is the third conference of the kind within the last three years; yet, as things are, it can at best have but partial success. Where none will obey, but all are equally desirous to secure military independence, in case of events permitting a purely dynastic policy, no comprehensive agreement is possible. In Bavaria, the land of contrasts, whose Liberal and Protestant elements are pretty equally balanced by Ultramontane and Conservative ones, the Court can afford to put off decision. The Munich Cabinet is determined to support Prussia in nearly all possible contingencies. Republican Würtemberg will oppose constitutional and moderate Prussia as much as she can; while in Baden, where unity patriotism is paramount, people and Ministry agree that the only thing for them to do under the military treaties with this Government, is to go to war whenever the signal is given at Berlin.

Such being the diversified bias of the several Courts, it is not to be expected that the office of a commander of the Southern armies will be created, or an identical organisation of the Southern troops be resolved upon. After, as before, the conference, the Prussian system in its unrestricted entirety will prevail in Baden. In Würtemberg the army will continue to be less than half the number it would attain under Prussian regulations; in Bavaria the middle course recently adopted will no doubt be per-

severed in. To render inequalities still more palpable, Baden and Würtemberg are sure to retain the needle-gun, whereas Bavaria will not part with her own self-invented and much-beloved Podewils. The only points probably to be settled at Munich refer to the management of the South German fortresses and the eventual mobilisation of the South German troops. To provide for the former—beneficial to all, but too expensive for either singly—a common commission is likely to be instituted; to facilitate the latter, analogous arrangements are to be introduced, enabling the various armies to take the field simultaneously, should the policy of their respective Sovereigns happen to agree. The mobilisation plan, a work of the once Prussian now Baden General Beyer, is said to be modelled on the Berlin pattern. Awaiting the result, it will not be irrelevant to add a few political remarks to these military details.

Nothing would be more erroneous than to infer from what I have said that Prussia, in the event of war, will be probably deserted by the Southerners. Multifarious reasons render the reverse the more likely. There is that in the character of the German, be he labourer or prince, that will not admit of his giving in while there is a chance in his favour. While peace continues, the South German Courts are in a position to indulge their visions of an impossible independence. Every instinct of their nature would have to be changed before they could resolve to forego the pleasure of profiting by the opportunities thus thrown in their way. But in the event of war, the face of things would be metamorphosed in a twinkling. Whatever enticements might be held out, patriotism would become a potent force in the land, and the desire already so strong in their armies to fight on the German side would necessarily assert its sway. Prussia in such a contingency might also resort to means of persuasion different from what she is willing to use now. Thus, there is every prospect

that, however little in the way of unity may be effected at Munich, it will not amount to preparing the ground for actual disunion. As far as can be foreseen, the worst to be anticipated from the Munich Conference is, that it will prevent the Southern armies from becoming as numerically strong as they ought to be.

Some more particulars have been suffered to transpire about the cannon which performed such extraordinary feats at Tegel. It is Krupp's well-known 72-pounder, a cast-steel breech-loading gun, with an 8-inch bore, and a grenade of 200lb. The improvement which made it so formidable a weapon consists in the enlarging the chamber, which, instead of a charge of 14lb. as formerly, now admits one of 34lb. In addition to this the new barrels will be a foot and a half longer than the old ones, both being made secure by steel rings. The opening and closing contrivance at the breech, one of the features of the gun, has been likewise improved by the insertion of a conic wedge, said to answer admirably. In its new form the gun weighs 165 cwt. against 260 cwt. of the 9-inch Woolwich gun, and costs 13,000 thalers against 12,000 thalers, the price of Mr. Armstrong's cannon. The grenade, containing a charge of 4lb., an invention of Captain Gruson, is similar to the Palliser missile, but bursts only after having pierced through its resistant object. The gun, after the late trial, being considered superior to its English competitors, the King has ordered the whole of the Prussian navy to be furnished with it. There is not much on hand to discard, as, to give time to the maturing of experiments, the navy has been hitherto but scantily supplied with heavy artillery. To complete the equipment of ships, and provide for coast defences, still heavier cannon is to be cast after the manufacture of a certain number of 72-pounders. An enormous specimen has just been manufactured at Essen for the Russian Government. It has an 11-inch bore, a ball of 450lb., a charge of 70lb., and an incipient velocity

of 1,318 feet. Of the result of the 400 rounds lately discharged from this monster piece at Essen nothing has been made known in this country.

THE CZAR COMMENTS UPON THE AUSTRIAN IDEA OF UTILISING POLAND. THE ACTION OF THE BULGARIAN COMMITTEES SUSPENDED. HOLLAND, DENMARK, AND SWEDEN ASSUME A MORE FRIENDLY ATTITUDE TOWARDS GERMANY.

Berlin, October 17, 1868.

When a man has been obliged to tell an unpleasant tale, he is almost tempted to wish there should not be too many confirmations to it. Still, if they do arise, there is nothing but to chronicle them as they appear. A considerable portion of to-day's Letter will be again devoted to the thankless task of alleging additional proof that an understanding for a combined move against Russia and Prussia did exist. In unravelling the Austro-Franco-Polish design I have not yet recorded the fact, that when the Emperor of Austria gave up the contemplated trip which was to inaugurate the Polish revival, he, with one of those sudden revulsions not unfrequent in the diplomatic sphere, instead of opening the campaign against the Czar, sent off an adjutant to salute his Russian Majesty on the occasion of his stay at Warsaw. The Czar knew too well what a different course would have been pursued towards him by his imperial neighbour, had not the Spanish Revolution temporarily engrossed the attention of that France which had offered to assist the Kaiser in the enterprise, and probably urged him to it. The resentment felt at the unfriendly

design, and the satisfaction experienced at its accidental failure, were too powerful in the mind of Alexander II. to allow him to receive Austrian courtesy with a good grace. On General Prince Thurn and Taxis welcoming him in the name of the Kaiser, the Czar, in the presence of a numerous suite, could not restrain himself from answering in the following style. His Majesty said:

'Return to your Sovereign my thanks for the considerate politeness he has been pleased to accord me. I am glad his Majesty has desisted from his journey to Galicia. I have, as a matter of course, no right to express an opinion on the internal politics of Austria. However, if that journey had been undertaken, not for purposes of internal interest, but as a political demonstration against myself, it would have scarcely left me indifferent (*il m'eût difficilement trouvé indifférent*).'

The last few words were delivered in a raised tone. General Thurn, feeling things had gone too far to be smoothed over, and that an explanation was deliberately brought on, calmly bowed to the reproach, and asked as pointedly as etiquette permitted, 'Sire, am I to understand that I am charged to communicate these words to my Sovereign?' '*Comme il plaira à Monsieur*,' was the curt reply; which finished the audience.

The news of this reception of the imperial messenger had probably reached Galicia before Saturday last, when Prince Sapieha closed the local Parliament of the province in the name of the Kaiser. The speech he delivered was evidently based on the supposition that the Kaiser wished him to defy the Czar, and would himself do the like as soon as circumstances permitted. He, the Kaiser's nominee, had no hesitation in saying:

'Galicia wanted a more independent position than it now enjoyed. The Kaiser was favourably disposed towards them. Whatever had occurred the last few days, they would soon have Count Goluchowski, the chosen representative of their national aspirations, restored to them as Governor-General, nor would the Kaiser's visit to his Polish subjects be long delayed.'

Pending these events, the policy which caused such

sanguine hopes to be raised at Lemberg has in no way been affected by the resignation of Count Goluchowski. It is not only persevered in by the imperial authorities in Galicia, but continues to be directed by a nobleman the *alter ego* of the former Governor-General, and able coadjutor in all his plans. It is only natural that details such as these should be noted here with vigilant eye. After what has come and gone, they are necessarily construed into a wish to carry out at a more opportune moment what has been inevitably postponed now.

What I have said about the Bulgarian share in the business has likewise been farther corroborated. The Bucharest *Narodnost* ('Nationality') has printed the full text of the Bulgarian petition presented to Prince Napoleon during his stay in the Danubian Principalities. That paper being written in Bulgaria but conceived in France, it is the more probable that the petition was not drawn up without the sanction of the eminent traveller just mentioned. Were any more proof needed that France had a hand in the Bulgarian insurrection, it would be supplied by the following extract from the Cracow *Czas:*

'The action of the Bulgarian committees in the Danubian Principalities has been entirely suspended, and there is nothing to be heard of fresh bands preparing to cross the Danube. Since the moment that the idea of a winter campaign on the Rhine has been abandoned, Bulgarian disturbances have become not only useless, but, by creating a premature entanglement on the Danube, might be absolutely prejudicial.'

None were to play a more important part in the scheme than the Czartoryski faction of the Poles, and no paper represents the doings of that faction more faithfully than the *Czas.* Here, then, we have it fully admitted by the avowed allies of Napoleon III. that, like themselves, the Bulgarians were to be used as a means of keeping Russia occupied during the contemplated campaign on the Rhine. In a previous Letter I have observed that the frankness of the Polish press in openly avowing the in-

trigue after it has had to be postponed must be ascribed to a wish to convince their countrymen of the inevitability of the delay.

Such being the phenomena of the political horizon in the far East, we shall not be far wrong in coupling with them some remarkable incidents that have simultaneously occurred in South, West, and North.

In the fortnight preceding the Spanish outbreak, General Dumont, the commandant of the French forces at Rome, repeatedly offered to arm the Papal troops with the chassepot, 'as there might be work to do.' Though he knew that the Remington rifle had been ordered by the Head of the Church, and that a quantity were to be delivered in a few weeks, he pressed his proposal upon Cardinal Antonelli, insisting that a general conflict was close at hand. In these representations he was seconded by M. Armand, the French Chargé d'Affaires, who likewise spoke of a Continental war as unavoidable. Since the landing of Marshal Serrano at Cadiz, both have ceased to dwell upon the necessity of placing a more deadly weapon in the hands of the soldiers of Christ's Vicegerent.

Next, the Dutch-Prussian misunderstanding has been likewise set at rest since that tranquillising event in Mediterranean waters. As some of your readers may remember, a couple of months ago the States bordering on the Rhine held one of their usual conferences at Düsseldorf. All being equally interested in keeping the river navigable, it is essential their representatives should meet from time to time and concert common measures for a common purpose. On the present occasion a proposal was submitted by the Prussian representative, in lieu of some expiring agreement, that before constructing any works on or near the river, any member of the Conference should be bound to obtain the consent of the rest. Though this was only what practically, at any rate, had been complied

with by all present for some time past, the Dutch member declined the proposal. The Dutch papers, pretending to be afraid of Prussia, insisted that no concession should be made which might enable this aspiring Government to interfere with their arrangements for flooding the country in time of invasion; and the Dutch Cabinet sent a memorandum to the Conference confirming the refusal of their representative in so many words. All endeavours to adjust the difference being in vain, the Conference was eventually adjourned. But the same touch with the magic wand which has changed the aspect of European politics during the last two weeks has been also felt at Amsterdam. It is understood that the Dutch Government have waived their objections, and that the Conference will shortly reassemble to take note of the tardy assent.

Lastly, in the speech with which King Christian of Denmark recently opened his Parliament, the betrothal of his Crown Prince to the only daughter of the King of Sweden and Norway was alluded to in terms suggestive of the hope of a permanent alliance between the three Scandinavian kingdoms. It is well known that within the last six weeks such an alliance has been recommended to the Courts of Copenhagen and Stockholm by France, to be used as a strengthening of Denmark in the probable event of her seconding a French attack on Germany. When King Christian delivered his speech, things in Spain having already assumed a very ominous look, his language was cautious and measured. In the short interval which elapsed between this and the delivery of another speech from the throne in the neighbouring kingdom of Norway, events had so far developed that the very name of Denmark was omitted by his Swedo-Norwegian Majesty. All which points the same moral, that the peace of Europe depends on the humour of France, or, as the proud French version has it, '*Si la France est satisfaite, l'Europe est tranquille.*'

An autograph letter of the Pope has been delivered by special messenger to King William of Prussia. What the contents may be is unknown. They can scarcely refer to the invitation addressed by him to all Protestants to bow to his authority, so that they may avoid his curse. The established church in Prussia has been so incensed by his calling them his erring children, that, by order of the Central Consistory, a declaration will be read to-morrow from the pulpit in all churches and chapels of this country declining the invitation, and repelling the arrogance with which it is accompanied.

The South German States have agreed upon a common plan of mobilisation. It is not to be divulged, being, as in Prussia, considered a State secret.

THE NORTH SCHLESWIG QUESTION.

Berlin, October 24, 1868.

DIPLOMATIC rumours reaching us from Paris represent the Emperor Napoleon as still brooding over a proposal of disarmament, and the war party endeavouring to mar his idea by the demand that its execution should be preceded by the cession of Northern Schleswig to Denmark. Were such a claim actually preferred, it is easy to see what would follow. The promise to cede a portion of Schleswig having been given to Austria, not to France, the right of the latter to interfere would be denied by this Government, and no discussion admitted. Even supposing that in the interest of peace a gentler answer were returned, no parley could be of any avail while the Danish demands remain what they are. It is well known what occurred last summer, when, to redeem her pledge, Prussia conferred with Denmark on the extent of territory to be

restored. Denmark insisted that about one-half the Duchy, including Düppel-Alsen, the only strategical position in it, should be given up. Prussia retorted, that

'She could not be expected to cede those important heights she had twice taken at the expense of so much blood. In 1863 she had run the risk of a war with France and England rather than leave Düppel in Danish hands. Would she now evacuate the coveted position, when it was her own at last, when the Duchy could not be defended without it, and when there was nothing in her promise to justify the construction that it ought to be ceded? Far from being equitable, such an interpretation'—it was held at Berlin—'would be most arbitrary. In the treaty of Prague, Prussia had certainly engaged to yield "the northern districts of Schleswig;" but Düppel was situate in the centre rather than in the north. Again, as the cession was avowedly to be made in deference to the nationality principle, would it be justifiable that a district in which the educated classes were mainly German should be handed over to Denmark, because the humbler portion of the inhabitants were Danish?'

To these Prussian representations Denmark replied by simply reiterating her demand. Even though Count Bismarck, in the sitting of the Federal Parliament, on March 17th, declared that this Government would never accept a frontier which might entail the necessity of conquering Düppel once again, Denmark would not come to terms, but, as before, wanted all or nothing. To make bad worse, the Danish Minister of War, while negotiations were still pending, at a public banquet and in the presence of his King, gave as a toast, 'The recovery of our lost provinces.' After this the negotiations naturally came to a standstill; and the Luxemburg affair having just then revealed the ungracious disposition of France towards this country, it was pretty generally inferred in our political circles that the Copenhagen politics were due to promptings from Paris. It was but reasonable to think that, but for the hope of a Continental war, Denmark would have been glad to take what she could get; while, on the other hand, if France harboured warlike designs, as there was ground to fear she did, she must prefer keeping open a question which, while it remained unsettled, was pretty

sure to secure her the alliance of Denmark in a German campaign.

This latter anticipation the French war party now seem intent upon realising. Indeed, could they induce their Sovereign to make the proposal of disarmament, clogging it with the qualification above mentioned, they would not only have engaged the services of Denmark, but might also have succeeded in accelerating, as far as in them lay, the opportunity for using them. Fortunately, the resolutions of the French Government are not swayed by the representatives of one party alone. In giving their advice the more temperate men in the Cabinet will be powerfully assisted by a reference to the change which has come over the situation of Europe since the Spanish revolution. In Denmark too people are by no means agreed on the subject of war. However ardently desired by the educated classes, a Schleswig campaign has numerous opponents among the country people. This was proved a few days ago by a circumstance connected with the address of the Rigsdag in reply to the speech from the throne. A distant allusion to foreign politics *à la Française* occurring in the draft was enough to make the 'peasant party,' who form a third of the House, vote against it.

COUNT BEUST SHADOWING FORTH THE CONTINGENCY OF A FRENCH-PRUSSIAN COLLISION.

Berlin, October 28, 1868.

It may not be uninteresting to note that the Eastern intelligence recently contributed by me has not called forth a single contradiction in the German, Russian, Polish, Bulgarian, Roumanian, Servian, and Croatian press. As far as I have seen, the same remark equally refers to the

Vienna and Magyar papers, which, with the Polish, are the most interested in the question.

The *Nord Deutsche Zeitung*, a semi-official organ of the Berlin Cabinet, looks upon the language employed by Baron Beust in a parliamentary committee as rather disquieting. Indeed, his Excellency has spoken of the contingency of a French-Prussian collision as so very possible that the Polish papers can do no less than regard their sanguine anticipations as in a fair way of being realised. Nor is the latest intelligence from France the most reassuring. The map shadowing forth the political redivision of Europe which Louis Napoleon thought it incumbent upon him to publish, and the provoking commentaries with which it has been accompanied by *La France* and his other organs, have been noticed as so many signs that the petty annoyances long indulged in, and only a few weeks ago interrupted by the Spanish rebellion, are again to be had recourse to. It is not unnatural that, in reply to the menaces uttered, the Prussian papers should assure their French contemporaries that this Government, whether voluntarily or not, will cross the Main before the world is very many years older. The thing is certainly not now intended by the Prussian Cabinet, and, if carried out at all under the present aspect of affairs, will be forced upon it by foreign hostility; but who knows what French affronts may ultimately result in? Were it not that the French semi-official papers delight in the *rôle* of *agents provocateurs*, it would be the height of imprudence on their part to goad the Germans into a state of mind which cannot but ultimately react upon the Berlin Government.

COUNT BEUST *versus* LORD STANLEY.

Berlin, October 31, 1868.

WHEN Baron Beust, in his recent speech on the army budget, represented the general situation of the Continent as rather critical, a member got up and not unreasonably reminded him of the different picture drawn the other day by Lord Stanley. The Austrian Premier replied:

'My position differs materially from that of the English Secretary of State. Lord Stanley is the Minister of a country surrounded and protected by the sea; I have the honour of directing the affairs of a State which has every reason to beware of its neighbours. We should, of course, be glad to be on friendly terms with Prussia, and are even endeavouring to improve our relations with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. But, as I said, we must be on our guard, though there is nothing to excite our immediate fears.'

These words, and the still more forcible illustrations with which they were accompanied, seem to have given offence here. *Zeidler's Correspondenz*, a semi-official, or, more correctly, a confidential organ of the Berlin authorities, does not scruple to answer the implied apprehensions of the Austrian Premier in this wise:

'We had better not listen to all Baron Beust has got to say. It is quite true, however, that if he will not leave off speechifying, the day may arrive when we shall have to give him a direct rejoinder. But then we shall again have to select the taciturn Moltke for our spokesman.'

To enable the reader to understand the wrath which has inspired these lines, I had better quote a short passage from the Vienna *Presse;* a paper whose editor is the nominee, and of his many semi-official colleagues perhaps the most faithful mouthpiece of the Austrian Government. The representative passage is as follows:

'That Austria's military preparations are merely defensive must be plain to any one that is not wilfully blind. To assume the contrary is simply to offend against common sense, or to enact over again the old

story of the lamb and the wolf. But of course we owe it to our own interests not to allow ourselves to be netted and bagged. Our rival is showing an unmistakable intention of reviving the Oriental question to enable him to cross the Main. It is this policy which encourages Russia to assume a haughty and menacing attitude towards Western Europe, and which is evidently intent on encompassing Austria with flames of revolutionary fire, from the Red Tower Pass to the Alps,—from the River Save to the Bocca di Cattaro.'

The accusation here preferred was also more or less plainly indicated in the speech of Baron Beust. Now, it is stoutly maintained at Berlin, that unless offensive war against this country figured among the eventualities in the Vienna programme, no such apprehensions would be expressed by Austrian Ministers and ministerial editors. The fable of the wolf and the lamb cited by the Viennese in their own behalf is here likewise applied to the case, but with this difference, that the Berliners assert themselves to be the calumniated and ill-used party. It is declared that to charge Prussia with any immediate intention of crossing the Main is a perversion of facts indisputable in themselves, and notorious to every one. Prussia, it is alleged in proof of this, not only declined to admit Baden to the Confederacy, but even gave the Bavarian overtures such a chilling reception as to force the Munich Cabinet to change its policy from unifying to particularist. Again, Prussia yielded to France rather than make the Luxemburg question a cause of war, than which none better could have served her purpose in point of time and patriotic zest, had she been intent upon 'completing her mission.' This Government, therefore, as it is not in a hurry to effect the reunion of all Germany, can have no reason for setting the East on fire. Instead of making any such attempt, about a year ago, when Russia wished them to enter into a compact by which the one was to cross the Danube and the other the Main, the Berlin Cabinet positively declined to embark in the venture. If the worst accusations are, notwithstanding, perpetually brought against their Cabinet, the Berliners

believe themselves justified in concluding that those charges are made, to serve as a peg on which to hang something more tangible, should circumstances permit. I should add, that, despite all this, the general aspect of affairs is regarded here as not disquieting; but if they look forward to the future with comparative tranquillity, the Berliners persistently maintain that they are indebted for the safety they enjoy not to the friendly disposition, but to the internal and external difficulties impeding the action of their neighbours.

I say neighbours, because France in these considerations is invariably coupled with Austria. Baron Beust, in his speech, is known to have alluded to the necessity of being well prepared in case a profitable alliance offered; France, on the other hand, has been ascertained to have modified her Italian policy, and befriended King Victor Emmanuel the moment the defalcation of Spain made it impossible for her to fetter Florence with the assistance of Madrid, in the event of a Rhenish campaign. Is Florence, then, it is asked, to be made innocuous? Is France under the necessity of purchasing the goodwill of Italy, if she cannot coerce her? Is the contingency she had in view when engaging Queen Isabella to occupy Rome still so very possible, that Italian neutrality has to be bargained for as soon as the chance of exacting it has disappeared? With these questions debated over and over again, it is only natural that the whole policy of France should be scanned with unceasing vigilance. It is noted that the officers of the Garde Mobile have been appointed in the eastern Departments, though no such order has been as yet given for the western. French Government papers had announced beforehand that such would be the case, it being imperative to provide for the defence of the East. Then there is that ingenious map of the Emperor Napoleon's —a plaything for grown-up children, as some papers call it, an insolent provocation of Germany, according to others.

The latter view, which is rather frequently uttered, mainly rests upon the Emperor's looking upon the present division of Germany as an arrangement not to be altered against his will. His ludicrous idea of representing the harmless cities of Cösfeld, Münster, &c. as fortresses, which they ceased to be 200 years ago, is found to savour of M. de Girardin, whose warlike eagerness recently promoted a host of German market-towns to the dignity of strongholds menacing the security of France.

The King of Bavaria has withdrawn the pension granted by his father, and hitherto continued by himself, to the poet Geibel, the accusation against the delinquent being, that he has written certain verses in which he greets the King of Prussia as the head of all Germany. Geibel being one of the most celebrated poets Germany ever produced, the behaviour of his Bavarian Majesty has awakened pungent criticism, and is regretted even by the Bavarian press. The unpleasantness arising to the King out of the matter is great. Owing to the treatment awarded his colleague, Herr Heyse, another poet pensioned by Maximilian II., has felt himself compelled to resign his salary, on the ground that he 'shares the political convictions of the disgraced one.' Public opinion expects their loss will be compensated to them by the King of Prussia.

The ex-Elector of Cassel having chosen to publish a memorial in which Prussia is charged with treachery for putting an end to his rule, this Government has determined to apply to him the process pursued in the case of the King of Hanover, and sequester all his property they can lay their hands on. The conduct of the ex-Elector is the more unjustifiable, as he has concluded a special treaty with this Government, transferring his sovereign rights, and receiving compensation in their stead. A bill ordering the sequestration will be shortly laid before the Prussian Landtag.

RUSSIA'S REPLY TO COUNT BEUST. THE GERMAN UNITY PARTY BEGINS TO STIR.

Berlin, November 4, 1868.

To modify the impression made by his speech in the Army Committee, Herr von Beust has made another address to the same body, which, however, does not seem to have got into the telegrams. This time he declared he required an army of nearly a million to keep Russia in check in the event of a war between Prussia and France. The avowal was made without reserve, and has not failed to elicit a reply. In Berlin the ministerial press regard it as a virtual declaration of war on the part of the Vienna Cabinet; in St. Petersburg the Foreign Office paper has been made to announce, in acknowledgment of the Austrian plain-speaking, that a French invasion of Germany would bring Russia into the field, at least if it led to dangerous results. Let us look a little closer into the opinions prevalent in both capitals.

In Berlin it is taken for granted, that when making his utterance Baron Beust was aware of what Russia would do in the presumed contingency. Supposing it to be generally admitted that Russia, for reasons connected with her Oriental policy, cannot afford to see Prussia humbled, or, what is the same, Austria raised to a dominant position, people are fain to assert that an intervention foreseen by all must have been equally anticipated by the Austrian Premier. If he nevertheless said that he would force Russia to remain neutral, Baron Beust, it is argued, deliberately implied that he meant to side against this Government in the event of a Franco-German conflict. What is thus determined by inference is thought to be likewise corroborated by the undisguised admissions of the party accused. It so happens that the construction put

upon those portentous speeches by the Vienna *Presse*, Baron Beust's own organ, is the most disquieting yet published. The *Presse* says:

'Those speeches were of an eminently pacific character. There could be no peace without a due balance of power. Prussia having disturbed that balance, it was evident that if Austria armed with a view to restore it, the policy of the imperial Cabinet was in keeping with the interests of order and tranquillity. That such a policy should be pursued was the more necessary from the Berlin appetite not being yet appeased. Not content with what she had got, Prussia was anxious to cross the Main, and, as she could not do this without Russian assistance, had handed over the East to the tender mercies of the Czar. The liberty of the Continent was consequently imperilled, and upon Austria devolved the task of protecting it.'

There is certainly not much of the interpreter's skill required to see hostile intentions revealed in these significant lines. But can the writer be in earnest, or is it merely intended at Vienna to imitate a game so long indulged in by the ministerial papers in France? Is it the only purport of these suspicious utterances to amuse the natives and annoy foreigners? These questions are universally asked here. I am, however, glad to perceive that influential people, however irritated by what they are fain to set down as *malice prepense*, yet decline to be disquieted by it. In their eyes, and I believe in the eyes of the Government too, Austria is at present impotent to act out the programme attributed to her, and in perplexing this Cabinet cannot be assumed to have any more serious intention than to appear dignified to the gossiping public. Such being the opinions entertained here, I might as well have refrained from alluding to the subject, were it not that I have ideas of my own touching the wisdom of treating a rival to ominous predictions. While Austria has not yet got together her 800,000 men, her prophecies, unpalatable though they be, will be made light of; but if, by persisting in them, she should succeed in convincing people that she will carry out her vaticinations as soon as

she can, it is just possible that she will not be allowed to choose her own time.

As regards Russian feeling, we may divine it from the sensational article in the *Journal de St. Petersbourg*, the gist of which has just been telegraphed to the four corners of the world. It has the form, unusual in a Russian paper of this nature, of a letter to the editor. The sentiments to be expressed being of such an extraordinary kind, it was probably thought advisable to give them as irresponsible a shape as possible. The letter, which occupies no less than five columns, begins by asserting—

'That the nations of Europe being all favourable to peace war has become improbable. In the East it could be brought on only by the arbitrary intervention of one or more Powers; in Italy the danger of an outbreak has been diminished by the Spanish rebellion, and the hope with which it has inspired the people of compassing their national aims without having recourse to arms. But there is the contingency of a war between Germany and France. Is the Schleswig question likely to precipitate it? No. If the worst come to the worst, Prussia might remove that bone of contention by settling with Denmark in the eleventh hour. Or is the line of the Main to furnish the necessary pretext? Hardly. However probable has become the reunion of all Germany at some future day, Prussia is not in a hurry to accelerate the event, and will not certainly have resort to force to bring it about. France therefore, were she ever to attempt to prevent it, would have to face all Germany—a prospect which cannot but deter her from the enterprise. Nor can France count upon the alliance of Belgium and Holland. The former is desirous to maintain neutrality; the latter not in a position to lift a finger against Prussia.

Still, supposing, for argument's sake, that all these dangers and difficulties did not prevent the Emperor Napoleon from trying his luck, he would soon have to deal with more than Germany. Were he to penetrate victoriously to the Rhine, he would stir up the Grand Duchy of Posen, and cause the excitement to extend to the kingdom of Poland. In such an event, the Russian army would have to watch over the preservation of order and quiet. There is not at the present moment much love lost between the Russians and Germans; but, were the French armies to march into Germany, the memory of old alliances would waken at Berlin and St. Petersburg, the public mind would be inflamed with military ardour, and the Governments would be urged by their own subjects to hinder one single Power from aspiring to a dominant position

in Europe. Add to this, that, even were France to overcome all resistance, and carry everything before her, Germany would still remain too strong to acquiesce in the terms of a humiliating peace for any length of time; and where would then be the use of France's having ventured upon such a war at all? Louis Napoleon therefore can hardly be supposed to be contemplating hostilities. For him, as for the other Sovereigns, it would be better to disarm. This may be a pious wish unlikely of fulfilment just at present; but the day will come when Governments will learn that the axiom, *si vis pacem, para bellum*, is antiquated.'

As the reader will not fail to discover from this short summary, there are two different ingredients mixed up in the article. The one is the reply to Herr von Beust; the other, miscellaneous and humanitarian matter, is apparently destined to modify the import of the graver passages, and give an unofficial air to the whole. Yet the fact of an article like this having appeared in the Russian Foreign Office journal is a host in itself.

Having said so much about the reception given to Austrian intimations by Cabinets, I may put in a few words upon the feelings roused in the people—the German people, I mean.

The anticipation repeatedly expressed by me, that unless foreign opposition to the North German Confederacy be discontinued, there will be a cry to admit the South, and raise the country to a strength that would free it from the danger of attack, is getting nearer fulfilment. A few days ago Herr Lasker, a leader of the moderate Liberals—the party on whose parliamentary support the Government mainly relies—delivered a speech before his constituents in which the following passages occur:

'And I must now declare it radically wrong to decline admitting to the North German Confederacy any South German State asking for this benefit. I do not for a moment deny that, were we to receive Baden into the Confederacy, war with France might be the immediate consequence. Never till a South German State joins us will it be decided whether the mysterious man at Paris will allow the destinies of Germany to be consummated without unjustifiable interference. Many as have been the pacific assurances exchanged between Berlin and Paris, everything remains

in a state of suspense till this has been tried. It is my opinion that, notwithstanding the manifest danger attending the step, it would be both wrong and impolitic on our part to allow ourselves to be dissuaded by the objections of foreign Cabinets. Not only would it be more dignified to carry out the promise given by Count Bismarck, that the appeal to fear will never find an echo in the German heart, but our material interests alike demand that a stop should at length be put to the uncertainties of the present situation. I can understand that a man in the position of Count Bismarck, burdened as he is with the responsibility of his office, is not inclined to run the risk of a terrible international collision, merely to increase the Confederacy by a small portion of the South. But the advantage to be reaped is not so much the reunion of Baden with the bulk of the nation as the assertion of our rights, and the decision of the momentous question pending between ourselves and France. If the Chancellor of the Confederacy has no wish to take the responsibility of the ordeal upon himself, it is all the more incumbent upon the German people to raise their voice and loudly declare that they do not shun war for such a reward. I should like to wander from town to town, and to call meetings in each one, to bear testimony that we are resolved to arrange our own affairs, in spite of the protest of an overbearing neighbour.

As I said, ideal and material interests combine to urge us to a speedy decision. We are groaning under a military budget which taxes our resources to the utmost. We, as well as the minor States, being obliged to apply every available penny to military purposes, are no longer in a position to provide for the pacific and more essential purposes of the State. Our civil officials are miserably underpaid; our roads, nay our very schools, are sinking for want of funds; while as to science and art, we have simply given up all hope of endowing them as they ought to be. Business, too, is slack. Such a state of things is unbearable. We have a right to ask that it should be superseded by another more worthy of ourselves. The time has arrived when we wish to devote ourselves to the avocations of peace, to diminish our armaments, reduce our expenditure, and enjoy the blessings of a safe and respected place among the nations. As soon as all Germany is united, it will be strong enough to guarantee the maintenance of peace both to itself and all Western Europe. Frivolous menaces will disappear before the reëstablishment of unity; and the torch of internecine war, so often lighted by reckless hands on the Seine, will be quenched for ever. Let us set to work, then, and achieve our purpose.'

Herr Lasker being one of the most influential as well as most moderate Liberal members both in the Prussian and Federal Parliaments, we must prepare to hear his sentiments reëchoed in the impending sitting of the Landtag.

I do not think that the Government are at all likely to take the cue, and to be carried away by patriotic though rather venturesome demands; but foreign opposition may hasten on the day when they will find it impossible to resist the public voice. People are becoming impatient of a state of things in which they are obliged to keep up a huge army merely to be told daily by foreign ministers and editors, that the time is drawing near when they will be put down. Could they have purchased tranquillity by moderation, they would have been well content to defer the reunion of all Germany to an indefinite time; as it is, they are beginning to ask themselves whether it would not be more advantageous from a purely pecuniary point of view to fight it out at once.

This afternoon the sitting of the Prussian Landtag was opened with the ordinary ceremonies, the King delivering the speech from the throne in the absence of Count Bismarck, still detained by ill-health at his country seat. As was to be expected, the speech is all in favour of peace, and, excepting a few ironical allusions, scarcely condescends to notice the innuendoes of foreign critics. That these allusions have reference to would-be adversaries, besides being plain enough in itself, is confirmed by an article in to-day's official *Provinzial Correspondenz.*

ANOTHER AUSTRIAN MINISTER HOLDS FORTH ON THE STATE OF EUROPE.

Berlin, November 21, 1868.

THE Prussian papers are filled with comments on the speech of Dr. Giskra, the Austrian Minister of Internal Affairs, delivered on the 11th instant in the Vienna Parliament. To render an army of 800,000 men less objection-

able to the reluctant members, the Minister said that 'to maintain such a force for several years would entail financial ruin on the monarchy. Such was his opinion, as well as that of his colleagues. But the present state of Europe could not last for any length of time.' Supposing, then, a retributive policy to be pursued by Austria against this Cabinet, it is obvious that by her own showing she has not much time to lose. Let the truth be what it may, I believe there is not a statesman in Berlin but is convinced that Austria is meditating attack. Whatever the policy and speeches of Baron Beust may be meant to convey, it is to be regretted they should have resulted in producing this impression. If they did not doubt the ability of their defeated rival to carry out the designs attributed to him, people here would regard the situation as very critical indeed.

Geibel, the poet discarded by the King of Bavaria for his Prussian propensities, has received a Prussian pension of as many thalers (1000) as he before had Bavarian guldens. To reward him even more signally for his patriotic ardour, he will have the refusal of the first Professorship of Literature that shall become vacant in a Prussian University. He has been also invited by the Grand Duke of Weimar, the generous patron of poetry and art, to grace the Thuringian Court by his presence for an unlimited period. The latter invitation has been likewise extended to the poet Heyse, who resigned his Munich emolument when Geibel fell into disgrace.

THE RUSSIAN 'INVALIDE' ON LORD STANLEY'S SPEECH.

Berlin, November 24, 1868.

THAT portion in Lord Stanley's speech which relates to foreign affairs is thus commented upon in the *St. Petersburg Invalide*, the organ of the Russian War Office:

'Lord Stanley's speech certainly belongs to the most remarkable utterances of modern English statesmen. What distinguishes it most is the tone of frankness and candour pervading it from beginning to end; a peculiarity not always to be found in diplomatists. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs has reviewed nearly all the most important political questions of the day. Adhering to the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of Germany, he remains true to the same creed elsewhere, and abstains from all interference with the East. This is the first time that the aspirations of Eastern Christianity have been adverted to in such equitable language by an English politician. It is true, it was high time to renounce the idea that Turkey was a strong and respectable State, full of inherent vitality, if only protected against the mischievous designs of foreign enemies. Lord Stanley has at length made up his mind to avow the real state of the case; a great merit for a man of his class. The deduction to be drawn from his words is, that the principle of non-interference will be at length fully acknowledged with regard to the East. Should this turn out so, should Europe make up her mind to abstain from undue intermeddling with Eastern development, she will be resorting to the safest means of escaping the troubles which will otherwise inevitably befall her. The moment the Turkish Government is left face to face with its Christian subjects without the hope of foreign assistance in the hour of need, it will be obliged to make them concessions, calculated to guarantee their independent and pacific progress. Should the Turkish Government even then continue in the path along which it is now moving with so much obstinacy, and should its own shortsightedness result in exciting agitation, Europe, by keeping in the background, would at least confine the troubles of Turkey within the confines of Turkey.'

Similar opinions have been expressed by other Russian papers. Upon the whole, however, I should be inclined to say that in Germany as well as in the neighbouring empire of the Slavonian race the tone of the press, in adverting to Lord Stanley's Eastern politics, has been one of incredulous surprise rather than grateful acknowledgment of the

impartiality evinced. The sympathies the noble lord manifested with the cause of German unity meet with a ready response in the German press, the Republican, Ultramontane, and Austrian journals alone excepted.

AUSTRIA CHARGING PRUSSIA WITH ENCOURAGING A ROUMANIAN UNITY MOVEMENT.

Berlin, December 2, 1868.

THE Austrian Red-book has occasioned not a few angry articles in this country. To judge from the language of the ministerial press, the Prussian Government seem to be more than ever convinced that the Powers dominant at Vienna will subject them to hostile demonstrations, while there is no opportunity for war, and to actual war, were the opportunity to occur. What else, it is urged, can be the object of Baron Beust in publishing a despatch in which he suggests that France would be justified in attacking this monarchy on the score of Schleswig? What else can he mean by divulging a communication to his representative in London, in which he ascribes to this Government the intention of strengthening its position in Germany by letting Roumania loose against Austria in the East? Of all the charges preferred against Prussia in the Red-book this particular one, being seemingly rendered plausible by the circumstance of a Hohenzollern reigning in Roumania, has been perhaps the most sensibly felt. You are aware that the charge has been met with a flat and indignant denial. Not content with this, the Prussian Government have proved by act and deed that there is no occasion for these reckless innuendoes. By threatening to recall their Consul they have forced the Roumanian Cabinet out of office, and obtained the appointment of another and less popular administration, which cannot be suspected of an

intention to annex their co-nationalists in Austro-Hungary. This stroke of policy, in which Bismarck's usual resolution comes out as markedly as ever, has been preceded by sundry articles in the semi-official organs assuring Hungary that Prussia does not care a bit for Roumania, and that she must be mad to sacrifice the valuable friendship of Pesth for the useless support of poor tottering Bucharest. As the Austrian accusation is supposed to have been preferred for the purpose of setting Hungary against this Government—a purpose, by the way, which has been but too well attained, if the language of the Hungarian press reflects the opinion of the country—people here are not a little curious to see how the blow will be parried at Vienna.

In the mean time universal satisfaction is experienced at the reply given by Lord Stanley to the Austrian insinuations, made public in the Red-book. From all I hear and see, I cannot but be convinced that the noble lord was perfectly right in thinking that Prussia has no wish to cross the Main just now, and consequently can have no motive for disquieting Austria in any quarter. Were there, after the many already vouchsafed, any farther proof needed of the cautious and abstinent policy pursued by Count Bismarck since the restoration of peace, it would have been afforded by a meeting which the leaders of the Liberal party in Baden held two days ago at Offenburg. This meeting had been specially summoned to discuss the propriety of continuing general conscription introduced a year ago. Their hopes of being admitted to the Northern Confederacy having been dashed to the ground, the Baden Liberals assembled to consider whether their military preparations might not as well be suspended, seeing Prussia chose to leave Germany divided, rather than irritate France by union. After deploring the want of patriotic ambition, which they thought they descried in the conduct of this

Government, the meeting eventually resolved that the framework of the new military arrangements should be maintained, but the people be relieved of a useless burden by granting furlough to large numbers.

Before quitting the subject, I may observe that the words uttered by Baron Beust with regard to Galicia in the Red-book expressly sanction the Polish policy embarked on under his auspices by the Governors-General of that province. The words are these: 'The question of Polish autonomy from the very outset appeared to be one of political opportunity, and has been treated as such.' In other words, Austria will confer upon Galicia the degree of independence necessary to convert that country into a weapon of offence against Russia. Using such language after his recent mishaps, the Chancellor of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy is naturally supposed to be still canvassing for Polish revolutionary support in the event of a war against the two Northern Powers.

Nor is the news reaching us from France of a much more comforting character. The Marquis de Bonneville, the new French Minister at Rome, has advised the Pope to make concessions to Italy, lest he should be obliged to accord greater ones on the outbreak of a German war, when France would be no longer able to protect him against his covetous neighbour. Of course this does not necessarily imply that France means to go to war; but it betrays a provoking indifference to the feelings of this Government, and a determination to persist in the worrying system indulged in for the last two years.

COUNT BISMARCK'S REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN CHARGE. EXPLOSIVE BULLET TREATY.

Berlin, December 5, 1868.

THAT the Bratiano Cabinet at Bucharest have been turned out of office by the Prussian Government threatening to recall their representatives, is a fact, notwithstanding its having been contradicted by a semi-official paper of this capital. That Cabinet having sympathised with the grievances of the three millions of Roumanians living on Austrian territory, Baron Beust denounced their policy as a consequence of encouragement received from Prussia, who, he said, was anxious to create a new enemy for Austria on her eastern flank. To clear himself from this imputation, and give an earnest of his pacific sentiments, Count Bismarck resorted to the strongest pressure at his command, and actually effected a change of Ministers at Bucharest. The new Ministers appointed by Prince Charles belong to the Boyard party, and, being opposed on principle to the liberal spirit which has pervaded the administration of their predecessors, cannot be suspected of sympathising with, or being likely to enlist the sympathies of, their Roumanian co-nationalists on Austrian soil. Exercised though it was in the cause of peace and amity, still it was only natural that the influence this Government had on the ministerial crisis on the Lower Danube should not be openly avowed. Prussia has evidently every wish to prove to Austria her anxiety to remain on good terms with her; but, having misgivings of her own as to the intentions of Austria, she will scarcely deem it to her advantage to offend the Roumanians.

The following is the text of the explosive bullet treaty just signed at St. Petersburg by the representatives of Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, England, France,

Greece, Holland, Italy, Persia, Portugal, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Würtemberg:

'Considering that the progress of civilisation ought to result in diminishing as much as possible the sufferings inseparable from war; that the only legitimate object pursued in war is to weaken the force of the enemy; that to attain this it suffices to place as many men as possible *hors de combat;* that to make use of expedients which shall unnecessarily aggravate the wounds of the men placed *hors de combat,* or entail inevitable death, is incompatible with the before-mentioned object; that to make use of such expedients would, moreover, be contrary to the teachings of humanity:

The undersigned, in virtue of the instructions given them by their Governments, are authorised to declare as follows:

1. The contracting parties engage, in the event of war between any of them, to abstain from the use of missiles of any description possessing explosive power, or filled with explosive or inflammable material, weighing less than 400 grammes. This restriction to apply to the army and navy alike.

2. They likewise invite all those States not represented at the deliberations of the Military Commission assembled at St. Petersburg to subscribe to this mutual engagement.

3. In the event of war, this engagement is to be observed only towards the contracting parties, and those that may subsequently subscribe to it. It need not be observed towards any who have not signified their assent to the above stipulations.

4. The above engagement likewise ceases to be valid if a State that has not signed it takes part in a war between parties that have signed it.

5. Whenever the progress of science results in any new definite proposals being made for improving the equipment of the troops, the contracting parties, as well as those who have subsequently joined this engagement, will assemble to maintain the principles laid down to reconcile the requirements of war with the demands of humanity.'

A good deal might be said against the reasons alleged for this agreement. If the explosive material in the bullets be only meant to explode, not to burn, how can the wounds inflicted be more dangerous than lead and propelling force can make them? The treaty seems to be based upon mistaken ideas of the requirements of humanity. It is not in the battle, but in the camp, where death reaps his largest harvest: everything that shortens war tends to

the preservation of life. It may, by the way, eventually become of some political consequence, that of the States which may possibly be participants in a European war, Baden, Luxemburg, Roumania, Servia, Montenegro, and the United States have not joined.

COUNT BISMARCK ON COUNT BEUST AND THE CHANCES OF PEACE IN THE AUTUMN OF 1868.

Berlin, December 12, 1868.

We are indebted to Count Bismarck for an authentic utterance as to the chances of peace now and a few months ago. Adverting, in a special Committee of the Lower House, to the conduct of the ex-Elector of Cassel, who transferred his sovereign rights to this Government for a consideration, and wanted them back as soon as he saw a prospect of war, the Count expressed himself as follows:

'The Prussian Government have repeatedly warned the Elector not to continue exciting ill-will against them in the press and elsewhere, as he has latterly been in the habit of doing. The Elector not only turned a deaf ear to our remonstrances, but in his correspondence with this Government persisted in enacting the Sovereign of Hesse. The more probable war became, the more discourteous were his letters. I must here say there was a certain period in the autumn when peace appeared anything but secure. The misgivings expressed by the public at the time were not without foundation. Happily these apprehensions have since been removed by an event which, unexpected as it was, has yet exercised considerable influence upon the course of European affairs. Still the ex-Sovereign of Hesse does not cease his bitter enmity even now. A few months back, when he imagined Germany on the eve of a great international conflict, he published and presented to all European Governments, and the most influential editors, his protest against what he was pleased to call the usurpations of this dynasty. Now, when he can no longer hope for an immediate outbreak, he still causes himself to be represented in an anti-Prussian committee established at Vienna under the auspices of the ex-King of Hanover. This committee, which, among

other members, includes a Dane and a German Republican, who has paid the penalty of his political errors by imprisonment in a fortress, also comprehends a Hessian nobleman and late adjutant of the Elector. On these grounds it has become indispensable to sequester the fortunes of the ex-Sovereign; a measure which, I hope, will be approved by this Committee and the House. Perhaps I may be permitted to avail myself of this, the first opportunity that offers, to declare that Baron Usedom's note on the most desirable plan for the Italian campaign did not come to my knowledge during the war. It was sent after me to the camp, but lost on the way.'

The unexpected event alluded to in the above is the Spanish rebellion, the lulling influence of which upon the international relations of the Continent has been repeatedly mentioned in the course of this Correspondence. The serious nature of the collision from which Europe had such a narrow escape in September last will excuse my pointing to the speech of Count Bismarck as a confirmation of what I felt bound to report at the time concerning the doings of Austria and France in Bulgaria, Roumania, Galicia, and Hungary. However, that danger is past; and, as a prudent and even-tempered man, the Prussian Premier prefers holding out the right hand of friendship to harbouring revengeful feelings against those who but yesterday meditated no good towards him. His desire to be again on friendly terms with Austria, so apparent in the last passage of his speech, was likewise evinced in an interesting debate which occurred in the Lower House this week. The question at issue was, whether the Prussian Legation at Dresden should be kept up or abolished. On this head Herr Wölfel, a moderate Liberal, made some remarks, which, as they brought Count Bismarck to the front, deserve to be briefly summarised. Herr Wölfel said:

'In my opinion it will be indispensible to have a Prussian Minister at Dresden as long as Baron Beust—(*cries of* '*Count, Count!*') well, then, Count Beust—chooses to keep an Austrian representative there. You all are aware that the motive power in Count Beust's policy is a morbid hatred of this country and Government; a hatred which it seems he has

latterly been unable either to control or to conceal. Revenge is his sole object. Under his auspices the ex-Sovereigns of Hanover and Hesse are notoriously urging the Emperor of the French to go to war with us. One of the means employed for his malicious purpose is the maintaining a Legation at Dresden. I will not deny that the Saxon Government have thus far been faithful to the obligations they owe to the North German Confederacy; but does this alter the fact that there are certain elements to be found in Saxony which, however impotent to do mischief if left unassisted, may, by foreign agency, be turned to account for hostile demonstrations and the like? If we look at all Count Beust has done during the two years he has held office at Vienna, we cannot but arrive at the conviction, that even the mask of Liberalism he has lately chosen to assume—a mask so transparent that it is seen through by all except his interested satellites—is mainly destined to make him appear, in the eyes of the uninitiated, a more worthy chieftain of Germany than Count Bismarck. Well, we are certainly not satisfied with each and every act of our Government, but to believe in the Liberal opinions of Count Beust would be contrary to common sense. Were Count Bismarck to turn Liberal to-day—which I neither hope nor fear—Count Beust would, I believe, see his advantage in becoming an Absolutist, and accordingly become so on the spot.' (*Laughter.*)

To this Count Bismarck, after several other speakers had had their say, made a characteristic reply:

'It is absolutely impossible for me to defend a foreign Minister without dilating on the policy of the State he serves; a task I do not feel called upon to perform at this moment with regard to the Chancellor of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Still, I may observe that I am ignorant of the existence of personal hostility to myself or this Government in—if I may call him so—my Austrian colleague. In former years I was on a friendly footing with him, and have no reason to suppose that a change has occurred. I should therefore deem myself bound to vindicate his conduct against what has fallen from a preceding speaker, had I not reasons for wishing to steer clear of the quicksands of international policy in to-day's debate. As to Austria's Liberalism, it consists in an army of 800,000 demanded and voted for a period of ten years, and some municipal arrangements introduced into Prussia fifty years ago. Even these Count Beust has taken care to render innocuous by a vigorous supervision on the part of the administrative authorities. *Au reste*, there is this similarity between Liberal Governments and the reigning beauties of the season, that the last out generally carries the day.'

The closing joke was not without its effect, the House immediately after voting almost unanimously the salary

of the Dresden Minister. As to his observations on Count Beust, Count Bismarck was evidently desirous to evince due courtesy to his 'colleague,' without, however, extending his approval to the slippery field of politics. Only two years ago he declined to enter upon peace negotiations with Saxony until Count Beust had been dismissed from office. However, bygones are bygones, and it is as well they should be so. To give Austria another proof of the friendly relations he is willing to cultivate, Count Bismarck has just offered to supply the Empire with salt from the inexhaustible mines in the possession of this Government, charging only cost price. The offer has been declined, on the ground that the available quantity is large enough to supply the Empire till it can be ascertained what the damage done in the flooded shafts and galleries of Wieliczka really is.

THE CRETAN QUESTION.

Berlin, December 16, 1868.

THE facts related in the following lines will throw light on the chaos of Oriental telegrams. On the 10th inst. the Turkish Minister at Athens, Photiades Bey, delivered an ultimatum to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, containing these demands: 1. That the existing bands of volunteers be broken up, and the formation of new ones be prohibited. 2. That the Cretan fugitives be permitted to return home, and protected, if necessary, against the coercion of the Greek Committees, who hinder their return. 3. That those who have hitherto prevented the Cretan fugitives from returning home, using force against them as well as against the Turkish officers commissioned to superintend their reëmbarkation, be punished

and that the families of those murdered on these occasions be indemnified. 4. That the Greek harbours be closed to the blockade runners, and that the ships be disarmed before leaving port. 5. That Greece engage to pursue a policy in conformity with the law of nations and special treaties.

In laying these terms before the Greek Cabinet, the Turkish Minister declared that, unless they were accepted before the expiration of five days, he would leave the country, when the Greek Minister at Constantinople would be likewise requested to take his departure. Matters having reached this climax, the Powers interfered with a view to insure the maintenance of peace. England and France, acting, it seems, more or less conjointly, represented to Greece that the Turkish ultimatum was but the natural consequence of the unjustifiable conduct pursued by her with regard to Crete for the last two years. To yield, therefore, would only be to make *amende honorable* for past offences. When Greece replied, that some of the demands preferred might be acceptable, while others were not, England and France endeavoured to obtain a modification of the ultimatum from Turkey, but likewise failed.

The efforts of the Western Powers were supported by Prussia. Though holding back at first, Prussia soon relinquished neutrality, and cordially seconded England and France both at Athens and Constantinople. A slightly different course was adopted by Austria and Russia. The former advised Greece to give in, counselling the Porte at the same time not to abate its demands; the latter likewise desired Greece to strain a point and eat humble pie, but would not condescend to enter into any lengthy negotiations upon the subject with Turkey. Owing to these efforts making in the two antagonistic capitals, Greece at last consented to break up the bands, permit the refugees to return, and prohibit the officers and *employés* of the Government from having anything to do with the insur-

rection. This counter-proposal Turkey looked upon as insufficient, and the interval mentioned in her ultimatum having expired, her representative at Athens, on the evening of Monday the 14th, left the town, but afterwards returned. At the same time the Greek Minister at Constantinople was provided with his passports. A rupture in diplomatic relations may, then, be regarded as having actually occurred.

Even before it arose the English and French Ambassadors at Vienna were instructed by their respective Governments to point out to Count Beust the danger of taking up matters so warmly, as had been latterly done by his representative at Constantinople. It is probable this remonstrance was administered in consequence of complaints made by this Government. From the very beginning of the complication it had been noticed with feelings of dismay in this capital, that the papers at the disposal of the Austrian Government in Vienna and Paris had painted the situation in the darkest colours, and described a conflict as probable. The misgivings inspired by these tactics were not allayed by the semi-official Vienna correspondent of the *Allgemeine Zeitung* charging England with fanning the flames, and claiming for the Government he represents the credit of endeavouring to quench them. Prussia eventually complained of this conduct, which she did not think conducive to the preservation of peace, and respecting which yesterday's *Kreuz Zeitung* contains a sharp *communiqué* dilating upon the alleged contradictoriness and equivocation of Austrian politics. In conclusion, I may observe that the Constantinople *Turquie*, a paper constantly quoted in sensational telegrams, is not a semi-official organ properly speaking, but a journal in the hands of French diplomates and Polish refugees, coöperating with the *Correspondance du Nord-Est* at Paris, *Der Osten* at Vienna, *Czas* at Cracow, &c.

In reply to certain Russian proposals, the Pope has

declared his willingness to admonish the priesthood in Poland to acknowledge the existing Government, and serve it loyally, obediently, and unconditionally, provided the direction of the Catholic Church in that country is restored to the Bishops and Holy See. The negotiations which have led to this signal concession are being conducted by M. Valuyeff, the late Russian Minister of Internal Affairs, who has been staying at Rome the last few we ' . To what extent Russia will concede the condition with which the Papal proposal is clogged remains to be seen; but the proposal in itself looks very much like an indication that the hope of ever witnessing the resurrection of Poland is at last abandoned by the Vatican.

THE EAST ONCE MORE TAKEN IN HAND. '

Berlin, December 23, 1868.

A FEW weeks ago, before the Greek controversy had assumed a serious aspect, France gave Russia to understand that she would not oppose the formation of some new independent or semi-independent States on the Balkan peninsula. France, it was added, would be prepared to arrange the affair in concert with Russia, with whom she had no wish to embroil herself. Simultaneously with this proposal, and as an earnest of the promises involved in it, the Polish refugees in France were informed that the pecuniary assistance accorded them for so many years by a hospitable Government would most probably be withdrawn on the 1st of January. What answer has been returned by Russia to these suggestions we know not. The supposition derived from contingent circumstances is, that no

definite reply has been vouchsafed, but a general opinion expressed, postponing a decision in so grave a matter as long as possible.

As may be seen from the proposal made, France is looking forward to a conflict in the East, which will enable her to realise her plans. Should Russia determine to accept the French overtures, the conflict would be confined to Greece and Turkey. In the event, however, of Russia's regarding the proffered hand as insincere, and declining to grasp it, a rupture between the two Powers and their respective friends is no longer impossible. In either case Turkey runs the risk of having to pay the piper.

A presentiment of such a result seems to have been felt at an early hour at Constantinople. Before following the advice of Austria and France, and adopting severe measures against Greece, the Porte asked for some guarantee that it should not be left in the lurch. Herr von Prokesch, the Austrian Internuncio, allayed these apprehensions somehow or other. About this interesting episode the Constantinople correspondent of the *Moscow Gazette*, a gentleman connected with the Russian Embassy in that capital, has a few vehement remarks to offer:

'We do not know what are the guarantees submitted to the Turkish Cabinet by Herr von Prokesch; but we have good reasons for believing that the Divan has become the victim of a rather glaring deception. Should the Divan be really so blind as to allow itself to be drawn into military action against Greece, the first shot on Hellenic soil would become the signal for a general conflagration in the East, in which our Slavonic co-nationalists and co-religionists would be sure to play an important part. The Oriental question would explode like a powder-magazine, and destroy those whose unprecedented infatuation is now applying the match to the combustibles. Up to this time Russia has avoided everything which might occasion so terrible an event. But if provoked, we shall show our mettle, and avail ourselves of the advantages which, in this particular matter, we have over our antagonists.'

I doubt whether people at St. Petersburg have already made up their minds to view the coming entanglement as enthusiastically as these words would seem to imply.

There appears to be a possibility of Russia making her peace with France even before going to war with her. But in whatever way Russia may decide, the thing, it is thought here, is not without peril to this Government. If the Czar agrees with France, he will have no inducement to cover the rear of Prussia, should the latter become the object of a French-Austrian attack. Only while he competes with Austria and France in the East can the Czar have any very urgent interest in supporting Prussia against these Powers. On the other hand, if he deem it inexpedient to settle with France, he may, were he deserted by Prussia, be defeated either in the field of battle or diplomacy, and thus be rendered unable or unwilling to succour this Government in that hour of need likely to arrive before long. Such being the line of argument adopted in this capital, Prussia has determined upon a step calculated to show that she esteems it necessary to prepare for any emergency. Besides proving the resolution with which she faces the future, the step taken is so cleverly devised, that in case the Czar sides with France, and, as is expected, stipulates for a time of grace for Prussia, it will strengthen her against future danger; while in the opposite alternative, if war ensue, and she be entangled, it will afford her a more national and popular reason for taking up arms than the succouring Russia would be. Prussia has laid before the council of the North German Confederacy a proposal from the Baden Government, to the effect that Baden subjects residing in Northern Germany be allowed to serve in the North German army, the corresponding privilege being accorded to Northerners residing in Baden. Considering the intimate relations existing between Berlin and Carlsruhe, it is evident that such a proposal would not have been made unless Grand Duke Frederick had been assured of its willing acceptance by his royal father-in-law. This, then, is the first step towards crossing the Main. After the conclusion of such

a treaty as is now proposed by Baden, the latter State may still be separated from the Confederacy in matters of domestic import; in all that concerns foreign politics, or, in other words, is of any consequence to foreign Governments, Baden will be practically embodied with the Confederacy, if once her subjects fight in the Federal army, and Federal subjects are placed in the Baden rank and file.

Should the Eastern question be farther developed in either of the ways described above, the Baden proposal will be no doubt passed by the Council representing the Princes of the Confederacy, as well as by the Parliament, the exponent of its people. France and Austria, having in the last two years repeatedly given this Government to understand that they will make the extension of the Confederacy to the South a *casus belli*, will then be either compelled to fight Prussia on the question of German unity, not of Oriental resuscitation, or will have to permit her to gather strength by identifying herself more and more completely with the cause and the name of the nation at large. In a war for a Russian alliance the Bavarian and Würtemberg dynasties might have made the attempt to dissever themselves from the Federal colours; in a struggle for German unity they cannot dare to venture on such a game, unless prepared to stake their all. Three days ago, even in the Würtemberg Parliament, which includes a strong Republican party, the representatives of secessionist views failed to carry an address which should inform the King of their anti-Prussian leanings. The debate lasted three days; but, on the Cabinet declaring that to desert Prussia would be tantamount to upsetting the throne, terminated in the House rejecting the proposed address by a majority of 49 to 38.

Prussia having thus seen fit to prepare an act of the greatest international consequence, it is superfluous to add that she regards the situation in no very sanguine mood.

Right or wrong, she fancies that the Oriental complication has been got up with an eye to German rather than to Eastern affairs, and that the Greek question is only a continuation of the Roumanio-Bulgarian troubles, which occupied the summer, and concerning the ultimate objects of which Count Bismarck the other day volunteered such startling revelations. The *Cologne Gazette* only reflects public opinion when it says:

'What occurred in Roumania, and at first was so mysterious, is now perfectly comprehensible. Through Turkey England was to be alienated from Prussia, and the way paved for a Congress in which the enemies of Prussia were expected to preponderate. This preliminary achieved, Prussia was to be required to give a guarantee that she would never cross the Main; after which the Schleswig and disarmament questions were to be brought forward. Such were the designs rife among the war parties at Vienna and Paris, for which they hoped to secure the approval of England. By Prussia's pacific bearing in all that regards the East, their policy was foiled at the time.'

But now, it is asserted, it has been revived in another quarter. To make the misgivings of Prussian politicians even more irrepressible, the news from Italy is getting more unpleasant every day. Not many weeks ago you were informed that France had asked the Pope for concessions to Italy, on the plea that in the event of a Prussian war she might be incapacitated from protecting him from his adversaries. The Pope declined the request; and, what was even more unexpected, Italy, whom France applied to next, likewise refused to give any promise as to what would be her conduct in the eventuality mentioned. In consequence of this double rebuff, the Marquis de Bonneville, the French Minister at Rome, has asked and obtained permission of the Pope for a considerable increase of the *corps d'occupation*, as soon as it should seem advisable to Napoleon III. The Marquis de Bonneville is making no secret of the destination of these troops, which are intended to keep Italy in check, should a collision in a more important quarter ensue.

The official Warsaw *Dziennik* states that a large number of Austrian officers, and among them Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Wagner, with his adjutants Milosiewicz, Milenkowicz, and Iovanowicz, are surveying Bosnia for strategical purposes.

THE CRETAN QUESTION.

Berlin, December 26, 1868.

At a moment when telegrams are flying to and fro between the various capitals, and the situation may be hourly assuming a new aspect, it would be venturesome to say what the latest incident really is. With greater confidence we can advert to the events of the last few days. The idea of a Cretan Conference was first mooted by France's suggesting a meeting of the Powers engaged to protect Greece. In reply to this proposal, Russia, seconded by Prussia, moved for extending the Conference to the whole conclave of States that signed the Paris treaty of peace in 1856. At about the same time England addressed some Powers, advising that the two intending belligerents should be made to abstain from hostilities for a period of three weeks, lest the Conference be interrupted by the din of war. Improving upon this, Russia recommended the extension of the truce to the whole duration of the Conference. England, France, and Prussia had no objection to the proposition; but the first, and, I believe, in a less definite way, the second also, asked that the programme of the meeting should be clearly laid down beforehand. The Porte was quite content it should be, on condition that the ultimatum addressed by it to Greece were adopted in lieu of programme. Up to

yesterday no final agreement had been arrived at. In the mean time, as you are aware, the day for the departure of the Greek subjects residing in Turkey has been put off.

According to Berlin politicians, the question of war and peace mainly lies between Russia and France. If the Power so long engaged in the demonstrative protection of the Rayah, and the other Power who glories in the strength of her foreign influence, are determined to preserve peace, they may secure their object by simply forbidding war. Austria is not in a position to act alone; Prussia has no interest in acting at all. If, therefore, Russia and France cannot agree upon this simple solution of the difficulty, or agree upon it in a way calculated to produce political changes in an important quarter of the world, ulterior consequences are likely to ensue. The Russian papers begin to have an inkling of this. The St. Petersburg *Golos*, sometimes inspired by the Minister of Education, advises the Government it serves to cut the Gordian knot of Eastern difficulties by settling with France about a regeneration of the struggling nationalities of the debatable peninsula. The paper admits:

'War would just now be very inconvenient to Russia. Her Southern railway is not yet finished; her fleet is frozen up at Cronstadt; her army but very insufficiently supplied with the needle-gun. A compromise with the only Power to be feared, therefore, would be the most natural thing in the world. Attempts should be made in this direction, and earnestly continued, even if not immediately successful. Should they fail in the end, war would be inevitable. But even then there is good reason for anticipating that, come what might, the hopes entertained by Austria would be disappointed.'

A circular note of M. de Lavalette, the new French Minister of Foreign Affairs, will, it is expected, be shortly addressed to the principal Courts to announce an era of peace and goodwill to Germany. I am afraid the suspicions so prevalent in this capital for the last two years, and so strongly roused by recent events, will prevent the circular

from being appreciated, unless accompanied by a clearing up of the Eastern sky.

The *Courrier d'Athènes* relates that Mr. Julius Bing, late colonel in the American army, has been appointed by the 'Cretan Provisional Government' their representative at Washington, and received as such by Mr. Seward.

A large order for the 9-inch cannon which performed such extraordinary feats at Tegel has been given Mr. Krupp by the Prussian Government. The bill is expected to amount to 4,000,000 thalers, each barrel costing about 30,000 thalers. The same gun has just been adopted by the Belgian Government, to be placed on the walls of Antwerp. According to official intelligence received here, experiments made with the 9-inch cannon in Belgium resulted in the Bellerophon target being totally destroyed after eight rounds, the Warrior target having endured but seven.

END OF VOLUME I.

LONDON:
ROBSON AND SONS, PRINTERS, PANCRAS ROAD, N.W.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 18 July, 2018